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## JUAN DE RENA AND THE FINANCING OF THE TUNIS CAMPAIGN: THE VIEW FROM BARCELONA'S DOCKYARDS

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**ABSTRACT:** *The struggle between Charles V and the Ottoman empire for control of the central Mediterranean spanned the whole of the emperor's reign and continued for much of the sixteenth century. It would come to an end with the final campaigns of the Ottoman fleet under the command of Cigalazade towards the end of that century. From 1529, when Süleyman first attempted to conquer Vienna, until 1541 when the imperial forces failed to take Algiers, the two great rulers based at opposite ends of the Mediterranean organised a series of campaigns against the other, relying for the most part on their maritime forces. During the 1530s in particular it is possible to detect a major shift in the emperor's strategic direction which would have important repercussions on the development of the Monarchy's principal Mediterranean ports, especially Barcelona and Malaga. This article illustrates and assesses the significant contribution of the city of Barcelona and its dockyards to the imperial campaign launched in support of the Hafsid sultan's attempt to recover the city of Tunis, which had been conquered in 1534 by the Ottoman fleet under the command of Hayreddin Barbarossa. It relies principally on the little-known manuscripts of Juan de Rena now housed in the Archivo General de Navarra, supplemented where possible with material relating to the costs of the expedition from the Archivo General de Simancas.*

**KEYWORDS:** *Barbarossa, galleys, Mediterranean warfare, shipbuilding.*

JUAN DE RENA E IL FINANZIAMENTO DELLA CAMPAGNA DI TUNISI DAI CANTIERI NAVALI DI BARCELLONA

**SOMMARIO:** *Lo scontro che contrappose Carlo V all'Impero Ottomano per il controllo del Mediterraneo centrale, oltre a marcare l'agenda politica dell'Asburgo per l'intera durata del suo regno, caratterizzò tutto il lungo Cinquecento. Di fatti, questo conflitto si affievolì solamente negli ultimi decenni del XVI secolo, quando si registrarono le ultime incursioni della flotta ottomana posta sotto il comando di Cigalazade nel Mediterraneo occidentale. Dal 1529, quando Solimano il Magnifico tentò per la prima volta di conquistare Vienna, fino al 1541, quando la flotta imperiale fallì nel tentativo di conquistare Algeri, Osmanli e Asburgo promossero una serie di campagne navali ai danni del rivale contando principalmente sulle proprie forze navali. In modo particolare, durante gli anni '30 del XVI secolo, è possibile rilevare un importante cambiamento nella strategia politico-militare adottata da Carlo V, che avrebbe avuto un impatto importante sullo sviluppo dei principali porti mediterranei della Monarchia spagnola, tra cui Barcellona e Malaga. In questo articolo si valuta proprio il contributo significativo della città di Barcellona e dei suoi arsenali alla campagna imperiale lanciata a sostegno di Muley Hassan, il sultano Hafside impegnato nel tentativo di recuperare la città di Tunisi dopo che, nel 1534, fu conquistata da Hayreddin Barbarossa, comandante della flotta ottomana. Tale indagine si basa principalmente su una serie di manoscritti di Juan de Rena ancora poco conosciuti e conservati presso l'Archivo General de Navarra, a cui si integra, ove possibile, il ricco materiale relativo ai costi della spedizione che si trova nell'Archivo General de Simancas.*

**PAROLE CHIAVI:** *Barbarossa, galere, Guerra mediterranea, costruzione navale.*

\* Abbreviations: Argn, Ap Rena (Archivo Real y General de Navarra [Pamplona], Archivo Privado Rena); Ags, E (Archivo General de Simancas, Estado). Acknowledgements: This research was funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science (Project PGC2018-099152-B-I00).

The Tunis campaign is well known due to the numerous chronicles, many of which are readily available, as well as through the famous paintings and tapestries which were commissioned to celebrate the great victories of Charles V in the Gulf of Carthage<sup>1</sup>, after which he was greeted in Italy as a triumphant emperor<sup>2</sup>. This should not hinder us from appreciating that the emperor's decision to go to North Africa in person remains curious and surprising. The imperial secretary, Antoine Perrenin, in what can be considered an official chronicle of the campaign, explained it thus:

Having seen and pondered with great sorrow the great damage, cruelty and tyranny which this Infidel and enemy, Barbarossa, also named Hayreddin Pasha, had inflicted on Christendom, and especially along the frontiers and ports of the kingdoms and maritime lands of His Majesty, where he had captured many Christians – men, women and children – taking them in chains as slaves and captives. [And having learnt that] the said Barbarossa had been named Captain General of the Ottoman fleet and had left Istanbul heading for the kingdom of Barbary with nearly three hundred sail, including galleys, foists and brigantines as well as other sailing ships, all well manned and provided with artillery and munitions, [and that] he had taken the fortress of the port of La Goletta in Tunis, as well as the city [of Tunis] and the ports of Bona and Bizerte which are on the border of the said kingdom of Barbary and near the kingdoms and maritime lands belonging to the emperor, in particular the islands of Sicily, Sardinia, Mallorca and Menorca...<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> S. Haag, K. Schmitz-Von Ledebur, *Kaiser Karl V. erobert Tunis Dokumentation eines Kriegszuges in Kartons und Tapissereien*, Kunsthistorisches Museum, Wien, 2003; H.J. Horn, *Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen, painter of Charles V and his conquest of Tunis, Paintings, Etchings, Drawings, Cartoons and Tapestries*, Davaco, Doornspijk, 1989. The campaign became one of the most important for the Habsburg dynasty, and the Vermeyen tapestries were used in public events more often than any others. The two candidates for the throne of Spain during the War of Succession both commissioned copies of the series. M. Falomir Faus, M.Á. Bunes Ibarra, *Carlos V, Vermeyen y la conquista de Túnez*, in J.L. Castellanos, F. Sánchez-Montes (eds.), *Carlos V. Europeísmo y Universalidad. Religión, cultura y mentalidad*, Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, Madrid, 2001, t. V, pp. 243-257.

<sup>2</sup> A. Chastel, *Les entrées de Charles Quint en Italie*, in J. Jacquot (ed.), *Les Fêtes de la Renaissance. II. Fêtes et cérémonies au temps de Charles V*, CNRS, Paris, 1975; M.A. Visceglia, *Il viaggio cerimoniale di Carlo V dopo Tunisi*, in J. Martínez Millán (ed.), *Carlos V y la quiebra del humanismo política en Europa (1530-1558)*, Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, Madrid, 2001, vol. II, pp. 101-108. It is very difficult at present to provide a synthesis of the different entries because of the sheer volume of publications relating to them in the last few years.

