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SAGGI & RICERCHE

Francisco J. Moreno Díaz del Campo

VIGILAR DESDE ABAJO. LAS AUTORIDADES LOCALES Y EL CONTROL DE LOS MORISCOS GRANADINOS DE CASTILLA

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RESUMEN: *El control de los moriscos granadinos constituyó una de las prioridades políticas de la Monarquía Hispánica durante el último cuarto del siglo XVI. Este artículo analiza cuáles fueron los mecanismos legales empleados para vigilar a los moriscos y analiza qué factores condicionaron su aplicación. Se presta especial atención al importante papel ejercido por las autoridades locales y al carácter descentralizado que, finalmente, adquirió la gestión política y social del asunto de la «lista». Para vigilar a los moriscos se analizan las funciones que ejercieron los delegados regios y la justicia local y cuáles fueron los principales problemas a los que hicieron frente en el ejercicio de su labor.*

PALABRAS CLAVE: *moriscos granadinos; vigilancia; autoridades locales; Castilla; 1570-1610.*

MONITORING FROM THE BASE. THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND THE CONTROL OF THE GRANADA MORISCOS IN CASTILE

ABSTRACT: *The monitoring of the Granada moriscos was one of the political priorities of the Hispanic Monarchy during the last quarter of the 16th century. This paper explores which legal mechanisms were used to control the Moriscos, as well as the factors that conditioned their application. Special attention is given to the important role played by local authorities. It also closely examines the decentralized way in which the political and social management of the «lista issue» was handled during those years. To this end, the functions that the royal officers and local judges played are analysed. The main problems they faced in the exercise of their work are also studied.*

KEYWORDS: *Granada moriscos; monitoring; local authorities; Castile, 1570-1610.*

La historiografía relativa a la minoría morisca viene insistiendo desde hace algunos años en el asunto de la movilidad[1]. Se trata de un tema complejo, al que últimamente se ha vuelto la mirada para tratar

* Este trabajo se enmarca en el proyecto de investigación «La Monarquía Hispánica y las minorías: agentes, estrategias y espacios de negociación», financiado por MINECO (Gobierno de España) (Ref.: HAR2015-70147-R). Para su elaboración se han consultado los fondos cuyas siglas se citan entre paréntesis: Archivo Histórico Nacional (Ahn), Órdenes Militares. Archivo de Toledo (Om, At), Archivo General de Simancas (Ags), Archivo de la Alhambra (Aa), Archivo Histórico Provincial de Albacete (Ahpab), Archivo Histórico Provincial de Ciudad Real (Ahpcr), Archivo Histórico Provincial de Toledo (Ahpto), Archivo Diocesano de Albacete (Adab), Archivo Municipal de Toledo (Amt), Archivo Municipal de La Solana (Amso), Archivo Municipal de Almagro (Ama), Archivo de la Villa de Madrid (Avm).

[1] De entre las aportaciones más recientes sobre movilidad morisca, véanse, como punto de partida B. Vincent, *Morisques et mobilité. L'exemple de Pastrana*, en A. Dubet y S. Urdician, (dirs.), *Exils, passages et transitions. Chemins d'une recherche sur les*

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de esclarecer si la Corona logró impedir que los moriscos dispusieran de libertad de tránsito o si, por el contrario, fueron los granadinos quienes salieron victoriosos en su empeño de burlar las limitaciones impuestas por la todopoderosa maquinaria de la Monarquía Hispánica. En cierto modo, el debate es innecesario si se admite que las posibilidades de movilidad de los moriscos corrieron paralelas a su origen y al tiempo y lugar en el que cada cual vivió, motivo por el que conviene recordar que no todos los cristianos nuevos tuvieron una misma condición legal. Es obvio que no fue igual gozar de libertad personal, que ser un esclavo, pero incluso entre los individuos de condición libre también hubo diferencias. De entre ellas, y en lo relativo a Castilla, la principal es la que distingue entre los antiguos mudéjares y los granadinos, pues la autonomía de la que gozaron los primeros no es equiparable a las (pocas) posibilidades de moverse libremente que tuvieron los segundos.

El presente trabajo centra su atención en analizar cuál fue el papel que desempeñaron las autoridades locales en el control de los moriscos de Granada tras la expulsión de éstos del antiguo reino nazarí. El punto de arranque de estas línea se sitúa en el invierno de 1570-1571, momento en el que se puso fin a la guerra de las Alpujarras, cruento conflicto que había enfrentado a la Monarquía y a los moriscos granadinos y que terminó con el destierro forzoso de estos últimos a Castilla. Ese es, por otra parte, el marco geográfico en el que cabe ubicar las reflexiones que siguen y de manera muy especial en Castilla la Nueva, Extremadura y Andalucía, allí donde el destierro dejó más huella.

Nos situamos ante un colectivo que, desde una óptica estrictamente jurídica, no dispuso de libertad de movimiento, entendida esta como consecuencia de la puesta en marcha de una voluntad individual. Ello no equivale a decir que los «granadinos castellanos» permanecieran en una permanente situación de confinamiento, pues son conocidos tanto los intentos por revertir su *alistamiento* como las concesiones que la Corona asumió como mal menor en esa política de control. De hecho, puede decirse que la Monarquía desarrolló una política que

marges. Hommage à Rose Duroux, Presses de l'Univesité Blaise Pascal, Clermont-Ferrand, 2008 y R. Sánchez González, *Movilidad morisca en la Corona de Castilla, 1570-1610*, in A.I. López-Salazar y F.J. Moreno Díaz del Campo (eds.), *La Monarquía Hispánica y las minorías. Élites, poder e instituciones*, Sílex, Madrid, 2019, pp. 371-407, así como Alice Kadri, Yolanda Moreno y Ana Echevarría (eds.), *Circulaciones mudéjares y moriscas*, CSIC, Madrid, 2018. Para el ámbito mediterráneo, y en perspectiva comparada, véanse José A. Martínez Torres, *Circulación de personas e intercambios comerciales en el Mediterráneo y en el Atlántico (siglos XVI, XVII, XVIII)*, CSIC, Madrid, 2008 y L. Maziane y K. Ben Srhir (coords.), *Mobilité individuelle et collective en Méditerranée et en Méditerranée atlantique (XVème-XXème siècles): Perspectives historiques*, «Hespéris Tamuda», LIII/2-3 (2018).

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impuso límites colectivos, pero que permitió excepciones individuales y que estas últimas tampoco constituyeron un bloque monolítico, sino que se vieron modificadas en función de los «tiempos moriscos».

El estudio de la movilidad morisca ha sido abordado desde diferentes puntos de vista. Una de las principales formas de acercamiento al fenómeno ha sido el análisis de los censos de control. Si bien este sistema de monitorización alcanzó sus cotas máximas en el último tercio del Quinientos en la Corona de Castilla, debe señalarse que la cuestión no fue exclusiva de este territorio. Sirvan al respecto un par de ejemplos. El primero, relativo a Valencia, donde con motivo del propio levantamiento alpujarreño, el conde de Benavente intentó recabar la colaboración de los *portantveus* para levantar padrones que incluyesen a los granadinos que habían llegado al virreinato valenciano. Su intención era incluir en dichas listas referencias a los caracteres físicos de los recién llegados, así como mención expresa de las personas a través de las cuales habían llegado a tierras valencianas[2]. Por su parte, Bruno Pomara ha dado cuenta de que la redacción de padrones para censar a los moriscos también fue algo habitual en la Roma posterior a la expulsión de 1609-1614[3].

En Castilla, las listas de moriscos han dado lugar a una amplia literatura, especialmente en los últimos años. En una primera fase fueron objeto de análisis los grandes censos elaborados a instancias de instituciones como el Consejo de Castilla o la Inquisición. De ellos se ha dado cuenta en otro lugar[4], lo cual no obsta para recordar que, en muchas ocasiones, fueron la culminación administrativa de un trabajo previamente realizado por individuos de condición diversa y posicionados en diferentes escalones administrativos de la Monarquía Hispánica sin los cuales no habría sido posible su realización.

1. Vigilar a los granadinos: tiempos y protagonistas

Después de la guerra de las Alpujarras, los intentos de controlar la vida de los moriscos granadinos corrieron paralelos a su instalación en Castilla. La documentación parroquial y municipal permite conocer algunas de las medidas que se tomaron en aquellos

[2] M.P. Belchí Navarro, *Felipe II y el virreinato valenciano (1567-1578). La apuesta por la eficacia gubernativa*, Generalitat Valenciana, Valencia, 2006, p. 137.

[3] B. Pomara Saverino, *Rifugiati. I moriscos e l'Italia*, Firenze University Press, Florencia, 2017, pp. 164-166.

[4] Para literatura al respecto, véase H. Lapeyre, *Géographie de l'Espagne morisque*, SEVPEN, París, 1959, pp. 126-130. Véase también F.J. Moreno Díaz del Campo, *Los padrones moriscos de la gobernación calatrava de Almodóvar a finales del siglo XVI*, «Cuadernos de Historia Moderna», 44/1 (2019), pp. 44-46.

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primeros momentos, antes, incluso, de la promulgación de la pragmática de 1572. En la villa manchega de La Solana, los granadinos fueron objeto de una vigilancia «domiciliaria». Según los testimonios contenidos en los libros del concejo, las autoridades locales ya ejercían de aquella manera en enero de 1571[5], mientras los moriscos seguían llegando desde Granada. Dicha forma de actuar se prolongó, ya bajo el amparo de la propia pragmática, durante los años siguientes por medio del nombramiento de personas encargadas de su control y supervisión[6].

Junto a las autoridades municipales, el clero parroquial también tuvo cierto protagonismo en aquellos primeros momentos. Hasta donde se sabe, su labor no puede ser calificada de general, pero lo cierto es que hubo localidades en las que la impronta de su trabajo se dejó sentir de manera temprana. Una de ellas fue Alcaraz. Entre sus libros parroquiales se localiza una «Matrícula de los cristianos nuevos avecindados en la misma [parroquia de san Ignacio]»[7], documento en el que únicamente aparecen registrados moriscos de Granada y cuyo inicio se fecha en el día de la Ascensión de 1573. La «matrícula» de San Ignacio de Alcaraz tiene cierto interés en el asunto de la vigilancia ejercida sobre los moriscos granadinos, sobre todo por dos razones. Primero, porque permite intuir que, al menos al principio, los moriscos asentados en la ciudad quedaron alistados prácticamente en exclusiva en dicha parroquia, dado que, hasta el momento, no se han documentado listas similares en las otras colaciones. Tal situación nos informa de lo complejo que fue llevar a buen puerto las disposiciones regias que ordenaban que los granadinos fueran repartidos «por menudo» en cada localidad, evitando la formación de guetos[8]. Junto a ello, el documento es interesante porque anticipa alguno de los procedimientos posterior-

[5] Amso, libros de acuerdos, lib. 10. 11.01.1571.

[6] Sirva como ejemplo el nombramiento de Juan de Salazar y Juan de Cuedo, «a los quales encargaron que velaran por la pramatica de su Mag. e en cumplimiento della visiten a los moriscos». Amso, libros de acuerdos, lib. 16. 21.10.1582.

[7] Adab, libros parroquiales. Alcaraz. Sig. ALZ 79, fols. 81r y ss. Para más detalle acerca de la vida de la comunidad morisca de Alcaraz véase F.J. Moreno Díaz del Campo, *Convivencia, control y fe. La práctica sacramental de los moriscos de Alcaraz*, «Al-Basit. Revista de Estudios Albacetenses», III época, 48 (2004), pp. 53-92.

[8] De ello también dan cuenta Fernández Chaves y Pérez García, quienes informan acerca de la existencia de sistemas de control muy similares en la ciudad de Sevilla. En concreto, en las parroquias de San Bernardo y de Santa Ana, donde, desde 1587, los moriscos fueron alistados en libros específicos, algo que, tal y como nos dicen los autores antes mencionados –y al igual que ocurre en Alcaraz– se lleva a cabo en aquellas zonas de la ciudad donde su presencia [de moriscos] es muy importante». Véase M.F. Fernández Chaves y R.M. Pérez García, *En los márgenes de la ciudad de Dios. Moriscos en Sevilla*, Publicacions de la Universitat de València-Editorial Universidad de Granada-Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Zaragoza, Valencia, 2009, p. 353.

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mente empleados en la actualización de la información relativa a los moriscos. De hecho, y dejando aparte su valor demográfico[9], lo interesante en esta ocasión es fijar la atención en el procedimiento empleado para la actualización de la lista, consistente en la comparación nombre a nombre y en el tachado de los ausentes[10]. El ejemplo de la parroquia de San Ignacio también es útil para observar la denominada «vía sacramental», que aprovechó el cumplimiento obligatorio de los preceptos religiosos para vigilar a la minoría[11]. En este sentido, se sabe que, ya en la década de los años 1530, los moriscos de Villarrubia de los Ojos eran reunidos por las autoridades municipales y parroquiales en la iglesia de la villa, lo que provocó quejas por parte de los cristianos nuevos. El representante de los antiguos mudéjares, Diego Niño, protestó contra el párroco de la villa por lo que consideraba una patente humillación ya que todos los domingos eran sometidos al escarnio de ser señalados como nuevos cristianos cuando, en realidad, su comportamiento religioso era impecable[12]. El ejemplo villarrubiero es muy temprano, pero indicativo de que las obligaciones fijadas en la pragmática de 1572 no eran nuevas y de que, en muchos casos,

[9] El nuevo recuento permitió constatar que, de los ciento veintidós moriscos presentes en 1573, faltaban cincuenta y tres (más del 43%). De ellos, se sabe que ocho habían fallecido, que dos estaban ausentes de la ciudad, pero avecindados en ella y que tres más habían emigrado a Murcia con autorización de la Corona. Los demás simplemente desaparecieron del listado, lo cual permite admitir que fueron considerados como huidos y emigrados sin licencia real.

[10] El alistamiento fue actualizado el 25 de mayo 1575, dos años después de la realización del primer listado.

[11] Sobre este asunto, y desde una óptica general, véase B. Vincent, *El padrinazgo y los moriscos*, in B. Vincent, *Minorías y marginados en la España del siglo XVI*, Excma. Diputación Provincial de Granada, Granada, 73- 82. Para Andalucía y el reino de Granada, J.J. Bravo Caro, *La familia morisca a través de los registros parroquiales*, in *Actes du VIIe Symposium International d'Etudes Morisques sur Famille morisque: femmes et enfants*, Fundation Temimi pour la Recherche Scientifique et l'Information, Zaghouan, 1997, pp. 33-48; B. Vincent, *Baptêmes, noms et parrainage à Mojacar (XVIe-XVIIIe siècles)*, en A. Molinié, M.C. Zimmermann, M. Ralle (eds.), *Hommage à Carlos Serrano*, Editions Hispaniques-Université Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV), París, 2005, vol. I, pp. 61-68; y C.J. Garrido García, *La parroquia de Santa María Magdalena de Guadix en época morisca a través de las series de bautismo y confirmación (1559-1570)*, «Boletín del Instituto de Estudios 'Pedro Suárez'», 13 (2000), pp. 23-50. De este último, véase también *Moriscos y repobladores del reino de Granada en el siglo XVI a través de una nueva fuente: las series parroquiales de bautismo*, «Miscelánea de Estudios Árabes y Hebraicos. Sección Árabe-Islam», 58 (2009), pp. 119-153. Aparte del ya citado relativo a los moriscos de Alcaraz, véanse en relación a Castilla F.J. Moreno Díaz del Campo, *Godparenthood, evangelization and alliance building. The Granada Moriscos after the Council of Trent*, «Popolazione e Storia», 19/2 (2018), pp. 9-39.

[12] M.F. Gómez Vozmediano, *Mudéjares y moriscos en el Campo de Calatrava. Reductos de convivencia, tiempos de intolerancia (ss. XV-XVII)*, Excma. Diputación Provincial de Ciudad Real, Ciudad Real, 2000, p. 56.

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estaban inspiradas en experiencias previamente ensayadas o llevadas a cabo tanto en Castilla como en la propia Granada con anterioridad a la rebelión de las Alpujarras[13].

Poco a poco, la situación se fue aclarando desde el punto de vista procedimental. Las fuentes municipales dan cuenta de que la labor de vigilancia, originariamente no regulada, y cuya gestión había sido asumida *ad hoc* por diferentes instancias, pasó a ser competencia del denominado superintendente de moriscos (en otros lados llamado alcalde de moriscos o regidor de moriscos). La existencia de dicho oficio es consecuencia de la promulgación del texto de 1572, cuyo contenido es muy conocido. Sin embargo, conviene recordar que, en lo relativo al control de los moriscos granadinos, fue la norma sobre la que se asentó el armazón jurídico y procedimental relativo a esa vigilancia. A pesar de ello, no puede decirse que, a lo largo del tiempo, se mantuviera una línea de actuación sostenida e inamovible. En los años finales del siglo XVI se detecta la existencia de diferentes ritmos cuya existencia se debe a la evolución del propio asunto morisco, a la autopercepción que la Corona tuvo de su actuación y al papel desempeñado por la propia minoría.

Podría hablarse de una primera etapa que abarcaría toda la década de 1570 y los primeros años ochenta (al menos hasta 1583-1584). Las actuaciones desarrolladas en aquel momento tomaron diferentes derroteros. Desde el punto de vista organizativo, todo indica que la gestión del control sobre moriscos quedó definitivamente (o al menos de manera prioritaria) en manos de las autoridades civiles. Por su parte, el régimen punitivo parece claramente establecido, dado que las sentencias interpretan al pie de la letra las indicaciones de la propia pragmática. A pesar de ello, aún se está lejos de llegar a un claro dominio de la situación por parte de la Corona: a las frecuentes autorizaciones que validan peticiones y cambios de residencia, se une el inagotable (y casi siempre ilegal) desplazamiento de población morisca, una muestra más de la incapacidad de la administración filipina para dar fin al propio proceso de expulsión de los granadinos. El decreto de hasta cinco nuevas sacas de moriscos en este periodo es suficiente indicio para constatar que el deseo de inmovilizar a los moriscos en sus lugares de acogida estaba resultando un fracaso[14].

[13] Sobre ello, véase C.J. Garrido García, *Control, aculturación, segregación y resistencia: los padrones de asistencia a misa de los moriscos en el Reino de Granada*, «Miscelánea de Estudios Árabes y Hebraicos. Sección Árabe-Islam», 68 (2019), pp. 125-152.

[14] A la de 1570-1571 siguieron las decretadas en 6 de mayo de 1576, 21 de julio de 1578, el 4 de abril de 1579 y el 26 de enero de 1581, cuyas fechas se aproximan a las de realización de algunos de los grandes recuentos de los que damos cuenta aquí. Véase

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La expulsión ordenada en noviembre de 1583 pondría fin a esta etapa. Para entonces, ya puede hablarse de un cambio de tendencia. Incapaz de controlar el constante flujo de granadinos, en 1581 la Corona determinó que todos los moriscos debían poseer un «testimonio signado» de su alistamiento. En dicho documento debían incluirse sus principales datos[15] «y este testimonio se a de dar a cada morisco solamente una vez e no más», con asistencia de las autoridades locales y refrendo del correspondiente escribano «para que unos moriscos no lo puedan prestar a otros ni aprouecharse del ni hazer cautela alguna». La publicación de dicha provisión generó un auténtico ajetreo identificador en muchas localidades de Castilla y dio lugar a expediciones «masivas» de este tipo de partidas, tal y como prueba la existencia de constantes referencias a dicho proceso, tanto en la documentación judicial como en la municipal y en los protocolos notariales. Tales salvoconductos se unirían a las cédulas de movimiento y a los padrones, complicando, aún más si cabe, la burocracia asociada al control de moriscos.

Su efecto debió ser limitado. Tan solo dos años después, la Corona orientó sus miras al clero. Según García Gómez, las disposiciones legales hechas públicas en el primer lustro de los años 1580 desautorizaron a los corregidores y justicias civiles, especialmente a partir de la pragmática de 14 de febrero de 1583, que «releva a los justicias de las anteriores funciones sobre el control de la movilidad y la expedición de pasaportes» y dejaba la última palabra en dicha materia en manos del Consejo de Población[16]. A pesar de su aparente carácter expeditivo, la asociación del control de moriscos al Consejo de Población no debe verse como reprobación a las justicias civiles. No al menos de manera completa, pues la Corona fue consciente del valor que tenía el trabajo de las autoridades locales en aquel primer escalón de la gestión y no solo en el asunto de la

B. Vincent, *Los moriscos del reino de Granada después de 1570*, «Nueva Revista de Filología Hispánica», 30/2 (1981), pp. 603-604.

[15] Nombre propio y sobrenombre, lugar de origen, localidad de alistamiento, edad, señales, estatura, rostro y señales en otras partes del cuerpo, oficio, casa en la que estuviere, parroquia... Ahn, Om, At, leg. 89144. Madrid, 12.09.1581.

[16] M.J. García Gómez, *Contribución de la Iglesia a un proyecto político de Felipe II: la integración de los moriscos granadinos deportados a Castilla (1570-1610)*, in *Iglesia y religiosidad en España: historia y archivos. Actas de las V Jornadas de Castilla-La Mancha sobre investigación en archivos. Guadalajara, 8-11 de mayo de 2001*, ANABAD Castilla-La-Mancha / Asociación de Amigos del Archivo Histórico Provincial de Guadalajara, 2002, p. 1439. Copia de la pragmática (en este caso de la dirigida al conde de Villanueva de Cañedo), en el anexo XXX, incorporado por Benítez Sánchez-Blanco a la edición de M. Danvila y Collado, *La expulsión de los moriscos españoles. Conferencias pronunciadas en el Ateneo de Madrid*, ed. R. Benítez Sánchez-Blanco, Publicacions de la Universitat de València, Valencia, 2007, pp. 292-293.

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movilidad; también en otros de calado similar como el porte de armas. La recuperación de la vía eclesiástica se vio complementada con la elaboración de los censos de 1581 –gestionada por los obispos– y con la publicación de toda una serie de recomendaciones que, entre ese último año y 1583, conminaban al clero parroquial a intensificar la vigilancia pastoral y a aumentar el control sobre sus feligreses cristiano-nuevos mediante la elaboración de registros similares a los que, hasta aquel momento, habían ejecutado las autoridades civiles[17]. Más allá de ello, poco se dice de éstas últimas y aunque el tono reprobatorio es evidente, lo cierto es que corregidores, gobernadores de partido y justicias señoriales siguieron controlando la elaboración de padrones en sus respectivas demarcaciones.

Por tanto, y a pesar de la pérdida de confianza, la retirada de competencias solo fue parcial y derivó en la asunción de responsabilidades en materia de vigilancia de moriscos por parte del Consejo de Población, institución encargada de gestionar la Granada postalpujarreña, pero que había quedado relativamente al margen de las actuaciones relativas a los moriscos expulsados a Castilla. A partir de aquel momento, los justicias debían responder ante un órgano jurisdiccional superior, orden en la que cabe observar el deseo de conseguir una mayor eficacia –fruto de la centralización en la toma de decisiones– y, sobre todo, la asunción de una única doctrina a la hora de validar y otorgar permisos de movimiento, cambios de residencia y nuevos avecindamientos. El problema es que el Consejo cesó en sus actividades entre 1592 y 1597[18], lapso en el que ha de entenderse que los corregidores debieron responder de nuevo ante el Consejo de Castilla. Más allá de ello, lo verdaderamente llamativo es que las peticiones de libertad de movimiento y de avecindamiento comienzan a menudear desde finales de los años 1580, dando la sensación de haber dejado un rastro documental más claro durante el lustro en el que el Consejo *hibernó*[19].

A ello cabe añadir la relajación en la vigilancia, muy visible en la retirada de la obligación de poseer y «mostrar» pasaporte decretada en

[17] M.J. García Gómez, *Contribución de la Iglesia a un proyecto político de Felipe II: la integración de los moriscos granadinos deportados a Castilla (1570-1610)* cit., pp. 1434-1441.

[18] Sobre este asunto, véanse M.M. Birriel Salcedo, *Las instituciones de la repoblación del Reino de Granada (1570-1592)*, «Anuario de Historia del Derecho español», 58 (1988), pp. 173–204 e I. Gómez González, *La intervención de la Chancillería de Granada en el Consejo de Población y en la administración de la renta de población*, «Chronica Nova», 25 (1998), pp. 321–335.

[19] F.J. Moreno Díaz del Campo, *Los moriscos de La Mancha. Economía, sociedad y modos de vida de una minoría en la Castilla moderna*, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Madrid, 2009, p. 294.

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1581. En esta ocasión, la enmienda vino de la mano de los servicios fiscales que la *nación* morisca otorgó a la Corona. Es seguro que los moriscos dispusieron de dicha «gracia» al menos desde 1603, pues quedó recogida en la disposición quinta del contrato firmado con la Monarquía para el pago del servicio de aquel año[20]. Sin embargo, también es probable que la Corona hubiera transigido un lustro antes, cuando se negociaba la prestación que se pagó en el cuatrienio 1597-1600[21]. De hecho, y gracias a testimonios indirectos se sabe que, en enero de 1597, Felipe II accedió a la petición de «las personas que vinieron a esta nuestra Corte en nombre y con poder de los naturales del Reyno», cuya principal reivindicación era que fuera suficiente «con estar alistados y abeçindados en los libros de los ayuntamientos (…) sin tener obligación de traer consigo el dicho testimonio en los dichos lugares y los que traginassen fuese bastante la liçencia y pasaporte que por la justicia se les diesse sin otro recaudo alguno»[22].

Dejando aparte el detalle de que las negociaciones entre *nación* y Monarquía se gestaron en el momento en que el Consejo de Población no existía[23], lo importante de dicho testimonio es que la exención aún seguía vigente en 1609, cuando Alonso de Aparicio, zapatero morisco de Almagro, afirmaba que «antes de que se hiciese ante su magestad el asiento del serbiçio que los naturales del Reyno de Granada hacen al rey nuestro señor de los dosçientos y quarenta mil ducados con que le serbían los dichos naturales, tenían obligación a tener el dicho

[20] «¶ Que atento que el principal caudal de los dichos naturales consiste en el traginar, y sobre los pasaportes, por dárselos con muchas limitaciones de tiempo, se les siguen molestias, de aquí adelante los que fueren a traginar o tratar de negocios, las justicias les den los pasaportes, por quatro meses, sin que hasta que hasta que estos passen, tengan necessidad de pedir otros. Y que los dichos naturales que tratan de labrança para salir a trabajar en las heredades y güertas de los términos de las ciudades y villas y lugares donde viuen, y dormir en las dichas güertas y heredades, lo puedan hazer sin licencia ni passaporte de las justicias, ni que por esta causa los molesten ni procedan contra ellos». Amto, sig. 6420, fol. 38v. 07.11.1603.

[21] Incluso, quizás, desde 1589, cuando se empezó a negociar el primero de los servicios concedidos por las naturales, cuyos años de pago coincidieron *grosso modo* con los de inactividad del propio Consejo de Población. Sobre estos servicios, véase B. Vincent, *Los moriscos granadinos y la monarquía (1570-1609)*, in J. I. Fortea y J. E. Gelabert (eds.), *Ciudades en conflicto (siglos XVI-XVIII)*, Junta de Castilla y León-Marcial Pons Historia, Valladolid-Madrid, 2008, pp. 163-179.

[22] Ahn, Om, At, leg. 38223. El testimonio hace relación a las causas emprendidas durante las décadas de 1580 y 1590 contra moriscos del Campo de Calatrava por el Consejo de las Órdenes a causa de no estar alistados o haber violado sus licencias de movimiento. Los moriscos juzgados en 1609 por idénticos motivos recurrieron a testimonios orales y pruebas documentales en las que sustentaron la no obligación a portar pasaportes.

[23] La restitución del Consejo de Población se produjo en mayo de 1597. Véase I. Gómez González, *La intervención de la Chancillería de Granada en el Consejo de Población y en la administración de la renta de población* cit., p. 326.

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testimonio, pero después que se hiço el dicho asiento (…) sabe que no tienen la dicha obligación de tenerlo sino de solo estar en las listas y padrones»[24].

Parece claro, pues, que la negociación política a la que la *nación* se entregó desde su llegada a Castilla, logró minimizar, al menos en parte, los efectos de la política de corte restrictivo iniciada en 1581.

2. Una acción de largo alcance geográfico

Cada vez son más los censos de moriscos granadinos de los que se tiene noticia que se realizaron en la Castilla posterior al conflicto alpujarreño. En puridad, dichos recuentos deberían haber dejado rastro documental en todas las localidades que acogieron a los deportados de Granada y su frecuencia debería ser, al menos, anual, pero lo cierto es que no son tantos los ejemplos que se conocen. A pesar de ello, y en lo que respecta Castilla la Nueva, Extremadura y Andalucía, la cartografía de las matrículas moriscas muestra un escenario cada vez más completo y diversificado, pues afecta tanto a ciudades y villas de tamaño grande e intermedio como a pequeñas localidades. La cronología de tales registros da cuenta de que su elaboración fue constante y estuvo íntimamente relacionada con los tiempos analizados más arriba. Debido a ello, se localizan puntos de inflexión, momentos específicos en los que la elaboración de padrones parece concentrarse. Sin duda, se trata de un fenómeno que no es casual y que debe relacionarse tanto con las sacas de moriscos de Granada como con las pulsiones normativas y políticas a las que se ha hecho referencia.

Entre esos momentos de especial interés cabe situar los años 1570-1573, momento en el que tiene lugar la primera de las cuatro grandes etapas censales que se desarrollaron en el último tercio del siglo XVI[25]. Ahí cabría incluir, por ejemplo, los padrones elaborados en 1573 en Toledo y Pastrana, de los cuales se hablará más adelante. De las mismas fechas procede el redactado en la ciudad de Córdoba, completado con otro de similares características seis años después[26]. Por su parte, en su estudio acerca de la comunidad morisca de Sevilla,

[24] Ahn, Om, At, leg. 38223, s.f. 23.05.1609. Se refiere aquí el morisco al «donativo» de 1603, pues el de 1597 ascendió a 200000 ducados y no a 240000.

[25] B. Vincent, *Morisques et mobilité. L'exemple de Pastrana* cit., p. 17.

[26] B. Vincent, *¿Cuál era el aspecto físico de los moriscos?,* in B. Vincent, *Andalucía en la Edad Moderna: economía y sociedad*, Diputación Provincial de Granada, Granada, 1985, pp. 303-313 y J. Aranda Doncel, *Los moriscos en tierras de Córdoba*, Publicaciones del Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Córdoba, Córdoba, 1984, pp. 78-79.

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Fernández Chaves y Pérez García dan noticia de uno fechado en 1580 y realizado en cinco de las collaciones de la capital hispalense[27]. En concreto, el censo al que hacen referencia es «el primero del que ha quedado constancia documental en Sevilla», lo que no invalida el hecho de que, muy probablemente, existiera alguno anterior[28]. Tiempo después, en 1589, los moriscos sevillanos se enfrentarían a un nuevo recuento[29]. Sin salir de Andalucía también es necesario hacer mención a las listas de moriscos elaboradas en Écija[30], Antequera y Carmona[31].

No son menos los ejemplos que pueden localizarse en Castilla y Extremadura. Más arriba se ha mencionado el elaborado en Pastrana en 1573, conocido gracias a los trabajos de Prieto Bernabé[32]. Por su parte, Bernard Vincent ha aportado datos acerca de un segundo recuento efectuado en la misma villa y fechado en 1585. Dicha lista constituye una «compleja actualización» de la realizada en 1573, así como un «excelente observatorio de los movimientos de la minoría en contra de la voluntad firme de las autoridades de ponerles freno»[33]. Por las mismas fechas, el gobernador del marquesado de Villena también dio orden de que se recontara a los moriscos de la villa de Albacete. La inspección ocupó dos largas jornadas (20 y 21 de julio de 1586) y perseguía actualizar la información de la que ya se disponía[34].

[27] M.F. Fernández Chaves y R.M. Pérez García, *En los márgenes de la ciudad de Dios. Moriscos en Sevilla* cit., pp. 200-212.

[28] Ivi, p. 272.

[29] M. Boeglin, *Demografía y sociedad moriscas en Sevilla. El padrón de 1589*, «Chronica Nova», 33 (2007), pp. 195-221.

[30] J. Aranda Doncel, J. y M. Martín Ojeda, M., *Evolución demográfica y estructura de población morisca en la ciudad de Écija*, in *Actas del III Congreso de Historia «Écija en la Edad Media y Renacimiento»*, Universidad de Sevilla-Ayuntamiento de Écija, Sevilla, 1993, pp. 228-253; M. F. Fernández Chaves y R. M. Pérez García, *Notas sobre la destrucción de las comunidades moriscas malagueñas y su reconstrucción en la campiña sevillana*, 1569-1610, «Áreas. Revista Internacional de Ciencias Sociales», 30 (2011), pp. 121-139.

[31] R.M. Pérez García, *Moriscos en Antequera, 1569-1574*, «Al-Qantara. Revista de Estudios Árabes», 37/1 (2016), pp. 75-110; M.F. Fernández Chaves y R.M. Pérez García, *Notas sobre la destrucción de las comunidades moriscas malagueñas y su reconstrucción en la campiña sevillana, 1569-1610* cit., p. 134.

[32] Su confección también fue supervisada por autoridades municipales, en concreto por dos regidores y un escribano. Véase J.M. Prieto Bernabé, *Los moriscos de Pastrana según un censo de 1573*, in *Conflictos sociales y evolución económica en la Edad Moderna (I). Actas del I Congreso de Historia de Castilla-La Mancha*, Servicio de Publicaciones de la Junta de Comunidades de Castilla-La Mancha, Toledo, 1988, vol. VIII, p. 270. Dicho censo también ha sido utilizado por el mismo autor para aproximarse al estudio antropológico de la minoría en J.M. Prieto Bernabé, *Aproximación a las características antropológicas de la minoría morisca asentada en Pastrana en el último tercio del siglo XVI*, «Wad-al-Hayara», 14 (1987), pp. 355-362

[33] B. Vincent, *Morisques et mobilité. L'exemple de Pastrana* cit., p. 18.

[34] A. Santamaría Conde, *Albacete y la deportación general de los moriscos granadinos*, in *Actas del II Congreso de Historia de Albacete. Volumen III: Edad Moderna*, Instituto de Estudios Albacetenses, Albacete, 1984, pp. 49-51.

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Fig. 1 - *Localidades de Castilla la Nueva, Extremadura y Andalucía en las que se elaboraron padrones de moriscos**

LEYENDA

1. Toledo (1573, 1580-1582, 1586)
2. *Ocaña (1573, 1579, 1583)*
3. Renera (*1597*)
4. Pastrana (1573, 1585)
5. Corral de Almaguer (1579)
6. Quintanar de la Orden (*1573?*)
7. El Toboso (*1597*)
8. Mota del Cuervo (1583-1584)
9. Campo de Criptana (1583-1584)
10. La Solana (*1571?*)
11. Almagro (*1574*, 1602)
12. Almodóvar del Campo (1589-1590)
13. Almadén (1603)
14. Los Santos (1579)
15. Llerena (1579)
16. Guadalcanal (1579)
17. Sevilla (1580, 1589)
18. Carmona (1585)
19. Écija (1573, 1576, 1579, 1580)
20. Córdoba (1573, 1579)
21. Antequera (1573)
22. Beas de Segura (1576)
23. Alcaraz (*1573*, *1575*)
24. Chinchilla (*1601)*
25. Albacete (*1581*, *1586*)

* Excluidos los censos generales de 1581, 1589 y 1594
· entre paréntesis, año de elaboración del padrón
· en cursiva, padrón/es conocido/s por fuentes indirectas

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Para entonces, la villa manchega había realizado diferentes registros de su población morisca desde aquel inicial recuento que se produjo en noviembre de 1570, nada más acabar la guerra de las Alpujarras[35]. Gran parte de ellos pertenecen a listados confeccionados con objetivos fiscales y no estrictamente relacionados con el control de la minoría como los de 1572 y 1573, elaborados «entre los vecinos de esta villa e otras personas para matar la langosta», idéntico motivo que inspiró la redacción de una nueva matrícula fechada en 1585[36]. Distinto a los anteriores fue aquel otro del que Santamaría Conde dice que lleva por título «Lista de los christianos nueuos del reyno de Granada, questán en esta villa auezindados y captiuos», redactado en 1581 y cuya confección fue ordenada por el vicario albacetense a instancias del obispo de Cartagena[37].

En Toledo también se realizaron censos de manera frecuente. Rodríguez de Gracia publicó hace años los datos relativos a uno parcial fechado en 1589[38]. Es muy posible que dicho trabajo se enmarcara en el contexto de preparación del recuento que, por aquel entonces, ocupaba al resto de párrocos castellanos, inmersos en la realización de este tipo de listas, cuya gestión definitiva correspondió a la Inquisición[39]. Aquí, su valor radica en que, de nuevo, confirma la enorme importancia de las autoridades locales –en este caso parroquiales – a la hora de controlar a la minoría. Sin embargo, dicha información no fue la primera de este tipo que se elaboraba en Toledo. El propio Rodríguez de Gracia advierte de la existencia de listas fechadas en 1580-1582[40] y no son menos interesantes el conjunto de recuentos elaborados entre finales de 1570 y 1573[41], de entre los

[35] B. Vincent, *L'expulsion des Morisques du Royaume de Grenade et leur répartition en Castille (1570-1571)*, «Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez», 6 (1970), pp. 229-232.

[36] A. Santamaría Conde, *Albacete y la deportación general de los moriscos granadinos* cit., pp. 45-46 y 48-49.

[37] Ivi, p. 47. Todo hace pensar que dicho padrón se enmarca dentro de las averiguaciones encargadas en ese mismo año a los obispos por el Consejo de Castilla y que, en este caso, estamos ante el documento primario, a partir de la cual se enviaron luego los datos resumidos al prelado cartaginés.

[38] H. Rodríguez de Gracia, *Un censo de moriscos de finales del siglo XVI*, «Toletum», 11 (1981), pp. 521-542.

[39] H. Lapeyre, *Géographie de l'Espagne morisque* cit., p. 129.

[40] H. Rodríguez de Gracia, *Moriscos expulsados de Granada y «avecindados» en Toledo*, «Hispania Sacra», 65/extra 1 (2013), pp. 177-178.

[41] M. García Ruipérez, *La expulsión de los moriscos del Reino de Granada en los documentos municipales. Estudio archivístico*, «Documenta & Instrumenta», 12 (2014), p. 76.

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cuales destaca el fechado en este último año relativo a esclavos granadinos y analizado hace años por Esperanza Pedraza[42].

También se sabe de la elaboración de este tipo de padrones en localidades situadas bajo dominio de la orden de Santiago como Beas en el partido de Segura de la Sierra[43]; Llerena en Extremadura[44] o Quintanar de la Orden[45], Campo de Criptana y Mota del Cuervo en la Mancha[46]. Igualmente los hubo en localidades calatravas, como Almodóvar y Almadén[47] o Almagro[48]. Sin salir de esta última localidad, puede hacerse referencia al más que posible censo de 1574, año en el que el gobernador del campo de Calatrava ordenó que los granadinos de la villa fueran reunidos en el hospital de las Comendadoras para proceder a su matrícula[49]. Por desgracia, no contamos con la más que probable lista a que dio lugar aquella encuesta, lo cual nos priva de una valiosa herramienta para conocer cómo era la comunidad almagreña en aquellos primeros años de asentamiento granadino. Sin embargo, la mera referencia al recuento elaborado por aquel entonces es indicativa de que el sistema funcionó desde bien temprano. El Toboso en 1599 y Ocaña en diferentes momentos de las décadas de 1570 y 1580 también son ejemplos de ello. En casos como estos, las alusiones a los padrones que se hicieron allí proceden de documentos de muy diverso tipo. De los dos señalados, el de la villa quijotesca es

[42] E. Pedraza, *Población morisca en Toledo en la segunda mitad del siglo XVI*: nuevas aportaciones, Universidad Complutense, Madrid, 1975 (Memoria para la obtención del grado de licenciatura dirigida por el prof. Dr. Manuel Terán Álvarez, inédita). El original del censo en Amto, Lib. Mss. Sección B, nº 174.

[43] Ahn, Om, At, leg. 51575.

[44] Ahn, Om, At, leg. 3064. Sobre los moriscos extremeños, véase M.A. Hernández Bermejo, R. Sánchez Rubio e I. Testón Núñez, *Los moriscos de Extremadura*, «Studia Historica. Historia Moderna», 13 (1995), pp. 89-118. De las mismas autoras, *La presencia de los moriscos en la Extremadura de los tiempos modernos*, «Alborayque», 3 (2009), pp. 11-49.

[45] En febrero de 1575, las actas municipales de Quintanar de la Orden, en Toledo, daban cuenta del nombramiento de superintendentes de moriscos, a los que se encarga que «con un traslado de la copia de los moriscos que aquí fueron repartidos los visiten y vean los que están muertos y ausentes y los apunten», lo cual indica que ya se debía haber elaborado un recuento en el pueblo. Ahpto, Diversos, sign. D-246 (Actas del Concejo de Quintanar de la Orden), fols 236r-236v. 21.02.1575.

[46] Ahn, Om, At, leg. 7356. Su contenido relativo a las descripciones físicas de los moriscos ha ido recientemente estudiado de B. Franco Llopis y F.J. Moreno Díaz del Campo, *Pintando al converso. La imagen del morisco en la península ibérica, 1492-1614*, Cátedra, Madrid, 2019.

[47] F.J. Moreno Díaz del Campo, *Los padrones moriscos de la gobernación calatrava de Almodóvar a finales del siglo XVI* cit., pp. 37-62.

[48] M.F. Gómez Vozmediano, *Mudéjares y moriscos en el Campo de Calatrava* cit., pp. 134 y ss.

[49] Ahn, Om, At, leg. 39195. Para más detalle, véase F.J. Moreno Díaz del Campo, *Los moriscos de La Mancha* cit., p. 291 y ss.

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conocido gracias a la documentación notarial[50], mientras que en el caso de Ocaña se sabe de él por los papeles del tribunal del Consejo de las Órdenes Militares[51]. Es en los propios fondos judiciales donde también se localizan referencias a censos elaborados en localidades más pequeñas como Renera (Guadalajara)[52] o Los Santos (Badajoz) y Guadalcanal, hoy situada en la sierra norte sevillana, pero perteneciente en el siglo XVI al mencionado partido santiaguista de Llerena[53].

4. Una laboriosa *milicia* civil al servicio de la Corona: funciones y cometidos

El papel que desempeñaron las autoridades locales en la gestión del proceso de asentamiento de los granadinos está en gran medida por conocer. Son muchas las gestiones a las que tuvieron que hacer frente con motivo de la guerra de Alpujarras. El proveimiento de pertrechos y alimentos[54], la búsqueda de casas para alojar a los recién llegados[55], la paga de salarios a los soldados que iban y venía a Granada[56] o la adquisición de armas para la propia guerra[57] son algunas de aquellas importantes cuestiones que, sin embargo, parecen haber dejado poco rastro documental, sobre todo porque fueron puntuales en el tiempo y se limitaron a los meses siguientes al destierro granadino. Más perdurables fueron las relativas al asunto de la «lista» y la movilidad, cuyo alcance puede resumirse en los siguientes aspectos:

[50] En 1599, algunos de los moriscos de El Toboso se vieron envueltos en un largo y complicado proceso motivado por su no comparecencia ante las autoridades el día en el que se pasó lista a los granadinos de la villa. García Zarco y Diego Velázquez, dos de los más directamente implicados en dicho caso, desplegaron una activa labor burocrática y concedieron hasta tres poderes diferentes para autorizar a sus correspondientes representantes a seguir su causa ante las autoridades de la propia villa de El Toboso, de la gobernación de Ocaña y de la Chancillería de Granada. Ahpto, Protocolos, leg. 13356-3, fols. 80r-80v. 31.03.1599.

[51] Ahn, Om, At, leg. 15648.

[52] Ags, Consejo Real de Castilla, leg. 514-9.

[53] Ambos, junto a otra lista relativa a la cabecera del partido, fechados en 1579. Ahn, Om, At, leg. 3064.

[54] Ahpto, Diversos, D-246 (Actas del Concejo de Quintanar de la Orden), fols. 26r-v (12.11.1570) y fols. 33r-34r (19.XI.1570).

[55] Ags, Cámara de Castilla, leg. 2162, fol. 2.

[56] Aa, leg. 88-81.

[57] Ags, Cámara de Castilla, leg. 2160, fol. 56.

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Dar respuesta a las solicitudes institucionales de avecindamiento de moriscos

Aunque no fueron generalizadas, las peticiones de las autoridades locales para que en sus villas se instalaran moriscos tampoco resultaron extrañas. En su inmensa mayoría estuvieron asociadas a la necesidad de mano de obra y parecen propias –no exclusivas– de zonas rurales, con escaso potencial demográfico. Uno de los ejemplos mejor conocidos es el de Almadén, donde los Fúcares reclamaron y consiguieron que, a principios de 1570, el rey enviara casi un centenar de moriscos, procedentes en su mayoría de Jaén y Córdoba a los cuales «que an ydo y fueren a esta dicha villa para el benefiçio y fábrica del dicho pozo y açogue del, les deis y agays dar cassas en que vivan y los mantenimientos que oviere menester, todo por sus dineros a preçios moderados, sin se los encareçer más de cómo valieren»[58].

En relación con este último asunto, Bernard Vincent ha demostrado de manera reciente la constante preocupación de la Corona por avecindar moriscos en la villa minera[59], cometido en el que las autoridades del partido fueron las principales interlocutoras del monarca, si bien las fricciones de la gobernación y del concejo con los banqueros alemanes y sus agentes constituyeron un problema añadido a la hora de fijar población granadina junto al pozo de azogue.

Menos complicaciones parece que hubo en otras localidades desde las que también se elevaron a la Corona peticiones concejiles de avecindamiento. Así ocurrió, por ejemplo, en Villamayor de Calatrava, cerca de Ciudad Real, donde en 1600 el ayuntamiento afirmaba que recibiría «grand merçed» si el Consejo de las Órdenes le daba licencia para avecindar veintiséis casas de moriscos «por no aber quien cultive los campos»[60] o en Hornos (actual provincia de Jaén), cuyos vecinos solicitaron en 1579 que se les permitiera acoger a media docena de casas moriscas «y mande dar licencia para [que] libremente puedan

[58] Ahn, Om, At, leg. 44905. 09.01.1570.

[59] B. Vincent, *Los moriscos y las minas de Almadén* (en prensa). Agradezco al citado profesor la gentileza de haberme proporcionado el original de dicho trabajo, aún pendiente de publicación. Sobre la mina, véanse también R. Gil Bautista, *Las minas de Almadén en la Edad Moderna*, Publicacions de la Universitat d'Alacant, Alicante, 2015 y G. Bleiberg, *El 'informe secreto' de Mateo Alemán sobre el trabajo forzoso en las minas de Almadén*, «Estudios de Historia Social. Revista del Instituto de Estudios de Sanidad y Seguridad Social», 2-3 (1977), pp. 357-443, este último con referencias concretas a los moriscos.

[60] Ahn, Om, Consejo, leg. 3114-4.

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abezindarse y estén en la villa los dichos moriscos»[61]. Tras estudiar la petición, el gobernador accedió a que se instalaran en el pueblo dos familias, siempre que tuvieran avalista cristiano-viejo y que el concejo se encargase de los trámites.

Elaborar los padrones

Consecuencia lógica de lo anterior, fue la inclusión de cada nuevo vecino morisco en los correspondientes padrones, algo que, unido a las bajas provocadas por la emigración y por la dinámica natural de la población, hizo necesaria la permanente actualización de los mismos. La gestión de las listas comenzaba con su necesaria elaboración, tarea que, entre otras cuestiones, incluyó el pregón y convocatoria, el recuento personal de los moriscos y el traslado documental de la información. Se trata de una de las labores más importantes de cuantas asumió el escalón inferior de la administración y la base sobre la que se asentaron el resto de actuaciones desarrolladas para vigilar a los moriscos. Su redacción, obligatoria, afectó por igual a todas las localidades que censaron cristianos nuevos y debió seguir patrones similares, aunque debe suponerse la existencia de diferencias de procedimiento entre las grandes ciudades y núcleos rurales de tamaño y población granadina más reducidos. De entre ellas, quizás quepa señalar tres. La primera, relativa al modo en que se gestionó la elaboración de los censos, que en los grandes núcleos por fuerza tuvo que ser por agregación de las diferentes listas elaboradas en cada barrio o parroquia.

Para estos casos, se había previsto la participación y nombramiento de los «semaneros», también nombrados por cada concejo y encargados de actuar como enlace entre éste (o el superintendente de moriscos) y los propios cristianos nuevos[62]. Sin embargo, no es descartable que las autoridades civiles contarán aquí con la colaboración del clero parroquial. He ahí la segunda de las diferencias: la relativa al personal implicado en la tarea de controlar a los moriscos, más numeroso en las localidades de tamaño grande. Finalmente, también pueden observarse diferencias en la rendición de cuentas de quienes elaboraron tales padrones. Y es así como el ejemplo visto más arriba, en el que los semaneros respondieron ante su correspondiente regidor, se calca

[61] Ahn, Om, At, leg. 51575. 01.05.1579.

[62] De su nombramiento y competencias, se tienen noticias a través del caso de Almagro, donde, en 1584, se les conminaba a que «cada uno en su semana», controlasen la asistencia a misa de los granadinos. Amal, Actas del Concejo, caja 5, siglo XVI, fols. 134r-134v. (01.02.1584).

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entre estos últimos y las autoridades de distrito, algo que debió reproducirse en los núcleos rurales dependientes de las cabeceras urbanas y que también se dio en los territorios de órdenes, donde los gobernadores y alcaldes mayores supervisaron el alistamiento en todas las localidades de sus respectivos partidos[63].

Por lo demás, lo observado permite deducir una secuencia lógica de actuaciones que, en previsión de que pudiera aducirse desconocimiento, comenzaba con el anuncio público de la realización del padrón. El que se elaboró en Ocaña en 1583 fue precedido del correspondiente bando, que corrió a cargo del alguacil de la villa, quien dio cuenta de su convocatoria

> en la calle Mayor de la dicha villa (...) y en la plazuela que diçen del Duque y a la puerta de Murcia y en las tendeçuelas del Villar y a la esquina de las Casas de Pedro Alonso Sanctana y cerca de la iglesia de San Martín, a la esquina de las casas del cura de san Martín y de Gabriel de Cepeda y en la plaçuela de la yglesia de san Juan y abaxo de la calle de sancta Catherina y ente los mesones y en otras partes desta dicha villa[64].

Cumplido dicho trámite, el procedimiento más habitual consistió en reunir a los moriscos en algún emplazamiento público. En ocasiones, el lugar elegido fue el ayuntamiento; en otras la residencia de las autoridades del partido, como ocurrió en el anterior ejemplo[65]. No obstante, lo más habitual es que el lugar elegido fuera una iglesia o ermita, momento en el que, a delegados de la justicia civil, escribano y superintendente de moriscos, solía unirse la figura de algún miembro del clero. A dicho esquema se acoplaron, entre otros el ya mencionado padrón de Almodóvar del Campo (1589-1590)[66], los realizados en Albacete en 1573 y 1574[67] y el que tuvo lugar ese mismo año en Almagro[68].

[63] Así se deduce del encargo que en 1576 se hizo al alguacil mayor de la gobernación de Quintanar, a quien se ordenó que «vaya a las dichas villas y cada una dellas y atento a todas cosas tome un traslado de la lista que en cada una dellas hubiere de los moriscos que en ellas se alistaron...». Ahn, Om, At, leg. 24678. 14.09.1576.

[64] Ahn, Om, At, leg. 15648.

[65] Ivi.

[66] F.J. Moreno Díaz del Campo, *Los padrones moriscos de la gobernación calatrava de Almodóvar a finales del siglo XVI* cit., pp. 38 y 49.

[67] A. Santamaría Conde, *Albacete y la deportación general de los moriscos granadinos* cit., pp. 52-53.

[68] M.F. Gómez Vozmediano, *Mudéjares y moriscos en el Campo de Calatrava* cit., p. 134.

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Actualizar periódicamente el contenido de los padrones

También se siguieron pautas similares a la hora de plasmar por escrito los datos recogidos. Así, y dejando aparte el contenido y organización de las entradas[69], es significativo observar que, para la correcta actualización de cada censo, fue frecuente hacer un uso comparado de dos padrones realizados en años consecutivos o con poco intervalo temporal. Dicho procedimiento permitió que los responsables de recontar a los moriscos conocieran con precisión el movimiento de la población censada en sus respectivos pueblos, así como consignar las altas y bajas que se produjeron en el lapso temporal existente entre la redacción de cada censo[70].

Junto a ello, es importante señalar que la estructura de los documentos también suele hacer distinciones, bien entre moriscos libres y esclavos, bien entre presentes y ausentes y fallecidos. De esto último son ejemplo, las listas elaboradas en Almadén, Mota del Cuervo y Campo de Criptana en la Mancha o la que se redactó en 1579 en la localidad extremeña de Los Santos[71]. De lo primero dan cuenta los censos toledano, astigitano y antequerano de 1573[72]. A una escala más reducida, también es posible encontrar esa distinción en el que se elaboró en la localidad jienense de Beas en 1576, donde, incluso, se señala el nombre de los propietarios de esclavos[73].

[69] Como norma general, las listas recogían nombre, edad, sexo, estado civil, dedicación profesional, descripción y rasgos fisicos destacados... y se organizaban por familias, citando primero al cabeza de la misma y en sucesivas entradas a la esposa (si la hubiere) y a los hijos, mencionados por orden en función de su sexo –primero los varones– y luego las mujeres.

[70] Por ese motivo, son habituales expresiones como «de la primera lista» o sus opuestas, «alistado en la villa por primera vez», que nos informan de ese procedimiento comparativo, algo especialmente visible en los censos de Mota del Cuervo y Campo de Criptana de 1583-1584. Ahn, Om, At, leg. 7356.

[71] Ahn, Om, At, leg. 3064. De reducido tamaño, fue elaborado a instancias del alcalde mayor de Llerena el 15 de septiembre de 1579. Incluye unas quince entradas y algo más de una treintena de individuos censados, de los cuales, al menos seis ya no estaban en la villa por haber marchado tres a Fuentedecantos y otros tantos a Llerena. Su estructura, como la de otro listado coetáneo al mismo que se elaboró en Guadalcanal, es muy sencilla: apenas incluye los nombres de los censados, el parentesco que les une y una pequeña referencia a si están o no en la villa, trámite suficiente para cumplir con lo estipulado en la pragmática y permitir que fuera comparado con otra lista levantada con los que «an venido a esta villa después de la lista» (...) «de quatro o cinco años a esta parte».

[72] M.F. Fernández Chaves y R.M. Pérez García, *Notas sobre la destrucción de las comunidades moriscas malagueñas y su reconstrucción en la campiña sevillana, 1569-1610* cit.; R.M. Pérez García, *Moriscos en Antequera, 1569-1574* cit.

[73] Ahn, Om, At, leg. 51575.

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Gestionar la concesión de pasaportes y la autorización de licencias.

Como indica Vincent, la expedición de pasaportes y licencias[74] fue competencia de las autoridades locales, facultad que, como se ha visto, fue puesta en cuarentena mientras que el Consejo de Población mantuvo esa atribución. La posibilidad de autorizar estos permisos otorgó a corregidores y gobernadores competencias muy amplias. Entre ellas se contaban labores policiales y administrativas y, por supuesto, la potestad de juzgar en primera instancia a quien no dispusiera de los permisos correspondientes o hiciera un uso indebido de ellos[75]. De todo lo anterior es muestra el proceso incoado contra un tal Julián Hernández, granadino que había recalado en Caravaca (Murcia) y que fue acusado de llevar pasaporte falso[76]. En el escrito de acusación, el fiscal dijo de él que constaba que estaba avecindado en «los lugares de la Mancha». Su presencia en la villa cruceña contravenía dos de las prohibiciones estipuladas en la pragmática, pues al quebranto de la lista se unió su instalación en tierras murcianas, territorio inicialmente vedado a la instalación de granadinos[77]. Por su parte, el morisco se dijo natural de Alboloduy, un pueblo de la Alpujarra oriental, y afirmó estar avecindado en Toledo y tener licencia del corregidor de la ciudad imperial. Para apoyar su relato aportó el propio pasaporte, que el alcalde mayor incorporó como prueba en el proceso[78]. La diligencia de este último fue clave para esclarecer la situación del morisco. Aparentemente, el pasaporte estaba firmado el 30 de septiembre de 1579 en Alcanavate (sic). Fue la data la que despertó los recelos del alcalde mayor, y no solo por la cercanía a su fecha de caducidad, sino por el lugar de expedición del documento, que, de admitir que podría corresponderse con la localidad conquense de El Cañavate, invalidaría toda posible

[74] Términos que, junto al de «provisión», suelen emplearse de manera paralela, pero que enmascaran realidades diferentes, en la medida en que las primeras solo podían ser otorgadas por el monarca y las últimas no suponían un «acto estrictamente obligatorio». Véase B. Vincent, *Morisques et mobilité. L'exemple de Pastrana* cit., p. 20.

[75] Ahn, Om, At, leg. 41976.

[76] Su proceso en Ahn, Om, At, leg. 23772.

[77] B. Vincent, *L'expulsion des Morisques du Royaume de Grenade et leur répartition en Castille (1570-1571)* cit., p. 225.

[78] En él se incluía una somera descripción física del morisco –pequeño de cuerpo, con una mella en la barba y ausencia de dientes «en la quijada de la parte de arriba», la correspondiente mención a su edad –46 años– y una breve explicación de los motivos –laborales– que originaron la expedición del salvoconducto, así como la duración de su validez –un año–. Para observar un modelo de pasaporte, véase M. García Ruipérez, *La expulsión de los moriscos del Reino de Granada en los documentos municipales. Estudio archivístico* cit., p. 73.

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participación del corregidor toledano en su autorización. Posteriores averiguaciones confirmaron que el pasaporte era totalmente falso y que el morisco lo había obtenido de manos de un tal Martín Marín, compañero de celda, quien se ofreció a urdir la treta documental con la que Hernández pretendía librarse de la una condena segura.

Recoger y validar avales y «fianzas»

La falsificación de pasaportes fue una artimaña más frecuente de lo habitual[79]. Para minimizar su incidencia y para asegurar el cumplimiento de las condiciones estipuladas por parte de quien solicitaba salvoconducto, la Corona dispuso que los granadinos presentasen «fianzas», avales a través de los cuales un tercero (morisco o no) hipotecaba capital e, incluso, libertad personal como medio de asegurar el cumplimiento de lo pactado con el primero. Hasta donde conocemos, la expedición de tales documentos se registraba ante escribano, pero, una vez más, fueron las autoridades locales, las encargadas de reclamar su presentación como paso previo a la expedición de un pasaporte o la autorización de una licencia[80].

Otros trabajos burocráticos y de gestión cotidiana

Finalmente debe hablarse de las funciones meramente administrativas. Entre ellas se encontraba la obligación de informar acerca de quiénes habían salido de cada localidad, así como gestionar las llegadas. Este último cometido planteó dos posibles caminos. El primero da cuenta de lo complicado que fue desligar el trabajo puramente administrativo del que tenía un carácter más punitivo, dado que, tras constatar la correspondiente irregularidad en el alistamiento, se obligaba al morisco a regresar a su lugar de origen. Los archivos judiciales dan cumplida cuenta de esas «expulsiones individuales», verdadera némesis de los deseos de los granadinos de dar un cambio a su vida personal. Entre otros, pueden señalarse el requerimiento mediante el cual el gobernador de Ocaña obligó a todos los moriscos presentes en la villa a dar cuenta de su alistamiento y,

[79] Más ejemplos en Ahn, Om, At, leg. 38462.

[80] Un ejemplo, de 1579, en Ahn, Om, At, leg. 51575, en el que el escribano del partido de Almagro reconoce que Diego Hernández «dio por su fiador a el doctor Juan Rodríguez, médico, vecino de esta villa».

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en caso contrario, a cumplir «con sus listas»[81]. A resultas del mismo, más de veinte familias fueron condenadas a salir de la villa. El caso afectó de manera especial a Bernardino Fajardo y Luisa Gutiérrez, su mujer, inicialmente alistados en Villanueva de los Infantes, pero residentes en la villa toledana desde once años antes. A pesar de que los moriscos demostraron arraigo[82] y aunque figuraban en el padrón que se redactó en 1579, no se localizó testimonio de su alistamiento en el de 1573, el primero que, al parecer, se hizo en la villa[83]. El alcalde mayor fue inflexible: cuatro años de galeras y cien azotes para él y destierro de la provincia para ella.

La otra opción consistió en transigir con el alistamiento de los moriscos llegados a cada localidad, tarea que debió resultar habitual y que corrobora que, legales o no, los movimientos de población eran más frecuentes de lo que la Corona estuvo dispuesta a tolerar[84]. El procedimiento no planteó problemas cuando los granadinos dispusieron de la correspondiente autorización, que –y he ahí otra de las funciones que pueden señalarse– debía ser emitida por las autoridades de la villa de partida. En ese caso, actuaban la correspondiente autoridad municipal y un escribano, que abría nuevo asiento en la lista oficial de moriscos[85]. Así lo hizo, por ejemplo, el gobernador de Beas en octubre de 1579, cuando autorizó el alistamiento de Alonso Hernández y su familia, naturales de Alhendín, en la vega de Granada, y trasladados con autorización a La Puerta de Segura desde Villanueva de los Infantes[86]. No obstante, y a pesar de que las formas fueran

[81] Ahn, Om, At, leg. 15648, s.f. Lo normal, en esos casos, es que los moriscos dispusieran de un plazo prudencial para presentar sus certificaciones. Véase R.M. Pérez García, *Moriscos en Antequera, 1569-1574* cit., p. 79.

[82] Ivi. Según testimonio del escribano firmado el 18.02.1583, el morisco había pagado alcabalas en la villa desde, al menos, 1575.

[83] Fajardo solicitó que el escribano diera testimonio de su inscripción en las «listas que yo y la dicha mi muger e hijo tenemos en esta villa, ansí la que hiço de mi persona e casa el doctor Vera, alcalde mayor que fue deste partido como la que ultimamente hiçieron el señor liçenciado Ortega, alcalde mayor que de presente es, en las quales dichas listas me listé yo e la dicha mi muger e hijo». En febrero de 1583, el escribano certificó que los moriscos aparecían en sendos censos realizados en 1579 (el del doctor Vera) y en mayo de 1582 (la del licenciado Ortega).

[84] Aparte de los ya citados relativos a Extremadura y la Mancha, sirva como ejemplo el caso de Écija, donde entre 1585 y 1594, las autoridades municipales alistaron más de setenta moriscos trasladados allí desde diferentes lugares. Cifras más modestas, pero también significativas en Pastrana, en dominio señorial. Véanse M. F. Fernández Chaves y R. M. Pérez García, *Notas sobre la destrucción de las comunidades moriscas malagueñas y su reconstrucción en la campiña sevillana, 1569-1610* cit., p. 133 y R. Sánchez González, *Movilidad morisca en la Corona de Castilla, 1570-1610* cit., p. 391.

[85] M. García Ruipérez, *La expulsión de los moriscos del Reino de Granada en los documentos municipales. Estudio archivístico* cit., pp. 85-86

[86] Ahn, Om, At, leg. 51575. 14.10.1579

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respetadas en lo esencial, el «recibimiento» de nuevos vecinos moriscos podía llevarse a efecto siguiendo pautas diferentes, en las que parece que también mediaron las autoridades concejiles. Así ha podido documentarse, entre otros, en Llerena, donde se menciona la participación de los regidores[87] o en Madrid, en cuyos libros de acuerdos municipales se dejaba constancia de tales avecindamientos[88].

Finalmente, y relacionados con la labor de alistamiento, también deben señalarse la expedición y visado de certificados de vecindad cuando, a petición de parte, eran reclamados por otra autoridad gubernativa o judicial o por los propios moriscos. En este último caso, era el cristiano nuevo quien solicitaba el documento. La cédula solo le era concedida tras demostrar, mediante la presentación de testigos, que el morisco era quien decía ser, algo que, de paso, obligaba a la correspondiente toma de declaración a los testigos[89] y al más que posible pago de las costas, que corrían de cuenta del propio morisco. El resultado final era un documento de alta consideración para los cristianos nuevos, dado que en él recaía el valor probatorio necesario para la solicitud de nuevos visados, el cambio de residencia o la futura petición de pasaportes y cédulas. No en vano, en ellos se incluían todos los datos necesarios para redactar los diferentes documentos a los que ya ha hecho referencia[90].

[87] En torno a 1574, Francisco Gutiérrez, regidor de Llerena «recibió por vecino» a Alonso de Peralta, quien había sido alistado inicialmente en Alcalá del Río, para recalar en la villa extremeña tras haber pasado también una temporada en Pastrana. Ahn, Om, At, leg., 3064, s.f. Testimonio de septiembre de 1579.

[88] A veces era tan solo una sucinta mención («alistose por provisión...», se dice). Avm. Libros de Actas, libro 23. 02.04.1594. En otras ocasiones se observan asientos más detallados: «En este ayuntamiento Alonso Méndez y Alonso de Espinosa, moriscos, presentaron una provisión de S. M. firmada de los señores de su Real Consejo, su fecha en quince de octubre deste año y refrendada de Juan Gallo de Andrada, su secretario, por la qual se manda los alisten en esta villa. Y vista, la obieron por presentada y los obieron por alistados». Avm, Libros de Actas, libro 22. 06.11.1585. Agradezco a Javier Irigoyen-García la generosa cesión de los datos relativos a este asunto.

[89] Como, por ejemplo, el que hizo Alfonso de Parra, vecino de Almagro, a favor de Miguel Fernández Roayne: «conoce al dicho Miguel Fernández Roayne y sabe que es de los moriscos naturales del Reyno de Granada e sabe que desde que vino del dicho Reyno su padre y él son vezinos e alistados en la dicha villa de Almagro donde los a visto vivir e morir e sabe quel susodicho en una caxa de hoja de lata tenía su lista e testimonio de su vezindad de la justicia». Ahn, Om, At, leg. 38223. 08.03.1593.

[90] Véase a través del testimonio de vecindad de Álvaro de Jaén, firmado por el alcalde mayor de la gobernación de Almagro. En él se incluyen: ciudad de origen (Granada), parroquia de origen (Santiago), parroquia de alistamiento (Madre de Dios), dirección (calle del mesón de Orozco), descripción de la casa (en una casa de Pascual Rodríguez, mesonero), edad (27 años poco más o menos), descripción física (buena estatura, ladino, blanco de rostro, barbirrojo, los ojos verdes pintados, delgado de cara, tiene un poco poblada la barba, lunar encima de la ceja izquierda, señalica pequeña de herida en la

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5. La gestión del día a día: problemas y conflictos

La acumulación de funciones obligó a un reparto más o menos efectivo de competencias entre los diversos agentes locales (justicias, escribanos, alguaciles...). Ese aumento de la carga de trabajo también corrió paralelo al surgimiento de problemas relacionados con la administración burocrática y con la consiguiente aparición de lo que podría denominarse como una «conflictividad de la vigilancia», a cuya resolución tuvieron que hacer frente los tribunales de primera instancia, independientemente de que sus sentencias pudieras ser apeladas.

Como no podía ser de otra manera, la libertad de movimiento acaparó gran parte de los escenarios de enfrentamiento judicial. Las causas que empujaron a los moriscos a desplazarse sin autorización son conocidas y se repiten por doquier, independientemente de la comarca en la que se centre la atención. Recién terminada la guerra de las Alpujarras, y con centenares de granadinos aún por alistar, fueron muchos quienes se resistieron a emprender una nueva vida alejados de los suyos. Los recursos ante los comisarios encargados del reparto de los expulsados granadinos lo corroboran. Muchos de los traslados fueron autorizados y permitieron que individuos inicialmente inscritos en una localidad pudieran cambiar de residencia para facilitar su reagrupación familiar, bien de manera temporal bien definitivamente[91]. Por motivos obvios, el asunto requería de cierta atención cuando el morisco carecía de vínculos con la localidad en la que pretendía alistarse. Así le ocurrió al alguacil del partido de Ocaña, quien emprendió proceso contra un tal Juan Martínez, arriero oriundo de Palencia que, finalmente, logró demostrar que tenía sus papeles en regla[92]. En otros casos, las salidas no fueron autorizadas y se trata de un fenómeno que, a juzgar por la frecuencia con la que se repite, fue mucho más habitual de lo que cabría suponer en un primer momento. Sin duda, es algo que

mano izquierda entre los dedos pulgar y el de junto a él) y fecha de expedición (02.03.1582). Ahn, Om, At, leg. 38223, fol. 13v.

[91] Se trata de casos frecuentes en el año 1571 y casi siempre se refieren a mujeres que sido separadas de sus esposos e hijos como los que, entre otros, en la Mancha, afectaron a Lorenzo del Ari, su hermana y su madre, que obtuvieron permiso para trasladarse desde el campo de San Juan hasta el vecino partido de Quintanar. Ags, Cámara de Castilla, leg. 2162, fol. 31.

[92] Ahn, Om, At, leg. 54065.

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también muestra muy claramente la negativa a aceptar el resultado del reparto ejecutado por los comisarios[93].

Transcurridos aquellos primeros momentos, los movimientos no desaparecieron. Todo indica que el regreso al reino de Granada dejó de ser un objetivo prioritario; sin embargo, no parece que mermara la intensidad del fenómeno, algo que alertó a las autoridades y obligó –se ha visto ya– a replantear los sistemas de control. Un testimonio del gobernador de Ocaña fechado en febrero de 1583 da idea de que el asunto era percibido con cierta preocupación, pues «es benido a su noticia que muchos moriscos de los repartidos y listados en esta dicha villa se an ydo y ausentado della y otros rrepartidos y listados en otras partes se an benido a bibir y residir en esta dicha villa mudándose sin orden y licencia de su mag»[94].

Junto a los motivos familiares[95], las otras dos causas que se aducen para justificar las huidas son la pobreza[96] y los motivos laborales, recurso este último que emplean de manera mayoritaria los arrieros y trajinantes[97].

[93] En Almagro, por ejemplo, más de una treintena de individuos fueron condenados por llegar de manera ilegal a la villa ya que carecían de los documentos que acreditaban su vecindad. Véase M.F. Gómez Vozmediano, *Mudéjares y moriscos en el Campo de Calatrava* cit., cuadro nº 9, pp. 127-128. De la magnitud del fenómeno dan idea las cifras relativas a toda la región manchega, donde el porcentaje de personas que cambiaron de residencia (legal o ilegalmente) ascendió a un 2,5% del total de moriscos avecindados. Más de tres cuartas partes de ellos fueron detenidos o alistados (en el caso de traslados autorizados) en lugares de Andalucía, incluso del propio reino de Granada. Véase F.J. Moreno Díaz del Campo, *Los moriscos de La Mancha* cit., pp. 100-102.

[94] Ahn, Om, At, leg. 15648. 06.02.1583

[95] Sirva el ejemplo de Lorenzo Hernández y Francisco, su hijo, quienes en 1579 se trasladaron a Llerena desde tierras segovianas con el objetivo de casar a una hija del primero. A pesar de tener pasaporte para siete meses, fueron juzgados por haber sobrepasado ese límite temporal. Parece ser que una inesperada enfermedad les retuvo. A pesar de ser inicialmente condenados a cuatro años de galeras y cien azotes, la revisión de su caso en el Consejo de las Órdenes determinó que fueran expuestos a los azotes y a vergüenza pública, pero no se vieron libres del remo y solo fueron obligados a regresar a su localidad de origen. Ahn, Om, At, leg. 3064, s.f.

[96] Así le ocurrió, por ejemplo, a Luis de Mendoza «y consortes», quienes, «por la grande hambre y esterilidad que auía», recalaron en 1579 en la localidad de Los Santos, procedentes de diversos lugares de Extremadura (Ahn, Om, At, leg. 3064). Similares motivos llevaron en 1575 a Hernán Álvarez a trasladarse desde Villanueva de los Infantes hasta la comarca de Ocaña. Ahn, Om, At, leg. 15766.

[97] Sobre este asunto es referencia obligada S. de Tapia Sánchez, *Las redes comerciales de los moriscos de Castilla la Vieja: Un vehículo para sus «complicidades»*, «Studia Historica. Historia Moderna», 11 (1993), pp. 231-243. Del mismo, *Arrieros, mercaderes, mesoneros... La movilidad de los moriscos de Castilla la Vieja*, in A. Kadri; Y. Moreno Moreno y A. Echevarría Arsuaga (eds.), *Circulaciones mudéjares y moriscas* cit., pp. 129-166. Véase, para clasificación y cuantificación de licencias otorgadas en el reino de Toledo, R. Sánchez González, *Movilidad morisca en la Corona de Castilla, 1570-1610* cit., p. 387. Sobre ese

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De manera tradicional se ha defendido que la mayor parte de los movimientos tuvo un alcance comarcal, si bien es cierto que algunos llegaron más allá. En el partido de Llerena, las indagaciones hechas por el licenciado Burgos, su alcalde mayor, permitieron constatar que una parte considerable de los movimientos rebasó el límite del radio medio y alcanzó destinos ciertamente alejados de los puntos de origen. De las más de cuarenta causas que revisó el alcalde, diecinueve correspondían a individuos que habían llegado desde localidades situadas a más de cien kilómetros de la cabecera del partido, algunas de ellas tan distantes como Valencia de Alcántara en la propia Extremadura, Ciudad Rodrigo y Toledo en las Castillas o Alcalá del Río en Andalucía. A ellos cabe unir los doce individuos que procedían de lugares situados a entre cincuenta y cien kilómetros, como Montánchez o Almendralejo entre otros. Sólo cinco procedían de emplazamientos distantes a menos de cincuenta kilómetros. Muchos de ellos, como se ha visto, llegaban tras recalar por varias localidades en lo que no se sabe a ciencia cierta si era una etapa más de un periplo que no tenía por qué haber concluido ya en aquel momento[98].

Derivados del cumplimiento de la pragmática se localizan otros tres motivos de conflicto. En primer lugar, el relativo a la necesidad de llevar pasaporte. Sobre el papel, esta fue una cuestión aclarada desde principios de los años ochenta. Sin embargo, y aun a riesgo de verse desautorizadas por instancias superiores, lo cierto es que las autoridades locales optaron por una postura que, a veces, resultó conservadora, obligando a muchos moriscos a regresar a sus lugares de origen si no disponían de dichos documentos[99]. Junto a ello, cabe mencionar las discrepancias sobre la pertinencia de otorgar pasaporte y autorizar licencias de movimiento, aspecto que, como ya se ha señalado, se hizo especialmente visible cuando las autoridades tuvieron dudas acerca de las intenciones del morisco que lo solicitaba y en torno a la licitud de las mismas. A esa desconfianza se enfrentó, por ejemplo, Alonso Hernández, tendero de Ocaña, quien, no obstante, salió airoso de su pleito con el gobernador[100]. Finalmente, también se puso en duda no tanto los propósitos personales, sino la validez de los testimonios de

mismo espacio, y del mismo autor, véase *Cristianismo e Islam: moriscos granadinos en tierras de Toledo*, «Revista de Historia Social y de las Mentalidades», 15/2 (2011), pp. 187-211.

[98] Por ejemplo, Gonzalo Hernández, alistado inicialmente en Salamanca fue a parar a Azuaga o el de Diego Hernández Cuevas, morisco, de Membrilla, en la Mancha, que posteriormente pasó por las minas de Guadalcanal para recalar finalmente en Llerena. Ahn, Om, At, leg. 3064.

[99] Ahn, Om, At, leg. 38347.

[100] Ahn, Om, At, leg. 89144. Ocaña. 28.01.1582.

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los que hacían uso los moriscos para lograr esos salvoconductos o para ver autorizado un cambio de residencia[101].

La confluencia de suspicacias e interpretación estricta de la ley derivó en un endurecimiento de las condiciones para moverse libremente. Paradójicamente, ese contexto fue especialmente gravoso para aquellas personas y familias que pretendieron cambiar de residencia de manera legal[102]. Aunque la casuística es conocida, quizás convenga volver sobre algunos detalles que ayudan a comprender tanto los factores que influyeron en la gestión que se hizo de este asunto, como la evolución del mismo. En ese sentido, la muestra documental que manejamos apunta a que, durante los años 1570 y gran parte de los 1580, las autoridades judiciales de primera instancia se mostraron inflexibles a la hora de aplicar las sentencias estipuladas por la pragmática. Distinta cuestión es observar lo ocurrido a partir de la última década de siglo, momento en el que parece darse cierta relajación en las penas impuestas, tanto en las sentencias dictadas inicialmente como en las de apelación. El caso ya visto de Bernardino Fajardo y Luisa Gutiérrez es uno de ellos. También el de Alonso de la Fuente, quien, debido a su condición de mercader, se ausentaba de manera frecuente de la villa de Borox, cerca de Aranjuez, donde estaba alistado, para ir a comerciar y tratar negocios en Toledo. Al parecer, según él mismo defendió, había obtenido permiso para ir puntualmente a la ciudad del Tajo, donde también pretendía ser alistado. A pesar de incumplir la pragmática, mantuvo que la cercanía de ambas localidades (distantes algo más de una legua) demostraba que sus intenciones no eran espurias. Finalmente, solo fue condenado a no ausentarse de su villa[103].

Su caso fue muy similar al de García de Molina. Alistado inicialmente en Albalate (actual provincia de Guadalajara), fue sorprendido residiendo en Almonacid de Zorita, a apenas un cuarto de legua de distancia. Tras ser condenado a la pena estipulada por la pragmática, el Consejo de las Órdenes modificó la condena y ordenó cuatro años de destierro de la propia villa de Almonacid y reclusión, durante el

[101] Tal y como le ocurrió a un tal Alonso de Alcalá, que no pudo demostrar su avecindamiento en Almagro tras llegar, años antes, procedente de la villa montieleña de Cózar. Ahn, Om, At, leg. 38223. 16.05.1609

[102] Ese fue el motivo que llevó a determinadas comunidades, como la de El Toboso, a solicitar al Rey que les permitiera contraer matrimonio con personas de otras localidades y «hacer vida con nuestras mugeres aunque sean listadas en otra parte». Ahpto, leg. 13360, s.f. 12.01.1584.

[103] Ahn, Om, At, leg. 38151. 09.02.1590.

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mismo tiempo, en la de Albalate[104]. Aunque la fecha (1585) viene a coincidir con esa progresiva relajación a la que ya se ha hecho referencia no cabe descartar la existencia de otros factores como la edad, los problemas de salud que adujo el acusado o la cercanía entre ambas villas, cuestión en la que también entra en juego la calificación y gravedad del delito, tal y como le ocurrió también, y entre otros, a Alonso García, su esposa e hijos, a los que se encausó porque siendo moriscos «andauan fuera de sus casas a la medianoche»[105]. En este caso, la sentencia tampoco resultó muy dura (doscientos maravedíes por persona), si bien agravó la situación de proscripción social de los granadinos, dado que limitaba, más aún si cabe, su libertad de movimiento.