<sup>3</sup> A. Perrenin, *Goleta de la ciudad de Túnez, 1535. Jornada de Túnez*, in R. González Cuerva, M.A. Bunes Ibarra (eds.), *Túnez 1535: Voces de una campaña europea*, CSIC, Madrid, 2017, p. 59: «Viendo y considerando con gran pesar los grandes males y crueldades y tiranías que el infiel y enemigo Barbarroja, nombrado Carinbasa, había hecho en la Cristiandad, mayormente en las fronteras y puertos de los Reinos y tierras marítimas de Su Majestad, habiendo prendido muchos cristianos, hombres y mujeres

However, the rapid reaction of Charles V on hearing that Barbarossa and the Ottoman forces had sacked much of the coast of Naples in 1534 and gone on to conquer Tunis, suggests that he may have already decided to take the initiative in the conflict against the Ottoman empire. What he particularly feared in 1534 was that the Ottoman squadron would attack the Mediterranean coast of Spain, and to counter this he ordered wide-ranging defensive measures to be implemented, as spies based in Venice reported<sup>4</sup>. The emperor wanted to take the initiative to halt the expansion of the Ottoman empire now that Barbarossa had destroyed the *statu quo* that had existed between the two great Mediterranean empires in the Maghreb. Some years earlier, Charles V had signed an alliance with Venice<sup>5</sup>, which resulted in the conquest of Corón in the southern Peloponnese in 1532<sup>6</sup>. For tactical reasons, the emperor had in effect compartmentalised the Osmanli threat, creating two distinct fronts: one maritime, the other on land. He handed over responsibility for the defence of the German lands to his brother, Ferdinand I, and assumed full responsibility for the Mediterranean front<sup>7</sup>. The proximity of the Tunisian Hafsids to the Maghrebian states controlled by the successors of the Barbarossa brothers had already prompted the emperor to offer protection to various members of the Hafsids after 1530. He

y niños y llevados detenidos esclavos y cautivos. Teniendo el dicho Barbarroja la armada del mar del Turco, de que él era Capitán General, con la cual con cerca de trescientas velas, así galeras, fustas y bergantines, como otros navios de mar bien proveidos de gente de mar, artillerías y municiones, se había partido de Constantinopla y venido al Reino de Berbería. Y había tomado la fortaleza del puerto de La Goleta de Túnez, y asimismo la ciudad y los puertos de África, de Bona y de Bizerta, fronteras del dicho Reino de Berbería cercanos de los dichos Reinos y tierras marítimas del Emperador, mayormente de las islas de Sicilia, Cerdeña, Mallorca y Menorca».

<sup>4</sup> The measures taken to defend Valencia have been studied by J.F. Pardo Molero, *La defensa del imperio. Carlos V, Valencia y el Mediterráneo*, Sociedad Estatal para la conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, Madrid, 2001, pp. 289-306.

<sup>5</sup> «Antes de que recibiera la de v. majestad: yo havia entendido con esta Republica havia recibido cartas de sus embaxadores por los quales avisaban de lo que V. Majestad me escribe y sobre ello tovieron su consejo con los procuradores y el Príncipe y otros particulares personas principales y con el parecer del dicho Príncipe y de todos fue concluydo de entrar en la Liga y contribuye en ella de la manera que dire». Ags, E, 1366, n. 153, Gómez de Figueroa to Francisco de los Cobos, Genoa, February 1533. The ambassador is referring to the discussions relating to the creation of a League or alliance to mount an attack against Algiers, the chief corsair base in the region, where the Barbarossa had settled from the early sixteenth century. M.Á. Bunes Ibarra, *Los Barbarroja. Corsarios del Mediterráneo*, Aldebarán, Madrid, 2004.

<sup>6</sup> G. Varriale, *Nápoles y el azar de Corón (1532-1534)*, «Tiempos Modernos», 22 (2011), pp. 1-32.

<sup>7</sup> Ö. Kumrular, *El duelo entre Carlos V y Solimán el Magnífico (1520-1535)*, ISIS, Estambul, 2005.

also agreed to give financial subsidies to the tribal leaders of lands surrounding the Spanish *presidios* (the fortified outposts they had established in the region) so as to ensure their continued support for these settlements. For example, he paid an annual pension of 500,000 *maravedies* to the tribal leader they called the Infante of Bugía (Béjaïa, Algeria)<sup>8</sup> to reinforce the security of the small garrison stationed in that city under the command of Perafán de Ribera<sup>9</sup>. In fact, even before the 1530s the emperor had forged intimate contacts with the Hafsid dynasty, as evinced by the fact that a Hafsid princess who had converted to Christianity was given a dowry by the empress so that she could enter a convent in Barcelona. Even more telling - and a clear sign of respect for the longstanding relations between them, of course - was the fact that Charles V went to Tunis in person to restore Mulay Hassan to power over his dominions, rather than to conquer the region and take it for himself<sup>10</sup>.

It is universally accepted that Charles V decided to mount the Tunis campaign so as to prove to his contemporaries that he was capable of personally commanding military forces, and to establish himself as the defender of Christendom<sup>11</sup>. What has not been studied or appreciated is that financially, the expedition was quite out of the ordinary, and that the campaign had a significant impact not only on the internal financial structures of the emperor's lands, but also on his foreign policy<sup>12</sup>. Quite simply, it was on a different scale from anything he had done to date. It is true that even before this, imperial campaigns had placed a great economic burden on his subjects, especially in Castile and the Low Countries; but he had never organised a campaign that

<sup>8</sup> Ags, 462, s. f., Charles V to the Council of the Finances, 14 February 1535. Summaries from some of these documents were included in É. De La Primaudaie, *Documents inédits sur l'occupation espagnole en Afrique (1506-1594)*, A. Jourdan, Alger, 1875, passim.

<sup>9</sup> R. Gutiérrez Cruz, *Los presidios españoles del norte de África en tiempos de los Reyes Católicos*, Consejería de Cultura, Melilla, 1997.

<sup>10</sup> S. Boubaker, *L'empereur Charles Quint et le roi Mawlay al-Hasan (1520-1535)*, in S. Boubaker, C. Ilham Álvarez Dopico (eds.), *Empreintes espagnoles dans l'histoire tunisienne*, Trea, Gijón, 2011, pp. 13-82.

<sup>11</sup> M.J. Rodríguez Salgado, *¿Carolus Africanus?: el Emperador y el turco*, in J. Martínez Millán (ed.), *Carlos V y la quiebra del humanismo político en Europa (1530-1558)*, Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, Madrid, vol. I, pp. 487-531.

<sup>12</sup> This aspect emerges clearly from the imperial negotiations for a closer alliance with Genoa: "... porque demás de ser la puerta de Italia tienen fuerças por la mar y aparejos para ellas más que en otra parte y dineros que aunque cuestan caros se hallan lo de aquí consiste todo en el príncipe mayormente que el que agora es duque y el son una...". Ags, E, 1366, n. 154, Gómez de Figueroa to Francisco de los Cobos, Genoa, March 1533.

combined a huge fleet with a powerful, sophisticated land force and this proved to be much more expensive. The military and naval forces were levied not only from the emperor's vast, scattered territories, but also from allied lands, ranging from the sailors of Malaga to the German and Swiss landsknechts. To achieve his aim of defeating Barbarossa, Charles V seized the treasures that had come from the conquest of Peru and not just what belonged to the crown. He also confiscated the money and goods belonging to others, whether merchants, religious institutions or private individuals. These funds enabled Charles V to avoid calling the Cortes and demanding another extraordinary subsidy from Castile to pay for the war. However, this does not mean that Castile was spared financially. The campaign has been generally considered as the beginning of a long-term and highly damaging process that led to massive exports of specie and precious metals from Castilian lands<sup>13</sup>.

Be that as it may, the campaign was unquestionably one of the most expensive foreign wars of the whole of the sixteenth century. Yet, unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to calculate the economic impact of this expedition because so much documentation has been lost, and what remains is dispersed and fragmentary. The very extent and complexity of the organisation required to put the campaign together makes it impossible to agree even on the number of people who took part in the conquest of La Goletta. The imperial forces had to be moved from their diverse places of origin to a single meeting point; something that could only be done piecemeal and over a considerable period of time. New contingents continued to join the expedition as late as the siege of La Goletta, as Charles V noted in a letter to the viceroy of Navarre<sup>14</sup>. From the west came contingents from the Netherlands and Portugal, and the soldiers and artillery of Malaga. The Iberian fleet was gradually assembled in the port of Barcelona. All ships still in Iberian waters were ordered to sail to the Sardinian port of Cagliari where they were joined by the Neapolitan and Sicilian galleys and other vessels under the command of the marquis del Vasto carrying soldiers from Lombardy, Naples, Sicily as well as German

<sup>13</sup> «Una gran parte de gasto se cubriría fuera de España. Aquí quedaría el dinero que costara lo que en casa se hiciera en las faenas de los astilleros, catalanes, murcianos y andaluces, donde se aprestaban las naves, y en la requisa de las embarcaciones fletadas con el mismo destino, y las obligaciones inherentes a la dotación de soldados y de marineros y la provisión de equipos, vituallas, artillería y todos los imprescindibles pertrechos». R. Carande, *Carlos V y sus banqueros*, Crítica, Barcelona, 1977, vol. II, pp. 104-105.

<sup>14</sup> Argñ, Ap Rena, 76, n. 14, Charles V to the Viceroy of Navarre, count of Cañete, La Goleta, 30 June 1535.

landsknechts<sup>15</sup>. From the outset, chroniclers and observers realised that the war was extremely costly, particularly as news that the Ottoman fleet under Barbarossa had arrived in Christian lands had already forced the emperor to organise extensive -and expensive - defensive measures throughout the Mediterranean coastal areas. The chronicler Sandoval wrote:

The emperor ordered provisions to be sent and fortifications in the principal ports of Naples and Sicily to be reinforced, which was very costly, but he knew that galleys are like lightning: they may be visible and may even be heard, but it is impossible to predict where they will strike until the harm is done. Once he saw that the enemy had seized the whole of the kingdom of Tunis and forced Mulay Hassan to flee, he was determined to do everything in his power to remove Barbarossa from there. To achieve this, he sent his couriers to the pope, and ordered Andrea Doria, the viceroys of Naples, Sicily and Sardinia, the marquis del Vasto, Antonio de Leyva and others to amass as many troops and ships as they could, and to provide them with all the necessary armaments, munitions and victuals for the campaign but to do this secretly. He raised large sums of money, and ordered don Luis Hurtado de Mendoza, the marquis of Mondéjar, Captain-General of the kingdom of Granada, to levy men and prepare victuals in Andalucía and its ports. Finally, to make sure he had everything necessary to carry out successfully an expedition of such magnitude, he levied eight thousand Germans. He summoned the veteran soldiers from Coron and Naples, who numbered up to four thousand men and levied eight to ten thousand Spaniards in the Spanish kingdoms who were joined by the majority of the nobility from those realms. In Italy some eight thousand Italians were levied. The emperor gathered this vast war machine with all possible secrecy<sup>16</sup>.

<sup>15</sup> A very interesting account written by a German soldier who was recruited for the campaign has been recently published by Rubén González Cuerva, giving us a different viewpoint of the event: N. Guldin, *Relato de la jornada del emperador Carlos V a Túnez*, in R. González Cuerva and M.A. Bunes Ibarra (eds.), *Túnez 1535 cit.*, pp. 109-134. Niklaus Guldin was a lowly infantryman, who seemed primarily concerned to secure the salary he had been promised and get a share of the booty taken during the brutal sack of Tunis, although he claims that they got relatively little out of it. The figures he gives for the fleet and soldiers are somewhat inflated: «Todos los barcos juntos han sido 300 – así naos como galeón, galeras, mediagaleras, fustas –, la gente de guerra junto con la gente de mar han sido 100.000». *Ivi*, p. 119.

<sup>16</sup> P. de Sandoval, *Historia de la vida y hechos del emperador Carlos V. Rey Catholico de España y de las Indias*, Bartholome Paris, Pamplona, 1634, book XXII: «Hizo, pues, el Emperador bastecer y fortificar los lugares más importantes de Nápoles y Sicilia, que costaron hartos dineros, conociendo que las galeras son como rayos, que si bien se ven y oyen, no se sabe dónde van a dar hasta que han herido. Mas después que vió cómo el enemigo se había apoderado de todo punto del reino de Túnez, echando de él Muley Hacem, puso todo su pensamiento en echarle de allí. Para lo cual envió sus correos al Papa; escribió, mandando guardar secreto a Andrea Doria y a los virreyes de Nápoles, Sicilia y Cerdeña, y al marqués del Vasto, y a Antonio de Leyva y otros para que se

Other authors avoid giving any estimates of the different contingents that participated in this event. There are also notable differences in the figures given by those who took part, especially by the protagonists of the siege of La Goleta on the one hand, and on the other hand, authors who based their figures on on narratives written in the months immediately after the summer of 1535, or on secondary accounts<sup>17</sup>.

Evidently, the Tunis campaign was unique in many ways besides the excessive cost for the emperor's lands. He managed to put together one of the most diverse, combined military and naval expeditions of the whole of the sixteenth century.

According to the chronicle of López de Gómara, the marquis del Vasto arrived with five thousand Italians and eight thousand Germans, not counting the cavalry under Maximilian Herberstein. He embarked these forces

in the thirty-eight ships he had fitted out in Portovenere ... Thus, when the emperor reviewed the list of troops in Cagliari he reckoned that with these and the Spanish soldiers, he had 25,000 men. In addition to these, he had 2,000 cavalry, 800 of them fully armed, and light cavalry, so-called because their armour consisted only of a coat of mail. The total number of vessels, counting both large and the small ones, came to 700. There were about 70 Flemish hulks, 40 galleons, 100 round ships, 25 Portuguese caravels and some from Andalucía. The rest were made up of vessels such as *tafurcas*, *escorpachines*

juntasen cuanta gente y navios pudiesen, aprestándolos con todas las armas, municiones y vituallas necesarias para tal empresa. Recogió gran suma de dineros, mandó que don Luis Hurtado de Mendoza, marqués de Mondéjar, capitán general del reino de Granada, recogiese gente y bastimentos y los aprestase en la Andalucía y puertos de ella, y finalmente, todo lo que era necesario para una determinación de tanta importancia. Mandó levantar ocho mil alemanes. Juntáronse los soldados viejos de Corón y de Nápoles, que serían hasta cuatro mil. En España se levantaron de ocho a diez mil españoles, con gran parte de la nobleza de estos reinos. En Italia se hicieron otros ocho mil italianos. Todo este aparato de guerra hizo el Emperador con el secreto posible».

<sup>17</sup> This is certainly the case for Francisco López de Gómara, a direct witness who wrote: «Mandó el Emperador hacer alarde de los caballos que había en su corte para embarcar, que los demás y de los soldados ya tenía nómina, y hubo hasta 1.500 con ricos jaeces y otras buenas guarniciones, que cada caballero procuraba de ir galán tan bien como armado. Las naves de armada que allí en Barcelona se juntaron, sin muchos bajeles chicos, fueron 25 carabelas con el galeón del rey, en que iban 2.000 portugueses, 60 o más urcas con bastimento, armas y municiones, especialmente pelotas y pólvora, 50 naos y galeones españoles donde iban hasta 8.000 soldados novicios y hasta 700 jinetes...Estando pues el Emperador con esta caballería y con 15 galeras que traía don Álvaro de Bazán, entró Andrea de Oria con tres galeones y 16 galeras en Barcelona». F. López de Gómara, *Guerras de mar del Emperador Carlos V*, eds. M.Á. Bunes Ibarra, N.E. Jiménez, Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, Madrid, 2000, pp. 161-162.

and *açauras*. There were also many brigantines, frigates, foists and some galliots. There were 12 papal galleys, 4 from [the Order of the Knights of St. John of] Malta under Aurelio Botigela, the prior of Pisa, 15 of ours [i.e. Spanish] under Álvaro de Bazán, 19 under Andrea Doria, 10 Sicilian galleys captained by don Belenguer de Requesens, 9 Genoese galleys, 6 Neapolitan galleys under don García de Toledo, another 5 under Antonio Doria and 2 belonging to the lord of Monaco. In total 82 very well-armed and richly decorated galleys, because each captain wanted his galley to be the best whether in terms of speed, armaments or beauty<sup>18</sup>.