El caso anterior puede relacionarse con otro de los motivos de roce entre moriscos y autoridades locales: el abuso de posición dominante por parte de estas últimas. En la mayor parte de las ocasiones, las quejas de los cristianos nuevos estuvieron motivadas por lo que se consideró un exceso de celo y no solo porque sintieran incomodidad ante la constante vigilancia a la que eran sometidos y por el escarnio público que suponía verse recluidos y contados de tanto en tanto[106]. Más allá de la oposición a ese «dominio simbólico», los moriscos mostraron su rechazo frontal a abusos más tangibles. Entre ellos se contaba, por ejemplo, el de tipo monetario. De ello se quejaron en 1579 los moriscos de la toledana villa de Corral de Almaguer cuando vieron que el encargado de realizar su recuento demoraba la finalización del mismo para aumentar los ocho reales diarios que cobrada y que, evidentemente, corrían de cuenta de los propios granadinos[107].

En otras ocasiones, el daño económico no era directo, pero sí interfería en el correcto desempeño de las labores profesionales de los moriscos. De ello se quejaron los moriscos de Chinchilla, en Albacete. Allí los granadinos eran citados todos los domingos y días festivos en la iglesia mayor de la localidad para comprobar si estaban presentes o

[104] Ahn, Om, At, leg. 37019. 16.10.1585. Solo se aplicaría la pena contemplada de manera inicial en caso de reincidencia.

[105] Ahn, Om, At, leg. 16870.

[106] Así lo hacían ver, entre otros, los moriscos de Quintanar cuando enviaron emisarios a solicitar al prior de Uclés que «sea servido de mandar que en la parrochial desta villa no seamos llamados a las misas mayores y contados por dichos alcaldes de la villa con el escándalo que al presente haçen de que se nos sigue ofensa». Ahpto, Protocolos, leg. 13168, fol. 441v. 07.11.1605.

[107] Ahn, Om, At, leg. 7681, s.f. Corral de Almaguer. 09.III.1579. Similar motivo llevó a los moriscos de Beas a elevar su queja ante el Consejo de las Órdenes. Ahn, Om, At, leg. 51575. Para mitigar esos gastos, los granadinos de El Toboso llegaron a proponer que los recuentos fueran efectuados por las autoridades del concejo y no por los delegados del gobernador «porque se les syguen muchas costas y gastos». Ahpto, leg. 13360, s.f. 12.01.1584.

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no. Sin embargo, la gran mayoría de ellos, jornaleros del campo, residía fuera de la villa. Acudir al pueblo les resultaba gravoso debido a la pérdida de tiempo que dicho traslado suponía en el desarrollo de sus faenas cotidianas. Por ello, y sin negar la obligación que tenían de acudir a dicha «revista», los moriscos otorgaron poder a Pedro de Baeza, uno de los suyos, para que mediara ante el obispo Juan de Zúñiga e intentara que se revocara dicha obligación «alegando en la dicha defensa de la dicha causa lo que nos convenga por cuanto muchos de nosotros tenemos nuestras tierras en el Monasterio del Arrabal de la dicha çiudad, donde vivimos e vamos a misa y con más ofrendas y somos buenos cristianos...»[108].

En última instancia, el cobro de derechos más o menos legales debe relacionarse con la carencia de medios apropiados para desarrollar las labores de vigilancia, algo que también generó conflictos, no tanto con los moriscos, sino con instancias gubernativas superiores. En ese sentido, una de las quejas que más se repite es la relativa al incumplimiento de los mandatos estipulados. El desconocimiento de la obligatoriedad de alistar a los moriscos fue uno de ellos, especialmente en localidades de reducido tamaño[109]. Como también lo fue la deficiente o inadecuada custodia de los libros de matrícula[110], cometido altamente significativo, pues en ellos estaba la base de la posterior labor de identificación de los moriscos. No en vano, el mantenimiento de todo de este armazón burocrático fue soportado por las arcas concejiles[111], ya maltrechas de por sí, algo que, sin embargo, no es suficiente para blanquear abusos que, por otra parte, fueron evidentes en más de una ocasión.

6. Vigilar desde abajo

La necesidad de saber quién y quién no estaba presente, de controlar los movimientos de miles de personas, de autorizar los desplazamientos, de gestionar cientos y cientos de kilos de papel... en una época en la que los medios de reconocimiento personal no podían

[108] Ahpab, Protocolos Notariales, leg. 1824, fols. 24v-25v 6.IX.1601.

[109] Ags, Consejo Real de Castilla, leg. 514/9-4. Interrogatorio a Miguel Moreno, labrador y alcalde ordinario de la villa de Renera (Guadalajara). 20.10.1594

[110] Ags, Consejo Real de Castilla, leg. 514-7, fol. 10r. Griñón, 23.02.1595. Caso similar en Quintanar de la Orden, donde se mandó comprar libro para alistar a los granadinos. Ahpto, Diversos, fols. 236r-v (21.02.1575)

[111] Ahn, Om, At, leg. 55833. El Consejo a las autoridades municipales del partido de Quintanar de la Orden instándoles a que hagan información para saber si los salarios del superintendente de moriscos pueden pagarse de los propios o si es necesaria alguna contribución morisca. Madrid, 14.05.1576.

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ir mucho más allá de la mera encuesta visual, convirtió en ineludible la redacción de los padrones de moriscos, poderosa y utilísima herramienta gracias a la cual se dispone hoy una fuente con la que esclarecer importantes datos acerca de la minoría morisca[112]. El objetivo del texto que concluye aquí ha sido poner de relieve el importantísimo papel que tuvieron las autoridades locales en la gestión del asunto morisco, especialmente tras la revuelta de las Alpujarras y en todo lo relacionado con el asunto de la movilidad. El interés de la Monarquía a la hora de controlar a los granadinos fue manifiesto en los años que mediaron entre las expulsiones de 1570 y 1609-1614, pero nada de lo realizado entonces hubiera sido posible sin el concurso de aquellos individuos encuadrados en los escalones inferiores de la administración. Su desconocido trabajo fue la admisión tácita de que la gestión descentralizada del asunto morisco era la única manera de poner coto a los deseos de libertad de los granadinos y de intentar calmar esa «obsesión» que, como tan acertadamente señala Bernard Vincent, caracterizó a la actuación de esas autoridades que, desde Madrid, observaban a los moriscos con miedo y recelo, pero casi siempre desde lejos.

[112] En torno a este tipo de documentos y a su existencia como muestra del vigor administrativo del estado moderno, véase T. Herzog, *Naming, Identifying and Authorizing Movement in Early Modern Spain and Spanish America*, in K. Breckenridge, K., S. Szreter (eds.), *Registration and Recognition: Documenting the Person in World History*, The Bristish Academy-Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, p. 191.

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Fernando Moreno Cuadro

LOS LIBROS DE VIAJES DE GIOVANNI AGOSTINO COTTALOURDA A PALESTINA, PERSIA Y MESOPOTAMIA (1753-1757)

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RESUMEN: *La obra de Giovanni Agostino Cottalourda se encuadra de manera excepcional en la labor misional del Carmelo teresiano, sobre la que existe una amplia bibliografía que silencia de forma sistemática al carmelita descalzo a quien dedicamos este artículo, enmarcando sus publicaciones en la clásica literatura de viajes más que en el ámbito misional, pues en sus libros aborda, además de los itinerarios recorridos e interesantes notas artísticas, aspectos políticos, militares y de costumbres, sin olvidar obviamente los aspectos religiosos que están presentes desde el primer viaje al Monte Carmelo, donde tuvo su origen la Orden para venerar a María y que fue abandonado por la presión de los sarracenos.*

PALABRAS CLAVE: *Carmelitas, Misiones, Monte Carmelo, Palestina, Persia, Mesopotamia.*

TRAVEL BOOKS BY GIOVANNI AGOSTINO COTTALOURDA ABOUT HIS JOURNEYS THROUGH PALESTINE, PERSIA AND MESOPOTAMIA (1753-1757)

ABSTRACT: *The work of Giovanni Agostino Cottalourda fits perfectly into the missionary work of the Teresian Carmel. Despite the extensive bibliography on the subject, it systematically omits the barefoot Carmelite who this article is dedicated to, slotting his publications into the genre of classic travel literature rather than missionary work. This may be because, in his books, he not only addresses the itineraries and routes but also adds interesting artistic notes, as well as political, military and cultural observations, obviously not forgetting the religious elements, which are mentioned from the first trip to Monte Carmelo, the place where the Order was first founded to venerate the Virgin Mary, later to be abandoned due to pressure from the Saracens.*

KEYWORDS: *Carmelites, Missions, Mount Carmel, Palestine, Persia, Mesopotamia.*

1. Introducción a la labor misional del Carmelo teresiano y su expansión a Italia

La idea que llevó a santa Teresa a promover la fundación del primer monasterio de carmelitas descalzas fue vivir la rigidez primitiva[1] con la finalidad de conseguir un total aislamiento para centrar la vida en Dios[2], como los ermitaños del Carmelo. Así, la primera fundación teresiana (San José de Ávila, 1562) estuvo orientada a la vida contemplativa, volcada en la oración: «Todas las que tenemos este hábito sagrado del Carmen somos llamadas a la oración y contemplación,

[1] Santa Teresa de Jesús, *Vida* 32.

[2] Véase Efrén de la Madre de Dios, *El ideal de Santa Teresa en la fundación de San José*, «Carmelus», 10 (1963), pp. 206-230.

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porque éste fue nuestro principio»[3], a lo que se debía unir el silencio, la penitencia y el trabajo, con un singular replanteamiento del *Ora et labora* que la descalcez convierte en *Contemplatio* y *Actio*, sus componentes fundamentales[4], concentrándose esta última en la lucha contra las herejías para la rama masculina y en las tareas de la vida cotidiana –«Pongan mucho en los ejercicios de las manos»[5]— para la rama femenina, en cuyo seno se presenta como un símbolo de la humildad que permite progresar en la oración[6], que se convierte en vehículo fundamental para salvar almas[7], tanto de herejes como de gentiles, propósito que contagió a sus seguidores convirtiendo la vida contemplativa en acción apostólica[8], siendo de especial relevancia para el pensamiento teresiano la introducción de la dimensión misionera en el ideal contemplativo[9]. Importante concepto que se visualiza en algunos tipos iconográficos teresianos[10]; sirva de ejemplo una singular pintura del convento de PP.CC.DD. de Úbeda, en la que se asocia el retrato de santa Teresa fundadora y escritora con san Juan de la Cruz y el padre Gracián en actitud orante[11], ambos de la misma edad, pero con marcada diferencia de años en la tela ubetense, recordando la *actio* y la *contemplatio* características del Carmelo, la cercanía de san Juan de la Cruz con la reformadora descalza contemplativa que añoraba la primitiva *Regla* y que contrasta con la activa fundadora con preocupación misional y de salvación de almas, tendencia al apostolado, a la predicación y a la misión de corte jesuítico y aviliano que estaría representada por Gracián[12].

En *Camino de perfección* la carmelita expone la búsqueda de Cristo en la oración y, aunque santa Teresa fomenta la vida común fraterna –«todas han de ser amigas, todas se han de amar, todas se han de querer, todas

[3] Santa Teresa de Jesús, 5 *Moradas* 1, 3.

[4] F. Moreno Cuadro, *Apoteosis, tesis y privilegios del Carmelo*, en *Iconografía y arte carmelitanos*, cat. exp. Hospital Real de Granada, 1991, Publicaciones del IV Centenario de San Juan de la Cruz, Junta de Andalucía, Turner, 1991, pp. 17-40, vid. esp. pp. 30-31.

[5] Santa Teresa de Jesús, *Carta* LXXXVII al padre Gracián, 20 de septiembre de 1576.

[6] F. Moreno Cuadro, *La vida cotidiana como símbolo de la humildad y la fortaleza en el Carmelo teresiano*, en M.A. Zalama, P. Mogollón (eds.), *Alma Ars*, Universidad de Valladolid y Universidad de Extremadura, Valladolid, 2013, pp. 233-240.

[7] Santa Teresa de Jesús, *Carta* XXIII al padre Gracián, 13 de diciembre de 1575, citada por D. Zuazúa, *Trayectoria misional de Santa Teresa de Jesús*, «Revista de Espiritualidad», 74 (2015), p. 553.

[8] D. De Pablo Maroto, *Ser y misión del Carmelo Teresiano*, Editorial de Espiritualidad, Madrid, 2011, pp. 61-62.

[9] E. Renaultt, *L' idéal apostolique des Carmélites selon Thé-rèse d'Avila*, Desclée de Brouwer, París, 1981, p. 171.

[10] F. Moreno Cuadro, *Iconografía de santa Teresa de Jesús*, III. *De las visiones a la vida cotidiana*, Grupo Editorial Fonte – Monte Carmelo, Burgos, 2018, pp. 309-311.

[11] *Decor Carmeli. El Carmelo en Andalucía*, cat. exp. CajaSur, Córdoba, 2002, p. 248.

[12] Al respecto, véase L.E. Rodríguez-San Pedro Bezares, *La dualidad de Teresa de Jesús y el proyecto de `jesuitas descalzos´*, «Hispania Sacra», LXVIII, 137 (2016), pp. 299-315.

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se han de ayudar»[13]–, insiste expresamente en el aislamiento y recogimiento, con espíritu ermitaño: «El estilo que pretendemos llevar es no solo de ser monjas sino ermitañas, y así se desasen de todo lo creado»[14], lo que subraya el retorno a la primitiva austeridad del Carmelo eliano.

En tanto que la descalcez sugirió la vuelta al eremitismo[15], en los monasterios femeninos son frecuentes los oratorios donde las descalzas podían buscar la soledad de la vida eremítica y a donde se retiraban «todo el tiempo que no anduvieran con la comunidad o en oficio della»[16]; ermitas que se construyen en la huerta y están dedicadas a determinados santos o misterios y decoradas con imágenes «que ponen mucha devoción a quien las ve»[17], en las que, además del retiro en soledad, se celebraban las festividades correspondientes de sus respectivas advocaciones con procesiones y adornos de enramados[18]. Más elaborada fue la propuesta arquitectónica de los descalzos, creando el carmelita español Tomás de Jesús (1564-1627) la tipología de los Santos Desiertos[19], complejos monásticos de los que Pateta[20] ha destacado un precedente en las estructuras y caracteres de los eremitorios camaldunenses, que debían estar alejados del mundo con celdas aisladas para estar encerrados en soledad hasta la muerte[21], y los sacromontes[22] –cuya edificación fue tan querida de san Carlos Borromeo, el santo de la regeneración espiritual– que reproducían los lugares de la Pasión de Cristo con ermitas convirtiéndose en centros del mundo en los que tenía lugar la ascensión espiritual hasta el Árbol de la Cruz, un *axis mundi* como el Árbol del Paraíso, asimilándose con el Gólgota[23].

[13] Santa Teresa de Jesús, *Camino de perfección* 4, 7.

[14] Ivi, 13, 6.

[15] Fray Anastasio del Santísimo Rosario, *L´Eremitismo della Reforma carmelitana*, «Ephemerides Carmelitana», II (1948), pp. 245-262.

[16] *Constituciones*, cap. I, 14.

[17] A. Saint-Säens, *Thérèse d´Avila ou l´erémitisme sublime*, «Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez», 25 (1989), pp. 121-143.

[18] Al respecto, véase Jerónimo de San José, *Historia del Carmen Descalzo* (Madrid, 1637) y J.J. Martín González, *El convento de San José de Ávila (Patronos y obras de arte)*, «Boletín del Seminario de Arte y Arqueología de Valladolid», XLV(1979), pp. 317 y sgg.

[19] B. Zimmerman, *Les saints déserts des Carmes déchaussés*, Art catholique, París, 1927.

[20] L. Pateta, *De los Sacros Montes a los Santos Desiertos*, en *Actas del III Congreso Internacional de Barroco Americano*, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Sevilla, 2001, pp. 1121 y sgg.

[21] G.B. Mittarelli, A. Costadoni, *Regola della vita* (1575, c. 2 y 4), *Annales Camaldulenses Ordinis Sancti Benedicti*, Venecia, 1755-1773, v. III. p. 543.

[22] Véase A. Bonet Correa, *Sacromontes y Calvarios en España, Portugal y América Latina*, en S. Gensini (ed.), *La <Gerusalem> di San Vivaldo e sacri monti in Europa*, Pacini Editore, Montaione, 1989, pp. 174-213.

[23] G. Oneto, *Il Monte Sacro. Note sugli aspetti simbolii dei Sacri Monti*, en *La città rituale: La città e lo Stato di Milano nell´etá dei Borromeo*, Franco Angeli, Milán, 1982, pp. 189-211.

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Pero las fundaciones de Tomás de Jesús, que promovió a finales del XVI tres desiertos en España entre 1592 y 1599 –Bolarque (Guadalajara)[24], Burgo (Málaga) y el salmantino de Las Batuecas (1598), el más famoso de toda la Orden del Carmen[25]– que desde la Península[26] se difundieron por todo el orbe impulsados por el movimiento de renovación religiosa que lleva a aislarse del mundo y restaurar los caminos de la vida espiritual[27], más que lugares de retiro hasta la muerte, eran lugares destinados al retiro temporal que permitía recuperar fuerzas con la práctica eremítica[28] y seguir adelante con las tareas de evangelización encomendadas por la Iglesia, especialmente la lucha contra las herejías y la defensa del ideal católico con espíritu misional[29].

Para representar la difusión del Carmelo por todo el mundo se utilizaron varios medios, entre los que destaca especialmente la barca, que no solo fue utilizada por los Carmelitas de la Antigua Observancia para figurar su traslado de Oriente a Occidente que recordaremos en el siguiente parágrafo, sino también por el Carmelo teresiano para figurar la expansión de los descalzos a Italia y al resto del mundo, como podemos apreciar en dos espléndidas estampas de Adrian Clouwet (Fig. 1). En la primera, grabada para el libro de Isidorus a Sancto Ioseph y Petrus a Sancto Andrea, *Historia generalis fratrum discalceatorum ordinis beatae Virginis Mariae de Monte Carmelo congregationis S. Eliae*, publicado en Roma en dos volúmenes en 1668 y 1671, se representó la expansión del Carmelo teresiano desde España a Italia, donde tuvo un destacado protagonismo Génova[30], la principal ciudad

[24] Diego de Jesús María, *Desierto de Bolarque, yermo de carmelitas descalzos y descripción de los demás conventos de la reforma*, Imprenta Real, Madrid, 1651.

[25] F. Rodríguez de la Flor, *De las Batuecas a las Hurdes. Fragmentos para una historia mítica*, Consejería de Cultura y Patrimonio de la Junta de Extremadura, Badajoz, 1999; D. de Pablo Maroto, *Batuecas. Tierra mítica y desierto carmelitano*, Editorial Espiritualidad, Madrid, 2001.

[26] Eulogio de la Virgen del Carmen, *Los santos desiertos carmelitanos en España*, en *Actas de la VI Semana de Estudios Monásticos. San Salvador de Leyre. España Eremítica*, Universidad, Pamplona, 1970, pp. 587-632.

[27] Felipe de la Virgen del Carmen, *La Soledad Fecunda. Santos Desiertos de Carmelitas Descalzos*. Editorial de Espiritualidad, Madrid, 1961.

[28] Paralelamente a la implantación de los Santos Desiertos, la Orden se preocupaba de dar *Instrucción espiritual para los Religiosos carmelitas Descalzos que profesan la vida eremítica*, en la obra publicada en Madrid en 1629.

[29] Pauline du Saint Sacrement, *Du Saint Désert aux Missions: la vocation de Tomás de Jesús*, «Études carmélitaines», 1945, pp. 248-252.

[30] Para el papel de Génova en la expansión, véase A. Roggero, *Genova e gli inizi della riforma teresiana in Italia (1584-1597)*, Institutum Historicum Teresianum, Studia, 3, Roma, 1984. Sobre el carácter receptivo de Italia a los extranjeros, véase I. Fosi, *Stranieri in Italia: Mobilità, controllo, tolleranza*, en A. Giuffrida, F. D´Avenia, D. Palermo (eds.), *Studi storici dedicati a Orazio Cancila*, «Quaderni Mediterranea. Ricerche storiche», 16 (2011), 4 vols. II, pp. 531-556.

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

1. A. Clouwet sobre dibujo de Fabritius Clarus, *Expansión del Carmelo teresiano*, en *Historia Generalis Fratrum Discalceatorum...*, Roma, 1668 y 1671 (izquierda) y versión para la *Controversia dogmaticae Adversus Haereses*, Roma, 1710 (derecha).

de la región de Liguria, a la que hay que vincular a Giovanni Agostino Cottalourda[31]. La bandera de la barca del Carmelo lleva la inscripción «Ex Ibero ad Tiberim», estando representados dichos ríos respectivamente por la alegoría que al fondo de la estampa vierte el agua de un ánfora y por la situada en primer término con una loba y dos niños que aluden a la mítica fundación de Roma. La barca, que estaba capitaneada por santa Teresa y tenía en la proa una imagen de la Virgen del Carmen, era llevada por cuatro carmelitas: Domingo de Jesús María (Domingo Ruzola), Fernando de Santa María (Martínez), Juan de Jesús María de San Pedro y Uztarroz (El Calagurritano) y Pedro de la Madre de Dios (Pedro Jerónimo de Villagrasa).

En la versión de Clouwet para la *Controversia Dogmaticae Adversus Haereses utriusque orbis occidentalis et orientalis explicatae alumnis seminarii S. Pancratii Fratrum Carmelitarum Discalceatorum apud Sanctum Pancratium de Urbe* de Liberio de Jesús, publicada en Roma en 1710, la barca del Carmelo sigue igual, pero ha cambiado la

[31] W. Piastra (ed.), *Dizionario biografico dei liguri, dalle origini ai nostri giorni*, Consulta Ligure, Genova, 1998, IV, p. 64.

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inscripción «Ex Ibero ad Tiberim» por la de «Ex urbe ad orbem» para indicar la expansión del Carmelo por todo el mundo combatiendo la Herejía y la Idolatría que aparecen representadas en primer término de la estampa, siendo aquí donde se han producido los cambios más significativos respecto a la plancha que sirvió de modelo, puesto que se ha añadido la representación de la Herejía y se ha transformado el antiguo Tiber en una alegoría de la Idolatría sustituyendo el laurel por las serpientes que adornan su cabeza y envuelven su cuerpo. Menos significativo desde el punto de vista formal, pero muy interesante en relación con el mensaje ideológico que quiere transmitir la estampa, es el cambio de inscripción en el lienzo que portan los ángeles que preceden a Elías. En la estampa que ilustraba la *Historia generalis…* llevaba el título de la obra, mientras que en la de la *Controversia Dogmaticae…* lleva la frase evangélica «Ite et vos in vineam meam» («Id también vosotros a mi viña», Mt 20,4), aludiendo no solo a la evangelización llevada a cabo por los descalzos, sino también a la expansión de la Orden con nuevos conventos que engrandecieron la Vid del Carmelo plantada por Elías y la devoción a María, para cuya veneración surgió la Orden en la cordillera israelí del karmel, en el distrito de Haifa sobre el Mediterráneo, desde donde se trasladaron a Occidente.

2. El abandono de Oriente por la presión de los sarracenos y el papel de Italia en la iconografía de la Virgen del Carmen

En *Les peintures sacrees du Temple du Carmel* (c.1660)[32], ilustrada con veintiséis estampas de los más importantes grabadores flamencos del momento que fueron ideadas por el padre Gracián de San Elías y

[32] No tiene fecha de edición, aunque la dedicatoria del padre Gracián de San Elías a la condesa de Boussv se data el 19 de abril de 1660, en la ermita de San José en Mulem. En ella se presenta el carmelita como inventor de las estampas, que fueron dibujadas por Abraham Diepenbeeck, anotando a continuación que un religioso de la Provincia Carmelitana de Francia realizó las poesías que las completan, quedando éste en el anonimato, aunque lo conocemos a través de la edición que se realizó en 1669 de la excepcional obra, recogida por Antoine Gabriel de Becdeliévre-Hamel en su *Biographie liégeoise, ou précis historique et chronologique de toutes les personnes qui se sont rendus célèbres pour leurs talens, leurs versus ou leurs actions, dans l´ancien Diocése et pays de Liége, les duchés de Limboarg et de Bouillon, le pays de Stavelot, et la ville de Maestricht; depuis les tempes les plus reculés jusqu´a nos tours* (Imprimerie de Jeunehomme Frères, Dernier-Le-Palais, Liége, 1837, t. II. p. 161), en la que el padre Louis, prior de los carmelitas de Liége, además de dedicar la obra a Maximiliano Henrique de Baviera, elector de Cologne y obispo de Liége, previene el lector de que no tenía necesidad de creer que había nacido poeta y que su obra literaria había sido compuesta en los momentos que le dejaban libres las obligaciones eclesiásticas.

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dibujadas por Abraham Diepenbeeck (1596-1675)[33], se inserta una estampa de Adrian Lommelin en la que san Bertoldo de Lombardía[34] recibe el encargo de María de dirigirse a Occidente —«Surge / et / vade /in / occide(n)/tem»[35]— con la promesa de que «Pour un lieu que tu perds, je t´en prepare cent, / et ton Nom fera bruit jusqu´aux deux bouts du monde»[36], representado en un segundo plano rodeado por unos carmelitas que preparan el viaje.

Entre la estampas que ilustran *Les peintures sacrees*... encontramos otras estampas directamente relacionadas con la expansión del Carmelo, especialmente la que fue favorecida por san Luis de Francia, quien tuvo una gran devoción a la Virgen del Carmen[37] que se explica con una estampa de Pierre Clouwet en la que se representa al monarca francés desembarcando en el Monte Carmelo salvado por María de una tempestad que aparece reflejada en la lámina con el contraste entre el oscurecido cielo marino y la luminosidad del Carmelo coronado por la capilla dedicada a la Virgen, cuya imagen se ha figurado en la parte superior de la plancha sobre las nubes que cubren la embarcación real simbolizando su especial protección (Fig. 2). La estampa tuvo una importante repercusión artística, habiendo sido seguida por Nollet en

[33] F. Moreno Cuadro, *Diseños de Abraham van Diepenbeeck para `Les peintures sacrees du temple du Carmel´*, «*BSAA arte*», v. LXXIX (2013), pp. 157-182.

[34] En el raro ejemplar libresco comentado del que se conocen pocos ejemplares (Bibliothéque Royal de Belgique. VH 15.919ª / RP / Magasin-Réserve précieuse: Niv.-2), aparece como cuarto general de la Orden y se ha confundido a veces con san Bertoldo de Malefaida, cruzado de origen francés que hay que situar en la segunda mitad del siglo XII (B. Zimmerman, *Monumenta historica carmelitana*, Ex typis abbatiae, Lirinae [Îles de Lérins, France], 1907, I, pp. 269-276) y que se quiso conectar con los «Hijos de los Profetas», aunque en los *Acta Sanctorum*, repertorio iniciado a principios del siglo XVII por H. Rosweyde y seguido, entre otros, por J. Bolland, G. Henschen y D. Papenbroeck, este último defendió en sus trabajos sobre el santoral de marzo (Venerado como santo en la Orden, su culto fue permitido por la antigua Congregación de Ritos en 1584 y su fiesta fijada el 29 de marzo) que fue el primer general de la Orden del Carmen, tal como aparece en la inscripción que completa la estampa grabada por Arnol van Westerhout para la obra de M. Ventimiglia, *Historia Chronológica Priorum Generalium Latinorum Ordinis Beatissimae Virginia Mariae de Monte Carmelo* (Ex Typographia Simoniana, Nápoles, 1773), y que el grupo de ermitaños que reunió entre los que vivían dispersos en el Carmelo no había tenido ningún tipo de relación con Elías, salvo venerar su memoria, al que dedicó los edificios monásticos que reconstruyó (C. Kopp, *Elias und Christentum auf dem Karmel*, *l.* Collectanea Hierosolymitana, 3, Padeborn, 1929, p. 108).

[35] *Les peintures sacrees*..., p. 15.

[36] Ivi, p. 14.

[37] La verdadera razón de la llegada a Occidente está en la inseguridad de Tierra Santa a principios del siglo XIII a pesar de los pactos entre cruzados y sarracenos. Vicente de Beauvais concreta la fecha en 1238 (*Biblioteca mundi*, IV, Douai, 1624, p. 1275), pero el abandono definitivo sería a finales de la centuria cuando los cruzados fueron definitivamente vencidos por los sarracenos.

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2. Pierre Clouwet sobre dibujo de Abraham van Diepenbeeck, *San Luis de Francia desembarcando en el Monte Carmelo*, Biblioteca del Teresianum de Roma (izquierda) y vitral de *San Luis de Francia partiendo del Monte Carmelo*, diseñado por Abraham van Diepenbeeck, Carmelo de Boxmeer, Holanda (derecha).

el cuadro que realizó sobre este tema que se conserva en el Musée de la Poterie y en la pintura de Lucas Franchois del Musée de Beaux-Arts d´Anvers en la que aparece junto a la entrega del escapulario a san Simón Stock[38], como en la pintura de *María exhortando a santa Teresa para que nombrara a san José protector de la Orden* de Giovanni Battista Tiepolo del Szépmüvészeti Múzeum de Budapest[39], en la que se quiere destacar la presencia de los carmelitas en Occidente gracias a san Luis, siendo especialmente interesante en este sentido el vitral de Boxmeer[40], que siguiendo la estampa de Clouwet representa a cuatro

[38] J.B. Descamps, *Voyage pittoresque de la Flande et de Brabant*, Chez J. Grangé, Paris-Anvers, 1792, pp. 212 y 260-261.

[39] F. Moreno Cuadro, *En torno a las fuentes iconográficas de Tiépolo para la `visión teresiana´ del Museo de Bellas Artes de Budapest*, «Archivo Español de Arte», LXXXIV, 32 (2009), pp. 243-258.

[40] C. Emond. *L´Iconographie Carmélitaine dans les anciens Pays-Bas méridionaux*, Académie Royale de Belgique, Bruselas, 1961, p. 201.

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carmelitas que van a embarcar acompañando al rey que fundó el primer convento de la Orden en París[41] (fig. 2).

El Carmelo eliano es fundamentalmente un Carmelo mariano por la vinculación de Elías y sus seguidores con María, que fue venerada en el Carmelo antes de nacer por la relación de su abuela santa Emerenciana con el paraje bíblico, según narra san Cirilo de Alejandría en *De Ortu Virginis*, en el que aparece la joven consultando a los seguidores de Elías en el Carmelo sobre el casamiento que sus padres habían concertado, teniendo los ermitaños la visión de un árbol que simbolizaba a la joven y sus flores a sus descendientes, entre los que estaba Cristo. La leyenda estuvo muy extendida en la Orden desde fines del siglo XV (*Speculum Historiale*) y aparece representada en numerosas obras[42].

María es el centro fundamental de la Orden del Carmen y así se recoge en el *Speculum de institutione ordinis pro veneratione Maria, Tractatus super regulam ordinis carmelitarum, Laus religionis carmelitana* de Johannes Baconthorpe, c. 1: «Según los profetas, los frailes del Carmelo nacieron especialmente para venerar a la Sma. Virgen María... Y puesto que es honrada y predicada por medio del Carmelo, conviene que el Carmelo a Ella consagrado tenga carmelitas que la veneren de un modo especial. Y así fue ya en la antigüedad. En realidad las profecías se comprenden a la luz de los hechos... ¡Cuántos profetas y reyes tuvo el Carmelo que en sus hazañas rindieron honores a la Señora del lugar, la bienanventurada María!. Para continuar dando culto a la Virgen María en su Carmelo nació la Orden de los Hermanos del Carmelo. Porque el culto celebrado en los lugares de los santos se tributa, después de a Dios, a los mismos santos... Pues si bien todos cuantos habían de salvarse en tiempos de los profetas honraron al futuro Hijo de la Virgen María... los frailes del Carmelo, que en tiempo de Elías y Eliseo veneraban también al que había de venir, fundaron además en el Carmelo su Orden a Santa María... Por consiguiente, para este culto tuvieron su origen»[43] y la cristología mariológica es una de las bases del Carmelo.

En este lugar, recordar que las más importantes imágenes marianas que según la tradición fueron veneradas por los carmelitas en el

[41] J.B. Lezana, *Annales sacri et prophetici et Eliani ordinis Beatis. Virginis Mariae de Monte Carmeli*, Typis Iacobi Phaei Romani Amndreae, filij, Roma, 1645-1656, 4. vols., IV, pp. 470-471.

[42] F. Moreno Cuadro, *La Sagrada Estirpe*, en *Gratia Plena*, cat. exp. CajaSur, Córdoba, 2004, pp. 226-237.

[43] Sobre la vinculación en la espiritualidad del Carmelo de Elías y María, véase A. Staring, *Medieval Carmelite Heritage. Early Reflections on the nature of the order*, «Textus et Studia Historica Carmelitana», 16 (1989), pp. 184-193.

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Monte Carmelo se trasladaron a Occidente cuando lo abandonaron por las presiones de los sarracenos, surgiendo en Italia la iconografía de la Virgen del Carmen vinculada a las legendarias obras que se creían vinieron de Oriente[44]. Entre ellas, el excepcional icono de *La Bruna*, una obra del siglo XIII, probablemene de escuela toscana, que se venera en Santa María del Carmine Maggiore de Nápoles, y la Virgen de la Annunziata de Trapani, ambas con Niño, respondiendo a los modelos clásicos de *eleousa* que con gran ternura abraza al Hijo y *hodogetria* que señala el camino de la Salvación, Jesús, a quien porta en brazos, siendo sus variantes el origen de las más bellas obras del tipo iconográfico de la Inmaculada carmelitana, pudiéndose encuadrar entre ambos tipos el tríptico de la Inmaculada del Carmen, de principios del siglo XV, que se venera en la iglesia de Santa Águeda del Carmen de Bérgamo, que presenta la composición general que aparece en buena parte de las variantes de Trapani y *La Bruna*, la *Mater Amabilis* que en el misal del Carmelo de 1551 se representa entronizada con la media luna a los pies limitada por querubines y flanqueada por ángeles músicos.

El icono de *La Bruna* tuvo una amplia difusión entre los carmelitas[45], tanto en copias pintadas como en estampas, a través de las cuales se divulgó con la media luna característica de la Inmaculada, vinculada especialmente al Camelo desde la visión eliana de la `nubecilla´ que surgió del mar, y el escapulario de la Virgen del Carmen, que simboliza la promesa de María a san Simón Stock de liberar de las penas del purgatorio a los religiosos carmelitas y a sus allegados el primer sábado después de su muerte, reconocido oficialmente el 3 de marzo de 1322 por Juan XXII en la *Bula Sabatina*[46], uno de los grandes privilegios del Carmelo que asumieron los descalzos[47].

La media luna y el escapulario son los dos elementos característicos que transformaron las legendarias imágenes ligadas al Monte Carmelo en la tradicional Virgen del Carmen, teniendo una mayor expansión el tipo de la *hodogetria* que señala al Niño como camino a seguir, siendo especialmente numerosas las variantes de la Virgen de Trapani.

[44] I. Martínez Carretero, *La advocación del Carmen. Origen e iconografía*, en *Advocaciones marianas de gloria*, XX Simposium, San Lorenzo de El Escorial, 2012, pp. 776-780.

[45] Sobre esta importante devoción carmelitana, véase E. Boaga, *La Señora del lugar. María en la historia y en la vida del Carmelo*, Edizioni Carmelitane, Roma, 2001.

[46] Véase el excelente estudio de L. Saggi, *La `Bolla Sabatina´. Ambiente. Texto. Tempo*, Institutum Carmelitanum, Roma, 1967.

[47] F. Moreno Cuadro, *Apoteosis, tesis y privilegios del Carmelo*, en *Iconografía y arte carmelitanos*, cat. exp. Hospital Real de Granada, diciembre de 1991 - enero de 1992, Turner, Madrid, 1991, pp. 17-40, vid. esp. pp. 37-40.

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La obra siciliana, procedente de un taller oriental chipriota de la órbita de Nino Pisano, el último de los grandes escultores del Trecento italiano, activo entre 1349 y 1368, lo que coincide con la leyenda de su origen oriental que la vincula a los carmelitas, tuvo una amplia difusión desde el siglo XV en Europa[48], considerándose la más antigua escultura de la Virgen del Carmen, a la que se asocia la media luna en las *Constituciones* de 1524 y de 1593[49], cuya portada sigue el modelo de *vexillum* que se consagra en *In alma Urbe* de 1564[50], del que conocemos un ejemplar procedente del Carmen de Santa María in Traspontina de Roma y que con ligeras variantes tuvo un cierto desarrollo en el siglo XVI. María se presenta como estandarte de los carmelitas —*Vexillum Carmelitarum*[51]— y Madre y Decoro del Carmelo, flanqueada por Elías y Eliseo, apareciendo en la misma centuria asociada a san Alberto y san Ángel —colofón de Lvgdini, 1570— y entregando el escapulario a san Simón Stok en la *Carta de Indulgencias* publicada en Milán en 1608, variante que concreta versiones que se habían producido en la Orden desde el siglo XV, entre las que destacan el tríptico del Carmen de Corleone, atribuido a Tomás de Vigilia[52], en el que aparece La Virgen con el Niño y la media luna rodeada por escenas del Privilegio Sabatino.

[48] A. Franco Mata, *La `Madonna di Trapani´ y su repercusión en España*, «Boletín del Seminario de Estudios de Arte y Arqueología, BSAA» 49 (1983), pp. 267-286. Sobre la devoción de la Virgen de Trapani en Nueva España y los ejemplares conocidos, véase J. Fuentes Aguilar Merino, *El retablo de la Virgen de Trapana de la Biblioteca Palafoxiana, una revalorización de su función*, tesis de maestría en Historia del Arte, defendida en la Universidad Autónoma de México, Facultad de Filosofia y Letras, Instituto de Investigaciones Estéticas, Ciudad Universitaria, 2016. http://132.248.9.195/ptd2016/septiembre/505002561/Index.html, pp. 66-75.

[49] *Constitutiones et decreta tam pro reformandis bonarum literarum studiis, quam pro reparanda vitae regularis observantia Ordinis Carmelitarum in capitulo generali Cremonae in conventu s. Bartholomaei die 6 Iunii 1593 edita*, Cristoforo Draconi, Cremona, 1593.

[50] *In alma urbe in Carmelo Sancti Martini in Montibusanni 1564: Comitiorum generalium acta*, apud Antonium Bladum impressorem cameralem, 1563.

[51] Así lo porta Elías en el *Triunfo de la Virgen del Carmen*, s. XVIII, del templo del convento del Carmen de San Luis de Potosí que se encuadra en los triunfos de María, como el que representó Cornelio van Caukercken sobre dibujo de Abraham van Diepenbeeck, simbolizando, como el de Nicolás Rodríguez Juárez para el Carmelo de Celaya, el triunfo de los defensores de la Virgen del Carmen sobre quienes negaban su inmaculada concepción y su maternidad virginal junto a su maternidad divina. Sobre este tema, véase F. Moreno Cuadro, *Iconografía de Santa Teresa de Jesús*, I. *La herencia del espíritu de Elías*, Burgos, Monte Carmelo, 2016, pp. 44-47.

[52] G. Di Marzo, *La pittura in Palermo nel Rinascimento, Storia e documenti*, A. Reber, Palermo, 1899, pp. 102 y sgg.

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3. La vuelta a Oriente de Giovanni Agostino Cottalourda y sus libros de viajes

Los ideales de vida activa y contemplativa tuvieron un importante desarrollo en el Carmelo teresiano, en el que prácticamente son inseparables la *actio* y la *contemplatio*, porque los vuelven a Elías, un hombre de oración –retiro al torrente de Querit– y de acción –lucha contra los profetas de Baal–, defensa eliana de la verdad que fue retomada por la labor misional de la Descalcez carmelitana a través de sus nuevas fundaciones en las zonas de Europa por las que se había extendido el protestantismo y en el resto de los continentes, África, América y Asia, en la que se desarrolló una destacada labor misional, especialmente en Persia, cuya importancia queda constatada en numerosas obras desde el siglo XIX. Sirva de ejemplo la redactada por el Definidor General de la Orden, el padre Berthold Ignace de Sainte Anne, *Mission de Perse per les Pères Carmen-Déchaussés, de l´année 1604 á 1612*, publicada en 1885 en Bruselas y París por la Société Belga de Librairie y por la Société de Librairie Catholique, que fue continuada por el Archivero General de la Orden, fray Florencio del Niño Jesús, quien dedicó dos volúmenes a la empresa, publicados en la Biblioteca Carmelitano-Teresiana de Misiones, *A Persia 1604-1609. Peripecias de una embajada que fue a Persia a principios del siglo XVII* (Pamplona, Ramón Bengaray, 1929) y *En Persia 1608-1624. Su fundación, sus embajadas y su apostolado* (Pamplona, Ramón Bengaray, 1930).