García Cereceda, who took part in the Tunis campaign gives completely different figures, however. He refers to 113 high-sided vessels, 15 royal galleys – four of them carrying horses – 1 galleon, 1 *nave*, 22 caravels and an indeterminate number of galleons and hulks, in which were embarked 12,000 Italians and 7,000 German troops, as well as the soldiers from Spain and the papal states. As for the galleys he gives these figures: 15 Spanish; 3 papal; 13 Neapolitan; 15 belonging to the Doria family; 4 from Rhodes [meaning perhaps those of the Knights of St. John once based in Rhodes, but by then in Malta], 6 from Sicily and 2 from Palermo (*sic.*), 2 from Monaco, 12 from Genoa and 2 under Berenguel, as well as others belonging to unnamed individuals<sup>19</sup>.

Until very recently we did not even know how important the Portuguese military contingents that arrived in Barcelona on 29 April 1535 under the command of the infante don Luis were. The fleet was made up of 11 galleons, 2 carracks and 2 caravels, and was carrying some 1500 men, counting both soldiers and mariners<sup>20</sup>. The Portu-

<sup>18</sup> Ivi, p. 163: «sin muchos caballeros que traia Maximiliano Ebersteyn, y embarcólos en 38 naos, que para esto estaban aderezados en Portuvenere... De manera, pues, que tuvo el Emperador por lista en Callar 25.000 soldados, los demás españoles. Había también 2.000 de caballo, los 800 llevaban todos armas, los de malla, que por eso se llaman ligeros. Eran los navios 700, entre chicos y grandes. Había sobre de 70 urcas de Flandes, 40 galeones, 100 naves, 25 carabelas portuguesas y otras andaluzas, y demás era tafurcas, escorpachines, açauras y tales bajeles, había también muchos bergantines, fragatas, fustas y algunas galeotas. Galeras había 12 del Papa, 4 de Malta con Aurelio Botigela, prior de Pisa, 15 nuestras con Álvaro de Bazán, 19 de Andrea de Oria, 10 de Sicilia cuyo capitán era don Belenguer de Requesens, 9 de Génova, 6 de Nápoles con don García de Toledo, 5 de Antonio de Oria, 2 del señor de Mónaco. Así que todas eran 82, muy bien armadas y ricamente guarnecidas, porque cada capitán quería que sus galeras fuesen las mejores de remo, armas y gala».

<sup>19</sup> M. García Cereceda, *Tratado de las campañas y otros acontecimientos de los ejércitos del emperador Carlos V*, Sociedad de Bibliófilos Españoles, Madrid, 1873, vol. II, pp. 13-21.

<sup>20</sup> J.V. Pissarra, *O galeão S. João (c1530-1551). Dados para uma monografia*, in I. Guerreiro, F. Contente Domingues (eds.), *Fernando Oliveira e o seu tempo: humanismo*



guese contingent has been considered among the decisive elements that gave the imperial fleet superiority over the Ottoman forces, because of the greater firepower of these large, high-sided vessels. Their participation had the additional benefit of demonstrating the close family alliance and mutual interest of the Avis and Habsburg dynasties to safeguard and control the Mediterranean<sup>21</sup>. It is the Portuguese squadron, and especially the flagship, the *Botafogo* – literally, the Firebreather, a name that neatly evokes its deathly artillery power – that is the main protagonist in the two Vermeyen tapestries that depict the imperial fleet. This is in stark contrast to Paulo Giovio's written account of the campaign. While he notes the Portuguese contribution, he gives totally different figures for those who took part in the campaign<sup>22</sup>. Although Giovio received first-rate information from many of the participants, his account was considered tendentious at the time as it focussed almost exclusively on the role of the Italians, both the soldiers and the ships, stressing the importance of the papal galleys and especially the role played by Andrea Doria as commander of the combined naval forces, to the detriment of the others<sup>23</sup>.

In the present state of knowledge, we cannot resolve the vast discrepancies regarding the number of soldiers who took part in the campaign. Figures range between the 50,000 men which many

*e arte de navegar no renascimento europeu (1450-1650)*, Patrimonia, Cascais, 1999, pp. 212-224.

<sup>21</sup> H. Carvalho, *The Portuguese participation in the conquest of Tunis (1535): a social and military reassessment*, in E. García Hernán, D. Maffi (eds.), *Estudios sobre Guerra y Sociedad en la Monarquía Hispánica. Guerra marítima, estrategia, organización y cultura militar (1500-1700)*, Albatros, Valencia, 2017, pp. 169-187.

<sup>22</sup> P. Giovio, *Dialogo de las empresas militares y amorosas...*, Guilliemo Rouille, Lyon, 1562, cap. XLII, f. Cxvii. «Era venido también de Portugal el infante don Luis hermano del rey de Portugal, cuya hermana era mujer del Emperador con una armada de veynte y cinco naves de aquellas que se nombran Caravelas, avezadas a las navegaciones de las Indias, las quales trayan grandissimo numero de artillería y podían referir la furia del mar por más bravo que anduviesse y trayan muchas municiones. Entre estas carabelas avía un gran galeón bastecido de un grandissimo numero de artillería. En aquella armada havia dos mil infantes pagados sin los marineros».

<sup>23</sup> Referring to the Genoese admiral, Andrea Doria he wrote: «al qual el Emperador avia hecho general de toda la empresa de la mar, a quien solo por su singular fe y valor avia comunicado todo su parescer usando de una increíble presteza y diligencia, aparejó una armada de muchas naves gruesas y treinta galeras; entre las quales había una quattrirreme, la qual en lugar de capitana havia de llevar al Emperador. Tenia esta toda la cubierta entretallada, toda la popa dentro y fuera dorada y pintada de riquissimos fullajes y pinturas: también estaba la popa cubierta de un tendal de brocado y terciopelo carmesí y todos los marineros y soldados vestidos de seda y muy bien armados. Avia también destribuydo por las naves gran cantidad de vitualla, instrumentos navales...». *Ibidem*.

authors who did not participate personally accepted as accurate, to the 26-30,000 which are the estimates given by Lope de Soria, the resident imperial ambassador in Venice and which can also be found in contemporary, official accounts. As we alluded to earlier, the main impediment to reaching an accurate conclusion relates to the paucity and fragmentation of the surviving documentation on the organisation and financing of the campaign.

The papers of Juan de Rena suffer from similar limitations: they are patchy and limited, essentially concerning the construction of five galleys in the dockyards of Barcelona that were destined for the squadron of Álvaro de Bazán “el viejo” (senior), who was at this point the commander of the Spanish galley fleet. Nevertheless, the three bundles of documentation furnish us with the most detailed and concrete evidence to date of the costs involved in fitting out the fleet. They also contain information on the four ships added to the fleet to transport the many horses, which were also used as transports to bring a number of woodcutters and caulkers to Barcelona as they were in desperately short supply and essential to speed up the preparations. There was an acute shortage of skilled labour in the port given the volume of work to be done. Among Rena’s documents two exceptional maps can be found showing the battlefield near La Goleta. However, it should be admitted at the outset that the documentation is particularly valuable for what it reveals about the emperor’s consolidation of power over Navarre, rather than what it reveals about his foreign ventures. It is also very useful to trace the evolution of galley construction in the sixteenth century, and adds considerably to our scant knowledge of the Barcelona dockyards. But with respect to the Tunis campaign, at most, it can illuminate a specific aspect, that is the fitting out of a number of effectives in the Spanish galley fleet, and it is therefore of limited value when it comes to estimating the overall costs of the campaign<sup>24</sup>. The documents concern the building and fitting out of five galleys and of the horse transports. They do not give the overall cost of these vessels, nor do they give details of the cost of the artillery that they would need on board, because these aspects were dealt with by other paymasters and the funds came from different sources. Nor do they give any indication of wages or of what the men who came on board were paid. Although the nature of this

<sup>24</sup> «Por la de su Majestad vera v.s. y por las que escribiere el señor Príncipe y el protonotario micer Juan Rena a lo que se ofreciere en lo del armada y en todo lo demás por lo qual en esta no tengo más que decir sino que no se perdiera tiempo en adereçar las cosas necesarias para la breve espedizion que será presto con la ayuda de Nuestro Señor». Ags, E, 1366, n. 144, Gómez de Figueroa to Francisco de los Cobos, Genoa, 12 February 1533.

documentation is undoubtedly economic, its limitations highlight an interesting fact: the different paymasters were more interested in giving details of the contracts they had drawn up with providers, and with the provenance of the goods they had purchased than with giving precise details of the money they had paid to secure these products and services.

Juan de Rena was appointed as the *Comisario*, the official in charge of the construction and provisioning of the fleet destined for the Tunis campaign during 1534 and 1535 in the dockyards of Barcelona<sup>25</sup>. It is evident both from manuscripts found in the ARGN and from the information in the correspondence with Genoa during 1533 found elsewhere, that he was a specialist in galley construction and the fitting out of fleets, which accounts for the fact that he was assigned to both these tasks. He was born in Venice in 1480 and had risen to prominence in the years when Ferdinand the Catholic governed Aragon and Castile. He was already one of the king's counsellors when he arrived in Navarre in 1512 and played a key role in consolidating Castilian power over the newly-conquered kingdom<sup>26</sup>. The recent completion of cataloguing his entire archive has provided the information we needed to build up a picture of this complex and decisive individual who served both Ferdinand and Charles V until his death in 1539<sup>27</sup>. Besides being a royal counsellor, he was a merchant and a clergyman. No fewer than sixty-two different offices or functions have been attributed to him during his lifetime by taking into account his various public and religious offices and his private activities. Before taking up his new post in Pamplona he had acted as a royal official in the campaigns led by Pedro Navarro and financed by cardinal Cisneros that led to the conquest of Mazalquivir (Mers-el-

<sup>25</sup> M. Chocarro, F. Segura, *Inventario de la documentación de Juan de Rena*. *Archivo Real y General de Navarra*, Gobierno de Navarra, Pamplona, 2013. References to the different expeditions which both he and Charles V were involved with can be found in pp. 38-40, 43 and 47-54.

<sup>26</sup> J.M. Escribano Páez offered a general study of the manuscript collection in *Juan de Rena and the construction of the Hispanic monarchy (1500-1540)*, PhD thesis, European University Institute, 2016. His articles *Negotiating with the "Infidel": Imperial Expansion and Cross-Confessional Diplomacy in the Early Modern Maghreb (1492-1516)*, «Itinerario» 40:2 (2016), pp. 189-214; and *War, conquest and local merchants: the role of credit in the peripheral military administration of the Hispanic Monarchy during the first half of the sixteenth century*, «Economic History, Early Modern economic and social history and Early modern Spain», 14 (2013), pp. 1-19 are based on the information contained in the Rena papers of the ARGN.

<sup>27</sup> M. Chocarro, F. Segura, *Inventario cit.*, and also the article by M. Chocarro, F. Segura, *El reino de Navarra en la Monarquía Hispánica: nuevos enfoques desde la documentación de Juan de Rena*, «Príncipe de Viana», 261 (2015), pp. 109-136 which is particularly relevant here.

Kebir, Algeria) and Oran in North Africa in 1509. As soon as he arrived in North Africa, Rena had reconnoitred most of the ports of the region and written a description of these, and also of the characteristics of the local rulers, which probably accelerated his career in the service of Ferdinand II of Aragon. He became an expert in the fitting out of royal fleets, serving as the *proveedor general* (a naval Comptroller or Clerk in charge of procurement) for the fleet destined for the joint campaign with England in 1512 during the War of the League of Cambrai for example. He played a similar role in the preparation of the fleet that Charles V sent to Italy in 1526, and the ships that sailed to Italy and the Low Countries during 1527 and 1528. In 1529 he was also chosen by the emperor as one of the select group that would accompany him from Barcelona to Bologna for his coronation as Emperor by pope Clement VII (22 February 1530). Rena was again in charge of fitting out the fleets sent to Coron and Patras in 1532 and 1533 respectively<sup>28</sup>, and was on board the ships that fought against the Ottoman fleet in the gulf of Lepanto. He returned with the emperor to the Iberian Peninsula in 1533<sup>29</sup>. The construction and fitting out of the ships that admiral Álvaro de Bazán commanded in the Tunis campaign during 1534 and 1535 would be his last major contribution to the Mediterranean fleet and the wars against the Muslims in the region<sup>30</sup>.

The fact that he was a clergyman, as much as the sheer number of offices he accumulated, tell us a great deal about the way that Charles V organised the fleets destined to fight the Ottomans. From 1508 until 1538 Rena also held the office of royal chaplain. His benefices included parishes in the dioceses of Pamplona, Seville, Palencia, Calahorra, Ciudad Rodrigo and Sigüenza. He was Vicar General of the diocese of Pamplona from 1521 onwards, the year in which he also had charge of the rents collected there. His growing importance was reflected in the appointments he held in the bishopric of Pamplona as an apostolic or papal protonotary from 1525 to 1534, and as deputy collector of

<sup>28</sup> G. Varriale, *Nápoles y el azar de Corón* cit., pp. 1-32.

<sup>29</sup> M. de Foronda y Aguilera, *Estancias y viajes del emperador Carlos V*, S.n., S.I., 1914, remains a very useful source for tracing the many journeys undertaken by the emperor.

<sup>30</sup> These are all the references in Juan de Rena's papers relating to Mediterranean affairs in the 1530s: Argñ, Ap Rena, 76, n. 13, *Registro de Juan de Rena de instrucciones, relaciones y cuentas de la construcción de 20 galeras para la armada a Túnez, 1534-1537*; Argñ, Ap Rena, 76, n. 14, Charles V to the Viceroy of Navarre, count of Cañete, La Goleta, 30 June 1535; Argñ, Ap Rena, 76, n. 15, Gómez de Figueroa to Francisco de los Cobos, Genoa, 5 August 1537; Argñ, Ap Rena, 76, n. 16, *Relación de la cuenta de Francisco de Segura por los gastos en el camino a Valencia en la búsqueda de aserradores y calafates para ir a Barcelona desde el 7 de diciembre de 1534 a 11 de enero de 1535*.

papal revenues in 1531-1532. In 1534 he was promoted to the bishopric of Alghero in Sardinia, reaching the zenith of his ecclesiastical career in 1538 when he was given the bishopric of Pamplona. Charles V had sought to have him named as bishop of Alghero in order to facilitate not just the organisation of the fleet against Barbarossa, but in particular to ease the negotiations with the papacy, whose military and financial contributions to «the campaign against the Infidel» were considered vital<sup>31</sup>.