Posteriormente, Antonio Fortes, que había sido archivero general de la OCD, en su obra *Las misiones del carmelo Teresiano 1584-1799. Documentos del Archivo General de Roma,* en *Monumenta Historica Carmeli Teresiani. Subsidia 6* (Roma, 1997), ofrece el contenido del fondo misional del Archivo General destacando la misión de Persia, la primera asumida por la Orden al recibir en 1604 el mandato de Clemente VIII de conseguir una alianza de Shah Abbas I con Roma[53], presencia carmelita que continuó en Irán hasta finales del siglo XVIII[54]. Pero en el Archivo General de la Orden en Roma no se han

[53] Sobre la oportunidad de la misión pontificia y el proyecto de algunos carmelitas de ir a Palestina, véase D. Fernández de Mendiola, *El Carmelo teresiano en la Historia. Una nueva forma de vida contemplativa y apostólica*, Istituto Storico Teresiano, Studia 12, Roma, 2011, III, pp. 415-418 y 431-436.

[54] Para una visión sobre la opción misionera asumida por la Congregación italiana que buscó cooperadores en España, véase D. Fernández de Mendiola, *Opción misional de la congregación italiana siguiendo el espíritu de Sta. Teresa y la llamada de los papas*, en *Herencia histórica y dinamismo evangelizador*, Actas del Coloquio Internacional de Misiones OCD, Larrea, 14-19 de enero 2002, «Monte Carmelo», 110 (2002), pp. 161 y sgg.

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localizado documentos del viaje de Giovanni Agostino Cottalourda, el carmelita de la Congregación italiana que centra nuestro trabajo.

No se conocen muchos datos sobre el misionero descalzo, pero sí algunas notas biográficas de interés que sintetizamos a continuación[55]. Sabemos que nació el dos de febrero de 1704 en Breglio (Cuneo) y que profesó el veintiuno de noviembre de 1725 en Roma. A los siete años de obligarse a cumplir los votos fue enviado al Monte Carmelo donde permaneció entre 1732 y 1734, año en el que volvió a Roma, aunque su estancia en la Ciudad Eterna fue corta, pues en 1735 fue enviado a Bagdad acompañando a su correligionario Emanuele di sant´Alberto, que había sido nombrado provicario apostólico de la Iglesia católica en la región de misión. En esta etapa recorrió varias localidades de Persia, estando documentada en 1736 su presencia en la provincia iraní de Hamadán, en los montes Zagros. El veinticuatro de abril de 1745 vuelve a Europa y tiene la oportunidad de viajar en 1746 a su tierra natal acompañando a su hermano Giovanni Andrea di sant´Agostino, también carmelita descalzo, a quien los médicos le habían recomendado una estancia en su región para sanar de una enfermedad que no logró superar[56].

En 1747 la *Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide* lo envió a Mesopotamia con el encargo de fundar en Mosul, Mardin, Diabequir y Orfa (Edesa), desde donde volvió a Diabequir y Mosul, en la que permaneció desde 1748 a 1750[57], fecha en la que regresó a Roma siguiendo un largo periplo por vía terrestre a través de Constantinopla, Valaquia, Transilvania y Viena[58], donde presentó su labor en las misiones orientales, como él mismo confiesa en su texto *Al benigno lettore*, en el que escribe «Io non avrei mai ardito di darle alla publica luce, se a ciò fare non mi avesse obbligato il comando dei clementissimi Arciduchi d´Austria», los hijos de la emperatriz María Teresa I de Austria y de Francisco I del Sacro Imperio Romano Germánico, a quienes dedicó su obra, el libro de *Palestina* al archiduque José que sucedió a su madre y fue emperador del Sacro Imperio entre 1780 y 1790 como José II, el de *Persia* al archiduque Carlos que murió de viruela sin

[55] Ambrosius a sancta Teresia, *Bio-bibliographia missionaria ordinis carmelitarum discalceatorum*, Curiam Generalitiam OCD, Roma, 1941, p. 194.

[56] S. Giordano, *Cottalourda, Giovanni Agostino, in religione Leandro di santa Cecilia*, en W. Piastra (ed.), *Dizionario biografico dei liguri, dalle origini ai nostri giorni*, Consulta Ligure, Genova, 1998, IV, p. 64.

[57] Sobre la presencia de fray Leandro en Persia, véase A. Hubert Chick, *A chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia and the Papal Mission of the XVIIth and XVIIIth Centuries*, Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, 1939, vol. I, pp. 624-625.

[58] Ambrosius a sancta Teresia, *Nomenclator missionarum ordinis carmelitarum discalceatorum*, Curiam Generalitiam OCD, Roma, 1944, pp. 244-245.

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

3. Fray Leandro de Santa Cecilia mostrando a los archiduques de Austria un mapa con las zonas recorridas por él en Oriente (izquierda) y Emblema heráldico de los Habsburgo centroeuropeos dominando el mundo por el que extendieron la Fe romana (derecha).

descendencia y el de *Mesopotamia* al archiduque Leopoldo, gran duque de Toscana, emperador del Sacro Imperio Romano Germánico y rey de Hungría y Bohemia (1790-1792) que sucedió a su hermano José II como Leopoldo II.

La explicación de los viajes realizados por fray Leandro a los príncipes austriacos se visualiza con una estampa en la que aparece el carmelita mostrando a los archiduques un mapa de la zona recorrida en la evangelización llevada a cabo por él (Fig. 3). La escena se desarrolla en medio de un grandioso pórtico que evoca la importante arquitectura vienesa del momento, especialmente el palacio de Schönbrunn, el Versalles austriaco que la emperatriz María Teresa convirtió en la residencia veraniega de los Hasbsburgo, construido por los arquitectos Johann Bernhard Fischer von Erlach y Nicola Pacassi, con unos espectaculares jardines en los que se instaló el primer parque zoológico del mundo en 1752, interés por los animales que también se recoge por Cottalourda en sus libros de viajes a Oriente.

Bajo el arco central que enmarca en la estampa la citada presentación protocolaria en Viena se cobija un águila que junto al cetro y la corona de laurel porta una filacteria con un verso virgiliano «non indebita posco / regna meis fatis», tomado del libro VI de la *Eneida*, en el que la flota troyana llega a Italia y Eneas ruega al dios Apolo que

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permita a los troyanos establecerse en el Lacio, señalándole su padre Anquises el camino de Roma, concretamente de los vv. 65-68: «Tuque, o sanctissima uates, / praescia uenturi, da (non indebita posco / regna meis fatis) Latio considere Teucros / errantisque deos agitataque numina Troiae» [Y tú, santísima vate, sabedora de lo que vendrá, concede (y no pido reinos indebidos a mis hados) a los teucros asentarse en el Lacio y a sus dioses errantes y a los agitados númenes de Troya]. Una metáfora de la presencia austriaca en Italia y del largo recorrido del carmelita descalzo, quien después de sus estancias en Oriente entre 1732 y 1750 fue nombrado el 12 de mayo de 1758 prior del convento de Malta, donde permaneció cuatro años[59], y en 1762 provincial de la Orden, muriendo en el convento de la Scala de Roma el seis de julio de 1784[60] después de un largo peregrinar ejerciendo una importante labor misionera, lo que se enlaza con la defensa de la Fe por la Casa de Austria en una bella estampa de exaltación imperial que ilustra el segundo de los volúmenes analizados (Fig. 3).

En ella, a manera de manifiesto visual, se muestra la firme defensa de la Fe romana por los Habsburgo mediante su característico emblema heráldico del águila bicéfala coronada[61] que porta los símbolos del poder –cetro, espada y orbe rematado por cruz– con el lema NEC NIDVS NEC NODVS, tomado de Picinelli, que lo comenta desde el punto de vista religioso conectándolo con Abraham, a quien Yahvé le manda abandonar su tierra y encaminarse a una nueva región liberándose de su familia y de los lazos de sangre[62], lo que emprendió el Patriarca sin demora ni descanso, como se recoge en el tondo que muestra el águila en el pecho –NEC MORA NEC REQUIES– tomado asimismo de la *Eneida*[63], presentándose los Habsburgo, que desde Maximiliano recurrieron a la propaganda como práctica del poder[64], como continuadores del Pueblo elegido extendiendo la Fe por el

[59] Antonius Fortes, *Acta definitorii generalis O.C.D. Congregationis S. Eliae (1710-1766)*, Istituto Storico Teresiano, Monumenta Historica Carmeli Teresiani, Subsidia 5, Roma, 1988, p. 625.

[60] Ambrosius a sancta Teresia, *Bio-bibliographia missionaria ordinis carmelitarum discalceatorum* cit., p. 194.

[61] Sobe el significado y representatividad del emblema imperial, véase F. Moreno Cuadro, *La imagen del águila en las celebraciones públicas*, en R. Camacho, E. Asenjo (eds.), *Fiestas y mecenazgo en las relaciones culturales del Mediterráneo en la Edad Moderna*, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad - Universidad de Málaga, Málaga, 2012, pp. 291-322. Vid. esp. pp. 300 y sgg.

[62] F. Piccinelli, *Mondo simbolico formato d´imprese scelte, spiegate ed illustrate con sentenze, ed eruditione, Sacre e Profane*, Nella Stampa di Francesco Vigone, Milano, 1699, p. 850.

[63] Virgilio, *Eneida*, III, 110.

[64] L. Silver, *Marketing Maximilian. The Visual Ideology of a Holy Roman Emperor*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2008.

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mundo, simbólicamente representado por el paisaje que sirve de soporte al águila imperial que se encuentra rodeado por alegorías que recuerdan las partes del mundo recogidas por Cesare Ripa en su *Iconología*, pero que se reinterpretan de manera particular, acaparando un especial protagonismo las alegorías que aparecen sentadas en primer plano: a la derecha, con un pájaro exótico y un cofre repleto de riquezas, la que identificamos con Asia, tras la cual se ha figurado un mercader; y a la izquierda, junto a unos cuernos de la Abundancia, la alegoría de Europa limitada por Leda y el Cisne y unos faunos que simbolizan la lascivia contra la que había que luchar como fervientes católicos. Más desdibujadas aparecen las otras dos partes del mundo, América y África, que podrían estar simbolizadas respectivamente por las figuras del fondo que portan un abanico de plumas y una vara respectivamente.

Cottalourda publicó, como hemos indicado, tres libros en los que recoge diferentes noticias sobre sus viajes. El primero de ellos a Palestina, *Palestina ovvero primo via ggio di F. Leandro di Santa Cecilia carmelitano scalzo in Oriente, scritto dal medisimo*, publicado en Roma en 1753, y los siguientes a Persia, *Persia ovvero secondo viaggio di F. Leandro di Santa Cecilia carmelitano scalzo in Oriente, scritto dal medisimo*, y a Mesopotamia, *Mesopotamia ovvero terzoo viaggio di F. Leandro di Santa Cecilia carmelitano scalzo in Oriente, scritto dal medisimo*, que fueron publicados en Roma en 1757, todos ellos en la Stamperia di Angelo Rotili nel Palazzo de´ Massimi, con licencia de los superiores.

Los singulares textos de fray Leandro de Santa Cecilia aparecen recogidos al poco tiempo de su aparición en la «Novelle Letterarie», la primera revista literaria impresa en Toscana —fundada en 1740 por Giovanni Landi, que fue bibliotecario de la Biblioteca Riccardiana de Florencia—, una publicación que se hace eco de la literatura, la ciencia y las reformas de los estados recogiendo las publicaciones más recientes. Por ello, en el tomo XXII, publicado en 1761, perteneciente a la Primera Serie que tuvo como único editor a Landi, se incluyen los libros que Cottalourda envió a la imprenta en la década anterior, entre 1753 y 1757[65].

No conocemos otras obras semejantes en el ámbito carmelitano, por lo que adquiere una particular significación la trilogía de Cottalourda, que se encuadra en la abundante serie de libros de viajes que centran su atención en Oriente y en Tierra Santa. Este tipo de relatos está recogido por numerosos viajeros desde la Edad Media –Mandeville

[65] «Novelle Letterarie», XXII (1761), con los títulos de *Gervsalemme* (pp. 70-73), *Hispaan* (pp. 138-139) y *Babilonia* (pp. 239-240).

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(c.1356)[66], Breidenbach[67] y Schedel[68]– y fueron muy numerosos durante la Edad Moderna –Ziegler[69], Münster[70], Adrichen[71], Castillo[72], Cubero[73], etc.–, entre los que hay que incluir el conocimiento de lejanos países que proporcionan las órdenes religiosas, como los jesuitas[74], los franciscanos[75] y los carmelitas, a quienes debemos los originales libros de viajes de fray Leandro de Santa Cecilia comentados, de los que conocemos —procedentes del Carmelo de Ferrara— los ejemplares conservados en la Biblioteca del Teresianum de Roma.

Conforman una obra en la que se mezcla la línea naturalista influenciada por los cronistas de Indias con la monumental y la religiosa, tratando de ofrecer de forma conjunta la relación de la Naturaleza, el hombre y Dios[76] –creador del Universo y del hombre a su imagen y semejanza, por tanto señor y dominador del mundo, al que tiene que conocer y evangelizar–, continuando un planteamiento sustentado en ideas básicas del pensamiento occidental, entre las que destaca que la tierra ha sido creada para el hombre y la vida, además de conocer en qué medida cambia el hombre la naturaleza y su interés por todos los recursos naturales y su posible explotación.

[66] Jean de Mandaville, *Libro de las marauillas del mundo, y del viaje de la tierra sancta de Jerusalem*, Jorge Costilla, Valencia, 1521.

[67] Bernardo de Breidenbach*, Viaje de la Tierra Santa,* Pablo Hurus, Zaragoza, 1498, con ilustraciones de Heráld Reeuwich. Edición facsímil con introducción de Jaime Moll, Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, Madrid, 1974.

[68] Hartmann Schedel, *Liber chronicarum*, Antonius Koberger, Nuremberg, 1493, con ilustraciones de Michaele Wolgemur, Wilhelmo Pleydenwurff y Albrecht Dürer.

[69] *Terrae Sanctae, qvam Palasestinam nominant, Syriae, Arabiae, Aegypti & Schondiae doctissima descriptio, una cum singulis tabulis earundem regionum topographicis, authore Iacobo Zieglero Landaio Bauaro. (Etc) Terrae Sanctae altera descriptio…*, Wendelinum Rihelium, Estrasburgo, 1536.

[70] S. Münster, *Cosmographia universalis*, Bâle, 1550.

[71] *Breve descripcion de la ciudad de Jerusalen y lugares circunvecinos, como estaba en tiempo de Cristo nuestro señor ... compuesta en latín por Cristiano Adricomio Delpho y traducida al castellano por el P. F. Vicente Gómez*, en casa de J.P. Piferrer, Barcelona, 1603.

[72] A. del Castillo, *El Devoto peregrino*, Imprenta Real, Madrid, 1654.

[73] P. Cubero Sebastián, *Breve relación de la peregrinación que ha hecho a la mayor parte del mundo don Pedro Cubero Sebastián*, Juan García Infanzón, Madrid, 1680.

[74] *Cartas edificantes, y curiosas, escritas de las Misiones estrangeras por algunos misioneros de la Compañía de Jesús: letra traducida del idioma francés por el padre Diego Davin*, Oficina de la Viuda de M. Fernández, Madrid, 1753.

[75] Al respecto, véase la interesante obra de A. Tedesco, *Itinera ad loca sancta: i libri di viaggio delle Biblioteche Francescane di Gerusalemne, Catalogo delle edizioni dei secoli XV-XIII*, Edizioni Terra Santa, Milano, 2017.

[76] Sobre los aspectos ideológicos-religiosos de las relaciones hombre-naturaleza, véase C.J. Glacken*, Huellas en la playa de Rodas. Naturaleza y Cultura en el pensamiento occidental desde la Antigüedad hasta fines del siglo XVIII*, Ediciones del Serbal, Barcelona, 1996.

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4. Carta geográfica de Persia, Mesopotamia y Palestina.

La redacción de Cottalourda es directa y realista, en la que confluyen descripciones heterogénas de lo que observa, y se puede enmarcar en la línea del diario como crónica cotidiana de una experiencia personal[77], no faltando las emociones de lo que más le ha llamado la atención. Por ello, nos centraremos especialmente en las láminas que ilustran los tres volúmenes por el significado que adquieren en el texto y en el narrador que las describe.

De interés es el mapa de Asia destinado a evidenciar el amplio espacio visitado y los conocimientos del medio de Cottalourda, así como a

[77] Véase E. Bou, *El diario: periferia y literatura*, «Revista de Occidente», 182-183 (1996), pp. 121-136.

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subrayar el especial sentido que adquieren los lugares que aparecen priorizados en la carta geográfica «PERSIA, MESOPOTAMA, PALESTINA CON LE CITTA, VILLE, TERRE E FIUMI che si nominano ne Viaggi di Fr. Leandro di s. Cecilia Car, Scalzo. 1754» (Fig. 4), mucho más amplia que la zona asiática recorrida por el carmelita y carente del camino de vuelta por Europa, lo que nos lleva a pensar que se utiliza un plano conocido previamente, aspecto que no resulta extraño habida cuenta de la extensa exploración geográfica de la tierra en la Edad Moderna y el conocimiento de Asia en Italia[78].

Algunas de las estampas que completan la trilogía de Cottalourda están firmadas con las iniciales «A.C.F.» y «A.C.f.» de un grabador que resulta difícil de identificar en la Italia del siglo XVIII, en la que existían dos importantes centros de grabado, Roma y Venecia, donde destacaron Giambattista Tiepolo y Antonio Canale, quien se trasladó a Inglaterra (1746-1755) por falta de clientes en su ciudad natal y tuvo en la última etapa de su vida (1763-1768) un estilo poco elaborado caracterizado por la repetición sistemática de paisajes, lo que trajo consigo que perdieran la atracción que tuvieron antaño[79]. Es muy tentador, teniendo en cuenta el desinterés por el maestro veneciano en su última etapa y la pérdida de clientes italianos en los años en que se graban las ilustraciones de los viajes a Oriente de Cottalourda, pensar que se pueda tratar del famoso pintor veneciano A(ntonio) C(anale) F(ecit) que no firma todas las estampas, lo que era habitual en este tipo de trabajos, apareciendo las citadas iniciales en las que reproducen el *Castello di Balbech* (A.C.f.) y el *Dag Bostan* (A.C.F.) con la inicial del verbo en mayúscula como en la *Pianta del Rabasio*.

En el primer libro del viaje a Palestina, además de la comentada estampa de la presentación de su viaje a los archiduques de Austria, se incluyen varias láminas de interés que representan lo más significativo que el carmelita encuentra en su recorrido desde su primer destino en el Monte Carmelo, que constituía la frontera sur del reino de Tiro. El viajero se sitúa en la Fenicia meridional, en el sur del Líbano, en la famosa ciudad que fue declarada Patrimonio de la Humanidad en 1984, cuya zona insular unió Alejandro Magno al continente por un istmo artificial durante el asedio de la ciudad[80], famosa por sus puertos y sus productos comerciales, con una zona continental que le suministraba abundante agua potable, siendo esas infraestructuras

[78] Al respecto, véase O. Nalesini, *L´Asia sud-orientale nelle cultura italiana. Bibliografía analítica ragionata, 1475-2005*, Istituto italiano per l´Africa e l´Oriente, Roma, 2009.

[79] A. Corbnoz, *Canaletto. Una Venezia immaginaria*, Alfieri Electa, Milán, 1985.

[80] E.F. Bloedow, *The Siege of Tyre in 332 BC: Alexander at the Crossroads in his Career*, «La parola del passato. Rivista di studi classici» , 53 (1998), pp. 255-293.

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

5. Obras de ingeniería hidráulica de Tiro.

las que impresionaron fuertemente al misionero descalzo, quien describe y manda grabar para su obra la que considera «una delle più famose meraviglie, che trovate io abbia nè miei viaggi»[81] (Fig. 5), una fábrica de planta cuadrada que se elevaba en pendiente y contenía una gran cantidad de agua, capaz de soportar una pequeña embarcación. En los ángulos unos canales que hacían girar tres molinos y junto a ella muchas ruinas, entre las que sobresalía un acueducto de inmensurable grandeza por el que podía navegar un barco de vela, cuya fábrica remontaba la tradición a la época de Alejandro el Grande y fray Leandro considera de época de Nabucodonosor[82] y posteriormente renovada por el rey macedonio.

[81] *Palestina ovvero primo viaggio d´Oriente* cit., p. 38.

[82] Sobre su importante figura, véase D.J. Wiseman, *Nebuchadnezzar and Babylon,* Published for the British Academy by the Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York, 1985.

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

6. Planta del rabasio.

En el Líbano conoce una curiosa planta que nace bajo la nieve, el rabasio, cuya imagen incluye en su obra (Fig. 6) por el enorme interés que tiene desde el punto de vista alimentario y farmacológico, porque de ella se obtiene «un succo acido, ma grato, e molto giovevole nelle febri inflammatorie, per essere un refrigeranet assai omogeneo ai temperamenti di que´popoli, che anche sani ne fanno grand´uso, e ne mangiano, como facciam noi i Carciosi, ed i Cardi»[83].

En su recorrido por el Oriente Próximo admira la antigua Heliópolis o Baalbeck, que califica como «una delle più belle maraviglie dell´arte, benche la maggior parte rovinata, e distrutta»[84], destacando el «famoso Castello», sobre el que recoge las tradiciones de su origen entre los naturales del país, algunos de los cuales lo consideraban obra de Salomón, mientras que otros lo vinculaban a los romanos o a Belzebú, el príncipe

[83] *Palestina ovvero primo viaggio d´Oriente* cit., p. 58.
[84] Ivi, p. 59.

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

7. Castillo de Baalbeck.

de los demonios[85], todas ellas intentando explicar su grandiosidad, que se visualiza en su obra con dos grabados del mismo (Fig. 7). El nombre griego antiguo hace referencia al santuario y oráculo de Baal, dios de la lluvia y de la guerra, considerado por los hebreos como uno de los falsos dioses, cuya veneración se introdujo en Israel durante el reinado de Ajab tras su casamiento con la hija del rey de Tiro, la princesa fenicia Jezabel, a quienes se enfrentó Elías por la introducción de su culto en detrimento del único y verdadero Dios de Israel[86], momento crítico del yahvismo que conocía bien fray Leandro porque se resolvió en el «Juicio de Dios en el Carmelo» con la victoria de Elías, el mítico fundador de su Orden, sobre los profetas de Baal (1 Re 18, 20-40)[87], consorte de Astarté, la diosa de la fertilidad, a quien rindió culto Salomón (1 Re 11, 5), idolatría que marcó el declive hasta la división del reino de Israel al

[85] Probablemente para tratar de esclarecer los grandes bloques monolíticos del famoso Trilithon. Sobre este tema, véase J.P. Adam, *A propos du trilithon de Baalbeck. Le transport et la mise en oeuvre des mégalithes*, «Syria. Revue d´art oriental et d´Archéologie», 54, 1-2 (1977), pp. 31-63.

[86] R. Gnuse, *The Emergence of Monotheism in Ancient Israel: A Survey of Recent Scholarship*, «Religion» 29, n. 4 (1999), pp. 315-36.

[87] Sobre este tema, véase F. Moreno Cuadro, *Génesis iconográfica del `San Elías´ de Pedro de Mena de la catedral de Granada*, «Cuadernos de Arte de la Universidad de Granada», 40 (2009), pp. 179-192.

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quedar debilitado (ss. X-VIII a. C.) y conquistado por extranjeros; pero de esa época no queda nada en Baalbeck, que fue saqueada por asirios, griegos y romanos, y más tarde por los sarracenos, los mongoles de Hulagu Khan y los tártaros dirigidos por Tamerlán, decayendo finalmente bajo el imperio otomano.

En el siglo XVIII los exploradores de Europa la redescubren y en este contexto hay que situar la descripción que aporta Cottalourda en su primer viaje de Oriente. El yacimiento es muy extenso y heterogéneo, con una entrada monumental, propileos de la época de Caracalla que daban acceso a un patio hexagonal de la época de Filipo el Árabe, que fue transformado en capilla dedicada a la virginidad[88] y en bastión defensivo de la ciudadela árabe. El complejo monumental tiene un gran patio central de época de Trajano y tres templos dedicados a la Tríada heliopolitana: Hadad, dios del trueno, asimilado a Júpiter, cuyo templo se concluyó en la época de Nerón; la diosa Astarté relacionada con Venus, a la que se erigió un templo circular por Caracalla; y Adón, el dios de la primavera parangonable con Mercurio, cuyo caduceo presenta un águila en el templo erigido a Baco durante el gobierno de Antonino Pío en el segundo tercio del siglo II[89].

En la Edad Media Baalbeck tuvo importantes transformaciones; así, en el siglo XII fue convertido en una fortificación islámica frente a los Cruzados y el sultán Bahram-Shah remodeló el templo de Júpiter, y a mediados del siglo XIII los mongoles transformaron el templo de Baco y rodearon el recinto de un gran muro. Destrucciones y transformaciones que junto a varias catástrofes naturales desfiguraron el conjunto monumental que, no obstante su desolación y confusión, el carmelita califica como «una delle più belle maraviglie dell´arte»[90], reproduciendo y describiendo el más destacado edificio que encontró, el «Castello di Balbech» (Fig. 7), situado sobre una colina, con cuatro torres y una amplia puerta que daba acceso a un corredor con escaleras angostas para subir a la planta superior y a un gran espacio circular con columnas jónicas de granito en el que se incluían dos espacios con estructura templaria de naos y pronaos, el de la derecha decorado con bajorelieves que el viajero compara con los de la Columna Trajana[91] y el de la izquierda en el que subraya la decoración de un dintel decorado con el relieve de un águila.

[88] *Palestina ovvero primo viaggio d´Oriente* cit., p. 61; «che alla gloria della Vergi»nità».

[89] Sobre el complejo monumental, véase M. Van Ess, T. Weber, *Baalbek. Im Bann römischer Monumentalarchitektur*, Philipp von Zabern, Maguncia, 1999.

[90] *Palestina ovvero primo viaggio d´Oriente* cit., p. 59

[91] Ivi, p. 61.

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En el libro dedicado al viaje por Persia disminuyen los grabados y solo se incluye uno del emplazamiento sasánida de Taq-i Bostan, en el corazón de los Zagros, un paraje de la ruta de la seda en el conocido Camino Real Persa, donde describe algunos de los relieves de los soberanos del imperio tallados en la roca, pero solo dispone grabar uno de ellos –«Eccone un disegno, che per la rarità dell´opere ho io voluto darne»[92]– por su originalidad . Se trata de una de las grutas que en el siglo IV reemplazan los grandes relieves rupestres de los triunfos e investiduras de los emperadores –herederos del título persa de Rey de reyes o Shahanshah– sasánidas que se habían desarrollado desde le primera mitad del siglo III en Firuzabad, Naqs-i Rustam, Bichapur y Darabgird[93].

Durante los siglos IV y V continuaron los clásicos temas esculpidos, pero comenzaron a desarrollarse otros nuevos, como el de las cacerías, en Taq-i Bostan; una etapa en la que, como hemos indicado, la gruta reemplaza al tradicional relieve rectangular que comienza a labrarse al fondo de unos espacios a manera de iwanes que Cottalourda denomina «spelonca», completándose los laterales con otros relieves en los que se desarrollan ampliamente los nuevos temas que se introducen en la escultura del periodo, en el que resulta difícil identificar a los personajes representados por la falta de inscripciones[94].

Cottalourda, no obstante la admiración que le causa el diseño de la citada gruta sasánida, hace una descripción breve de la misma, indicando que en el centro había «una gran Vasca sostenuta da quattro Ninfae, il corpo delle quali è tutto inmerso nell´acqua, e le Teste loro fuerono rotte dai Barbari»[95], reseñando someramente los relieves que la decoraban, con la representación central de un monarca a caballo en corveta portando una estatuilla de la Victoria que mostraba a su pueblo y enfrente gran número de animales[96] (Fig. 8).

El último volumen de la trilogía de viajes a Oriente es con seguridad el que más peculiaridad presenta respecto de las estampas, no solo por ser mayor su número sino especialmente por la diversidad de las mismas, respondiendo al interés del carmelita descalzo por la religión y la naturaleza, que combina perfectamente al tratar algunas cuestiones

[92] *Persia ovvero secondo viaggio d´Oriente* cit., p. 20.

[93] Sobre el arte del imperio sasánida, que gobernó Persia desde la caída del imperio parto hasta el Califato Omeya, véase R. Ghirshman, *Parthes et Sassanides*, Gallinard, Paris, 1962.

[94] B. Overlaet, *Ardashir II or Shapur III?: reflections on the identity of a king in the smaller grotto at Taq-i Bustan*, «Iranica Antiqua» 46 (2011), pp. 235-250.

[95] *Persia ovvero secondo viaggio d´Oriente* cit., p. 19.

[96] Ivi, p. 20.

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8. Gruta sasánida en Taq-i Bostan.

que encuentra en su peregrinar, la numismática, los personajes históricos y la arqueología.

En este tercer viaje, en el que desde Roma, pasando por Venecia y Alejandría, llega al Monte Carmelo y a Beirut, encuentra en esta última ciudad una singular planta que llaman muza y que los habitantes de la zona denominan «il Fico d´Adamo, quale pare lo dimostrino le foglie atte a ricoprire la di lui nuditá»[97], cuyo tronco produce un jugo balsámico muy dulce que sirve para atemperar las inflamaciones torácicas y las dolencias producidas por las alteraciones de la bilis, de las que conoció plantas similares en Florencia y en la villa del cardenal Valenti de Roma, aunque eran muy pequeñas y estaban cultivadas en macetas. Pero la planta beirutina se diferenciaba, además de por su

[97] *Mesopotamia ovvero terzoo viaggio d´Oriente* cit., p. 10.

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

9. Planta muza en cuyos frutos aparece la figura del crucificado.

tamaño, porque en el interior de su fruto se observaba una imagen del crucificado siempre que se hacía un corte en el mismo[98] (Fig. 9). La sorprendente fruta, que nace en forma de racimos que a fray Leandro le evocan los de uvas que los exploradores encontraron en la Tierra prometida, tenía una textura similar al melón, aunque más insípida, y no era exclusiva de Beirut en su aspecto general, pero «ne in veruno fuerchè in Berito, ho trovata l´immagine mentovata sempre diversa, e per lo piú in rotonde línea, a foggia di tante sfere l´una dentro l'altra rinchiuse»[99].

Desde Beirut se dirigió a Trípoli y siguió hacia el norte hasta Alepo, desviándose hacia el noroeste en dirección a Siverek y Diyarbakir, desde donde descendió al sur con destino a Mardin y de allí por Nísibis, un importante centro religioso que tuvo obispo desde el año 300, a Nínive, actual Mosul, y continuó hasta Babilonia, desde donde emprendió viaje de regreso por Nínive, Mardín y Diyarbakir hasta Constantinopla y desde aquí, por Valaquia y Transilvania, a Viena.

En este último viaje, el contrapunto a lo extraordinario –unión de naturaleza y religión en «il Fico d´Adamo» o muza– experimentado en Beirut, viene marcado por la exposición y reproducción de hechos reales, como la explicación de monedas y personalidades, entre las que destaca al rey Tamms Kolican que reproduce en una estampa dominando el espacio marcado por las alegorías del Tigris y el Eufrates (Fig. 10), además de aspectos arqueológicos, poniendo de relieve la Torre de Babel en Babilonia (Fig. 11). Finalmente especifica algunos animales, entre los que señala, además del pelícano, el Cuculatto, a

[98] Ivi, p. 9.
[99] Ibidem.

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10. Retrato del rey de Persia Tamms Kolic



11. Torre de Babel en Babilonia

cuyo veneno no se había encontrado remedio, y recalca algunas plantas desconocidas en Europa, como la scorzonera que se utiliza de antídoto contra los venenos y la ravazza que se emplea como colirio en las inflamaciones de los ojos[100] (Fig. 12).



12. Animales y plantas de Mersopotamia. Cuculato y pelícano (izquierda), la scorzonera (centro) y la ravazza (derecha).

[100] Ivi, pp. 53, 125 y 134.

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4. Conclusión

La trilogía de Cottalourda es un ejemplo excepcional en las narraciones de la labor misional del Carmelo teresiano, apartándose de las clásicas fundaciones y relacionando la evangelización con la defensa de la Fe por los Habsburgo centroeuropeos, a cuyos archiduques dedica los volúmenes de sus viajes a Oriente.

En ella hay que destacar el interés por la historia, así como por la naturaleza y las costumbres de las regiones que visita, sin olvidar las grandes construcciones, tanto las de arqueología bíblica como los templos paganos –especialmente Baalbeck– y los grandes conjuntos persas, como el de Taq-i Bostan, en el que destaca los grandes relieves rupestres de época sasánida.

Este planteamiento permite concluir que, si bien sus viajes tuvieron un origen misionero, retomando el espíritu teresiano y volviendo al Oriente donde tuvo el origen su Orden que se vio obligada a abandonar el Monte Carmelo por la presión de los sarracenos, se terminan convirtiendo en una ventana al mundo, coincidiendo con las exploraciones que permiten avanzar en el conocimiento de determinadas disciplinas, como la geografía, la historia, la etnología, la arqueología y la historia natural, y se encuentran más cerca de la Ilustración que de la Era de los Descubrimientos, en la que desde el siglo XV al siglo XVII persistió la expansión de la actividad misionera que convirtió el Cristianismo en la religión más extendida junto al Islam, el más fuerte enemigo de la Cristiandad.

En este sentido, responden más al nuevo espíritu setecentista modernizador de la sociedad europea que a la labor misional que actuó de primer motor para el viajero carmelita, debiéndose destacar también en este lugar que es el único manuscrito que conozcamos de cuantos se conservan en el Archivo General de la Orden que fue llevado a la imprenta y que, además, se completó con importantes ilustraciones grabadas que contribuyen a una mejor comprensión de los conceptos expuestos, respondiendo a una decidida labor de comunicación y formación que en principio estaba dedicada a los archiduques de Austria, pero que la imprenta hacía extensiva a un gran número de personas completando lo que no podían conocer de primera mano viajando, muy acorde con la corriente empirista, convirtiéndose así en un vehículo de transmisión para el conocimiento del mundo de quienes no viajaban más allá de la Magna Grecia por el peligro otomano.

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Domenico Ventura

VINCENZO FEO E IL SUO COTONIFICIO: ALLE ORIGINI DI UNA S.P.A. NELLA CATANIA DI INIZI NOVECENTO*

DOI 10.19229/1828-230X/4932020

SOMMARIO: *Nel 1886 il quarantaduenne Vincenzo Feo, già garzone tintore quindi titolare di una piccola bottega a Palermo, si trasferisce in una Catania ancora non del tutto uscita dai postumi di una devastante crisi agraria e finanziaria. E qui, inizialmente con le sole sue forze e successivamente (1899) con l'aiuto finanziario di Pietro Aellig, un noto imprenditore svizzero da anni trapiantato nella città etnea, riesce a far rivivere l'industria del cotone in Sicilia dando vita a uno stabilimento modernamente attrezzato che, nella borgata popolare di Guardia Ognina, dà lavoro stabile a oltre 400 addetti, nella stragrande maggioranza donne. Nel 1904, da due anni Cavaliere del Lavoro, realizza una SpA della quale manterrà la gestione assieme ai figli fino alla sua morte in quel 1906 che in città già vedeva fervere i lavori per l'Esposizione Agricola del 1907.*

PAROLE CHIAVE: *Sicilia, Industria cotoniera, Età contemporanea.*

VINCENZO FEO AND HIS COTTON MILL: A SPA IN THE CATANIA OF EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

ABSTRACT: *In 1886 Vincenzo Feo, 42 years old, once apprentice in and then owner of a small dyeworks in Palermo, moves to Catania, when that city is not fully over the aftermaths of a terrible agrarian and financial crisis. There, initially by his only capabilities and later with the financial support of Pietro Aellig, renowned Swiss entrepreneur who had relocated to Catania years before, he manages to revitalize the Sicilian cotton manufacturing industry, building a modern factory which employed over 400 workers, mostly women, based in the working-class suburb of Guardia Ognina. In 1904, two years after being appointed Cavaliere del Lavoro, he establishes a SpA (joint stock company) he will keep managing with his sons till his own death in 1906, whilst the city was getting ready to host the 1907 Agricultural Exhibition.*

KEYWORDS: *Sicily, Cotton Manufacturing Industry, Contemporary Age.*

Premessa

Nel 1895 il palermitano Vincenzo Feo, dopo aver mosso i primi passi nella sua città natale con una modesta tintoria, riesce a rilanciare, in una Catania ancora non del tutto uscita dai postumi di una devastante crisi agraria e finanziaria[1], il settore cotoniero. Il risultato

* Abbreviazioni: Asct = Archivio di Stato di Catania; Andct = Archivio Notarile Distrettuale di Catania; Ccict = Camera di Commercio e Industria di Catania; Maic = Ministero dell'Agricoltura, Industria e Commercio.

[1] In proposito rinvio al mio recente contributo *Nella Catania di fine Ottocento: cronaca di una crisi annunciata*, «Archivio Nisseno», XI, 21 (2017), pp. 33-54.

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è il "Cotonificio Catanese Vincenzo Feo & C.", un opificio modernamente attrezzato che gli consente di esitare cotonate di ottima qualità e di dare un lavoro stabile a oltre 400 addetti, in prevalenza donne. E tutto ciò solo inizialmente, perché meno di dieci anni dopo, nel 1904, dà vita, allo scopo di procedere alla realizzazione di una completa strategia di integrazione verticale comprensiva del ramo della tessitura, alla "Società Anonima Cotonificio Feo".

Una storia di tutto rispetto, quindi, che tuttavia, al di fuori di numerosi cenni sul suo fondatore e sulla rilevanza dell'impresa – del tutto eccezionale nel panorama siciliano – apparsi in diversi scritti coevi[2] e in opere storiografiche contemporanee[3], non è stata oggetto di alcuna specifica ricerca, eccezion fatta per una tesi di laurea nella quale, però, il tema prevalente è relativo alla condizione operaia femminile nella Catania del primo Novecento[4].

Con il presente contributo si intende rimediare all'oscurità che ancora adesso avvolge la figura e l'opera di Vincenzo Feo. E questo perché la storia della ditta rappresenta, a nostro avviso, un'occasione per ricostruire le iniziali vicende di un'impresa che, nata individuale, ha

[2] *Guida del compratore della città di Catania*, Galati, Catania, 1901, p. 33; *Guida turistica di Catania e dintorni*, Giannotta, Catania, s.d., p. 60; M. Bontempelli, E. Trevisani, *La Sicilia industriale commerciale e agricola*, Tipografica Editrice Popolare, Milano, 1903, p. 329; G. Collotti, *I Cavalieri del Lavoro*, Giannotta, Catania, 1903, pp. 349-386; S. Salomone, *Catania illustrata*, Tipografia Editrice del Popolo, Catania, 1907, pp. 144-145; *Esposizione (II) Agricola Siciliana. Guida Ufficiale*, Galatola, Catania, 1907, p. 56; *Esposizione (II) Agricola Siciliana*, Albo illustrato redatto sotto la direzione di F. De Roberto, Galatola, Catania, 1908, ora in *Esposizioni di Sicilia*, Tringale, Catania, 1988, p. 51; P. Arrabito, *Ricordi e figure della II Esposizione agricola siciliana. Catania 1907*, Tipi Siracusa, Catania, 1908, pp. 13 e 23; Ccict, *Il Commercio di Catania. Un quindicennio di vita economica (1898-1912)*, Officina Tipografica Elzeviriana, Catania, 1913, p. 96; L. Casella, *Le industrie in Sicilia*, «Sicilia Industriale e Agricola», VII (1924), n. 292, p. 7 e n. 300, p. 3.

[3] Cfr. A. Tomaselli, *Artigianato e industria*, in A. Petino (a cura di), *Catania contemporanea. Cento anni di vita economica*, Istituto di Storia Economica dell'Università, Catania, 1976, p. 559; R. Spampinato, *Il movimento sindacale in una società urbana meridionale. Catania 1900-1914*, «Archivio storico per la Sicilia orientale», LXXIV (1978), pp. 234-235 e 274-276; G. Dato, *Urbanistica a Catania in età giolittiana*, «Quaderno dell'Istituto Dipartimentale di Architettura e Urbanistica», n. 11, Cavallotto, Palermo, 1980, p. 11; G. Barone, *Capitale finanziario e bonifica. La tecnocrazia riformista e il Mezzogiorno tra le due guerre*, Culc, Catania, 1984, p. 533 e *Dall'agricoltura all'industria. Il cotone «nazionale» tra le due guerre*, «Meridiana», 33 (1998), p. 15; G. Giarrizzo, *Catania*, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1986, p. 104; O. Cancila, *Storia dell'industria in Sicilia*, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1995, p. 220; S. Catalano, *Catania nell'esposizione del 1907*, in C. Dollo (a cura di), *Per un bilancio di fine secolo. Catania nel Novecento*, "Atti del I Convegno di studio", *I primi venti anni*, Società di Storia Patria per la Sicilia Orientale, Catania, 1999, p. 196; A. Castagnoli, E. Scarpellini, *Storia degli imprenditori italiani*, Einaudi, Torino, 2003, p. 116.

[4] A. Barnaba, *Industria tessile e lavoro femminile a Catania. Il Cotonificio Feo (1900-1912)*, Università di Catania, Facoltà di Scienze Politiche, A.A. 1986-87.

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avuto un ciclo di vita di oltre un sessantennio[5] quale conseguenza di un buon grado di efficienza, innovazione e redditività che le aveva fatto acquisire un rilievo di tutto rispetto nel panorama industriale non solo isolano.

1. La decadenza del settore cotoniero in Sicilia

Ancora nel recente passato, e in particolare dagli anni Trenta dell'Ottocento, l'industria cotoniera isolana aveva conosciuto, anche grazie a imprenditori stranieri, per lo più inglesi, un notevole sviluppo, specie a Messina[6], che le aveva consentito di raggiungere un egregio livello concorrenziale anche nei confronti delle più rinomate produzioni estere[7]. Poi, insidioso e devastante, era arrivato il declino – rivelatosi alla fine inarrestabile – che aveva le sue motivazioni, oltre che nella arretratezza tecnica e organizzativa del settore[8], nella politica protezionistica del 1878 che, se pure aveva dato l'avvio al rilancio del settore su scala nazionale, aveva finito col favorire le moderne industrie del Settentrione[9]. Declino che, conseguentemente, aveva portato alla chiusura di imprese, già floride e diffuse sul territorio, come la «magnifica e grandiosa filanda a vapore» di Leonforte e le altre di Domenico Adamo e Agostino Burgarella a Trapani, del barone Arezzo di Donnafugata a Ragusa, di Vincenzo Florio a Marsala; e, ancora, le fabbriche dei F.lli Ruggeri e degli inglesi Giovanni Synder, Giovanni Coop, Guglielmo Leaf e Giacomo Hall a Messina; la Tessoria di Ignazio Florio e C. e quelle del ginevrino Giovanni Albrecht, dei F.lli Morvillo, di

[5] Sulle vicende successive alla scomparsa del fondatore fino alla definitiva chiusura del "Cotonificio Andrea Francesco Feo e C." nel 1953, vedi ora F.P. Di Vita, *Il Cotonificio Feo: governance, finanziamento ed evoluzione di un'impresa familiare siciliana tra Otto e Novecento*, in G.M. D'Allura, R. Faraci (a cura di), *Le imprese familiari. Governance, internazionalizzazione e innovazione*, F. Angeli, Milano, 2018, pp. 156-166.

[6] G. Barbera Cardillo, *Messina dall'Unità all'alba del Novecento. Economia e società*, Librairie Droz, Genève, 1981, pp. 153-154.

[7] Cfr. V. Cordaro Clarenza, *Osservazioni sopra la storia di Catania cavata dalla storia generale di Sicilia*, tomo IV, Riggio, Catania, 1834, pp. 152 e 173-174; F. Rapisardi, *Notizie statistiche sulla provincia di Catania*, Martinez, Catania, 1881, p. 39; S. De Luca Carnazza, *Sulle condizioni economiche della provincia di Catania*, Galatola, Catania, 1881, p. 42.

[8] Cfr. V. Cordaro Clarenza, *Osservazioni sopra la storia di Catania* cit., tomo IV, p. 174; V. Ellena, *Notizie statistiche sopra alcune industrie*, Tipografia Eredi Botta, Roma, 1878, p. 68.

[9] Ma anche della Campania, la sola regione del Mezzogiorno che, soprattutto con la provincia di Salerno, poteva contare su un notevole e affermato comparto industriale risalente all'età borbonica. Cfr. F. Borghi, *L'industria del cotone all'Esposizione di Milano*, «Nuova Antologia», XVI, fasc. XX, vol. XXIX, 15 ottobre 1881, pp. 648-649; S. De Majo, *L'industria protetta. Lanifici e cotonifici in Campania nell'Ottocento*, Athena, Napoli, 1989.

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donna Rosalia Emanuele Citati, dell'Albergo dei Poveri e del Conservatorio di S. Spirito a Palermo; e la fabbrica di Gioacchino Felice ad Agrigento. Ovvero al fortissimo ridimensionamento di qualche altra, com'è il caso dell'unica fabbrica di tessuti rimasta a Messina, quella, cioè, di Gaetano Ainis[10]. Sicché al momento, fatta salva una persistente e diffusa attività tessile casalinga, per la quale con ben 39.173 telai (non di solo cotone) la Sicilia deteneva il primato nazionale[11], il quadro era davvero desolante[12].

La filatura era del tutto scomparsa, la tessitura poteva contare solo su 4 piccoli stabilimenti palermitani per un totale di 79 operaie e sulla anzidetta fabbrica messinese dell'Ainis, la tintoria sopravviveva solo grazie a piccole botteghe artigiane presenti, con l'unica eccezione dell'Agrigentino, in tutte le province isolane[13], ed infine la sgranellatura, dopo la chiusura dell'impianto di Salvatore Donzelli Occhipinti a Comiso, era rappresentata da appena cinque impianti a Terranova (oggi Gela) e uno a Niscemi[14]. Sicché – era questa l'amara constatazione del De Luca Carnazza[15] – «la nostra materia prima va in Inghilterra, là si fila e si torce, poi si riporta da noi, e così dalla Svizzera e dall'Alta Italia».

Né migliore era lo stato della cotonicoltura. Se nel 1864 la superficie coltivata a cotone era di 34.000 ha (quella nazionale di 88.000 ha), dieci anni dopo era scesa a poco più di 11.000 ha, cioè ad un terzo di quella nazionale nel frattempo ridottasi a 33.570 ha[16]. E ancora peggio

[10] Cfr. F. Rapisardi, *Notizie statistiche* cit., p. 40; S. De Luca Carnazza, *Sulle condizioni economiche* cit., p. 42; Ircac, *L'economia siciliana a fine '800*, Analisi, Bologna, 1988, p. 277 (rist. anastatica); R. Romeo, *Il Risorgimento in Sicilia*, Laterza, Bari, 1950, appendice III, tav. I; S. Costanza, *Un capitolo della storia economica trapanese. La «filanda a vapore» dei fratelli Adamo*, «Trapani. Rassegna mensile della Provincia», VIII (1963), n. 8, pp. 1-11; S.F. Romano, *Storia della Sicilia post-unificazione*, vol. II, *La Sicilia nell'ultimo ventennio del secolo XIX*, Industria Grafica Nazionale, Palermo, 1958, pp. 13-17; G. Barbera Cardillo, *Economia e società in Sicilia dopo l'Unità: 1860-1894*, vol. II, *L'industria*, Librairie Droz, Genève, 1988, pp. 187-188; O. Cancila, *Storia dell'industria* cit., pp. 77, 91-93 e 136-139.

[11] V. Ellena, *Notizie sopra alcune industrie* cit., p. 131.

[12] S.F. Romano, *Storia della Sicilia post-unificazione* cit., vol. II, pp. 15-17; G. Barbera Cardillo, *Economia e società in Sicilia* cit., vol. II, pp. 187-188; O. Cancila, *Storia dell'industria* cit., pp. 134-140.

[13] In proposito cfr. Ircac, *L'economia siciliana a fine '800* cit.

[14] Cfr. Ircac, *L'economia siciliana a fine '800* cit., p. 365; B. Pace, *Per la storia dell'industria siciliana: la prima cartiera*, «La giara», II, giugno-luglio 1953, p. 119; S.F. Romano, *Storia della Sicilia post-unificazione* cit., vol. II, p. 16; G. Barbera Cardillo, *Economia e società in Sicilia* cit., vol. II, pp. 187-188; O. Cancila, *Storia dell'industria* cit., p. 137.

[15] S. De Luca Carnazza, *Sulle condizioni economiche* cit., p. 42

[16] Cfr. A. Todaro, *La cultura dei cotoni in Italia*, Stamperia Reale, Roma-Palermo, 1877-78, ora Regione Siciliana, Accademia Nazionale di Scienze Lettere e Arti, Palermo, 1995 (rist. anastatica), p. 12; F. Borghi, *L'industria del cotone all'Esposizione di Milano* cit., p. 638; M. Tudisco, *La cotonicoltura in Sicilia* cit., p. 23.

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in seguito, quando, a partire dagli anni Ottanta, si restringeva ulteriormente interessando soltanto le aree più propriamente vocate alla produzione, cioè i territori di Terranova, Biancavilla, Noto, Pachino, Sciacca, Mazara[17]. Anche in questo caso, quindi, era ormai giocoforza, di fronte a una coltivazione pressoché abbandonata, importare quasi tutto dall'estero, e precisamente da Stati Uniti, India, Egitto[18].

2. **Da garzone a piccolo imprenditore: i primi passi nella città natale**

«Una volontà poderosa ed una fede incrollabile; una indomita energia ed una fibra d'acciaio, che mai le avversità han potuto piegare; una vita intera consacrata al lavoro assiduo, faticoso d'ogni giorno, d'ogni ora»[19]. Questi, nelle parole di chi come Guglielmo Collotti ebbe modo di conoscerlo e frequentarlo, i tratti distintivi dell'uomo che da «semplice garzone di tintore, senza beni di fortuna, senza maestri e senza protettori, ha potuto far sorgere un opificio, ch'è unico in Sicilia»[20].

Nato a Palermo nel 1844[21], appena undicenne, e da poco orfano di madre, si impiegò come garzone tintore in una piccola bottega artigiana della città[22]. Lavoro che cinque anni dopo sentì di dover lasciare per seguire Garibaldi, per poi riprenderlo una volta conclusasi l'impresa garibaldina. E però un'idea cominciò a farsi strada nella sua mente: avere una propria tintoria, anche piccola. Allo scopo, e con una costanza rara e ammirevole in un giovane della sua età, decise di mettere da parte venti centesimi al giorno dal già misero salario[23], anche se ciò lo obbligava a dover rinunciare spesso a un'alimentazione consona all'età e al tipo di lavoro piuttosto pesante per volgersi, verosimil-

[17] F. Borghi, *L'industria del cotone all'Esposizione di Milano* cit., p. 638; U. Tombesi, *L'industria cotoniera italiana* cit., p. 30; Maic, *Annali di Statistica. Statistica industriale*, fasc. LXIV, *L'industria del cotone in Italia*, Tipografia Nazionale Bertero e C., Roma, 1902, p. 6; G. Barbera Cardillo, *Economia e società in Sicilia* cit., vol. II, pp. 83-85.

[18] Maic, *Annali di Statistica. Statistica industriale*, fasc. LXIV, *L'industria del cotone in Italia* cit., p. 8.

[19] G. Collotti, *I Cavalieri del Lavoro* cit., p. 349.

[20] Ivi, p. 351.

[21] Tutti i dati biografici, salvo diversa indicazione, sono tratti dal citato G. Collotti, *I Cavalieri del Lavoro*, pp. 347-386.

[22] Proprio quell'anno (1855) nella città si contavano appena tre opifici e una stamperia di tessuti (F. Brancato, *Storia della Sicilia post-unificazione*, vol. I, *La Sicilia nel primo ventennio del Regno d'Italia*, Zuffi, Bologna, 1956, p. 55 nota).

[23] Dai dati dell'inchiesta industriale del 1855 emergeva che il salario medio di un lavoratore adulto era di tarì 4 (= L. 1,68). Cfr. R. Romeo, *Il Risorgimento in Sicilia* cit., p. 228 e F. Brancato, *Storia della Sicilia post-unificazione* cit., vol. I, pp. 61-63.

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mente, a un più frequente consumo di quegli ortaggi e di quella frutta che sul mercato cittadino spuntavano i prezzi più bassi[24].

Così, dopo quasi un anno, poté disporre di un piccolo capitale di un centinaio di lire, somma del tutto insufficiente però, come si rese conto, per impiantare una piccola tintoria per la quale si richiedevano almeno trecento lire. All'inevitabile scoraggiamento venne ad aggiungersi, nel 1866, la perdita stessa del lavoro a causa del ritorno, dopo la prima comparsa nel 1837, del colera. Qualche altro avrebbe ceduto forse, ravvisando in ciò un segno del destino; lui invece si recò al Monte dei Pegni riuscendo a ottenere quel denaro che, unito ai sudati risparmi, gli consentì di poter rilevare quella tanto bramata piccola tintoria, sicché, cessata l'epidemia, prontamente provvide a iniziare l'attività e a cercarsi la clientela. E i risultati non mancarono, se verso il 1875, sempre attento a limitare le spese personali e potendo contare ormai su un discreto giro d'affari, decise di fare un ulteriore passo in avanti estendendo la sua attività all'acquisto di filati grezzi da tingere poi nella sua bottega.

Alla concorrenza e all'assenza di un qualsiasi appoggio finanziario si aggiunse (settembre 1885) una nuova e più cruenta epidemia colerica che causò la paralisi di ogni attività. E tuttavia, di fronte all'impossibilità di poter riscuotere i crediti che vantava presso alcuni clienti dell'interno dell'isola, causa anche la sopravvenuta interruzione delle vie di comunicazione a seguito dell'istituzione del cordone sanitario[25], e disponendo di denaro appena sufficiente per i bisogni essenziali della famiglia che nel frattempo si era creata, ma non certamente per soccorrere anche i propri operai rimasti privi di lavoro (e di salario), riuscì a trovare la soluzione alle difficoltà del momento. In cambio di agevolazioni sul prezzo riuscì, infatti, a convincere alcuni amici negozianti a mantenere aperti i loro magazzini per due ore al giorno in modo da poter consegnare loro il lavoro ordinato e prodotto dai suoi operai, che così poterono continuare a percepire un salario, anche se ridotto.

Ma ecco che l'anno successivo, già quarantenne, un ennesimo atto di volontà segnò per sempre il suo destino imprimendo una svolta decisiva a tutta la sua vita.

[24] G. Chiesi, *La Sicilia illustrata nella storia, nell'arte, nei paesi*, Sonzogno, Milano, 1892, p. 547.

[25] F. Brancato, *Storia della Sicilia post-unificazione* cit., vol. I, p. 308.

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3. Catania, la città siciliana più industriosa e moderna

Deluso dell'andamento stazionario della sua attività e certamente stimolato dall'aver appreso che sulla piazza di Catania, causa l'assenza di una discreta attività tintoria[26], «s'importavano filati da Napoli e da Palermo»[27], decise, infatti, di trasferirsi nel centro etneo.

La città viveva in quegli anni, ben più di Palermo e di Messina, una rapida espansione demografica[28] – nel 1881 era arrivata a 100.415 abitanti dai 68.810 del 1861[29] – che le veniva e dall'incremento naturale e, in misura decisamente maggiore, dal fenomeno migratorio[30] a seguito della forte capacità di attrazione che esercitava sulle popolazioni dei comuni non solo limitrofi. E questo perché, dotata di un porto da poco migliorato e ingrandito[31] e di uno scalo ferroviario di rilevanza nazionale che l'avevano consacrata, grazie alla presenza di un attivo stuolo di imprenditori, banchieri e commercianti e locali e stranieri[32],

[26] In tutto si trattava di 23 piccole botteghe, tutte sparse in 12 comuni della provincia, per complessivi 37 lavoranti (Ircac, *L'economia siciliana a fine '800* cit., pp. 127-132).

[27] G. Collotti, *I Cavalieri del Lavoro* cit., p. 357.

[28] Alla quale, però, non si accompagnava una parallela (o quasi) espansione edilizia, col risultato di un peggioramento delle condizioni igienico-sanitarie di alcuni quartieri sovraffollati (Civita, Angelo Custode e San Berillo): di qui progetti di risanamento e di sviluppo edilizio che vedono protagonisti gli ingegneri Filadelfo Fichera (*Salubrità, igiene e fognatura della città di Catania: studi e proposte*, Galatola, Catania, 1879) e Bernardo Gentile Cusa (*Piano regolatore per il risanamento e per l'ampliamento della città di Catania*, Galatola, Catania, 1888), come, dall'altra, di abbellimento della città. Su questi temi vedi, tra gli altri, S. Boscarino, *Le vicende urbanistiche*, in *Catania contemporanea* cit., pp. 152-154; G. Dato, *Ingegneria sanitaria e risanamento delle città alla fine dell'Ottocento: il contributo di Filadelfo Fichera*, in P. Nastasi (a cura di), *Il Meridione e le scienze (secoli XVI-XIX)*, Istituto Gramsci siciliano, Palermo, 1988, pp. 385-401.

[29] G. Cavallari, *Struttura e sviluppo demografico*, in *Catania contemporanea* cit., tab. 18, p. 348.

[30] A.M. Altavilla, *I flussi migratori a Catania*, in *Per un bilancio di fine secolo. Catania nel Novecento* cit., pp. 127-129.

[31] E. Iachello, *Costruzione del porto e identità urbana a Catania nell'Ottocento*, in A. Coco, E. Iachello (a cura di), *Il porto di Catania. Storia e prospettive*, Lombardi, Caltanissetta, 2003, pp. 131-137.

[32] Tra i locali vanno citati i vari Alonzo e Consoli, Fischetti, Marano, Prinzi, Sangiorgi, Vasta, mentre, tra gli stranieri, vanno ricordati gli inglesi Aveline, Trewella, Thrupp, Wäckerlin e gli svizzeri Aellig, Brieger, Caflisch, Dilg, Rietmann, le due etnie più numerose e influenti, ma anche il danese Sarauw, il tedesco Fog e l'austriaco Peratoner: tutti esponenti di una «borghesia doratasi nella banca, nelle speculazioni, nei traffici e nello sfruttamento delle ricchezze agrarie e minerarie del vicino territorio» (G. Chiesi, *La Sicilia illustrata* cit., p. 363). In proposito si rinvia a B. Gentile Cusa, *Piano regolatore* cit., pp. 133-141; A.M. Iozzia, *Imprenditori europei a Catania nel commercio e nell'industria*, in *Imprese e capitali stranieri a Catania tra '800 e '900*, Catania, Archivio di Stato, Catania, 1998, pp. 109-136; F.P. Di Vita, *Gli imprenditori elvetici a Catania tra Otto e Novecento*, «Nuova Economia e Storia», XVII, 4 (2011), pp. 53-70.

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a centro di sbocco della produzione agricola della provincia (agrumi, vini, liquirizia, frutta secca) e della raffinazione dello zolfo, stava inseguendo anche un progetto industriale che dai settori tradizionali, organizzati per lo più su base artigianale (lavorazione del legno, abbigliamento e pelletterie, prodotti alimentari) e in crescita e/o consolidamento rispetto al recente passato[33], si allargava sempre più a quelli moderni. Sorgevano, pertanto, numerosi stabilimenti (produzione zolfifera, attività molitoria, meccanica) che andavano localizzandosi nelle adiacenze della stazione e del porto, lungo la nuova strada per Ognina (oggi via Messina). Una densa presenza che faceva dire a viaggiatori e acuti osservatori, come il console germanico a Messina, che «da per tutto [erano] i primordi d'uno sviluppo progressivo; laboratorii, magazzini, manifatture, fabbriche industriali; da per tutto i sicuri indizi d'un ardore fervido e giudizioso, che tende ad alti scopi ed ha fiducia che a questa città sia riserbato un grande avvenire»[34].

Come si vede dalla tabella seguente, seppure la città desse a prima vista l'impressione di una moderna società industriale, il suo tessuto produttivo, tranne il caso della Manifattura Tabacchi[35], non conosceva ancora l'organizzazione della grande fabbrica, né, tanto meno, la presenza di una massa proletaria. Quanto poi al settore tessile, della prestigiosa produzione di seta[36] sopravvivevano ormai appena tre "fabbriche" o, più propriamente, "botteghe" per la torcitura della seta che in tutto contavano quindici addetti. Né migliore era la situazione del ramo cotoniero. Appena un trentennio prima, secondo il rapporto della locale Camera di Commercio (18 aprile 1861), era ancora piuttosto sviluppato e di «massimo pregio», con una produzione concentrata in quattro fabbriche che occupavano un «numero significantissimo di individui d'ogni età»[37], mentre in seguito, sulla base dei dati dell'inchiesta industriale del nuovo regno, consisteva in 27 "stabilimenti" di sola tessitura per un totale di 180 telai a mano e 309 addetti[38]. Adesso esso sopravviveva solo grazie a imprenditori svizzeri ed era ridotto ormai ad appena un opificio per la sgranellatura del cotone di proprietà di

[33] R. Romeo, *Il Risorgimento in Sicilia* cit., p. 394.

[34] A. Schneegans, *La Sicilia nella natura, nella storia, nella vita*, Barbera, Firenze, 1890, p. 226. Vedi anche E. De Amicis, *Ricordi d'un viaggio in Sicilia* [1908], Alpe Sicula, Catania, 1968, p. 52.

[35] Cfr. B. Gentile Cusa, *Piano regolatore* cit., pp. 157-158.

[36] Cfr. V. Cordaro Clarenza, *Osservazioni sopra la storia di Catania* cit., tomo IV, pp. 170-173; S. De Luca Carnazza, *Sulle condizioni economiche* cit., pp. 39-40; F. Rapisardi, *Notizie statistiche* cit., p. 40.

[37] R. Romeo, *Il Risorgimento in Sicilia* cit., p. 394.

[38] V. Ellena, *Notizie sopra alcune industrie* cit., p. 68; O. Cancila, *Storia dell'industria* cit., p. 137.

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Tab. I - *Panorama industriale catanese al 1887*[39]

Settori	Esercizi	Addetti
Alimentare:		
Fabbriche di agrocotto	?	215
Fabbriche di birra e acque gazose	2	17
Fabbriche di conserve	?	?
Fabbriche di dolci e confetture	4	18
Fabbriche di ghiaccio	2	13
Fabbriche di liquirizia	7	191
Fabbriche di paste da minestra	50	277
Minerario, meccanico e chimico:		
Fabbriche di amido	1	2
Fabbriche di fiammiferi	1	70
Fabbriche di saponi	17	62
Fabbriche di sommacchi	2	?
Lavorazione dell'asfalto	1	20
Lavorazione dello zolfo	17	621
Officine del gas	1	60
Officine meccaniche e fonderie	7	75
Officine telefoniche	1	14
Polverifici	2	7
Tessile:		
Stabilimenti per la sgranellatura del cotone	?	?
Torcitura della seta	3	15
Stabilimento di filatura, ritorcitura e tintoria del cotone	1	[10]
Stabilimento per la tessitura della seta	1	?

[39] Cfr. *Annali di Statistica. Statistica industriale*, fasc. IX, s. IV, *Notizie sulle condizioni industriali della provincia di Catania*, Roma, 1887. Vedi anche S. De Luca Carnazza, *Sulle condizioni economiche* cit., pp. 39-65; B. Gentile Cusa, *Piano regolatore* cit., pp. 151-168; S. Salomone, *Le provincie siciliane studiate sotto tutti gli aspetti*, vol. II, *La provincia di Catania*, Tipografia Micale, Acireale, 1886, pp. 142-143; M. Bontempelli, E. Trevisani, *La Sicilia industriale commerciale e agricola* cit., pp. 252-255 e 322-325; S. Frazzetta, *Il censimento del 1871 e quello odierno*, «Catania. Rivista del Comune», III, fasc. I (1931), pp. 51-52.

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Diversi:		
Concerie di pelli	13	184
Fabbriche di cappelli	6	49
Fabbriche di carrozze	6	36
Fabbriche di cordami	?	?
Fabbriche di fiori artificiali	2	2
Fabbriche di guanti	4	32
Fabbriche di mobili	6	78
Fabbriche di specchi	1	?
Fabbriche di strumenti musicali	?	?
Fornaci	?	?
Litografie	4	?
Macinazione delle materie concianti	1	4
Manifattura dei tabacchi	1	603
Stabilimenti fotografici	9	?
Tipografie	11	76

Eduardo Dilg[40] e a una fabbrichetta di cotoni cucirini di Theodor Rietmann e Pietro Aellig[41], peraltro entrambi ignorati nel corso della rilevazione statistica dei primi anni Ottanta, a conferma della ormai irrilevante presenza del settore tessile non solo a Catania[42].

4. Nella nuova realtà: dalle difficoltà iniziali ai primi riconoscimenti e successi

È pertanto in questa realtà che, con i pochi mezzi disponibili e i limitati aiuti di qualche amico[43], giunse il quarantaduenne Feo, portandosi dietro una decina di operai e la famiglia[44].

Ma ecco che proprio quando aveva appena attivato la sua ditta, dotandosi anche del nuovissimo ritrovato telefonico[45], e già si era mosso alla ricerca dei fornitori e della clientela, il destino gli si volse contro

[40] Sulla sua figura e l'attività vedi V. Consoli, *Dilg Eduardo*, in Id. (a cura di), *Enciclopedia di Catania*, vol. I, Tringale, Catania,1987, p. 275; A.M. Iozzia, *Imprenditori europei a Catania* cit., p. 132; F.P. Di Vita, *Gli imprenditori elvetici a Catania* cit., pp. 55-57.

[41] A.M. Iozzia, *Imprenditori europei a Catania* cit., pp. 111 e 133.

[42] Come rilevato dalla locale Camera di Commercio nella sua *Relazione statistica sulle industrie ed il commercio della Provincia di Catania nel 1887*, Pastore, Catania, 1888, pp. 24-25.

[43] G. Collotti, *I Cavalieri del Lavoro* cit., p. 357.

[44] E precisamente la moglie e i tre figli: Andrea (era il nome del nonno), Francesco Paolo e Niccolò.

[45] A Catania era arrivato alla fine del 1882 (V. Pavone, *Storia di Catania dalle origini alla fine del secolo XIX*, Edizioni S.S.C., Catania, 1969, p. 181).

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ancora una volta. Catania, infatti, piombava, inaspettatamente – era il 1887 – in una grave crisi economica causata dal generale ribasso dei prezzi di quei prodotti (zolfo, agrumi, cereali, vino) che «costituivano il cespite più importante della piazza»[46], crisi che, a sua volta, provocava un crack finanziario, il tutto, poi, in un clima reso ancor più allarmante da un ennesimo riapparire dell'epidemia colerica[47].

Come Feo abbia operato in quella drammatica circostanza non sappiamo, ma è lecito pensare che non sia rimasto per nulla inattivo. Tant'è che dal 1888 in poi – nel contempo la nuova tariffa protezionistica del 1887 accresceva sempre più i favori all'industria cotoniera nazionale[48] – lo vediamo dispiegare tutta la sua energia nel perfezionare e accrescere la produzione per il momento limitata alla sola tintura. Riesce così a soddisfare le sempre più numerose ordinazioni che adesso cominciavano a giungere non solo dal mercato interno (Ancona, Bari, Bologna, Genova, Napoli, Palermo, Venezia), ma anche da quello estero, in particolare dalla Turchia (Costantinopoli, Salonicco e Smirne), avviandosi pertanto all'istituzione di apposite rappresentanze commerciali della sua ditta[49].

E conseguentemente il Nostro si vide costretto a dover prolungare spesso la sua presenza giornaliera nello stabilimento per poter sovrintendere, in prima persona, a tutte le diverse fasi del ciclo produttivo, come pure, in assenza di un'appropriata organizzazione commerciale, alla vendita, curando, in particolare, il sollecito adempimento degli ordini e delle relative spedizioni, così da garantire ai suoi clienti tempi certi di consegna della merce[50]. Non solo, ma estese la lavorazione anche ad altre varietà di cotone continuando ad attenzionare la qualità del prodotto, fino a ottenere, all'Esposizione palermitana del 1891-92[51], il suo primo importante riconoscimento[52], vale a dire la medaglia

[46] B. Gentile Cusa, *Piano regolatore* cit., p. 145.

[47] Ibidem. Sull'argomento vedi anche G. Giarrizzo, *Catania* cit., pp. 90-104; G. Barone, *Banchieri e politici a Catania. Uno scandalo di fine Ottocento*, «Meridiana», 14 (1992), pp. 33-65; D. Ventura, *Nella Catania di fine Ottocento* cit., pp. 33-54.

[48] In questa direzione, così da valere almeno a risarcimento dei danni causati dall'abolizione del corso forzoso (1882), si erano mossi gli auspici di F. Borghi, *L'industria del cotone all'Esposizione di Milano* cit., p. 651.

[49] G. Collotti, *I Cavalieri del Lavoro* cit., p. 358.

[50] Come quando nel 1884 non aveva esitato a trasportare, da solo e di notte, un grosso quantitativo di cotone che andava asciugato per poi essere spedito appena l'indomani: in quella occasione la sua forte fibra aveva ceduto fino a rischiare di morire (ivi, p. 360).

[51] Ibidem.

[52] Che va ad aggiungersi alle precedenti menzioni in occasione delle esposizioni di Genova e Napoli (*Corriere di Catania*, 12 gennaio 1896).

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di bronzo «per il perfezionamento introdotto nella manifattura dei coloranti e per la bontà dei tipi inglesi e tedeschi»[53].

Ed intanto le crescente domanda (interna ed estera) di cotonate per il consumo ordinario lo convinsero, nonostante «sul ristretto mercato isolano premesse la forte concorrenza dell'industria napoletana»[54], dell'opportunità di attivare anche il ramo della ritorcitura e, quindi, della necessità di disporre delle macchine adatte, il che comportava una disponibilità di capitali che eccedeva, e di molto, le possibilità finanziarie sue e della famiglia. Il ricorso al credito era perciò una improrogabile necessità, ma la diffidenza[55] nei suoi confronti – fino ad allora un perfetto sconosciuto al di fuori del suo opificio[56] – da parte dei pur numerosi istituti bancari presenti in città[57], che certamente aveva le sue motivazioni sia nelle sue umili origini sia nell'assenza di un garante o anche di un referente politico, sembrava dovergli precludere ogni ipotesi di crescita e modernizzazione dello stabilimento. Quand'ecco nel 1895 farsi avanti un finanziatore nella persona di Pietro Aellig, uno stimato e noto imprenditore di origini svizzere contitolare della Rietmann & Aellig – società che, oltre a produrre, come detto, cotoni cucirini nello stabilimento di via Vecchia Ognina 64-68, effettuava operazioni bancarie e si occupava di import-export con la Svizzera –, nonché amministratore e azionista di numerose società e istituti di credito, socio fondatore e poi presidente del "Deutsche-Schweizer Klub" catanese e vicepresidente del "Circolo Scacchistico" cittadino[58], il quale, nella successiva veste di presidente del CdA e azionista della Società Anonima "Cotonificio Feo", non avrebbe mai fatto mancare il suo illimitato appoggio finanziario ai Feo, anche dopo la scomparsa dello stesso fondatore del cotonificio[59].

[53] R. Camera di Commercio e arti della Provincia di Catania, *Relazione statistica sulle industrie ed il commercio della Provincia di Catania nel 1891* cit., p. 34.

[54] G. Barone, *Capitale finanziario e bonifica* cit., p. 533.

[55] A un «capitale diffidente» non solo a Catania ma in tutta l'isola accennerà lo stesso Vincenzo Feo in una lettera indirizzata a "Sua Eccellenza il Ministro d'Industria, Agricoltura e Commercio" del 23 maggio 1903 (Asct, Fondo Prefettura, s. I, *Affari Generali*, b. 382).

[56] Nessun cenno alla sua attività ritroviamo, per il momento, in pubblicazioni coeve quali quelle di S. Salomone (*Le provincie siciliane* cit., vol. II) e di B. Gentile Cusa (*Piano regolatore* cit.).

[57] B. Gentile Cusa, *Piano regolatore* cit., pp. 133-141.

[58] A.M. Iozzia, *Imprenditori europei a Catania* cit., pp. 111-112 e 132; F.P. Di Vita, *Gli imprenditori elvetici a Catania* cit., p. 67; S. Spina, *I giocatori siciliani: 1500-1975*, Federazione Scacchistica Italiana, Milano, 2011, pp. 12-14

[59] Cotonificio "FEO", *Relazione e Bilancio dell'esercizio 1906*, Galatola, Catania, 1906. Alla sua morte, avvenuta a Zurigo il 27 settembre 1911, lo stabilimento Feo non mancherà di tributargli solenni onoranze (*Giornale dell'Isola*, 7 ottobre 1911).

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Fu così che il nostro industriale, grazie alle L. 56.214,28 avute dalla Rietmann & Aellig per l'acquisto di macchinari e dei relativi accessori e alle sue L. 10.555[60], poté dotare lo stabilimento di 1200 fusi di torcitura, ingrandirlo con un nuovo fabbricato riservato alle macchine «inglesi e svizzere mosse da un motore a gas speciale denominato Dowson [...] fornito dalla ditta Langen e Wolf di Milano»[61], e dividere l'altro reparto, la tintoria, in due parti: «uno per i cotoni lucidi per cucire e l'altro per i cotoni chinati per calze e qualsiasi altro lavoro», attivando inoltre la stamperia, la impacchettatura e gli apparecchi dei cotoni lucidi, il che comportò anche un aumento della potenza complessiva da 20 a 30 cavalli ottenuto con l'aggiunta di una seconda motrice. Ed infine, a corollario di questo potenziamento dell'attività, nello stabilimento si elevò a 150 il numero degli operai (la maggior parte donne)[62], che subito si provvide a munire di assicurazione[63], nonostante ancora non fosse operativa una legge sugli infortuni nel lavoro (lo sarà dal 1898)[64].

Due anni dopo il Ministero di Agricoltura Industria e Commercio conferiva a Feo la medaglia d'argento al merito industriale per «avere impiantato e sviluppato l'industria della tintoria e ritorti da calza in Sicilia, vincendo le grandi difficoltà inerenti alla creazione di un'industria nuova, in una plaga affatto digiuna di tradizioni industriali»[65]. Nel 1898 arriverà la medaglia di bronzo all'Esposizione Nazionale di Torino[66]. Nel frattempo, dopo aver ricevuto un'ulteriore somma di L. 5.644,75 per acquistare altro macchinario[67], il legame finanziario e industriale con la Rietmann & Aellig si faceva sempre più stretto. Nel 1897 il capitale investito ammontava a L. 72.514,03, delle quali ben L. 61.859,03 provenivano dalla società svizzera che, a titolo di rimborso, ebbe diritto a un prelievo sugli utili del 10% annuo calcolato sul valore delle macchine, mentre il resto degli utili veniva diviso in parti uguali tra le due ditte, alle quali spettava infine un interesse del 6% sul capitale da ciascuna versato. E mentre il fabbricato rimaneva di proprietà del Feo, il macchinario, il cui costo si prevedeva che la

[60] Asct, Notaio Francesco Boscarini, *Contratto di società e vendita del Cotonificio Feo*, 1° agosto 1899, repertorio n. 14657.

[61] *Corriere di Catania*, 12 gennaio 1896 e 21 marzo 1896.

[62] G. Collotti, *I Cavalieri del Lavoro* cit., p. 361.

[63] Vedi *Regolamento interno del Cotonificio Catanese "Vincenzo Feo & C."*, Galatola, Catania, 1902, art. 21, p. 8.

[64] Legge 17.3.1898, n. 80.

[65] Cfr. G. Collotti, *I Cavalieri del Lavoro*, cit., pp. 362-363 e *Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno d'Italia*, 26 maggio 1897, n. 123.

[66] *L'Esposizione Nazionale del 1898*, Roux Frassati & C., Torino, 1898, p. 866.

[67] Asct, Notaio Francesco Boscarini, *Contratto di società e vendita del Cotonificio Feo* cit.

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ditta Rietmann & Aellig avrebbe potuto ammortizzare entro un decennio, era di proprietà comune e in parti uguali[68].

Il 1° agosto 1899 il sodalizio venne ulteriormente rafforzato, portando alla costituzione del "Cotonificio Catanese Vincenzo Feo & C.". Nello stesso anno Vincenzo Feo aveva ottenuto un prestito di L. 5.000 dal Comune di Catania (rimborsabile in cinque rate annuali)[69], ma sarà soprattutto l'apporto di capitale degli svizzeri a consentire l'ampliamento e il potenziamento dello stabilimento aggiungendo al ciclo lavorativo l'attività di filatura grazie a un grande impianto di fabbricazione inglese provvisto di una forza motrice di 150 cavalli [70]. Allo scopo la ditta Rietmann & Aellig, con sede in via Carcaci 10, si obbligava a versare entro l'anno in corso la somma di L. 92.299, per cui, in considerazione del fatto che la stessa risultava creditrice per la somma di L. 43.903,85, il suo apporto di capitale ammontava complessivamente a L. 140.202,85. A sua volta la ditta Vincenzo Feo, con sede in via Vecchia Ognina 64, si obbligava a versare, sempre entro l'anno in corso, la somma di L. 33.000 così costituita: L. 18.000 in contanti e L. 15.000 risultanti dalla vendita all'azienda stessa del fabbricato di cui sopra (= L. 10.655) e di un terreno di circa 3000 mq. sito in via Messina (= L. 4.345)[71]. Il capitale societario così reso disponibile doveva essere impiegato nell'«acquisto di altro macchinario e nella costruzione di altro fabbricato negli stessi locali in cui fu edificato il primo».

Completato lo stabilimento, la conduzione e la gestione amministrativa rimaneva affidata alla famiglia Feo, a rappresentare la quale, oltre al padre, entravano i figli Andrea e Francesco Paolo. Spettava a essa, usando «la diligenza del buon padre di famiglia», far «lavorare continuamente l'intero macchinario salvo i casi di forza maggiore» e occuparsi anche dell'acquisto della materia prima dandone prontamente avviso all'altra parte societaria. La Rietmann & Aellig, a sua volta, aveva facoltà di esercitare un controllo trimestrale sulla merce che entrava nei magazzini, nonché, dandone congruo preavviso, di partecipare allo stesso acquisto del cotone in stoppa. E a essa, inoltre,

[68] Ibidem.