As already mentioned, Juan de Rena was also an experienced merchant, agent and expert adviser on all matters relating to North Africa since the early years of the century. His knowledge of the region combined with his long experience with various maritime ventures under Charles V made him an ideal person to take charge of fitting out the fleet in the campaign against Tunis. He had been involved in the complex military world of the Mediterranean since at least 1505 when Mazalquivir was occupied by the Spaniards. That campaign had been undertaken with a combination of galleys from Barcelona and round ships originating both in Andalucía and the Cantabrian coast. It had involved the embarkation of over 7,000 men in the 170 ships that had been gathered in Malaga. As with other fleets in this period, it was a multinational enterprise which required extraordinary coordination, having to move and provide for both maritime and military personnel as well as securing victuals from many different points, and providing large quantities of artillery, both in terms of the normal complement required for each participating vessel, but also the siege and other artillery required which was normally kept on land and had to be embarked for these campaigns. The extraordinary complexity of organising large fleets in this period led to the development of a permanent, professional naval administration headed by a recognised expert (the *Provedor General*), assisted by a number of officials of different ranks. It was the only way that fleets of this kind could be organised and ships

<sup>31</sup> «Pour l'Espagne, il s'agissait généralement du Viceroy de Catalogne ou du Capitaine général du Royaume de Grenade; parfois des deux comme ce fut le cas en 1535, l'Empereur ayant choisi Barcelone comme port de réunion de l'armada proprement espagnole. Lorsque le projet était la conséquence d'une ligue internationale, la partie espagnole était représentée par une seule personne. Le plus souvent un prélat comme l'évêque de Pampelune en 1538. Cette qualité devait indubitablement faciliter les négociations avec la Papauté dont les concours financier et militaire ne pouvaient être négligés». R. Quatrefages, *La Proveduria des Armadas: de l'expédition de Tunis (1535) à celle d'Alger (1541)*, «Mélanges de la Casa dde Velázquez», 14 (1978), p. 218. As he had not consulted Juan de Rena's papers, Quatrefages did not identify the Bishop of Alguer (Alghero), this being the title with which he signed all the documents relating to the building and fitting out of the galleys in the dockyards.

maintained. In the 1530s the office was made permanent and its headquarters established in the port of Malaga.

The only accounts that survive in Rena's papers concern the five galleys commissioned from shipbuilders based in the dockyards of Barcelona, and those relating to the conversion of the four other galleys destined to transport the large number of horses that were embarked in Spain, mostly belonging to the numerous nobles who took part in the campaign<sup>32</sup>. Clearly, the expenditure contained in Rena's documents is but a small part of the total. The numerous ships that were embargoed in the Spanish ports had to be paid for, but we have no surviving evidence of the cost of this. However, it is possible to give some indication of the cost of constructing another two galleys built in Mallorca, although we have only indirect references for these. In the absence of documentation, it is impossible to say what differences there were in ship construction in the different Spanish ports, but there must have been some as monarchs expressed preference for some over others. Among the active dockyards of the period, for example, it appears that Charles V preferred those of Barcelona to those of Seville. True, this could be due to the shortage of wood in the vicinity of the southern port after so many years of excessive demands for such primary materials from that region. As for the Neapolitan dockyards, they had the reputation of producing ships of lesser quality and at a higher cost than those of the Drassanes Reials (Royal Dockyards) of Barcelona. Quality and convenience rather than cost may have affected the emperor's decision to use Barcelona for this campaign. For example, we know that the cost of building a galley in Gibraltar, without artillery, came to between 2143 and 2243 ducats, somewhat cheaper than those he ordered from the Catalan dockyards. As the ambassador, Figueroa, confirmed, the cheapest of all shipbuilding bases available to the emperor were to be found in Genoa, but the emperor did not want to place an order for galleys or other shipping with them at this juncture, although they were allies and close collaborators<sup>33</sup>.

Returning to the detailed information from Rena's accounts we get a glimpse of the complexity of the process of fitting out fleets in the sixteenth century. The accounts for the different galleys were signed by Luis del Puerto, mosén Fernando Ranese or Antonio Busto. It is an

<sup>32</sup> A. de Ceballos-Escalera Gila, *Guerra y Nobleza en la jornada de Túnez: Los Capitanes del César*, in A. Alvar Ezquerro, J.I. Ruiz Rodríguez (eds.), *Túnez 1535: Halcones y halconeros en la diplomacia y la monarquía española*, Gremio de Halconeros del Reino de España, Madrid, 2010, pp. 123-153.

<sup>33</sup> R. Quatrefages, *La Proveeduría des Armadas* cit., pp. 223-224 which relies on the documents from the Consejo de Guerra (Council of War) to be found in *Ags, Guerra Antigua*, 12, n. 107.

indication of the importance of the tasks he was undertaking that at such times as Juan Rena was absent, the viceroy in Cataluña took over his role, in particular supervising construction to ensure that progress was maintained, and taking the necessary measures to cover costs in a timely fashion so that these ships could be ready when required and would not delay the departure of the whole fleet.

The costs of constructing each of the new galleys were comparable and provide us with conclusive data to prove that costs of galley construction were increasing throughout the sixteenth century. The data also give us interesting information about the military materiel which each of the galleys was to be given and the cost:

*Tab. 1: Materiel to equip each galley (ARGN, AP Rena, 76, n. 16)*

120 pieces of body armour with the royal insignia and emblems	50 ducats
20 round shields	20 ducats
20 coselets (light armour)	15 ducats
40 harquebuses with their powder flasks and complements	130 ducats
Lead: 1 quintal and 10 pounds of lead to make shot	2 ducats
Gunpowder: 1 quintal and 21 ½ pounds @ 10 ducats per quintal	12,5 ducats
Match: 5 pounds	2 ducats & 2 <i>sueldos</i>
100 Pikes	17 ducats

The emperor also paid for the richly-decorated galley in which he embarked for Tunis. It was a cuatrirreme, a larger and faster vessel with four men to an oar rather than the usual three. It stood out principally as a result its lavish decorations and covered quarters of red velvet and damask with gold trimmings. All the pennants were painted and decorated<sup>34</sup>.

Until early 1535 Rena and his officials were charged with fitting out the new galleys and horse transports; thereafter, they were involved in procuring whatever was still needed for the whole fleet. Luis del Puerto, one of Juan de Rena's officials, was delegated with the task of fitting out all the ships under the command of Álvaro de Bazán, as and

<sup>34</sup> Argn, Ap Rena, 76, n. 16, *Relación de la cuenta de Francisco de Segura...*; also Giovio in note 23.

when they were required, whether they were old or new<sup>35</sup>. Costs rose exponentially once they had to procure gunpowder, harquebuses, and the hundreds of other things that a fleet required before it was fully functional<sup>36</sup>. Because this was an official imperial campaign, all ships were required to display the emperor's arms and insignia, thereby increasing the cost of the expedition, since new flags and pennants had to be made, and painters and designers were commissioned to design and paint the emperor's coat of arms and other insignia. All these decorative elements had to be paid for. It is surprising that the emperor should have felt the need to repeat orders so that this was done<sup>37</sup>. Painters in Barcelona were the first to paint the emperor's motto, Plus Ultra, in the pennants and flags, many of which also displayed the imperial two-headed eagle.

Thanks to Rena's accounts we also know the names of the galleys built in Barcelona in 1534 and 1535 which were incorporated into the Spanish squadron: Esperanza (Hope), Monte Calvario (The Mount of Calvary), La Garza (The Heron), Victoria (Victory), Toro (The Bull), Leona (The Lioness), Princesa (Princess), La Envidia (Envy) and San Marcos (Saint Mark). The four galleys allocated to the transport of horses belonged to Genoese captains: Baltasar Ranascero, Bernardino Pagia and Baptista Justianiani commanded one apiece; captain Vicencio Sent was in charge of the Galley San Nicolás.