[69] G. Collotti, *I Cavalieri del Lavoro* cit., p. 362. Non è escluso, a mio parere, che a farsi promotore dell'iniziativa sia stato lo stesso Giuseppe De Felice Giuffrida che nel consiglio comunale (sindaco Giuseppe Pizzarelli) era la figura più autorevole e il più sensibile ai problemi dell'industrializzazione. In questo senso F. Renda, *Socialisti e cattolici in Sicilia. 1900-1904*, Sciascia, Caltanissetta-Roma, 1990, p. 337.

[70] Cfr. G. Collotti, *I Cavalieri del Lavoro* cit., p. 362; M. Bontempelli, E. Trevisani, *La Sicilia industriale commerciale e agricola* cit., p. 329.

[71] «Con pozzo vasca, caseggiato e altro accessorio e pertinenza confinante da ponente con lo stabilimento Vincenzo Feo, da mezzogiorno con gli eredi Ursino e con Cristofaro Sansone, e da tramontana con la proprietà del sig. Vito Scuto» (Asct, Notaio Francesco Boscarini, *Contratto di società e vendita del Cotonificio Feo* cit.).

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andava corrisposto, sia sulla filatura che sulla torcitura, «un tasso fisso di lavoro, sempre nell'identica misura, qualunque sia per essere l'oscillazione dei mercati e la possibile concorrenza». Infine, una volta detratte le spese occorrenti per il corretto funzionamento dello stabilimento, cioè «mano d'opera, consumo di carbone, olio, anelli, cordelle, tasse governative, compra di rocchetti di cinghe ed infine di tutto quanto necessariamente occorre per l'esercizio nonché l'importo delle eventuali riparazioni al macchinario», la rimanenza andava versata nella Cassa della ditta Rietmann & Aellig che avrebbe provveduto ad accreditare l'azienda di tali versamenti «per tenerne conto alla chiusura di ogni anno, con un interesse del 6% annuo [...] sino al totale scomputo dell'avere di ciascun socio».

Col nuovo secolo lo stabilimento di «filatura ritorcitura e tintoria di cotone» Cotonificio Catanese Vincenzo Feo & C. era in grado ormai di produrre giornalmente 1500 Kg. di filati di ottima qualità[72], lavorando cotone, in massima parte di provenienza indiana, nella quantità di circa 50.000 Kg. al mese. Ed infine dava lavoro a 300 operai[73] – 28 maschi adulti e 2 ragazzi sotto i quindici anni e 240 donne e 30 ragazze sotto i quindici anni – che così potevano contare su una media annua di 290 giorni lavorativi.

Ormai il "Cotonificio Catanese Feo", unica grande e bella realtà della Sicilia, poteva figurare degnamente non solo nelle pagine della locale *Guida del compratore della città di Catania*[74] ma anche nel numero degli opifici nazionali. Lo accreditavano una dotazione di 2 caldaie a vapore, 2 motori a gas della potenza di 200 cavalli, 2300 fusi di filatura e 1100 di ritorcitura[75]. Non solo, ma, grazie fondamentalmente al nostro Feo, la Sicilia poteva annoverare adesso, oltre ai preesistenti rami di "tessitura" (Palermo)[76] e di "filatura, tessitura e stampa" (Messina)[77], anche quello di "filatura e ritorcitura", ivi compresa, nel nostro caso, anche la "tintoria", contribuendo così a elevare la dotazione nazionale complessiva di fusi (2.111.170 al 1900)[78].

[72] G. Collotti, *I Cavalieri del Lavoro* cit., p. 362.

[73] Nel 1902 diventati 325, così suddivisi: 225 donne, 54 fanciulle e 46 maschi adulti, per poi, l'anno successivo, crescere ancora di altre 25 unità (Asct, Fondo Prefettura, s. I, *Affari Generali*, b. 382 e *Corriere di Catania*, 19 settembre 1903).

[74] Galati, Catania, 1901, p. 33.

[75] Maic, *Annali di Statistica. Statistica industriale*, fasc. LXIV, *L'industria del cotone in Italia* cit., p. 50.

[76] Veniva esercitata da tre opifici: Ricovero detto del Boccone del povero, Giuseppe Gulì di Salvatore e Giuseppe Gulì di Vincenzo, con una dotazione complessiva di 36 telai meccanici (ivi, pp. 79 e 121).

[77] Trattasi dello stabilimento di Gaetano Ainis dotato di 102 telai meccanici (ivi, p. 104).

[78] Ivi, p. 9.

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Il che non poteva non attirare l'attenzione dello stesso ministro ai Lavori Pubblici on. Nicola Balenzano, il quale, in visita a Catania dall'11 al 13 settembre 1902, non mancò di sottolineare, tra i moderni stabilimenti industriali della città, l'esempio della raffineria di zolfi del Trewella e, per l'appunto, del "Cotonificio Feo" – divenuto oggetto, fra l'altro, di uno specifico servizio tramite vettura pubblica da qualunque punto della città[79] –, «nelle [cui] vaste sale, ove l'immane lavoro delle macchine, diretto con cura assidua, ininterrotta, paziente da centinaia di operai, mai vien meno, in tutte le cose, in quantità considerevoli porge dei prodotti che nulla han da invidiare ai migliori delle altre fabbriche del continente e dell'estero»[80]. A seguire, e cioè nel dicembre successivo, arrivava il decreto reale di nomina a Cavaliere del Lavoro[81].

5. Il Cotonificio Feo e i problemi del lavoro e della cotonicoltura

Seppure con grave ritardo rispetto alla gran parte dei paesi europei – e in primo luogo, ovviamente, all'Inghilterra, dove i primi passi di una vera e propria legislazione sociale particolarmente attenta ai fanciulli si erano avuti già nel 1819[82] – anche il governo italiano aveva cominciato a mostrare una crescente attenzione alla promulgazione di una legge a tutela dei minori e delle donne in fabbrica, cioè di coloro che costituivano oltre il 40% dell'intera popolazione operaia[83]. Nel 1886, apportando integrazioni e miglioramenti al testo della precedente legge del 15 luglio 1877, si era varato – non senza vibranti proteste da parte della quasi totalità dell'imprenditoria tessile[84] – quello

[79] Il costo era di L. 1 se a un cavallo, L. 1,50 se a due cavalli (*Guida turistica di Catania* cit., p. 60).

[80] Al termine della visita al ministro e al suo seguito «nell'ampia terrazza dello stabilimento Feo vennero serviti, con signorile professione, rinfreschi e liquori» (*Corriere di Catania*, 12 settembre 1902). Il successivo 20 settembre, sempre sulle pagine dello stesso quotidiano, Aristide Pollastri, inviato de "Il Secolo" al seguito del ministro, accennava a quel «colossale stabilimento di filatura e ritorcitura di cotone del Feo, che impiega molte centinaia di operaie, che è un vanto dell'industria nazionale e che pare ci trasporti per un momento nelle plaghe più laboriose della Brianza».

[81] R.D. 21 dicembre 1902. La proposta partì dal prefetto (Emilio Bedendo) e da tutti i deputati e senatori di Catania (www.cavalieridellavoro.it/cavaliere.php?numero_brevetto=98 [Federazione Nazionale Cavalieri del Lavoro, 2005-2014]).

[82] M. Blaug, *Gli economisti classici e i Factory acts: un riesame*, in R. Faucci, E. Pesciarelli (a cura di), *L'economia classica. Origini e sviluppo (1750-1848)*, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1976, p. 299.

[83] G. Procacci, *La classe operaia italiana agli inizi del secolo XX*, «Studi storici», III (1962), pp. 9-11.

[84] Il cui atteggiamento era «improntato generalmente a una totale insensibilità ed insofferenza di ogni limitazione alla propria autorità, spesso sconfinante nell'arbitrio. Nei casi migliori si può riscontrare un "buon" paternalismo, mai l'esplicito ricono-

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che viene considerato, a ragione, il primo atto della legislazione sociale in Italia[85], in forza del quale si vietava l'assunzione al lavoro dei fanciulli al di sotto dei nove anni, sempre previo accertamento di buona costituzione fisica, e si imponeva altresì l'adempimento degli obblighi scolastici. E, nel 1898, si istituiva l'assicurazione obbligatoria per gli infortuni sul lavoro.

Ma è solo agli inizi del Novecento che importanti provvedimenti sfociavano in una vera e propria legislazione organica sul lavoro minorile e femminile[86]. La legge del 19 giugno 1902, infatti, portava il limite di assunzione al lavoro da nove a dodici anni e fissava la durata massima di lavoro in undici ore giornaliere, mentre, riguardo alle donne, vietava il lavoro notturno, seppure, per il momento, solo per le minorenni, e regolamentava, altresì, il lavoro ante e post maternità. Essa sarebbe dovuta entrare in vigore il 1° luglio 1903, quattro mesi dopo, cioè, la pubblicazione del relativo regolamento applicativo emanato il 28 febbraio 1903, e nel contempo il Ministero provvedeva a emanare una circolare nella quale si ammettevano deroghe all'applicazione del regolamento, sia pure in via transitoria o anche straordinaria. Il che spingeva numerosi industriali a interloquire con lo stesso Ministero prospettando necessità e problemi che, a loro avviso, sarebbero potuti scaturire se non si fosse intervenuto almeno su alcuni articoli particolarmente gravidi di conseguenze funeste in termini di costi, di produttività e di occupazione[87]. In quest'occasione anche Vincenzo Feo non mancò di far sentire la sua voce.

Nel 1902 pubblicò una *Lettera aperta a Sua Ecc. il Comm. Guido Baccelli Ministro di Agricoltura e Commercio* nella quale non si limitava a manifestare apertamente alcune sue perplessità in merito a una sollecita applicazione della stessa, ma avanzava anche alcune istanze, in particolare, a due questioni che, come lui, inquietavano molti suoi colleghi. E cioè l'istruzione elementare inferiore obbligatoria per i fanciulli

scimento dei diritti del lavoro» (M. Abrate, *Lavoro e lavoratori nell'Italia contemporanea*, F. Angeli, Milano, 1977, p. 25). Su questi temi vedi anche D. Bigazzi, *Le permanenze del paternalismo: le politiche sociali degli imprenditori italiani tra Ottocento e Novecento*, in M.L. Betri e D. Bigazzi (a cura di), *Ricerche di storia in onore di Franco Della Peruta*, vol. II, *Economia e società*, F. Angeli, Milano, 1996, p. 40 e ss.

[85] M.V. Ballestrero, *La protezione concessa e l'eguaglianza negata: il lavoro femminile nella legislazione italiana*, in A. Groppi (a cura di), *Il lavoro delle donne. Storia delle donne in Italia*, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1996, p. 447.

[86] Con risultati apprezzabilissimi, dal momento che l'incidenza del lavoro delle fanciulle inizia proprio da questo periodo il suo trend discendente, passando dal 46,6% (media nazionale) del 1881 al 43,1% del 1901 e, in Sicilia, dal 51,0% addirittura al 13,9% (G. Toniolo, G. Vecchi, *Italian Children at Work 1881-1961*, «Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia», 66, n. 3 (2007), tab. 3, p. 426).

[87] S. Merli, *Proletariato di fabbrica e capitalismo industriale. Il caso italiano: 1880-1900*, vol. I, La Nuova Italia, Firenze, 1972, pp. 355-356.

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e le fanciulle minorenni[88] e l'interruzione di un'ora e mezza del lavoro notturno[89], che lo vedevano contrario non solo per il danno economico derivante dall'aumento dell'incidenza degli impianti fissi sul costo del prodotto, ma, soprattutto, per ragioni di "pubblica moralità"[90], non potendo «lasciare liberi gli operai di ambo i sessi, nelle sale al buio, che è causato dalla fermata della motrice»[91]. Istanze che, non accolte, lo avrebbero costretto – ed era questa una chiara minaccia – a operare numerosi licenziamenti, dal momento che sarebbe stato difficile, se non impossibile, reperire sul posto fanciulle in grado di leggere e scrivere[92], con immediate ripercussioni negative anche sull'attività dello stabilimento:

L'art. 2 della legge dispone che non possono ammettersi al lavoro le donne minorenni ed i fanciulli sino a 15 anni compiuti, i quali non abbiano frequentato il corso elementare inferiore, ai sensi dell'art. 2 della legge 15 luglio 1877[93]. Mentre per i fanciulli che, alla data della promulgazione della legge, manchino di tale requisito, è concesso un termine di tre anni per mettersi in regola, l'art. 5 vieta nella maniera più recisa il lavoro notturno alle donne di qualsiasi età, le quali non abbiano frequentato il corso elementare inferiore.

[88] Nel 1895 su 2.975.910 fanciulli gli iscritti erano solo 1.670.092, il che significa che oltre 800.000 eludevano completamente gli obblighi di legge, ed è del tutto comprensibile che ciò avvenga, sottolinea U. Tombesi, ove si consideri che, «data la scarsità dei salari, i genitori, invece di mandare i loro figli a scuola, preferiscono rinchiuderli in uno stabilimento in cui possono guadagnare qualche lira» (*L'industria cotoniera italiana* cit., pp. 225-226).

[89] Da molti osservatori giustamente accusato di essere «malsano e nocivo al fisico e al morale», perché causa principale di decessi per tisi da un lato e, dall'altro, perché rende «anormale all'operaio il consorzio civile e familiare» (ivi, pp. 211-213).

[90] Quelle stesse ragioni sottolineate già dall'on. Antonino Di San Giuliano nel corso di un suo intervento alla Camera a proposito della catanese Manifattura Tabacchi in data 6 maggio 1884: «uomini e donne stanno insieme confusi; i vincoli della famiglia, come è naturale, si rallentano, e ne nascono tutti quegli inconvenienti, i quali sono oramai tanto conosciuti, che sono persino diventati luoghi comuni» (*Atti Parlamentari*, *Camera*, *Discussioni*, XV legislatura, p. 7394).

[91] Asct, Fondo Prefettura, s. I, *Affari Generali*, b. 482: *Vincenzo Feo al Prefetto di Catania*, 28 giugno 1903.

[92] Ancora in data 19 dicembre 1909 la ditta Feo fa sapere al Ministero che l'analfabetismo tra il personale disponibile locale sfiora il 90% (ivi, b. 382).

[93] Di qui la sua intenzione, suggeritagli dallo stesso Collotti, di aprire una scuola elementare inferiore per le sue giovani operaie, ma in modo tale che, per non creare problemi alla vitale continuità del ciclo di produzione, quelle che «sono del turno notturno frequenteranno la scuola di giorno; viceversa quelle del turno diurno andranno a scuola la sera» (G. Collotti, *I Cavalieri del Lavoro* cit., p. 371 nota). Non ci risulta però che il Feo abbia effettivamente attivato una scuola, né, d'altra parte, che abbia dato tangibili segni di quella solidarietà sociale (scuole, doti, "cure fraterne" e paghe alte) che pure non era assente nella stessa Catania, come nell'impresa di liquirizia e di conserve alimentari di Bernardo Fichera e nella Società Molino a vapore di S. Lucia (M. Bontempelli, E. Trevisani, *La Sicilia industriale commerciale e agricola* cit., p. 255).

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L'inconveniente di tale disparità appare manifesto, se si consideri che in talune regioni, specialmente nel Mezzogiorno, è così esiguo il numero delle fanciulle del popolo, che sappiano leggere e scrivere, da riuscire addirittura una fortunata eccezione. Se a ciò si aggiunge che, nella gran parte degli opifici per la filatura del cotone, una quantità non indifferente di lavoro è affidata alle donne, non sarà difficile comprendere tutto lo squilibrio che l'attuazione integrale dell'art. 5[94] verrebbe a portare nell'andamento delle filature, in rapporto a una regolare distribuzione di lavoro. […]

Se l'industriale non può ritenere nel suo opificio, per il lavoro notturno, la minorenne che non si trovi nelle condizioni previste dall'art. 2 della legge 1877, dato, e non è difficile, il caso che non possa adibirla al lavoro giornaliero, sarà costretto a licenziarla senz'altro.[95]

E su questi temi prima lo stesso Vincenzo Feo e poi il figlio Andrea instaurarono un lungo contenzioso epistolare con l'amministrazione statale centrale (Ministero Agricoltura Industria e Commercio) e locale (Prefetto, Consiglio Provinciale Sanitario e Ufficio del Lavoro), avanzando continuamente istanze – e tutto questo ancora alla fine del 1909 –, dopo di che, in assenza di documentazione, si può ragionevolmente supporre che Feo si sia adeguato alle disposizioni normative, non senza aver ottenuto nel frattempo alcune concessioni, quali la riduzione del riposo diurno di un'ora sulle undici di lavoro e, ma solo in via transitoria, del lavoro notturno[96], e la progressiva sostituzione delle ragazze minorenni con altre superiori ai quindici anni.

[94] L'articolo in questione prescriveva che, trascorsi cinque anni dalla promulgazione della legge, e cioè nel 1907, il lavoro notturno sarebbe stato vietato alle donne di qualsiasi età, il che avverrà puntualmente con Legge 10.11.1907, n. 818. Sull'argomento vedi R. Canetta, *La questione del riposo festivo tra '800 e '900*, in S. Zaninelli, M. Taccolini (a cura di), *Il lavoro come fattore produttivo e come risorsa nella storia economica italiana*, Vita e Pensiero, Milano, 2002, pp. 681-695. Per un inquadramento generale L. Baudoin, *La réglementation légale du travail des femme set des enfants dans l'industrie italienne*, H. Paulin, Paris, 1905.

[95] Lo stesso anno il Ministero provvide a rassicurare il suo interlocutore: «tutti i fanciulli e le donne che alla data di attuazione della legge, si trovino già impiegati al lavoro, potranno rimanervi, anche se essi non abbiano soddisfatto al detto obbligo» (G. Collotti, *I Cavalieri del Lavoro* cit., p. 375).

[96] Il 27 dicembre 1907 Andrea Feo comunicava al Prefetto l'avvenuta cessazione del lavoro notturno nello stabilimento in data 31 agosto (Asct, Fondo Prefettura, s. I, *Affari Generali*, b. 382). Contro il lavoro notturno, all'improvviso visto come estremamente nocivo alla salute dei lavoratori, si leveranno le voci degli stessi industriali allorché apparirà loro come un rimedio alla crisi di sovrapproduzione, così coprendo «col manto di un altruismo inusitato le necessità imposte dal loro stesso interesse» (A. Cabiati, L. Einaudi, *L'Italia e i trattati di commercio*, «Critica sociale», XII (1902), p. 236). Vedi anche P. Jannaccone, *L'industria del cotone e l'abolizione del lavoro notturno*, estr. da «La Riforma sociale», s. II, IV, vol. VII, Roux Frassati e C., Torino, 1897.

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Quanto al rispetto delle regole[97] da parte dell'azienda, una multa elevata alla ditta, colpevole di non ottemperare alla legge sul lavoro delle donne e dei fanciulli, in data 3 aprile 1906[98], e due lettere di denuncia la dicono lunga sull'argomento. La prima, anonima e indirizzata al Prefetto in data 9 maggio 1905, riferiva di assunzioni di ragazze di appena dieci anni di età e non munite di regolare libretto di lavoro[99]. La seconda, firmata da una madre a nome di tutte le madri delle operaie e indirizzata sempre al Prefetto in data 9 ottobre 1907, parlava apertamente di «una vera barbarie crudele per gli angherie» cui venivano sottoposte le ragazze per i più vari motivi: «se vadono al cesso per un atto piccolo, se le vedono mangiare», o anche, e questo è ancora più incomprensibile in un ambiente di lavoro dove la polvere regnava sovrana, «se bevono» o «se si lavano la faccia»[100]. E il quotidiano "Unione", organo ufficiale della locale Camera del Lavoro, in data 21 febbraio 1909 aggiungeva: «Che dire poi delle minorenni che si fanno nascondere quando perviene qualche ispezione?». E ancora, infine, che dire dello stesso ambiente di lavoro malsano e nocivo quando all'assordante rumore delle macchine e al pericolo del contatto con le stesse bisognava aggiungere, specie nella sala di carderia, la costante onnipresenza di «una vera nebbia cotonosa»[101] con evidenti ripercussioni negative sugli organi respiratori[102]?

Dentro lo stabilimento vigeva un controllo assoluto della forza lavoro, come evidenzia il regolamento interno[103]. Elaborato unilateralmente dalla direzione aziendale, da un lato recepiva l'obbligo (Legge 19 giugno 1902) di presentazione del libretto di lavoro da parte delle donne e dei fanciulli in aggiunta ai consueti certificati di nascita,

[97] Lo stesso Ministero, come dimostrato da una circolare inviata ai prefetti in data 9 dicembre 1899, era perfettamente a conoscenza di una pressoché generale pratica di abusi e infrazioni nell'applicazione delle norme legislative (Maic, Ufficio del Lavoro, *Notizie sull'applicazione della legge 19 giugno 1902, n. 242 sul lavoro delle donne e dei fanciulli*, Officina Poligrafica Italiana, Roma, 1906).

[98] Il Ministero al Prefetto (Asct, Fondo Prefettura, serie I, *Affari Generali*, b. 295).

[99] Lettera di denuncia al Prefetto in data 9 maggio 1905 (ivi, b. 382). In proposito una nota del quotidiano "Unione" del 21 febbraio 1909 riferiva: «Le librette di lavoro prescritte per legge sono un mito nello stabilimento del sig. cav. Feo e se si domanda a qualche operaia di che colore sono non ve lo sanno dire».

[100] Lettera di Carmela Condorelli al Prefetto in data 9 ottobre 1907 (Asct, Fondo Prefettura, s. I, *Affari Generali*, b. 382).

[101] Citato in R. Romano, *Il Cotonificio Cantoni dalle origini al 1900*, «Studi storici», XVI (1985), p. 486.

[102] Di qui quella necessità di bere e lavarsi la faccia di cui è cenno nella lettera citata (vedi *supra*, nota 100).

[103] *Regolamento interno del Cotonificio Catanese "Vincenzo Feo & C."*, Galatola, Catania, 1903.

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vaccinazione e buona condotta e forme di tutela della maternità[104], come pure l'obbligo dell'assicurazione contro gli infortuni sul lavoro[105], dall'altro prescriveva delle norme rigorose, severe e anche, spesso, lesive della stessa dignità degli operai, peraltro suscettibili di variazioni da parte della direzione, sia pure con «avviso mediante affissione all'ingresso dello stabilimento in tempo utile». Norme che del resto si conformavano a quelle già in uso presso altre aziende del continente[106] e con le quali si voleva avere il controllo assoluto su una forza lavoro disciplinata, docile e stabile[107], magari attraverso una sorta di paternalismo aziendale che si manifestava tramite concessioni di vario tipo[108].

Così, ad esempio, «a garanzia della sua osservanza delle prescrizioni del presente regolamento», l'operaio doveva lasciare presso la ditta un deposito cauzionale pari a dieci giorni di lavoro, deposito che avrebbe perso se avesse lasciato il posto senza preavviso, se si fosse assentato senza giustificato motivo per tre giorni consecutivi senza regolare permesso, o anche, naturalmente, se fosse stato raggiunto da un licenziamento immediato. Da parte sua, infatti, la ditta, oltre al licenziamento con preavviso di sette giorni, si riservava anche il licenziamento immediato nei "casi speciali" contemplati dal regolamento, e cioè: «insubordinazione e rivolta verso i superiori; gravi offese ai compagni; ubriachezza recidiva; furto o frode; fumare o accendere fiammiferi nel recinto dello stabilimento; offesa al buon costume; danni alle macchine e al materiale causati per malvagità; rifiuto di lavorare su altra macchina od in altro riparto; propaganda nello stabilimento per distogliere i compagni dal lavoro».

Altra spada di Damocle che pendeva sugli operai era la comminazione di multe per i più vari motivi: ritardo al lavoro, assenza dal lavoro senza giustificato motivo, danni, «per negligenza o malvolere, a

[104] «… le puerpere non potranno riprendere il lavoro che dopo un mese dal parto, ed in via eccezionale anche dopo tre settimane, qualora risulti da certificato dell'Ufficio Sanitario del Comune di loro dimora abituale che sono in grado di compiere senza pregiudizio [per chi?] il lavoro».

[105] «Grave la questione degli infortuni in Italia» – si faceva notare –, «specialmente nella filatura del cotone, industria che richiede una grande quantità di congegni mossi da forze potenti e spinti agli estremi limiti di velocità» (S. Crespi, *Dei mezzi di prevenire gli infortuni e garantire la vita e la salute degli operai nell'industria del cotone in Italia*, Hoepli, Milano, 1894, citato in U. Tombesi, *L'industria cotoniera italiana* cit., p. 247).

[106] F. Dolci, *Regolamenti di fabbrica, contratti e tariffe di lavoro*, «Società e storia», 40, XI (1988), pp. 427-447.

[107] Solo nel 1909 gli operai del cotonificio costituiranno una loro Lega presso la locale Camera del Lavoro (*Unione*, 28 agosto 1909), mettendo così in discussione, per la prima volta, il potere, quasi assoluto, della direzione.

[108] Come case operaie, convitti, scuole, doti, casse di risparmio, assistenza medica e medicine gratuite (U. Tombesi, *L'industria cotoniera italiana* cit., pp. 253-259).

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fabbricati, macchine, apparecchi, utensili, merci, ecc.». E ancora per tutta una serie di motivazioni proibite dal regolamento e che in caso di recidività davano luogo anche al licenziamento:

a) abbandonare il lavoro senza autorizzazione del caposala o altro superiore; b) fischiare e schiamazzare; c) introdurre nello stabilimento bevande spiritose; d) abbandonare il proprio posto o la propria macchina, o tenerla ferma senza necessità; circolare oziosamente nello stabilimento o portarsi in altri locali fuori della propria sala di lavoro; e) fermarsi in crocchio o soffermarsi più del bisogno nelle latrine; f) fermarsi nelle sale di lavoro durante le ore di riposo, eccezione fatta per gli operai che in tali ore debbono prestare servizio, o per quei brevi riposi che la Direzione dovesse prescrivere; g) lordare pareti, scale, latrine, ecc.; h) introdurre nello stabilimento persone estranee; i) introdurvi senza permesso libri e stampati; l) essere indecentemente vestiti; m) andare nelle latrine con i compagni di lavoro.

Alla fine di ogni estenuante giornata lavorativa, infine, l'art. 12 prescriveva che: «il portinaio, o chi ne fa le veci, verificherà qualsiasi involto che gli operai asportassero dallo stabilimento e li sottoporrà alla visita personale. Una donna all'uopo adibita praticherà lo stesso per le operaie. Colui [o colei] che sarà trovato[/a] in possesso di attrezzi, utensili, merce o altro di spettanza della Ditta o altrui, sarà subito espulso[/a], perderà il deposito cauzionale e sarà eventualmente denunciato[/a] all'autorità giudiziaria»[109]. Quanto ai salari, se pure, a livello nazionale, degli aumenti si erano avuti nel corso degli anni, ancora alla fine dell'Ottocento il loro livello era rimasto pressoché ai limiti della sussistenza[110]. Con conseguenti riflessi negativi sia nel campo dell'alimentazione sia in quelli dell'alloggio, dell'igiene e dello stesso vestiario, il che significa che il più delle volte il lavoratore non era in grado di affrontare spese impreviste, per cui si trovava nella necessità di contrarre debiti che avrebbero comportato ulteriori privazioni.

Di fronte a questo fosco quadro generale, che, dopo l'inevitabile intensificarsi di scioperi, specie nel triennio 1896-98[111], pure veniva mitigato dai miglioramenti succedutisi nei primissimi anni del Novecento[112], quello che emerge dai pochissimi dati che abbiamo relativamente alle retribuzioni in vigore nel Cotonificio Feo è di una realtà

[109] *Regolamento interno del Cotonificio Catanese "Vincenzo Feo & C."* cit., pp. 4-5.

[110] Cfr. U. Tombesi, *L'industria cotoniera italiana* cit., pp. 195-205; B. King, Th. Okey, *L'Italia d'oggi*, Laterza, Bari, 1904, pp. 194-195; R. Morandi, *Storia della grande industria in Italia*, Einaudi, Torino, 1966, pp. 149-150.

[111] U. Tombesi, *L'industria cotoniera italiana* cit., pp. 229 e 234-235.

[112] L. Bonnefon Craponne, *L'Italie au travail*, Roger, Paris, 1916, ora trad. ital., *L'Italia al lavoro. Un'indagine dello sviluppo industriale d'inizio secolo*, Unione Industriale, Torino, 1991, pp. 79-80.

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sconfortante. Ancora nel 1909 le operaie addette alla filatura dovevano accontentarsi di un salario *a cottimo* che, in base alla mansione svolta[113], variava da un minimo di L. 0,40 a un massimo di L. 1,25 per una giornata lavorativa che in barba alla recente legge del 1907 era ancora di quattordici ore[114], quando invece le loro colleghe – al Nord (cotonifici Cantoni e Sciaccaluga) come al Sud (cotonifici Aselmeyer Pfister & C. e Schläpfer Wenner & C.) – potevano contare, già nel 1898, su un salario che da un minimo di L. 0,60 arrivava a L. 1,50, e per di più per una giornata lavorativa di undici/dodici ore[115]. Quando pure non era a rischio lo stesso salario o, addirittura, il posto di lavoro, come si ricava dall'art. 20, che così recitava: «se per causa di forza maggiore, o di riparazioni, costruzioni, crisi industriale, deficienza di commissioni, mancanza di materia prima, ecc. la Ditta dovesse tenere fermo temporaneamente, in tutto o in parte lo stabilimento, nessun operaio avrà diritto a compensi di sorta pel mancato lavoro e, nel caso la sospensione durasse da oltre quindici giorni, l'operaio avrà diritto di ritenersi sciolto dai suoi impegni e potrà ritirare il deposito cauzionale di cui all'art. 2».

Lo stesso anno della pubblicazione del citato Regolamento, il 1903, ecco un'altra lettera aperta allo stesso Ministro[116], ma su un tema diverso a Vincenzo Feo particolarmente caro e per il quale aveva goduto dell'«appoggio incondizionato» dello stesso primo ministro Francesco Crispi[117], ovvero il primario rilancio della cotonicoltura siciliana. Al quale peraltro lui stesso contribuiva con le sue costanti richieste ai produttori locali, come rilevava il *Corriere di Catania*[118]: «non poche famiglie di agricoltori dedicate alla coltivazione del cotone nell'isola ricavano dall'improvviso rialzo dei prezzi determinati dalle sue richieste

[113] E le mansioni erano davvero tante, dovendo le operaie attendere alle molteplici fasi della lavorazione: aspatura, ritorcitura, riga filare, *self-acting*, laminatoi, banchi intermedio, accoppiatrice, cardatrici, scalatrici, spazzatrici, fuso ("Unione", 28 febbraio 1909).

[114] Ibidem.

[115] U. Tombesi, *L'industria cotoniera italiana* cit., pp. 196-197; Maic, *Annali di Statistica. Statistica industriale*, fasc. LXIV, *L'industria del cotone in Italia* cit., pp. 29-32. Sono proprio la diminuzione della giornata di lavoro e l'aumento del salario le rivendicazioni che nel febbraio 1909 porteranno allo sciopero delle operaie del cotonificio conclusosi, con «una vittoria parziale», dopo quasi un mese di trattative con la direzione dell'azienda (R. Spampinato, *Il movimento sindacale in una società urbana meridionale* cit., pp. 234-235).

[116] *A Sua Ecc. il Comm. Guido Baccelli Ministro di Agricoltura e Commercio*, Di Mattei & C., Catania, 1903.

[117] In proposito vedi G. Giarrizzo, *Catania* cit., p. 104 e G. Barone, *Dall'agricoltura all'industria* cit., p. 15.

[118] Così, infatti, in una nota del 19 settembre 1903 dal titolo *Industrie catanesi. Elargamento dello stabilimento Feo*, p. 2.

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un benessere che da gran tempo quella cultura aveva cessato di dare». Anche perché si addossava le spese di trasporto, ovvero anticipava, a titolo di caparra, una parte del prezzo»[119].

Il brano che segue è tratto, per l'appunto, dalla citata lettera, nella quale, dopo aver tracciato una breve storia del suo stabilimento, il Feo auspicava

il sorgere di stabilimenti cotonieri in Sicilia [che] segnerebbe un vantaggio per l'industriale, messo in grado di acquistare più agevolmente e a miglior prezzo la materia prima, ed un beneficio per l'agricoltore che, aumentando il prodotto, vedrebbe al tempo stesso aumentare i prezzi, non più soggetti ad aggravi non indifferenti di spese di trasporto. [Tanto più che] a dare, in Sicilia, sviluppo alla industria cotoniera, ne confortano gli auspici migliori. I nostri campi danno una produzione di cotone superiore per qualità a ogni altra; la coltivazione non è difficoltosa, né richiede spese eccessive; l'utile che si ricava non è lieve; la trasformazione in filati ha dato buona prova, a giudicarlo dalle richieste e dal consumo, e continuerà a darne di sicuro; i vantaggi per l'industriale sono certi; quelli per gli operai non ammettono dubbi di sorta.

6. La "Società Anonima Cotonificio Feo"

Sono trascorsi ormai cinque anni da quando, superate difficoltà non lievi, Vincenzo Feo seppe dar vita in Catania, prima tra le città dell'isola, a un opificio cotonico che risponde a tutte le esigenze dell'industria moderna e rivaleggia per bontà di prodotti con le migliori fabbriche del nord d'Italia. Trecentocinquanta operai trovano nel suo stabilimento un impiego remunerativo e costante e non poche famiglie di agricoltori dedicate alla coltivazione del cotone nell'isola ricavano dall'improvviso rialzo dei prezzi determinati dalle sue richieste un benessere che da gran tempo quella cultura aveva cessato di dare. [...] Oggi la produzione del suo stabilimento non basta più alle aumentate richieste, e tra poco esso dovrà essere ingrandito di più del doppio. Saranno aggiunti a quelli già esistenti altri duecento cavalli di forza, i quali daranno movimento a un macchinario dei più perfezionati e completi richiedendo per tal modo un aumento di circa quattrocento operai che saranno specialmente destinati alla filatura e ritorcitura dei cotoni più fini di produzione indigena.

Così il *Corriere di Catania*, che da anni seguiva le vicende del Cotonificio Feo e precisamente da quel 12 gennaio 1896 quando lo aveva additato per primo all'attenzione della città[120], il 19 settembre 1903 preannunciava ulteriori grandiosi sviluppi dello stabilimento. Ed in

[119] Cotonificio "FEO", *Relazione e bilancio dell'esercizio 1906* cit., p. 10.

[120] Nonché – concludeva l'articolo – «alle considerazioni del Ministero di Agricoltura Industria e Commercio».

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effetti l'anno dopo, esattamente il 9 marzo, nei locali della ditta Rietmann & Aellig si riunivano Pietro Aellig, unico proprietario della citata ditta, e tre componenti della famiglia Feo (Vincenzo e i figli Andrea e Francesco Paolo) per procedere, preliminarmente, allo scioglimento della società[121]. Quindi, di seguito, si procedeva alla costituzione della Società Anonima "Cotonificio Feo"[122], che, questa volta, vedeva un vero concorso di azionisti. Ai sopracitati venivano ad aggiungersi, infatti, un piccolo gruppo di quattro "catanesi" e il cav. Onofrio Spasiano nella veste di procuratore speciale[123] di una cordata di dieci "palermitani".

La nuova società, della durata prevista di venticinque anni, salvo proroga[124], nasceva avente per oggetto «l'industria della filatura, torcitura, candeggio e tintoria» ed eventualmente – del tutto evidente il proposito di perseguire una completa strategia di integrazione verticale – «lo esercizio dell'industria della tessitura, nelle proporzioni e nei limiti richiesti dallo sviluppo dell'industria principale»[125]. Allo scopo di procedere all'ingrandimento degli impianti essa acquistava dalla famiglia Feo, per complessive L. 68.133,56, terreni e fabbricati sistematicamente acquisiti da Vincenzo Feo nel corso degli anni 1901-03 e siti nella stessa contrada Mortilla[126] dove già aveva sede lo stabilimento della precedente società, ovvero all'incrocio fra il prolungamento dell'attuale Corso Italia (già viale Regina Margherita) e l'attuale via

[121] Nell'occasione le due controparti nominavano liquidatore lo stesso Vincenzo Feo e decidevano, altresì, di procedere alla stesura del bilancio finale, onde effettuare la divisione delle attività sociali (Andct, Notaio Giovanni Monaco, *Scioglimento di società*, 9 marzo 1904).

[122] Ivi, *Contratto di società*, 9 marzo 1904.

[123] Così nella procura speciale redatta in Palermo il 2 marzo precedente presso il notaio Antonio Noto Galati e allegata al contratto di società. Lo Spasiano, nato a Castellammare di Stabia, era domiciliato a Palermo.

[124] Società Anonima Cotonificio Feo, *Statuto sociale*, Galatola, Catania, 1904, art. 4, p. 4.

[125] Ivi, art. 3, p. 3.

[126] Trattasi dello stesso fabbricato del Cotonificio "Vincenzo Feo e C." (= L. 44.015) ed inoltre dei seguenti terreni e fabbricati per un valore complessivo di L. 24.118,56: 1) l'utile dominio su un tratto di terreno con cascina acquistato il 30 dicembre 1901 e confinante con proprietà dello stesso Feo; 2) l'utile dominio su un tenimento di case, stalla, magazzino, cortile e altre pertinenze acquistato in data 4 aprile 1902 e confinante con proprietà dello stesso; 3) un tratto di terreno di mq.1077,17 acquistato in data 8 giugno 1903 e confinante con proprietà dello stesso e con proprietà dei coniugi Francesco Paolo Feo e Carmela Nicotra; 4) un fabbricato edificato su un tratto di terreno acquistato il 26 agosto 1893, l'11 settembre 1900 e il 14 gennaio 1901 confinante con proprietà del Cotonificio Catanese "Vincenzo Feo e C.", una casina e un'altra proprietà dello stesso Vincenzo Feo e con la già citata proprietà dei coniugi Feo-Nicotra. È da precisare, tuttavia, che sulla nuova società vengono a pesare i canoni gravanti sul primo e secondo lotto (= L. 9.264,54), il debito di L. 200 gravante sullo stesso secondo lotto e quello di L. 5.904 sul terzo lotto, entrambi dovuti «per resto di prezzo non pagato».

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Vecchia Ognina[127], vale a dire nella borgata popolare di Guardia Ognina, i cui residenti fornivano già al Cotonificio la quasi totalità delle oltre quattrocento unità lavorative accertate al 1906[128], consentendo così alla società, il cui stabilimento si estendeva per 10.000 mq., di attivare, appena qualche anno dopo (1907), 10.000 fusi di filatura e di produrre 20 quintali di filati al giorno[129].

Fig. 1 - *Collocazione del cotonificio nell'attuale rete stradale catanese*



Era uno sviluppo sorprendente che non poteva non destare l'attenzione dello stesso console generale austro-ungarico di Palermo che lo annotava nel suo rapporto annuale – «a Catania la fabbrica Fia [leggi: Feo] che fa filati e ne tinge ha esteso molto il suo lavoro» –, rilevando, di contro, le modeste dimensioni delle altre due fabbriche siciliane operanti nel settore, la palermitana Gulì e la messinese Ainis[130].

[127] Oggi l'area è occupata dal Reparto Mobile "Caserma Rinaldi" (Corso Italia 247). Cfr. G. Dato, *Urbanistica a Catania in età giolittiana* cit., p. 11.

[128] Esattamente 422 al 1906 e così suddivise: 61 ragazze dai nove ai quindici anni, 189 giovinette dai quindici ai ventuno anni, 129 donne, 9 giovani dai quindici ai ventuno anni e 44 maschi adulti (Asct, Fondo Prefettura, serie I, *Affari generali*, b. 295). E ancora i capi-reparto, i capi-sala, gli assistenti, i sorveglianti, il portinaio e le donne di pulizia (Cotonificio Feo, *Relazione e Bilancio dell'esercizio 1906* cit.).

[129] S. Salomone, *Catania illustrata* cit., pp. 144-145.

[130] G. Lo Giudice, *Il consolato d'Austria-Ungheria in Sicilia dal 1861 al 1914. Una fonte inedita per lo studio dell'economia isolana nel periodo post-unitario*, «Annali '80 del Dipartimento di Scienze Storiche», Facoltà di Scienze Politiche dell'Università, Catania, 1981, pp. 301-302.

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Quanto al capitale sociale, interamente sottoscritto, ma pari ad appena L. 600.000[131], anche se con possibilità di essere aumentato fino a L. 1.000.000[132], esso era diviso in 1200 azioni da L. 500 ciascuna (vedi Tab.2), mentre i dividendi si stabiliva che sarebbero stati pagati, nella sede della società, quindici giorni dopo l'approvazione del bilancio che, unitamente all'inventario, doveva farsi alla chiusura di ogni esercizio sociale, cioè il 31 dicembre di ogni anno[133]. Le cariche societarie, infine, dalle quali si evince che il controllo di gestione rimaneva saldamente nelle mani della famiglia Feo, venivano, al momento, così distribuite: Pietro Aellig, l'azionista di maggioranza relativa (almeno fino al 1906), cav. Giuseppe Russo, Liborio Vasta De Azevedo[134], Eduardo Muster (*Amministratori*); cav. Vincenzo Feo (*Consigliere delegato*); cav. Onofrio Spasiano, avv. Giovanni Palermo e avv. Achille Turrini (*Sindaci effettivi*); cav. avv. Giuseppe Alessi e cav. Vincenzo Platania (*Sindaci supplenti*); avv. Alfio Anfuso (*Segretario*)[135].

Fig. 2 - *Carta intestata del cotonificio con raffigurazione dello stabilimento*



[131] Società Anonima Cotonificio Feo, *Statuto sociale* cit., art. 5, p. 4. A titolo di confronto, si tenga presente che il Cotonificio Cantoni era diventato SpA con un capitale sociale di L. 7.000.000, e si era nel 1872 (R. Romano, *Il Cotonificio Cantoni* cit., p. 473).

[132] Società Anonima Cotonificio Feo, *Statuto sociale* cit., art. 8, pp. 4-5.

[133] Ivi, artt. 37-38 e 40, pp. 16-17.

[134] Addetto al Consolato dell'Honduras in Piazza Carlo Alberto, sede allora come oggi di uno storico mercato (*Guida turistica di Catania* cit., p.70).

[135] Esattamente un mese dopo le principali cariche societarie vedevano come Presidente CdA Pietro Aellig, Consigliere delegato Vincenzo Feo, Procuratore generale e Consigliere generale Andrea Feo (Ccict), *Registro ditte*, n. 657: *lettera del Cotonificio Feo*, 9 aprile 1904). E successivamente, anche a seguito della scomparsa del fondatore del cotonificio, e quindi a partire dal secondo semestre del 1906, Andrea Feo sostituiva il padre nella carica di Consigliere delegato, il cav. Spasiano da Sindaco effettivo passava a Sindaco supplente (lo sostituiva nella carica il cav. Giuseppe Seppilli) al posto del cav. avv. Giuseppe Alessi (Cotonificio Feo, *Relazione e Bilancio dell'esercizio 1906* cit., p.4).

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Tab. II - *Azionisti della Società Anonima "Cotonificio Feo"*[136]

Nominativo	*Luogo di nascita*	*Domicilio*	*Qualifica*	*Numero azioni*	*Valore*
Aellig Pietro[1]	Beltigen (CH)	Catania	commerciante	570	L. 285.000
Feo Vincenzo	Palermo	Catania	"	207	L. 103.500
cav. Celestre Giovanni	New York	Palermo	"	50	L. 25.000
Muster Eduardo	Münzingen (CH)	Palermo	"	50	L. 25.000
Feo Andrea	Palermo	Catania	"	46	L. 23.000
Feo Francesco Paolo	Palermo	Catania	"	41	L. 20.500
Nicotra Orazio[2]	Catania	Catania	"	30	L. 15.000
Zollikoffer Teofilo	San Gallo (CH)	Palermo	"	30	L. 15.000
Ferruzza Salvatore	Petralia Sopr. (PA)	Palermo	"	25	L. 12.500
Russo Giuseppe	Catania	Catania	proprietario	24	L. 12.000
Vasta De Azevedo Liborio Giuseppe	Catania	Catania	possidente	24	L. 12.000
Moser Vittorio	Palermo	Palermo	commerciante	20	L. 10.000
Rossi Domenico[3]	Positano (SA)	Palermo	"	20	L. 10.000
comm. Varvaro Pojero Francesco[4]	Palermo	Palermo	possidente	20	L. 10.000
comm. Varvaro Eduardo	Palermo	Palermo	"	20	L. 10.000
Muster Adolfo	Münzingen (CH)	Palermo	commerciante	10	L. 5.000
Fucito Francesco[5]	Palermo	Palermo	"	5	L. 2.500
Feo Niccolò	Palermo	Catania	"	4	L. 2.000
Zuccarello Orazio[6]	Catania	Catania	"	4	L. 2.000

Mia elaborazione da: Andct, Notaio Giovanni Monaco, *Contratto di società*, 9 marzo 1904.
[1] In rappresentanza della ditta Rietmann & Aellig. [2] Titolare dell'omonima ditta operante nel settore della molitura dei grani (B. Gentile Cusa, *Piano regolatore* cit., p. 153). [3] Rappresentante della ditta Rossi e Gagliardi. [4] Azionista della Navigazione Generale Italiana (O. Cancila, *Storia dell'industria* cit., pp. 271 e 441). [5] Rappresentante della ditta Raffaele Fucito e F.lli. [6] Proprietario di un cementificio (L. Gazzè, *La città 'nuova'*, in G. Giarrizzo (a cura di), *Catania. La città moderna, la città contemporanea*, Sanfilippo, Catania, 2012, p. 37).

Quale sia stato l'andamento della nuova società è possibile farsene un'idea, in assenza di una specifica documentazione, dal citato opuscolo *Relazione e Bilancio dell'esercizio 1906* e dai pochi dati che emergono dal "Concordato preventivo del 4 giugno 1912"[137], allorché il Cotonificio era in liquidazione[138].

[136] Nel 1906 si verificavano alcune variazioni in merito agli azionisti – faceva ingresso tra i soci Alfredo Fricker che con 462 azioni sostituiva l'Aellig come azionista di maggioranza – e al numero delle azioni da loro possedute: Pietro Aellig, infatti, risulta titolare di sole 48 azioni di contro alle precedenti 570, Eduardo Muster passa da 50 a 60 azioni, ed infine gli eredi Feo si ridistribuiscono le azioni della famiglia nel modo seguente: Andrea passa da 46 a 130, Francesco Paolo da 41 a 151 e Niccolò da 4 a 70, sicché in tutto si acquisiscono altre 53 azioni oltre alle 298 già possedute (Cotonificio Feo, *Relazione e Bilancio dell'esercizio 1906* cit., p. 5).

[137] Asct, Fondo Tribunale Civile, *Concordato preventivo del 4 giugno 1912*, b. 29.

[138] L'istanza di fallimento venne poi revocata su opposizione degli stessi liquidatori della società, i quali successivamente presentarono domanda di concordato provvisorio che venne accettata in sede giudiziaria (F.P. Di Vita, *Il Cotonificio Feo* cit., p. 161).

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Tab. III - *Bilancio al 31 dicembre 1906*

	ATTIVO			PASSIVO	Allegato A
1	Cassa	L. 43.140,35	1	Capitale sociale	L. 600.000,00
2	Mercanzie	L. 199.909,35	2	Depositanti titoli in cauzione	L. 84.000,00
3	Articoli tecnici	L. 18.447,45	3	Fondo di riserva	L. 3.121,90
4	Colori e droghe	L. 5.092,35	4	Azionisti c/ dividendo[2]	L. 8.343,15
5	Stabili	L. 94.943,35	5	Effetti da pagare	L. 468.318,25
6	Macchine	L. 539.791,60	6	Creditori diversi	L. 25.173,26
7	Produttori c/ anticipi	L. 2.905,94	7	Utile dell'esercizio	L. 59.281,58
8	Debitori diversi	L. 224.731,34			
9	Effetti da esigere	L. 23.460,01			
10	Azioni in deposito	L. 84.000,00			
11	Spese d'impianto	L. 7.087,00			
12	Spese generali[1]	L. 4.729,40			
	Totale	L. 1.248.238,14		**Totale**	L. 1.248.238,14

[1] «Per le spese sostenute e gravanti sull'esercizio del 1907». [2] «Per residuo utile del 1905 non ancora ripartito».

Conto profitti e perdite

SPESE		PROFITTI	Allegato B
Interessi e sconti passivi	L. 12.928,28	Sgranellatura	L. 2.469,54
Spese generali	L. 22.888,94	Mercanzie	L. 12.538,85
Ammortamenti e deperimenti: a) quota d'amm. delle spese d'impianto L. 322,40 b) " deperimento sulle macchine L. 32.807,30	L. 33.129,70	Filatura e torcitura	L. 103.185,54
Perdite e profitti	L. 2.837,89	Tintoria e candeggio	L. 12.867,46
Utile dell'esercizio	L. 59.281,68		
Totale	L. 131.066,39	**Totale**	L. 131.066,39

Fonte: Cotonificio Feo, *Relazione e Bilancio dell'esercizio 1906* cit., pp. 16-19.

Il primo anno, che può dirsi preparatorio, fu impiegato soprattutto nell'«ingrandimento e sistemazione dello stabilimento» più che nel «lavoro serio e produttivo»[139], e quindi, anche a causa della concomitante crisi di sovrapproduzione del mercato[140], gli utili furono del tutto insoddisfacenti, appena L. 1.148,43[141], e perciò tali da non consentire di effettuare alcun prelievo per accrescere il fondo di riserva[142]. Ma già a partire dall'anno successivo – fra l'altro in ottobre il Cotonificio

[139] Ibidem.

[140] La continua espansione degli impianti veniva ad essere penalizzata dalla riduzione della potenzialità di assorbimento del mercato nazionale (E. Corbino, *Annali dell'economia italiana, 1901-1914*, vol. V, Società Anonima Tipografica "Leonardo da Vinci", Città di Castello, 1938, pp. 149-150).

[141] A. Barnaba, *Industria tessile e lavoro femminile a Catania* cit., p. 22.

[142] Cotonificio Feo, *Relazione e Bilancio dell'esercizio 1906* cit., p. 11.

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poteva ormai fregiarsi del suo marchio di fabbrica[143] – i risultati furono buoni, considerando che il bilancio si chiuse con un utile di L. 62.438,52, il che consentì di elargire agli azionisti un dividendo dell'8%[144]. E ottimi nel successivo 1906[145], dal momento che se pure il bilancio d'esercizio si chiudeva con un utile di L. 59.281,58, cioè leggermente inferiore a quello dell'anno precedente, si poté, oltre a elargire agli azionisti lo stesso dividendo dell'8%, destinare una parte dell'utile netto (= L. 58.732,55) al fondo di riserva, sicché l'utile risultò di L. 48.000, cioè di L. 40 ad azione[146]. E ciò nonostante che, sempre in quest'anno, si fossero avuti, fino al mese di agosto, problemi di giacenza per un valore di L. 400.000 a causa del perdurante aumento del prezzo del cotone grezzo che a sua volta aveva mantenuto elevato il valore dei filati fino al mese di settembre facendo limitare gli acquisti e costringendo, perciò, anche il nostro cotonificio, come già si verificava a livello nazionale, ad attuare una politica di *dumping*[147]. Ed infine, che dall'utile netto si dovette effettuare un prelievo non indifferente per procedere all'acquisto di nuove macchine[148], mentre le spese generali subirono un leggero aumento di L. 683,49 per far fronte all'aumento dei premi di assicurazione sugli incendi[149].

7. La scomparsa del fondatore

Nel febbraio 1907 la società, da qualche anno ormai nelle mani del primogenito Andrea[150], nel mese precedente nominato consigliere delegato[151], poteva ascrivere, come s'è detto, un utile netto (bilancio

[143] «Etichetta triangolare col vertice in basso, contenente la figura di un'aquila ad ali aperte, che stringe fra gli artigli rami di alloro e saette; lateralmente veggonsi le iniziali *V. F.* e nella parte inferiore un fregio formante uno spazio destinato a portare il numero del filato. Lungo la cornice, con fregi agli angoli, leggesi: *Vincenzo Feo – Catania – Filatura, Ritorcitura e Tintoria di cotone*» (*Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno d'Italia*, n. 230, 3 ottobre 1905).

[144] Asct, Fondo Tribunale Civile, *Concordato preventivo del 4 giugno 1912*, b. 129.

[145] Cotonificio Feo, *Relazione e Bilancio dell'esercizio 1906* cit., p. 9.

[146] Ivi, pp. 11 e 14.

[147] Ivi, p. 9.

[148] Asct, Fondo Tribunale Civile, *Fallimenti*: *rapporto del Commissario giudiziale S. Pistone*, b. 63.

[149] Cotonificio Feo, *Relazione e Bilancio dell'esercizio 1906* cit., p. 10.

[150] «Anima principale di questo piccolo esercito industriale è il sig. Andrea Feo, che del padre ha tutta l'operosità instancabile e il fiducioso ardimento. A lui si debbono in gran parte i miglioramenti introdotti nella fabbricazione, l'ordine che regna nello stabilimento e lo sviluppo raggiunto dalla produzione che ha saputo accreditare su tutti i mercati di consumo» (*Corriere di Catania*, 19 settembre 1903).

[151] Presidente ne era il già citato Pietro Aellig, ed è lui che in tale veste assolve all'obbligo di comunicare alla locale Camera di Commercio la nomina a consigliere delegato del giovane Andrea Feo in sostituzione dello scomparso genitore (Ccict, *Registro ditte*, n. 657: *lettera di P. Aellig*, 25 gennaio 1907).

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Fig. 3 - *Vincenzo Feo* (Palermo 1844 – Catania 1906)

d'esercizio del 1906) di L. 59.281,58 che le consentiva di accrescere il fondo di riserva e di elargire ai suoi azionisti dividendi per complessive L. 48.000, pari all'8%[152].

Lui, un vero *self-made man*, che ipoteticamente avrebbe trovato collocazione nella fortunatissima opera di Samuel Smiles[153], «il padre fortunato di figliuoli che ha saputo educare allo studio e al lavoro, l'amico e benefattore» (sic!) dei suoi operai[154], si era spento la notte del 31 luglio dell'anno precedente, proprio mentre in città, e precisamente nella vasta Piazza d'Armi (oggi Piazza G. Verga), fervevano i grandi preparativi per la II Esposizione Agricola Siciliana che sarebbe stata inaugurata il 14 aprile 1907 alla presenza dello stesso Vittorio Emanuele III[155] e nel corso della quale al suo cotonificio, al quale fu riservato il centro della sala XII per l'esposizione dei prodotti, venne conferito il gran diploma d'onore.

Prontamente il quotidiano *La Sicilia* del 1° agosto ne dava il seguente annuncio: «Ieri sera, alle ore 10,50 cessava di vivere il Cav. Vincenzo Feo, industriale fra i più importanti della nostra città, cittadino integro ed onesto. Serva la presente di annunzio a tutti quanti lo conobbero e poterono apprezzarne le virtù». E il 24 febbraio dell'anno successivo, prima di dare avvio alla sua riunione, così l'Assemblea generale degli azionisti ricordava lo scomparso fondatore e socio:

[152] Cotonificio Feo, *Relazione e Bilancio dell'esercizio 1906* cit., p. 11.

[153] Il suo *Chi si aiuta Dio l'aiuta (Self-help)*, pubblicato a Londra nel 1859, ebbe la sua prima traduzione italiana nel 1865 presso i F.lli Treves di Milano.

[154] Così in G. Collotti, *I Cavalieri del Lavoro* cit., p. 364.

[155] Sull'evento protrattosi fino al primo dicembre, che vide la presenza di 1950 espositori e di oltre 150.000 visitatori forestieri, vedi S. Salomone, *Catania illustrata* cit., pp. 61-75; *Esposizione (II) agricola siciliana. Guida ufficiale* cit., p. 56; *Esposizione (II) agricola siciliana.* Albo illustrato redatto sotto la direzione di F. De Roberto cit., p. 51; P. Arrabito, *Ricordi e figure della II Esposizione agricola siciliana* cit., pp. 13 e 23; G. Arcidiacono, *Artigianato e industria a Catania dal Settecento al Novecento*, Tipolito "La Celere", Catania, s.d., pp. 155-169; S. Catalano, *Catania nell'esposizione del 1907* cit., p. 196.

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Signori,

ci incombe oggi il dovere di rendervi conto della passata gestione, ma prima ancora di procedere allo esame finanziario delle operazioni che si sono svolte durante l'anno e confrontarle con i dati del bilancio, permetteteci la ricordanza di un fatto luttuoso che ci ha colpiti irreparabilmente e che ha cagionato la perdita di un'anima a noi tanto cara.

Il Cav. Vincenzo Feo si spegneva serenamente la notte del 31 luglio nel gelido bacio della morte, che lo rapiva immaturamente allo affetto della famiglia e degli amici.

Colui che non risparmiò fatiche né dolori per il bene della nostra Società, di cui può considerarsi il più caldo fautore, oggi non è più! Il vigoroso impulso che seppe infondere colla opera modesta e disinteressata alla nostra azienda, facendole percorrere celermente tanto cammino, sarà per noi il ricordo più affettuoso di Lui. La sua vita senza ambizioni, né pretensioni, ricorderemo come esempio di costante emulazione e saranno sempre da noi tenuti presenti gl'illuminati e savi criteri adottati nella amministrazione di questo opificio a cui Egli aveva, con forte e santo entusiasmo, dedicato tutto se stesso.

Alla sua venerata memoria deponiamo un mesto e caro pensiero che esprima il nostro profondo rammarico per la dolorosa sua dipartita e la gratitudine immensa per la feconda sua attività nel dare un coscienzioso avviamento a questa industria che fiorì alacremente sotto il geniale e felice suo acume[156].

[156] Cotonificio Feo, *Relazione e Bilancio dell'esercizio 1906* cit., p. 8.s

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THE CONQUEST OF TUNIS (1535) AS A EUROPEAN ENTERPRISE

INTRODUCTION[1]

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In August 1534 Hayreddin Barbarossa, ruler of Algiers, and after 1533 also Admiral of the Mediterranean fleet of the Ottoman sultan, Süleyman the Lawgiver, captured the city and sultanate of Tunis. The Hafsi ruler, Mulay Hassan, referred to by Christian sources as King of Tunis, fled and appealed to his most powerful Christian ally, the emperor Charles V for aid. In the summer of 1535 Charles V personally commanded a large, amphibious operation with forces drawn from most parts of Europe to help Mulay Hassan recover the kingdom. With only token support from the Tunisian exiles, the combined Christian forces successfully besieged the fort of La Goleta outside Tunis and, despite their alliance with the deposed king, went on to sack the city itself before handing it back to its ruler. Writing in the 1760s William Robertson pondered how it was that Barbarossa, a potter's son and thus not "of rank to be illustrious", had raised the city-state of Algiers and the region of Barbary to become "formidable to the Europeans". He concluded that it was due to Barbarossa's "restless and enterprising spirit"; his valour, energy, talent and ambition, qualities that could be found in other conquerors, adding to the mix what he saw as the "bigoted hatred" of Christianity that inspired the inhabitants of the Maghreb. The result was to pose such a threat to "Europeans" that it made the history of the region, "worthy of more attention"[2].

The Christian eurocentrism and stark religious dualism that characterise Robertson's account of the Tunis campaigns of 1534 and 1535 were widely shared at the time and have long influenced the historiography of the campaigns. The reality was far from this and far from simple: there was bigotry and hatred on all sides, and conflicts and devastating wars. But there was also a good deal of mutual comprehension and collaboration, as was amply demonstrated in these campaigns, most notably by the alliance between Charles V – who as Holy Roman Emperor held the most prestigious title in Christendom – and the Tunisian ruler, Mulay Hassan; as well as the alliance between

[1] We are grateful to the Spanish Ministry of Science for the funding of the research and workshop that enabled us to develop this project, which is part of the *Tratar con el Infiel: Diplomacia hispánica con poderes musulmanes (1492-1708)* (PGC2018-009152-B-I00). We are also very grateful to Francesco Caprioli for providing the Italian translations of the summaries.

[2] W. Robertson, *The reign of Charles V*, in *The Works of William Robertson, D.D.*, T. Cadell, London, 1821 [1769], vol. V, pp. 420-436, cits. p. 421 and 422.

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Francis I of France – The Most Christian King – and Süleyman the Lawgiver who was the leader of Sunni Islam. This collection of articles arises from the international research project designed to explore and extend our knowledge of contacts between Christian and Muslim powers in the early-modern period[3]. It focuses on one of the most spectacular and complex events in those two centuries: the struggle for control of Tunis between the Ottoman sultan and his North African allies on the one hand, and Tunisian supporters of Mulay Hassan backed by Charles V on the other.

As the articles published here emphasise, the aura of success that clings to the emperor's campaign in 1535 and its enduring reputation as a Catholic Crusade are largely due to an over-reliance on the part of historians on the voluminous propaganda generated by the imperialists, both at the time and especially in the 1540s and 1550s. The wide-ranging literary and visual output extolling the virtues of the Habsburg monarch was also of such high quality that it could not fail to have a lasting impact, from Titian's equestrian portrait and Vermeyen's tapestry cartoons, to less familiar but much more widely circulated engravings and medals, chronicles, sermons and laudatory poems. Charles V – and subsequently the Habsburg dynasty and their successors – considered the conquest of what they still thought of as ancient Carthage to be one of his most outstanding deeds and used all available media to project this message. In the emperor's triumphant progress through Italy in the autumn of 1535 Charles V was represented as the new Scipio, succeeding where Louis IX of France, St. Louis, had failed – and paid for his failure with his life. In the short term, such representations facilitated the raising of funds, particularly in Sicily and Naples. It would be further elaborated subsequently. From the outset, Spanish and Italian writers vied to ascribe full credit for the success on their "nation" which led to distorted and contradictory accounts of key events but which largely succeeded in presenting the campaign as a hispano-italian enterprise, a Catholic crusade to reconquer Muslim territories. In fact, they fought as part of a coalition that included Tunisian Muslims, orthodox Christian horsemen from Albania, German infantry – the landsknecht accounted for a quarter of the military forces and was made up of Lutherans, Anabaptists and other Evangelicals as well as Catholics – and men from the emperor's own lands, mostly but not exclusively Catholic.

The Hafsi kingdom of Tunis did not present a danger to the Christian Mediterranean states. It had made commercial and political agreements

[3] *Tratar con el Infiel: Diplomacia hispánica con poderes musulmanes (1492-1708)"/ "Negotiating with the Infidel: Diplomatic contacts between Spain and Muslim powers (1492-1708)* (PGC2018-009152-B-I00).

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with neighbouring Christian powers for centuries, as had many other Muslim rulers in the Maghreb. This did not prevent them from tolerating and benefitting from the activities of corsairs who preyed on Christian shipping and coastlines. The real danger for Spain and, to a lesser extent, Italy, came from Hayreddin Barbarossa once he consolidated power in Algiers. His success attracted other corsairs and his power was reinforced when he accepted the sovereignty the Ottoman empire. This destroyed the equilibrium that had been reached in the Western Mediterranean. The danger was compounded when he was appointed admiral – *kapudan-ı derya* – of the Ottoman Mediterranean fleet. It signalled a greater commitment on the part of the Ottoman sultan to expand into the Central and Western Mediterranean. Süleyman (1520-1566) had already demonstrated the change of direction in Ottoman policy when he increased the navy and conquered Rhodes in 1522, expelling the most committed and formidable Christian corsairs, the Knights of St. John. That campaign, and the relentless Ottoman advance into Hungary and Austria during the rest of that decade, exposed the internal divisions and lack of cooperation among the Christian states.

Charles V was no less eager to develop a powerful Mediterranean navy in the 1520s but it proved difficult to do while he was consolidating his power over his scattered possessions and fighting the French. His predecessor in Iberia, Ferdinand The Catholic, had marked the path to follow with a series of campaigns in the 1490s which were part of a strategy to ensure the security of the Iberian and Italian states by creating a defensive bulwark along the Maghrebian coast, first taking key ports and using them as a base from which to expand into the neighbouring hinterland. North Africa was neither exotic nor peripheral for the Spanish and Italian realms. States on both sides of the sea had long been closely connected and remained so despite divergent ideologies and political divisions. Charles V wanted to gain control over the Western Mediterranean but, as had been the case with his grandfather, he was repeatedly diverted by the longstanding conflict with France. His position in the region was transformed when he succeeded in securing the services of Andrea Doria and the powerful Genoese fleet in 1528. Two years later he transferred the island of Malta, hitherto part of the Sicilian realm, to the Knights of St. John to compensate them for the loss of Rhodes and make sure of their future cooperation. He also insisted that they maintained a base in Tripoli. For a brief period after peace was signed between Charles V and his French rival, Francis I, in 1529 it looked as if Christendom might be able to unite against the Ottomans. But Francis I was unwilling to abandon the friendly relations he had established with Süleyman, and the Holy League which was formed and successfully took Ottoman-held ports in

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the Adriatic did not survive the internal competition between the Christian powers over the spoils.

Even without the Venetian fleet, the largest Christian fleet in the region, but neutralised by its alliance with the Ottoman sultan, Charles V was able to gather an extraordinary mixture of naval forces in 1535 from his own lands and those of his allies. The imperial fleet included ships and materials from the Spanish realms, the Low Countries, Naples, Sicily, Genoa, Florence, the Papal states, the Knights of St. John, and Portugal. It was an impressive achievement. A fleet manned and transporting thousands of men who had never before fought in the Mediterranean, particularly the infantry levied in southern German and Swiss lands.

Factual accounts of the 1535 campaign, with more or less detailed descriptions of the main stages of the conflict are easy to come by. The five articles that make up this dossier address some of the many gaps in our knowledge of this campaign and challenge some of the enduring misconceptions that continue to circulate about the conflict. To do so, they broaden the context and consider the situation before the campaign, as well as looking beyond the imperial alliance to how other powers responded. They approach the topic from a cosmopolitan viewpoint and share the fundamental aim of reconstructing the complex political and religious situation. The contributors set themselves ambitious goals to cover important topics and fill gaps and have had to overcome serious problems due to limited source materials.

The dossier opens with the Ottoman-corsair conquest of Tunis in 1534, a subject which has not been adequately studied to date. In the absence of Ottoman political correspondence, Evrim Türkçelik analysed the chronicles of the period as well as those of the following century to address the fundamental question whether Barbarossa launched the conquest of Tunis in 1534 under explicit orders from Süleyman, that is in order to execute an Ottoman strategy of expansion in the Maghreb; or if he commandeered the Ottoman forces under his command in order to carry out what was in essence a Muslim corsair strategy to control the Mediterranean by taking the most strategic ports in the region, and specifically Tunis which facilitated attacks on the Italian states. One of the chief merits of Türkçelik's article is to offer a systematic analysis of the Ottoman sources and thereby to present an alternative perspective of the conflict from the point of view of a political culture that is very different from the dominant, Western vision.

Calculating the economic impact of financing an amphibious expedition of the magnitude and complexity as that launched by Charles V in 1535 is crucial. Levying and transporting some 30,000 men from all over Europe and fitting out a fleet that probably reached

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some 300 vessels required vast expenditure. Yet, surprisingly, at present we know very little about the cost of the campaign, and rather more about the booty that the emperor and his leading commanders seized. The figures for the overall cost given to date are more or less convincing estimates, some based on contemporary assessments by observers, or by using project proposals which sometimes included calculation of notional costs. Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra searched multiple archives to advance our knowledge of this aspect, only to find that there are relatively few surviving documents, whether relating to ordinary taxes, loans, or the treasure from Peru that Charles V seized to finance the expedition. In the archives of the kingdom of Navarre, the municipal archives of Málaga, and the state archives at the Archivo General de Simancas, he found only partial series of accounts from paymasters and government accountants. He offers guidance as to what can be gleaned from this limited and diverse documentation and gives details of the multiple materials that were provided to fit out part of the galley squadron. He gives a rare insight into real-time needs and problems of provision faced by the rapidly mustered royal officials in Barcelona.

While historians agree that the long-term impact of the 1535 imperial campaign was slight, there has been a general assumption that contemporaries considered it as much of a success as it appears in imperial propaganda and in subsequent historiography. María José Rodríguez-Salgado set out to investigate this by analysing how the news of the campaign and the emperor's victory were viewed in a number of Christian courts. The main focus is on the emperor's attempts to control information and the response of Francis I of France and the English king Henry VIII to the news. As Christian monarchs officially at peace with the emperor they were constrained in terms of what they could say or do in public when faced with an expedition which the pope confirmed as a Christian campaign against the Infidel, but both were fearful of an increase in Charles V's power. The article illustrates the widespread manipulation of information by all courts; the problems of presenting inter-faith alliances; and the deliberate use of various tactics to give or deprive news of publicity. Even the emperor's allies participated in playing down the victory in order to persuade him to attend to their own needs. It also highlights how short-lived interest in the campaign was in a world as avid for the latest news as we are now, and mostly keen to highlight imperial weakness.

The alliance and friendship that bound Charles V and Mulay Hassan is a subject much in need of study, and the subject of Rubén González Cuerva's article. Despite the scant aid he provided to the imperial forces, Mulay Hassan was reinstated as the ruler of Tunis in 1535, save for La

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Goleta which was handed over to Charles V. González Cuerva traces the creation of a Habsburg protectorate over the ancient Hafsi kingdom from the point at which both sovereigns met, and describes how they were able to communicate and how they negotiated their personal encounters. He places their relationship in the context of the rich, late-Medieval Iberian tradition of alliances between Christian and Muslim monarchs. He also demonstrates the important role of intermediaries, and how the exchange of gifts and rituals of mutual courtesy were employed both to project the emperor's magnificence and the good faith and friendship of the Tunisian ruler.

The volume ends with Miguel Deyá's study of José de Cañizare's long forgotten play, *Carlos V sobre Túnez*, written around 1705. At first sight it seems surprising that so long after the event, both contenders for the throne of Spain during the War of Spanish Succession should have turned to this campaign at a crucial moment in their conflict. For supporters of the Habsburg candidate it was a testimony to the greatness of their dynasty. For the Bourbons it was a way to associate themselves with, and even to appropriate, an important event in Spanish history and share its reflected glory. Consequently, the play avoided criticism of the French which had been such an integral part of the original campaign propaganda and subsequent narratives. Less obvious is why the play should have remained relatively popular during the XVIII, particularly in the final decades, as is demonstrated by Deyá's detailed data of new productions and revivals. He offers a multi-layered explanation that merges an analysis of the message of the play with the national and international political context, the importance of its author, and the situation in Spanish theatres. Its revival during the War of Independence against Napoleon is attributed primarily to a surge of Spanish patriotism which resonated with that running through the play. The article confirms how the emperor's campaign had become a fundamental element in Spanish nationalism.

With these original and diverse contributions we have sought to widen the study of the important topic of European and Ottoman expansion in North Africa during the early-modern period, and to highlight how much more there is still to research on the struggle for control of Tunis.

María José Rodríguez Salgado
Rubén González Cuerva
Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra

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Evrim Türkçelik

THE BEST-KEPT SECRET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: BARBAROSSA'S 1534 TUNIS CAMPAIGN*

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ABSTRACT: *This article discusses Hayreddin Barbarossa's conquest of Tunis in 1534 in the light of the chronicles written by contemporary Ottoman historiographers and those of the late sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. The aim is to understand how Ottoman chronicles handled the question of the sultan's involvement in the conquest of Tunis since the accounts offered by the chronicles changed radically in the course of time. Some sources indicated that there existed Sultan's authorization/approval behind the conquest whereas some were shy of associating the conquest with the sultan. This uncertainty is also reflected in the modern historiographical approach to the conquest of Tunis. It is interpreted either as part of Süleyman's preconceived plans or as Barbarossa's unauthorized seizing upon an opportunity. By drawing on a comparison of several Ottoman sources, this article analyses the factors that might have influenced the historiographers' contradictory accounts and tries to provide a more accurate picture of the 1534 campaign.*

KEYWORDS: *Barbarossa, Süleyman I, Tunis 1534, Süleymannâme, Ottoman historiography.*

IL SEGRETO MEGLIO CUSTODITO DEL MEDITERRANEO: LA CAMPAGNA TUNISINA DI BARBAROSSA DEL 1534

SOMMARIO: *Questo articolo analizza la conquista di Tunisi condotta da Hayreddin Barbarossa nel 1534 alla luce sia della coeva cronachistica ottomana, sia di quella prodotta tra il XVI e il XVII secolo. Tramite quest'ottica, si vuole comprendere come le cronache ottomane abbiano trattato la questione del presunto coinvolgimento del sultano di Istanbul nelle operazioni di conquista della città tunisina, considerato che i resoconti offerti dalle stesse fonti sono molteplici e tra loro contrastanti. Sebbene alcuni testi indichino la presenza di una autorizzazione data dal sultano per svolgere la campagna in Magreb, altre opere non si sbilanciano nell'associare l'operazione militare del 1534 a uno dei numerosi obiettivi della politica estera della dinastia osmanli. Questa incertezza si riflette anche nel contemporaneo dibattito storiografico relativo alla prima conquista ottomana di Tunisi. A seconda della prospettiva di indagine, la presa di Tunisi è stata riletta o come parte di una strategia premeditata di Solimano il Magnifico, oppure come un'opportunità unica colta da Barbarossa senza il consenso di Istanbul. Pertanto, confrontando tra loro diverse fonti ottomane, questo articolo si propone di analizzare i fattori che potrebbero aver influenzato i resoconti contraddittori della cronachistica ottomana al fine di fornire un quadro più accurato della campagna tunisina capitanata da Barbarossa nel 1534.*

PAROLE CHIAVI: *Barbarossa, Solimano I, Tunisi 1534, Süleymannâme, storiografia ottomana.*

The victory of Charles V at Tunis in 1535 was one of the most cherished episodes of his war against the Ottomans. Spanish chronicles and personal narratives of the expedition as well as its official celebrations and pictorial representations offer detailed accounts and vivid descriptions of the emperor's response to Hayreddin Barbarossa's

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capture of Tunis in 1534. As Charles V's greatest victory against Islam, the year 1535 acquired symbolic and propagandistic resonance for his claim to be the protector of Christendom. On the international political scene, the conquest of Tunis created on the one hand, a triumphal atmosphere among Christian powers that led to the renewal of proposals to forge an anti-Islamic Holy League[1]. On the other hand, it deepened divisions among European powers and accelerated the move towards alliances that would provide a strategic counterweight to Charles V's expansion. The most striking result of this process was the «unholy alliance» between Francis I and Süleyman I[2]. Modern historical research, driven by the conquest's historical importance and nourished by abundant primary sources, has produced numerous accounts and analyses of various aspects of the campaign and its results. Scholars have also studied the political and religious significance of the artistic commemorations of the Tunis expedition, such as the tapestries of Vermeyen[3], and literary eulogies of the victory, including the poetry of Garcilaso de la Vega[4]. Interestingly, the references to Tunis and Barbarossa in *Gargantua*, the French satirical work that mocked the imperial ambitions of Charles V, have been examined to determine the exact publication date of the work's earlier versions and whether Rabelais published this famous work before or after 1535[5].

In comparison to the comprehensive studies of 1535 from European perspectives, Ottoman historiography has not shown the same level of interest in Barbarossa's 1534 Tunis campaign, or in his unsuccessful resistance against Charles V in Tunis in 1535 which he followed up with the successful assault on Mahón. Ottoman chronicles reserve little space for these episodes, and Ottoman archival sources, correspondence and first-person narratives relevant to the years 1534 and 1535 are rather scarce. The main reason for this appears to be the 1534-1535 campaign in Iraq against the Safavids, which Süleyman I (hereafter,

[1] M.J. Rodríguez Salgado, *¿Carolus Africanus?: el Emperador y el turco*, in J. Martínez Millán (ed.), *Carlos V y la quiebra del humanismo político en Europa (1530-1558)*, Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, Madrid, vol. I, pp. 487-531.

[2] É. Garnier, *L'Alliance impie. François Ier et Soliman le Magnifique contre Charles V*, Éditions du Félin, Paris, 2008; M. Heath, *Unholy Alliance: Valois and Ottomans*, «Renaissance Studies», 3 (1989), pp. 303-315.

[3] M. Falomir Faus, M.Á. Bunes Ibarra, *Carlos V, Vermeyen y la conquista de Túnez*, in J.L. Castellanos, F. Sánchez-Montes (eds.), *Carlos V. Europeísmo y Universalidad. Religión, cultura y mentalidad*, Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, Madrid, 2001, t. V, pp. 243-257.

[4] V. Beltran, *De Túnez a Cartago. Propaganda política y tradiciones poéticas en la época del emperador*, «Boletín de la Real Academia Española», 315 (2017), pp. 45-114.

[5] M. Screech, *Some reflexions on the problem of dating Gargantua <A> and <B>*, «Études rabelaisiennes», 11 (1974), pp. 9-56.

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Süleyman) decided to lead in person with İbrahim Pasha, his grand vizier and favourite[6]. The prestige arising from the 1535 conquest of Baghdad, former centre of the Abbasid caliphate, not only overshadowed Barbarossa's capture of Tunis but also helped diminish the negative consequences of his immediate defeat by the emperor, Süleyman's archenemy in the Mediterranean. In fact, Süleyman had felt the need to start a naval rearmament programme and shift his priorities towards naval warfare since Andrea Doria's conquest of Koron in 1532. Yet, this shift towards including the Mediterranean and North Africa in Ottoman strategic thinking was still in its infancy in 1534 when Barbarossa was appointed admiral of the Ottoman fleet. The illustrated account that the chronicler Matrakçı Nasuh wrote of the Baghdad campaign, which, in a sense, may be considered as the equivalent of Vermeyen's Tunis tapestries, is indicative of the Sultanate's priorities[7]. Contemporary Ottoman chronicles, therefore, neither glorified excessively Barbarossa's conquest of Tunis nor especially lamented his inability to defend it. Moreover, they did not link the contest over Tunis specifically with the person of Sultan Süleyman. In a period when Charles V was heralded as *Carolus Africanus* in Europe, Sultan Süleyman himself was isolated from the defeat of Barbarossa in North Africa and was lauded as the conqueror of Baghdad.

This article will discuss the 1534-1535 Ottoman-Habsburg struggle over Tunis in the light of the chronicles written by contemporary Ottoman historians and those of the late sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. My aim is to understand how Ottoman chronicles handled the question of the sultan's involvement in the conquest of Tunis, and to trace how the opinions and accounts offered by the chronicles changed radically in the course of time. There were narratives that were simultaneously in circulation which flatly contradicted each other in their explanation of what lay behind the conquest of Tunis. I will first address the arguments and sources of modern historiographical approaches to the conquest of Tunis. In the subsequent section, I will address Ottoman chronicles and historical narratives to understand the framework of their contradictory accounts, and to find an answer to the question whether the conquest of Tunis was the result of a predetermined strategy with the prior knowledge of the sultan, or whether Barbarossa was pursuing a semi-autonomous policy reminiscent of his pre-Ottoman career.

[6] R. Murphey, *Süleyman's Eastern Policy*, in H. Inalcik, C. Kafadar (eds.), *Süleyman the Second and His Time*, Isis Press, İstanbul, 1993, pp. 229-248.

[7] R. Murphey, *Süleyman I and the Conquest of Hungary: Ottoman Manifest Destiny or a Delayed Reaction to Charles V's Universalist Vision*, «Journal of Early Modern History», 5 (2001), p. 221.