Barcelona provided much of what was required by these ships, although a good deal of what was required to victual the fleet had to be brought over from Genoa. Both ports provided the cloth necessary to make the sails as well as other items. The documentation extant in Pamplona leaves no doubt as to the fact that the entire Spanish galley

<sup>35</sup> P. Fondevila Silva, J.J. Sánchez Baena, *Las galeras de la Monarquía Hispánica: elemento fundamental del poder naval durante el siglo XVI*, in A. Alvar Ezquerro, J.I. Ruiz Rodríguez (eds.), *Túnez 1535 cit.*, pp. 91-119; F.F. Olesa Muñido, *La galera en la navegación y el combate*, Ariel, Barcelona, 1972.

<sup>36</sup> «Que se haze cargo al dicho Antonio Botto de doszientas y quarenta bolsas de arcabuz que he recibido de Diego de Carvajal, cintero, que del se compraon para provisión de galeras, ... que se le reciben en quenta quarenta bolsas que dio a una de las cinco galeras nuevas que se consiganron a don Álvaro con quarenta arcabuzes de que capitán Simón de Finá», Argñ, Ap Rena, 76, n. 16, f. 151r, *Cargo de bolsas de cuero de arcabuz*.

<sup>37</sup> «Cargo de banderas: Que se haze cargo al dicho Antonio Botto de doszientas y dieciocho banderas que recibio de ciertos pintores, vecinos de Barcelona, que de ellos se compraron como parece por nómina de xxiiii de março, y entre las dichas banderas uvo dieciocho tallamares». The document specifies that thirty-six of them were given to the five new galleys, and the rest, which were to complete the 218 that had been commissioned, were distributed among the rest of the Spanish fleet. This suggests that there was an average of eighteen decorated flags per galley. Argñ, Ap Rena, 76, n. 16, f. 155r, *Cargo de banderas de las cuentas de Luis del Puerto*.



fleet was either constructed or renovated, as well as fully equipped, for the campaign, and where necessary the ships had their victuals replenished so that they were all combat ready when they sailed in 1535. This meant that costs kept rising and quite substantially. The imperial officials faced sudden and unexpected demands, such as the order to provide another fifteen vessels with armaments, lead and gunpowder. Two of the most expensive items they had to procure were oakum and tar, which were necessary for caulking the ships. They were forced to look far afield for caulkers as there were not enough of them in Cataluña for the purpose. They also had to import such items as compasses and clocks, hessian sacks from Genoa, as well as cotton to make the sails in Barcelona. Other objects such as ships' lanterns and lamps were imported from Milan<sup>38</sup>.

Details of the embargo and requisitioning of ships to transport men, materials and horses to the embarkation points can be found in a variety of inventories that have survived. These tended to be small- to medium-sized vessels, between 150 and 300 tons. Besides those taken from the northern Cantabrian coast, the majority of them came from the area around the Straits of Gibraltar and were normally engaged in commerce between Iberia and America, which was clearly adversely affected as a result. Curiously, the extant documentation gives no information as to whether shipping in Cataluña was also embargoed for such purposes<sup>39</sup>.

We turn now to another important aspect of the campaign: the provision of artillery to arm the galleys and of heavy siege trains and weapons to enable them to besiege the fortress of La Goleta and the city of Tunis. This was increased in part as a response to the reports of spies which confirmed the information coming from Italy, especially after Barbarossa's most recent attacks along the Italian coast, that his fleet was now equipped with powerful artillery. It was suspected that his French allies had provided him with these weapons. Their suspicions were confirmed first, when during the siege of La Goleta they saw that some of the cannon balls were decorated with the fleur-de-lis, and second, when they took the fortress and found it protected by powerful siege canon emblazoned with the French monarch's initials and insignia<sup>40</sup>.

<sup>38</sup> Quatrefages states that between 2143 a 2243 ducats were allocated for each new galley. R. Quatrefages, *La Proveduria des Armadas* cit., p. 224.

<sup>39</sup> Ivi, pp. 225-231.

<sup>40</sup> «La artillería que se halló en La Goleta era hermosa, y así en piezas grandes como medianas cuatrocientas piezas. Y, entre ellas, había una muy hermosa y grande que tiraba una pelota de grandor de un sombrero. Y algunas de las grandes y principales piezas estaban sembradas de flores de lis, y otras de FF, con la salamandra y la divisa que decia *nutrisco e extingo*». A. Perrenin, *Goleta de la ciudad de Túnez* cit., p. 88.

Rena's papers do not provide much information on artillery, but other documents stored in the archive of the kingdom of Navarre enable us to shed some light on the matter. The majority of the crown's artillery during these years was stored in warehouses in the city of Malaga. From February 1535 onwards, the emperor put even greater pressure on all the officials involved in preparing the campaign to finalise their various tasks so that everything would be ready for an early departure. He ordered more harquebuses to be made in the province of Vizcaya, and demanded that they be handed over as soon as possible, having been fully tested to ensure they were safe and in working order. They were to be sent to Malaga, where they would be shipped with all haste to Barcelona and distributed among the galleys there. On reading this, Francisco de los Cobos, Secretary of state and one of the emperor's two leading ministers, warned that they could not be sent to Malaga because the port could not cope with what they had already been assigned to do by the authorities. He suggested that they should take the best of what weapons were available to make up the 12,000 pikes, 4,000 harquebuses and 50 muskets that were needed<sup>41</sup>.

The correspondence between Cobos and the marquis of Mondéjar, who was Captain General of the kingdom of Granada, make frequent references to the need for money to be sent urgently to enable imperial officials to fulfil the orders emanating from Madrid and Barcelona. Unless the imperial council provided prompt and full payment it would not be possible for everyone and everything to be on board and ready to sail on time. This was vital as the Spanish fleet had to rendezvous at the designated time with the other naval squadrons being prepared in four other Western Mediterranean ports<sup>42</sup>. Orders were issued for the authorities in Malaga to provide the necessary girths, powder horns, fodder and victuals for the several thousand horses and their attendants who had embarked in Barcelona. That was before they were asked to add provisions for the fifty Albanian horses that had been taken on board ships in Naples, part of a contingent of light cavalry that would go on to distinguish itself in action on several occasions during the campaign. Vermeyen depicted them in his tapestries.

The most acute problem Mondéjar faced was finding enough shipping to transport the large number of soldiers to North Africa.

<sup>41</sup> Ags, E, 30, s. f., Málaga, 25 February 1535.

<sup>42</sup> «Recibí las cartas de v. mg. de xvi y de xviii de febrero y puede presuponer que lo que a mí toca de hazer quanto la embarcación de la jente de a pie ninguna cosa ay que detenga el armada, sino la falta de dinero. Si ay manera de prover de otra parte más breve que de Sevilla, V. Mg. lo mande prover porque para tan grande cantidad como es menester acá no se puede suplir». Ags, E, 30, s. f., Málaga, 25 February 1535.

These papers give us a very different perspective from what has prevailed to date in that they reveal the vital contribution made by the Portuguese in this respect:

As I have written before to Your Majesty, there are not enough ships available, other than the numerous caravels, *tafurcas*, Sevillian vessels and *chaluvas* that I have requisitioned in Seville and el Puerto [of San Lucar?]. The request I sent to the Portuguese ambassador asking them to send ships from there will not, as Your Majesty writes, delay the dispatch of their caravels. On the contrary, it will hasten it, because I specified in my letter that these ships had to be in Malaga by the eight of March because that was the date that Your Majesty had set for the fleet to sail. However, I wrote at once to inform them what Your Majesty has written to me. The king of Portugal's factor has informed me that they have written to him from [Portugal] that their fleet will be ready to sail by mid-March and not before that. From this we can deduce without doubt that it will not be here before the end of March. Nevertheless, if we can finalise the preparations here before that date we shall do so<sup>43</sup>.

Mondéjar was critical of the decision to organise the Iberian fleet and embark the troops in Barcelona because he argued that this would increase costs, and it required them to ship the soldiers north, that is, further from their final destination. Moreover, the merchants he was dealing with in Andalucía were unwilling to provide victuals for the fleet in Cataluña because that year Catalan wheat was cheaper than in the markets of Granada, and they refused to send it to the port if they were paid at the lower price<sup>44</sup>. Another, more acute problem the commissioners encountered was the shortage of lead. The great deficit of lead in 1535 would be a recurring feature in the preparation of

<sup>43</sup> Ags, E, 30, s. f., Málaga, 25 February 1535: «De navíos ay falta, como a v. mg. tengo scripto, más de carabelas y tafurcas y barcos sevillanos y chaluvas que para este tiempo tendré rrecabdo por que en el Puerto y Sevilla tengo embargados cantidad dellos/ Esto que escribí al embaxador de Portugal que enviase de allá naos no ay el inconveniente que v. mg. dice de dilatarse la venida de las carabelas, antes las dará más prisa por que le escribí que las naos que me avia de embiar fuesen en Málaga ocho de março por que para este tiempo quería v. mag. Que el armada se hiziese a la vela, más todavía le escribí a la ora lo que v. mag. Manda/ El fator del rey de Portugal me dice que le escriben de alla que el armada está presta para mediado março y no antes de manera que se puede rrazonablemente inegar que no será aquí antes del fin de março, sin embarco desto si lo de aquí pudiere antes estar en horden se hará».

<sup>44</sup> «Con mercaderes e puesto en platica que lleven alguna cantidad de trigo y cebada a Barcelona y no se determinan a llevarlo por lo suyo porque dicen que tienen aviso que vale allá barato y si esto es tampoco conviene llevarlo por de v. ma., ni es necesario v-mg. mandara que se me de aviso de lo que den esto de no haear que en Barcelona dicen que valía a xx de enero a xvi sueldos la quarterola, que sale a cinco reales y 3 maravedís la anegada». Ags, E, 30, s. f., Málaga, 25 February 1535.

subsequent Mediterranean fleets, especially – as demonstrated from documentation in Malaga – during the fitting out of the fleet of 1614-1616, the so-called “jornada secreta” or secret campaign<sup>45</sup>. To meet the needs of the Tunis campaign it proved necessary to import lead from Genoa, because - as the emperor was informed from Malaga - «I do not believe it can be found here even at a high price, and less so at low cost»<sup>46</sup>. As the sixteenth century progressed, it would be purchased with greater frequency from Milan and the Low Countries, where it was easier and cheaper to buy lead for the Mediterranean galleys.

## Conclusion

Due to the fragmentary nature of the evidence it is impossible to make well-founded calculations that could give a sense of the overall cost of the Tunis campaign, but that has not stopped some historians from attempting to do so. Using mainly the orders issued by the empress during its preparation, and the accounts of payments made to foreign creditors at the Castilian financial fairs, the economic historian Carande reckoned that the campaign had cost a million and a half ducats. Many years later, and relying on documentation such as the payment of wages to soldiers participating in the campaign, as well as on accounts of the funds allocated for the construction of new vessels, and of payments made to compensate owners whose ships were embargoed or rented, James D. Tracy came up with a revised estimate that is not that different from Carande's:

For the months of June through September, with October as the going home month, wages would have been 432.000 ducats for the 24.000 infantry on the emperor's payroll, and 39.000 for the cavalry. The cost for fifty galleys for five months would have been 125.000, bringing the total to 596.000. Adding 20% for victuals, officers pay and the 300 transport ships, plus 1125.000 ducats for the emperor's household expenses for the year, the overall cost of the Tunis campaign may be estimated at 840.200 ducats. This does not count the cost of building new ships for the expedition, including the

<sup>45</sup> M.Á. Bunes Ibarra, *La jornada secreta de Argel: recursos de la Monarquía de Felipe III para la organización de una operación anfibia*, in E. Martínez Ruiz, J. Cantera Montenegro, M. De P. Pi Corrales (eds.), *La Organización de los ejércitos*, vol. I, Cátedra Extraordinaria Complutense de Historia Militar, Madrid, 2016, pp. 594-626.

<sup>46</sup> Ags, E, 30, s. f., Málaga, 25 February 1535: «porque acá caro ni barato creo que no se podrá aver».

emperor's quadrireme. Because expenses for the galleys fitted out at Barcelona came to 118.226 ducats, it seems reasonable to double this figure. Thus total cost for the Tunis campaign would come to 1.076.652 ducats<sup>47</sup>.

Those are the best current estimates available, but it is worth emphasising that, as has been amply demonstrated here, we have only fragmentary information, and even that is for a relatively small part of the fleet. Of the twenty galleys which were fitted out in Barcelona, for example, we only have data relating to five of them, the ones that Juan de Rena was responsible for, as well as the four horse transports that he also organised. And even for these we cannot give a clear indication of the total cost.

The Tunis campaign of 1535 was one of the greatest military challenges that Charles V's lands faced during his reign. It was an enterprise of extraordinary complexity and it is unfortunate that it should be so problematic to estimate the overall cost with any degree of precision given the paucity of information. The timely arrival in Seville of a large quantity of specie and money from Peru solved the most pressing financial problems, enabling the emperor to pay for the contingents required to initiate this campaign. But it did nothing to solve the structural problems of the Monarchy which the campaign laid bare. To organise fleets of this magnitude it was necessary to count on a permanent, complex infrastructure that could meet the multiple needs of such a campaign. As they found out to their cost, for example, it was not possible to acquire sufficient artillery at short notice and in the quantity needed, as the hard-pressed officials in Malaga explained at the end of February 1535 with the departure date fast approaching:

we are making all haste to cast the artillery for the galleys, but such a large quantity cannot be made in so short a time, particularly as the gun foundries had not been very active. As for the many items which the captain of the artillery set out in his memorandum, we are endeavouring to provide them all, but despite our great diligence it seems to me that we would need three months to do this. We are doing everything possible to meet his requirements, but to ensure that as little as possible is left undone, if it proves impossible to do everything, it would be as well if the captain were to come here and take charge of the operation<sup>48</sup>.

<sup>47</sup> J.D. Tracy, *Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War. Campaign strategy, international finance, and domestic politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 155.

<sup>48</sup> Ags, E, 30, s. f., Málaga, 25 February 1535.

Evidently, the organisation of large, amphibious operations was only in its initial stages, but the Tunis campaign enables us to see clearly that the Spanish Monarchy was already creating the necessary mechanisms to cater for the needs of campaigns of great magnitude and complexity. The attempts by historians such as Ramón Carande, James Tracy and René Quatrefages to give an overall estimate of the cost of the campaign, despite using different sources and methodologies, confirm the evidence of the fragmentary information we have added: that the whole structure was entirely dependent on the decisions taken by the sovereign, and transmitted by him and the Council of War. But it also gives us a glimpse of how the *provedurías*, the different officials charged with procurement, were evolving in order to meet the requirements of the Monarchy's enormous offensive-defensive engagements in the Mediterranean.