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The conquest of Tunis in modern historiography

Most of the general surveys of Süleyman's Mediterranean policy as well as the few articles focusing on Barbarossa's conquest of Tunis have interpreted it either as part of Süleyman's preconceived plans, or as Barbarossa's unauthorized and opportunistic expedition. İdris Bostan stands out among those who took the position that the objective of the Ottoman fleet from the outset was to conquer Tunis. According to him, the year 1534 was a symbolic year in which the sultan bestowed the office of admiral on Barbarossa, established the province of *Cezâyir-i Bahr-i Sefîd* for him and sent him to take Tunis. Bostan argues that the real target of the Ottomans was to end the internal struggles for the Tunisian throne among the ruler and his brothers in favour of the Ottomans, and to block Spanish influence in Tunis, whose ruler, Mulay Hassan, had allied with Charles V and become one of his vassals in North Africa[8]. The Ottomans were to play a decisive role in this struggle because in the previous year, Mulay Rashid, the brother of Mulay Hassan and pretender to the Tunisian throne, had taken refuge in Algiers with Barbarossa and was brought by him to Istanbul where he appealed for Ottoman aid. Bostan also refers to an archival finance register of the spring of 1534 relating to the naval preparations in which the destination of the armada was indicated as *diyâr-ı Mağrib*[9]. However, whether this term referred to Algiers or Tunis or to the whole of North Africa is not specified. Moreover, Bostan discusses the conquest of Tunis in the context of the incipient French-Ottoman alliance and argues that the international conjunction of the war between Charles V and Francis I and the anti-Habsburg rapprochement between the French and the Ottomans were key factors behind the decision to conquer Tunis[10].

Svat Soucek interprets the capture of Tunis as a strategic move that paralleled the sultan's conquest of Iraq and argues that Barbarossa might have discussed this strategy with the sultan and İbrahim Pasha. According to Soucek, the principal objective was to take advantage of the strategic position of Tunis with its suitable gulfs and ports for

[8] İ. Bostan, *Kanuni ve Akdeniz Siyaseti (1530-1550)* [Kanuni Süleyman and the Mediterranean Politics], in Ö. Kumrular (ed.), *Muhteşem Süleyman* [Süleyman the Magnificent], Kitap Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2007, p. 28.

[9] İ. Bostan, *The Establishment of the Province of Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid*, in E. Zachariadou (ed.), *Kapudan Pasha, His Office and His Domain*, Crete University Press, Rethymnon, 2002, p. 246.

[10] İ. Bostan, *Kanuni ve Akdeniz Siyaseti* cit., pp. 28-31.

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concentrating a great fleet[11]. In fact, Soucek bases his argument on the account of Peçevî, a seventeenth century historian, who mentions that Barbarossa sent a petition to Süleyman explaining the political and military importance of Tunis and obtained the sultan's approval for its conquest. Following this line of argument, Özlem Kumrular argues in her analysis of the 1534 campaign that Barbarossa managed to convince the sultan to appreciate the strategic importance of North Africa and take advantage of the dynastic problems and chaotic situation in Tunis. Moreover, on the basis of speculative spy reports from Spanish archives, she maintains that Sultan Süleyman ordered Barbarossa to conquer Tunis because the intense naval preparations and military mobilization in Istanbul were signs of an organized campaign rather than a simple naval expedition into the Mediterranean[12].

However, the same Spanish sources have been the basis for the argument that Barbarossa's conquest of Tunis was his personal initiative, without specific instructions from the sultan. According to José María del Moral, Barbarossa's main objective was to land in Naples and not in Tunis. In support of his opinion, he refers to intelligence reports, which assured the Spanish authorities that the principal target of the Ottoman fleet was the Kingdom of Naples. He argues that Barbarossa's attack was not part of a premeditated plan, and that Tunis became his target only after he had failed to carry out a significant attack on Naples[13]. Another contribution which follows this line of thinking was offered by Emrah Safa Gürkan who, while emphasizing, like Soucek, the chief strategic objectives of the 1534 campaign, agrees with the contention that Barbarossa had no formal authorisation to do so, but decided on his own initiative to take Tunis[14]. For Gürkan, the conquest of Tunis is further proof that corsairs could shape Ottoman Mediterranean policy by carrying out measures they had devised to suit their own interests[15].

[11] S. Soucek, *Naval Aspects of the Ottoman Conquests of Rhodes, Cyprus and Crete*, «Studia Islamica», 98/99 (2004), p. 228.

[12] Ö. Kumrular, *İspanyol ve İtalyan Arşiv Kaynakları Işığında Barbaros'un 1534 Seferi* [Barbarossa's 1534 Expedition in the light of Spanish and Italian Archival Sources], in Ö. Kumrular (ed.), *Yeni Belgeler Işığında Osmanlı-Habsburg Düellosu* [The Ottoman-Habsburg Duel in the light of New Documents], Kitap Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2011, pp. 195-196.

[13] J.M. del Moral, *El Virrey de Napoles Don Pedro de Toledo y la guerra contra el Turco*, Instituto de Estudios Africanos, Madrid, 1966, p. 169.

[14] E.S. Gürkan, *Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekabeti Çerçevesinde Osmanlılar'ın XVI. Yüzyıl' daki Akdeniz Siyaseti*, [Ottoman Mediterranean Policy in the Sixteenth Century in the framework of Ottoman-Habsburg Competition], in H. Çoruh (ed.), *Osmanlı Dönemi Akdeniz Dünyası* [The Mediterranean World during the Ottoman Period], Yeditepe, İstanbul, 2011, pp. 25-26.

[15] E.S. Gürkan, *The Centre and the Frontier: Ottoman Cooperation with the North African Corsairs in the Sixteenth Century*, «Turkish Historical Review», 1:2 (2010), p. 150.

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The argument that Barbarossa initiated and executed the attack to Tunis has been recently adopted by Nicolas Vatin in a historiographical essay on the 1534 campaign. After discussing critically the modern historical literature and Ottoman and European primary sources on the 1534 campaign, Vatin argues that Tunis was not the objective of Barbarossa's first official campaign with Sultan Süleyman's fleet. For Vatin, Soucek's principal source, Peçevî, cannot be considered valid because this account was written more than a century after the events, and analysed the Tunis campaign with the advantage of hindsight, and following a similar approach to that of a modern historian. Vatin also disagrees with İdris Bostan's interpretation of the term *diyâr-ı Mağrib* and argues that if they had wanted to allude specifically to the region of Tunis, they would have used the term *İfrîkıyye*. Vatin bases his own arguments on the statements found in two contemporary Ottoman sources, Lutfi Pasha's chronicle, *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osman*, and Seyyid Murad's *Gazavât-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, the semi-autobiographical account of Barbarossa's life and deeds. According to Vatin, there is no reason not to rely on the personal testimony of Barbarossa and, in spite of its propagandistic nature, he considers the *Gazavât* as «the most reliable narrative source about Hayreddin». Finally, he concludes that there is no contemporary Ottoman source that confirms that the sultan had determined that the objective of the fleet should be the conquest of Tunis[16].

This interpretative bifurcation among scholars reflects the divergent accounts of their sources, which do not really offer the desired confirmation of either of these two lines of argument. There is no contemporary Ottoman source explicitly indicating the existence of a sultanic order to invade Tunis; nor are the arguments for an unpremeditated or opportunistic campaign convincing enough. In fact, modern historians, depending on their hypothesis, have preferred to prioritize the sources that seem to confirm their point of view while ignoring the others in order to draw their final conclusions. However, apart from the historical sources used by these historians, there are several little known or under-used Ottoman sources that offer different narratives of the 1534 expedition. The fact that there were such diverse representations of the same event points to the problematic perception of the conquest of Tunis. Thus, the question is not that of simply identifying who was behind the conquest; the topic also requires an analysis of the discursive and narrative strategies employed by several Ottoman historiographers, and it is precisely to this, which I now turn.

[16] N. Vatin, *Sur les objectifs de la première campagne navale menée par Hayreddîn Barberousse pour le compte de Soliman le Magnifique (1534)*, «Archivum Ottomanicum», 35 (2018), pp. 173-191.

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Sultan's *Firman* or *Adverse winds:* The testimony of Ottoman sources

In his biographical encyclopaedia of Ottoman poets (*Meşâirü'ş-şuarâ*), which he completed in 1568 and presented to Sultan Selim II, Âşık Çelebi narrates an anecdote about the poet Mahremî, who was captured in 1534 together with his family by a Christian ship when they were on their way from Salonica to Istanbul. Âşık Çelebi refers the year of Mahremî's captivity with the following words: «It was the beginning of the appearance of [the late] Hayreddin Pasha, [the late] Sultan Süleyman was on campaign in Iraq, and it was the year of Hayreddin Pasha's Tunis fleet»[17]. The anecdote further relates that after Mahremî secured his release, he met the poet Esîrî who served as an Ottoman official in Kızılhisar (Karystos, Greece). Mahremî asked him about his poet friends, Kâtibî (Seydi Ali Çelebi) and Nigârî (Nakkaş Haydar), who were also high-ranking mariners in the Ottoman fleet. According to Âşık Çelebi, Esîrî responded: «Hayreddin Pasha is on his way to Tunis with the fleet and Seydi Ali Çelebi and Nakkaş Haydar are serving under him»[18]. Âşık Çelebi was fifteen when Barbarossa conquered Tunis and had just settled in Istanbul after his father's death[19]. Even though he completed his *Meşâirü'ş-şuarâ* thirty years later, the way in which the 1534 expedition found an echo in such an important source for Ottoman cultural history, demonstrates that it was deeply embedded in popular culture, and specifically as Barbarossa's Tunis campaign.

Ironically, the picture is not that clear in historical sources. Ottoman historiographers produced different and incoherent accounts of the conquest of Tunis throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. During the reign of Süleyman, historical writing grew significantly and became an indispensable tool for glorifying the military and administrative deeds of the sultan. The panegyric type of historiographical activity, in forms such as *Süleymannâme*, *Şehnâme* or *Gazanâme*, proliferated under his patronage and became important instruments for portraying and promoting his image as a military leader, a just ruler, and

[17] «Miskin Mahremî ehl ü 'iyaliyle esir oldı...Hayrü'd-din Paşa-yı merhumun zuhurınun eva'ili ve Sultan Süleyman-ı merhumun 'Irakeyn seferinde olup Hayrü'd-din Paşa'nun Tunus donanması yılı idi». Â. Çelebi, *Meşâirü'ş-şuarâ* [Dictionary of Poets], ed. F. Kılıç, Kültür Bakanlığı, Ankara, 2018, p. 334.

[18] «Esirî cevab virüb Hayrü'd-din Paşa donanma ile Tunus'a 'azimetde ve Seydi Ali Çelebi ve Nakkaş Haydar anunla bile hıdmetdedür diyü haber virür». Â. Çelebi, *Meşâirü'ş-şuarâ* cit., p. 334.

[19] H. Aynur, *Kurgusu ve Vurgusuyla Kendi Kaleminden Âşık Çelebi'nin Yaşamöyküsü* [The Life Story of Âşık Çelebi from his Pen through his Fiction and Emphasis], in H. Aynur, A. Niyazioğlu (eds.), *Âşık Çelebi ve Şairler Tezkiresi Üzerine Yazılar* [Articles on Âşık Çelebi and his Dictionary of Poets], İstanbul Koç Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2011, p. 34.

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so on. The emphasis of these historical accounts was naturally on military and political affairs and they paid particular attention to Süleyman's campaigns that ended in victory[20]. However, not all historical works were composed as dynastic propaganda. There were also historical texts that transmitted different interpretations of events without being constrained by dynastic concerns. Barbarossa's conquest of Tunis became the subject of various genres of Ottoman historical production and received different treatment from each of them.

There are at least five distinct approaches that can be identified in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Ottoman works which included the episode of Barbarossa's occupation of Tunis. The first approach implies that Barbarossa conquered Tunis with the authorization of the sultan. The second approach explains the conquest as the result of Barbarossa's unintended arrival at Tunis without any mention of a sultanic order. The third approach criticizes Barbarossa and argues that the sultan only ordered a campaign against the infidels and not the conquest of Tunis from fellow Muslims. The fourth approach defines the principal objective of the Ottoman-corsair fleet as the peninsula of Morea and explains Barbarossa's conquest of Tunis by alluding to a variety of reasons but not due to the sultan's order. The fifth approach is seen in seventeenth-century sources and argues that the conquest of Tunis was ordered by the sultan and was part of a wider naval strategy to secure a better naval base from which to attack southern Italy. To understand these differences in the historical works we need a thematic and chronological analysis of the narratives as well as to consider the interpretative nuances that unveil their approach to Barbarossa's first campaign.

The first approach appears in the *Süleymannâme*s of Bostan Çelebi (d. 1570) and Matrakçı Nasuh (d. 1564), which were written in panegyric style and were more likely to be in the nature of history either sponsored or intended for consumption by the court. Both authors completed their works at a date very close to the conquest of Tunis and provided concise but vivid accounts of the events in 1534 and 1535. Their explanations for the reasons behind Barbarossa's campaign differ only very slightly from each other, but both refer to the sultan's approval and the just causes of the conquest of Tunis. The earliest of the two is Bostan Çelebi's *Süleymannâme* and, in fact, it is the earliest available account of the conquest of Tunis. He covered the event for the first time in the second version of his *Süleymannâme*

[20] C. Woodhead, *Perspectives on Suleyman*, in M. Kunt, C. Woodhead (ed.), *Süleyman the Magnificent and His Age: The Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern World*, Longman, London, 1995, pp. 171-173.

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(Ms. Ayasofya 3317), which was written between 1536 and 1537[21]. Since Bostan Çelebi was under the patronage of Süleyman's personal tutor, Hayreddin Efendi, he was very close to the highest court circles. Although it is somewhat less used as a source by modern historians, this *Süleymannâme* is considered a much better-informed source than other contemporary chronicles regarding court-centred decisions[22].

Bostan Çelebi offers the most open and direct statement that Barbarossa was given an official commission concerning Tunis. He states clearly that Barbarossa was given an imperial order (*fermân-ı vâcibü'l-izân*) to invite Mulay Hassan to declare his obedience to Sultan Süleyman. Instead of obeying the sultan's orders (*fermân-ı âlî-şân*), Mulay Hassan made an alliance with the Christians and did not pay homage to the "soldiers of Islam". Immediately afterwards, he fled the country and the notables and the local people of Tunis gave the keys of the city to Barbarossa. Bostan Çelebi then states, using the exact geo-historical term, *diyâr-ı İfrîkıyye*, that Tunis then became part of the Ottoman realm (*memâlik-i mahmiyye*):

> After these victories [on the Italian coasts], [Barbarossa] set off towards the West and anchored at the port of Bizerta in the province of Tunis. From there he arrived with a propitious wind at the port of Tunis on the sixth day of the victorious month of Safer in the year 941. With the mandatory imperial order of the Lord of Conjunction, may Allah make his Caliphate continuous, [Barbarossa] invited Emir Hasan, the ruler of the lands of Tunis, to obedience [to the sultan]. [Emir Hasan] was in harmony and alliance with the cursed Christians and dependent on that community of perversion. Therefore he [Emir Hasan] did not comply with the imperial order of the sultan, did not welcome the soldiers of Islam, and escaped the city of Tunis. The people of the city of Tunis and the rulers and notables of the castles and countries of that land obeyed and handed over the keys in a manner worthy of the sultan. Thus, the lands of Tunis became part of the protected [Ottoman] domains[23].

Matrakçı Nasuh offers an account of Tunis campaign in the first part of his *Süleymannâme*, which is thought to have been written between 1537 and 1538[24]. He gives a very straightforward description of Barbarossa's

[21] H.G. Yurdaydın, *Bostan'ın Süleymannâmesi* [The Süleymanname of Bostan], «Belleten», 74 (1955), pp. 137-202. The first version of Bostan Çelebi's *Süleymannâme* was published in 1524. The third and the fourth versions were published respectively in 1541 and in 1547. A. Sağırlı, *Süleymannâme*, in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, İstanbul, 2010, vol. XXXVIII, p. 125.

[22] N. Aykut, *Bostan Çelebi*, in *Türkiye Diyanet* cit., vol. VI, p. 308.

[23] B. Çelebi, *Süleymannâme*, Süleymaniye Library, Ayasofya, nr. 3317, 168b; Türk Tarih Kurumu Library, nr. Y/0018, 155a -155b; Austrian National Library, H.O. 42a, f. 234v.

[24] D. Erkan, *Matrâkçı Nasûh'un Süleymân-nâmesi (1520-1537)* [The *Süleymannâme* of Matrakçı Nasuh], M.A. thesis, Marmara Univ., 2005, p. lx.

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attack on Tunis and narrates it as a simple campaign of conquest. Matrakçı Nasuh's statements in terms of sultan's authorization are not as explicit as Bostan Çelebi's. According to his account, Barbarossa bombarded the castle of Tunis and conquered the city under the auspices [*sâye-i sa'âdetlerinde feth idüb zabt eyledi*] of Sultan Süleyman. In return for his bravery, Barbarossa was awarded a gilded sword and a robe of honour and was ordered to «preserve and protect» those territories. He stayed in Tunis to establish a «new order and fresh discipline» but its previous ruler forged an alliance with the infidels and together they attacked and reconquered the city[25]. Although Matrakçı Nasuh's use of the phrase «sâye-i sa'âdetlerinde» and his description of Barbarossa's further endorsement by Istanbul implies the approval of the sultan, this does not explicitly suggest that the sultan had determined that Tunis should be his objective[26]. However, since Matrakçı Nasuh participated in Süleyman's Iraq campaign in 1534, he must have personally witnessed *in situ* the sultan's positive reaction to Barbarossa's conquest of Tunis.

The second approach is adopted by Seyyid Murad's *Gazavât-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, which does not mention an explicit order from the sultan and denies totally any intentional responsibility of Barbarossa for the conquest of Tunis. Seyyid Murad states that the main source of his work is Barbarossa himself. The author is also known to have participated in some of Barbarossa's campaigns and therefore he probably added his own observations as well as using the testimony of Barbarossa's captains. *Gazavât-ı Hayreddin Paşa* was written both in prose and verse styles. There are several copies of its prose versions reproduced in different centuries. The prose *Gazavât* manuscript in the Escorial library was written before 1578 and is thought to be the closest to the original composition written by Seyyid Murad[27]. There is only one copy of *Gazavât*'s verse version and it is probable that it was completed before 1543[28]. With regards to the Tunis campaign, the main argument of both prose and verse versions of *Gazavât* is that the arrival of Barbarossa in Tunis was totally accidental. The *Gazavât* maintains that, after having plundered the Italian coasts as far as Sardinia, Barbarossa thought of sailing directly to Algiers. But an adverse wind (*rüzgâr muhalif olub*) brought the whole fleet to the port

[25] Ivi, pp. 186-189.

[26] N. Vatin, *Sur les objectifs* cit., p. 182.

[27] The Italian turcologist Aldo Gallotta carried out an analysis on several versions of *Gazavât* and published a facsimile edition of the prose manuscript found in the Escorial library. A. Gallotta, *Il Gazavat di Hayreddin Pasa di Seyyid Murad: edito in facsimile secondo il ms. 1663 dell'Escurial di Madrid con le varianti degli altri manoscritti*, Centro di Studi Magrebini, Napoli, 1983.

[28] Ivi, pp. 23-24.

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of Bizerta on the Tunisian coast[29]. Thus, the *Gazavât* only touches on Barbarossa's "unavoidable" landing in Bizerta, dispatching it with just one sentence, and gives the message that the conquest of Tunis was not previously planned and was entirely the result of a chain of events that started with unexpected, adverse weather conditions.

This narrative is reproduced with similar simplicity in several manuscript versions of the *Gazavât* in the following centuries. However, an eighteenth century version that is located in the İstanbul University Library (Ms. 2639) adds more apologetic phrases from Barbarossa in the first person[30]. In this version, Barbarossa could not sail to Algiers because of a strong westerly wind that propelled the fleet to the port of Bizerta. According to the text, when Barbarossa arrived at the Tunisian coasts, he uttered the following words:

> Then, Hayreddin Pasha said to himself: Oh, all-knowing Allah, it is known to you, your sinful slave had never thought of coming by here [Bizerta], yet, many hidden causes of yours must arise from coming to this side, 'Facilitate at once their accomplishment propitiously,' he prayed[31].

According to Gallotta, the Ms. 2639 version belongs to a group of manuscripts different from the original *Gazavât*s and written by someone other than Seyyid Murad, identifying these manuscripts as the product of "pseudo Seyyid Murad" because they had basic differences from the other versions that he considered originals[32]. Indeed, the account of Ms. 2639 frames Barbarossa's unintended landing in providential terms and absolves Barbarossa of responsibility with expressions much stronger than the original versions. This makes the account of Ms. 2639 even more interesting since, despite its distinct differences in content and narrative, it maintained the crucial argument of the original *Gazavât*s with further emphasis and narrative diversity. It should be emphasized that the *Gazavât* is a propagandistic text and the fact that both versions of the *Gazavât* made considerable effort to demonstrate that Barbarossa arrived at Tunis unintentionally could be understood as part of the authors' or the copyists' objective to create a positive and virtuous

[29] Ivi, p. 233r; The *Gazavât* in verse reads: «Çıkdı deryâya yine olub revân / Bes Cezâyir deyu giderken hemân / Rüzgâr oldı muhalif döndi ol / Tunus'un berrine toğrı tutdı yol». *Gazavât-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Topkapı Palace Museum Library, R1291, 171a.

[30] Mustafa Yıldız has published a transcription of this manuscript. M. Yıldız, *Gazavât-ı Hayreddîn Paşa: (MS 2639 Universitätsbibliothek İstanbul): kommentierte Edition mit deutsche Zusammenfassung*, Shaker, Aachen, 1993.

[31] Ivi, p. 314b.

[32] For more information about "pseudo Seyyid Murad", see A. Gallotta, *Il Gazavat* cit., pp. 27-30.

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image of Barbarossa. As the *Gazavât* was intended to be read aloud in public, it is possible that the continuous intertextual emphasis on the unintended nature of the conquest of Tunis in the Ms. 2639 might have arisen as a rhetorical device throughout its several recitations in public, later to be taken up by the author or the copyist[33]. If Barbarossa had admitted to having followed an official order from the sultan and consequently to have intended to conquer Tunis all along, his immediate defeat by Charles V might have meant admitting a significant failure to fulfil the sultan's orders.

The apologetic tone of *Gazavât* makes sense when assessed together with the third approach which was adopted by Lutfi Pasha. He severely criticized the conquest of Tunis in his *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osman*. Lutfi Pasha wrote his history in the 1550s after he had been dismissed as Grand Vizier, but he had been actively serving the sultan at the time of the campaign. He was married to the sultan's sister and thus enjoyed the high status of a husband of an Ottoman princess, a *damad*[34]. He had also been the admiral of the Ottoman fleet immediately before Barbarossa's appointment. When Barbarossa was elevated to the status of *Pasha*, Lutfi Pasha remained with the title *Beg* and his rank was relegated to a secondary commander[35]. Although he never mentioned these episodes in his chronicle, his dismissal from the admiralty must have been upsetting and have seemed unfortunate at a time when he enjoyed great favour with the sultan as a *damad* of the Ottoman dynasty.

Lutfi Pasha's chronicle is famous for his outspoken criticisms of sultans and statesmen, but his negative stance towards Barbarossa is even more evident and it extended throughout his history[36]. It is not known exactly when he recorded his account of the campaign but his approach provides the harshest criticism of the conquest of Tunis and Barbarossa's actions. He states that Barbarossa's range of action with the Ottoman fleet was supposed to be limited to the Italian or Spanish coasts and that his mission was merely to retaliate against the

[33] T. Değirmenci, *Bir Kitabı Kaç Kişi Okur? Osmanlı'da Okurlar ve Okuma Biçimleri Üzerine Bazı Gözlemler*, «Tarih ve Toplum: Yeni Yaklaşımlar», 13 (2011), pp. 37-38.

[34] According to Çağatay Uluçay, Lutfi Pasha got married with Şah Sultan, sister of Sultan Süleyman, before 1523. M. Çağatay Uluçay, *Padişahların Kadınları ve Kızları* [The Wifes and Daughters of the Sultans], Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara, 2001, p. 57. A document in Spanish archives also recognizes Lutfi Pasha's marital status as belonging to the sultan's household: «Havea dato esso Signor Turco a Lufetibei *suo genero* cento altre galere». S.l., 1533, Archivo General de Simancas, Estado, 1366, f. 212.

[35] İ. Bostan, *The Establishment of the Province of Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid* cit., p. 245.

[36] R. Murphey, *Seyyid Muradî's prose biography of Hızır ibn Yakub, alias Hayreddin Barbarossa*, «Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientarum Hungaricae», 4 (2001), pp. 519-532.

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Spanish occupation of Koron. Barbarossa was simply not ordered to launch an attack on Tunis. His words are worth citing at length:

> Hayreddin Pasha was sent to the seas. He was supposed to avenge the atrocities committed by the infidel fleets in the provinces of the Muslims. However, he did not go to the lands of the infidels but went instead to Tunis, which is in the Maghreb. He arrived with the fleet at the port of Tunis. There was a castle called La Goleta that protects Tunis. He took this castle and brought his ships to its port. He landed there and moved on to Tunis. He captured the city and caused many troubles and calamities to the Muslims and massacred the population. Then he declared himself governor and settled in Tunis[37].

As an independent source who allowed himself to be critical of his time, Lutfi Pasha's denial of any official authorization for Tunis is a strong testimony in favour of the arguments that see the conquest as Barbarossa's personal initiative. However, his account stands in complete opposition to Bostan Çelebi or Matrakçı Nasuh, who praised with eulogistic overtones how Barbarossa made Tunis part of the Ottoman realm on the orders of the sultan. Most importantly, Lutfi Pasha's account contradicts the official Ottoman register that indicated the destination of the armada as *diyâr-ı Mağrib*, somewhere in North Africa if not exactly Tunis[38]. In fact, even the *Gazavât* accepted that the fleet before it ostensibly diverted, had been heading for Algiers. Therefore, Lutfi Pasha seems to be mistaken when he believes that the objective of the fleet was limited to the infidel lands. Besides, the fact that he did not mention Barbarossa's attacks on the Italian coastline demonstrates that he was not well-intentioned and to an extent his account also distorted reality[39].

There is also another point worth considering. Lutfi Pasha did not regard the conquest of Tunis as a legitimate act. On the contrary, he was outraged by the massacre of Muslim Tunisian coreligionists and specifically emphasises the fact that Barbarossa attacked a Muslim polity and killed its Muslim population. Unlike the *Süleymannâme*s and the *Gazavât*, Lutfi Pasha does not mention the alliance between Mulay Hassan and Charles V as a justification of the conquest. While this might be ascribed to malice or rivalry, perhaps, as someone who at the time defended the Ottoman sultan's right to the caliphate, Lutfi

[37] K. Atik, *Lütfi Paşa ve Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osman* [Lütfi Paşa and his *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osman*], Kültür Bakanlığı, Ankara, 2001, p. 272.

[38] See footnote 9.

[39] N. Vatin, *Sur les objectifs* cit., p. 183.

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Pasha might have found Barbarossa's actions against fellow Muslims in Tunis unacceptable[40].

The fourth approach to the conquest of Tunis appears in the dynastically sponsored historical works of Ârif Çelebi and Seyyid Lokmân, official *şehnâmeci*s of the Ottoman dynasty. The post of *şehnâmeci*, official court historian, was created in the 1550s in a period when the Ottoman dynasty was particularly concerned with its self-image. Ârif Çelebi is considered as the first permanent court historian for whom the post of *şehnâmeci* was designed[41]. He was officially commissioned by Süleyman to compose a history of the Ottoman dynasty in Persian verse, which he completed in 1558[42]. The outcome was *Şehnâme-i Âl-i Osman*, a book modelled on Firdevsî's *Şehnâme*, which placed the Ottoman dynasty in the framework of sacred history and presented Sultan Süleyman as a divinely elected, prophetic king[43]. Its fifth and last volume, *Süleymannâme*, is a chronological account of Süleyman's reign until the year 1555 and includes several pages on Barbarossa and the conquest of Tunis.

Ârif Çelebi's account narrates the events using an approach totally different from the earlier *Süleymannâme*s of Bostan Efendi and Matrakçı Nasuh written twenty years before. Unlike them, he does not mention any official order or endorsement by the sultan for the conquest of Tunis. It clearly indicates that the Ottoman fleet's principal aim was to expel the infidel from Koron in the Morean Peninsula. After having achieved his primary objective, Barbarossa attacked and conquered Tunis. According to Ârif Çelebi, the reason behind this conquest was Barbarossa's enmity towards the ruler of Tunis and his personal grudge against him[44]. This information is an unexpected detail in a work written in panegyric style. Barbarossa's antagonistic relations with the members of the Hafsid dynasty were

[40] H. Yılmaz, *Caliphate Redefined: The Mystical Turn in Ottoman Political Thought*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2018, pp. 163-166; H.A.R. Gibb, *Lutfi Paşa on the Ottoman Caliphate*, «Oriens», 15 (1962), pp. 287-295.

[41] C. Woodhead, *An experiment in official historiography: the post of şehnameci in the Ottoman Empire, c.1555-1605*, «Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes», 75 (1983), pp. 157-182. For different views on the nature of the appointments for this post see E. Fetvacı, *The Office of Ottoman Court Historian*, in R. Ousterhout (ed.), *Studies on Istanbul and Beyond: The Freely Papers*, Univ. of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 2007, vol. I, pp. 6-21; F.S. Eryılmaz, *The Shehnamecis of Sultan Süleyman: Arif and Eflatun and their Dynastic Project*, Ph.D. thesis, Chicago University, 2010, pp. 8-9.

[42] A.F. Çelik, *Fethullah Arifi Çelebi'nin Şahname-i Al-i Osman'ından Süleymanname* [The *Süleymanname* of Fethullah Arifi Çelebi], Ph.D. thesis, Ankara University, 2009, p. 28.

[43] F.S. Eryılmaz, *The Sulaiman-nama (Süleyman-name) as an Historical Source*, in G. van den Berg, C. Melville (eds.), *Shahname Studies III: The Reception of the Shahnama*, Brill, Leiden, 2018, pp. 173-198.

[44] A.F. Çelik, *Fethullah Arifi Çelebi'nin* cit., p. 105.

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certainly known, even though they were not always discussed or mentioned in the sources. Although Ârif Çelebi criticizes the ruler of Tunis for having befriended an infidel and having become his ally, he implies that Barbarossa used the sultan's fleet to resolve his own, unresolved issues with the Hafsid dynasty. Thus, in the work of the first permanent court historian, Barbarossa's conquest of Tunis appears as something undertaken without prior official authorization.

Ârif Çelebi's approach created a pattern for the subsequent panegyric historical works supported by the Ottoman court. This is especially seen in the works identified with Seyyid Lokmân, the third *şehnâmeci* of the Ottoman dynasty, who served during the reigns of Selim II and Murad III. *Tomâr-ı Hümâyun*, *Zübdetü't-tevârîh* (1583) *Hünernâme* (1588) and *Şehnâme-i Âl-i Osman* (1590) dedicated considerable space to Barbarossa's 1534 expedition. The longest account of the Tunis campaign appears in *Tomâr-ı Hümâyun*, which was designed in the form of a huge scroll and composed as a universal history that starts from the creation and finishes with the Ottoman dynasty. *Tomâr-ı Hümâyun* was originally the project of Ârif Çelebi and of the second *şehnâmeci* Eflâtun during the reign of Süleyman, and it was later taken up by Seyyid Lokmân, who extended it to cover the whole of Murad III's reign[45]. Therefore, it is still a matter of debate whether Seyyid Lokmân himself or his predecessors authored the account of the reign of Süleyman[46]. *Tomâr-ı Hümâyun* reproduced Ârif Çelebi's argument that the principal target of the fleet was Morea. However, unlike Ârif Çelebi's 1558 account, it did not attribute the conquest of Tunis to Barbarossa's enmity with Mulay Hassan.

According to *Tomâr-ı Hümâyun*, when Barbarossa heard that the enemy had already evacuated Koron, he headed for North Africa and conquered Tunis. Unsurprisingly, there is no reference to the sultan's order to take Tunis, although the conquest is described as a natural extension of the Ottoman fleet's range of operations after Koron[47]. Thus, *Tomâr-ı Hümâyun* fits with Ârif Çelebi's tendency to detach the sultan from responsibility for the conquest of Tunis, but the

[45] E. Fetvacı, *Picturing History at the Ottoman Court*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2013, pp. 67-68. For a detailed analysis of *Tomâr-ı Hümâyun* [Imperial Scroll], see F.S. Eryılmaz, *The Shehnamecis of Sultan Süleyman* cit., pp. 229-261.

[46] Bekir Kütükoğlu thinks that Seyyid Lokmân's predecessors wrote the parts until Süleyman's reign. Eryılmaz has recently argued that Eflâtun might have written certain parts of the reign of Süleyman. B. Kütükoğlu, *Lokmân b. Hüseyin*, in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* cit., vol. XXVII, pp. 208-209; F.S. Eryılmaz, *The Shehnamecis of Sultan Süleyman* cit., p. 108.

[47] «Hayreddin Paşa keferenün firârın malûm idindikde tonanma-yı hümâyunla Mağrib diyârına inüb Tunus vilâyetin ve kal'asın 'Arab elinden alub feth eyledi». S. Lokmân, *Tomâr-ı Hümâyun* [Imperial Scroll], Topkapı Palace Museum Library, A3599.

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differences from the earlier account might have arisen as a result of Seyyid Lokmân's intervention in the text. The same argument, that an attack on Tunis was a natural continuation of the expedition against Koron, after that objective proved redundant, is reproduced in Seyyid Lokmân's *Zübdetü't-tevârîh*[48], which is in fact a summarized edition of *Tomâr-ı Hümâyun* in a book format, and also partly in his *Şehnâme-i Âl-i Osman*, a chronological account of the Ottoman dynasty composed in verse, including the reign of Murad III[49].

The shortest account of the 1534 expedition is offered in the second volume of *Hünernâme*, a chronological account of Süleyman's reign dedicated to the exaltation of his moral qualities and skills as a ruler. This project was again inherited by Seyyid Lokmân from his predecessors. *Hünernâme*'s account of the conquest of Tunis is rather obscure and, in fact, never mentions Tunis. Barbarossa tears down the enemy in Morea and then sets off for North Africa without Tunis being specified. Five lines later the account mentions that the sultan receives good news from Barbarossa, but it is not specified what this «good news» involved. Interestingly, the subsequent loss of Tunis is also totally omitted from the account, although it is an integral part of Ârif Çelebi's *Süleymannâme* and Seyyid Lokmân's other works[50].

The narratives of Ârif Çelebi and Seyyid Lokmân demonstrate that the palace was uneasy about the content of earlier *Süleymannâme*s and opted either to rectify or to manipulate the official discourse on Tunis. In fact, during the reign of Süleyman, there were authors who preferred not to touch upon the episode of Barbarossa's occupation of Tunis. For example, Senâyî's *Süleymaniyye*, which was completed in 1540 and written in verse, skips the conquest of Tunis in 1534 and the victory of Charles V in 1535 entirely[51]. Celâlzâde's famous *Tabakâtü'l-memâlik ve derecâtü'l-mesâlik*, which was probably completed in the 1560s, after Ârif Çelebi's work, makes no mention of the Tunis campaign even though Celâlzâde was in office as chancellor of

[48] «Küffâr anın varacağın işitdükde bi'l-cümle Mora'dan kalkub müteferrik oldılar badehu varub Mağrib zeminde Tunus nâm kal'ayı 'Arab elinden alub». S. Lokmân, *Zübdetü't-tevârîh* [Quintessence of Histories], Dublin Chester Beatty Library, T414, f. 163v.

[49] L. Akın, *Seyyid Lokman'ın Şehnâme-i Âl-i Osman'ı*, Akademi Titiz Yayınları, İstanbul, 2018, p. 169.

[50] *Hünernâme*, Topkapı Palace Museum Library, H1524, 260a.

[51] M.B. Düzenli, A. Akgül, *Senâyî'nin Manzum Süleymaniyye'si* [Senâyî's *Süleymaniyye* in Verse], Çizgi Kitabevi, Konya, 2018. Eyyubî's *Menakıb-i Sultan Süleyman* (1550s) makes no mention of Tunis and not even Barbarossa himself. Eyyûbî, *Menâkıb-ı Sultan Süleyman: Risâle-i Pâdişâhnâme* [The Saga of Sultan Süleyman], ed. M. Akkuş, Kültür Bakanlığı, Ankara, 1991, p. 90.

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Süleyman after 1534[52] and must have certainly monitored Ârif Çelebi's account and known the official version. The same is also true for *Künhü'l-Ahbâr* (1600), Gelibolulu Âlî's famous historical work, which offers an account of the rise of Barbarossa in Barbary and his appointment as admiral, but is totally silent as to the events between 1534 and 1537[53]. Thus, it seems that making references to the conquest of Tunis and to the authorization of the sultan had acquired a quasi-taboo status, and the authors did not want to confront or contradict the accepted version offered in official chronicles.

This deadlock was broken in the first half of the seventeenth century by Peçevî, who represents the fifth approach. This asserted that the seizure of Tunis was planned by Barbarossa and supported by Süleyman, and that a sultanic order to take the city was issued. According to Peçevî, Barbarossa wrote a memorandum to the sultan and asked for his authorization to conquer Tunis and hand the city over to Rashid, who in turn would open La Goleta to the Ottoman fleet. The sultan found the proposal appropriate and authorized Barbarossa to pursue this objective:

> [Barbarossa writes to the sultan] That frontier is far away from the Threshold of Felicity [İstanbul]. The army of Islam inevitably suffers hardship and fatigue to arrive there. If the Tunisian realm is handed to Rashid, the port of La Goleta is taken and preserved by the sultan and if the Imperial fleet frequently stays in it, with the blessing of Allah, the conquest of the land of al-Andalus would easily be accomplished. The sultan found the proposal appropriate and sent the Imperial fleet with Hayreddin Pasha to those parts[54].

Peçevî's account is a qualified return to the first approach with previously unmentioned details and a geo-strategic interpretation of the campaign's objectives. The interesting point is that Peçevî did not mention the Tunisian episode in his chapter about Süleyman's reign. Instead, he preferred to write about it as preliminary historical background to Kılıç Ali Pasha's definitive conquest of Tunis in 1574.

[52] M. Ş. Yılmaz, *'Koca Nişanci' of Kanuni: Celalzade Mustafa Çelebi, Bureaucracy and 'Kanun' in the Reign of Suleyman the Magnificent, 1520-1566*, Ph.D. thesis, Bilkent University, 2006, p. 95; K. Şahin, *Empire and Power in the Reign of Süleyman, Narrating the Sixteenth-Century Ottoman World*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2013.

[53] G. Mustafa Âlî, *Künhü'l Ahbâr* [The Essence of Histories], Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara, 2009, vol. IV, ff. 297v-299v and 305v-307v.

[54] P.İ. Efendi, *Tarih-i Peçevî* [History of Peçevî], ed. B.S. Baykal, Başbakanlık Matbaası, Ankara, 1981, p. 348. This passage is also translated and discussed in S. Soucek, *Naval Aspects of the Ottoman Conquests* cit., p. 228. It is worth noting that this arrangement was precisely what Charles V would do the following year, albeit with Mulay Hassan rather than Rashid as sovereign.

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It gives the impression that Peçevî retrospectively attributes the responsibility of the conquest of Tunis in 1534 to Süleyman and Barbarossa. Thus, the account of Peçevî was overlooked because he wrote his chronicle a century after the conquest of Tunis.

However, a similar version from the sixteenth century verified this. It is by Şaban Reis, a senior captain of Barbarossa's fleet, who was captured by the Spanish captain Álvaro de Bazán in July 1534 near Oran, the main Spanish base in North Africa. Álvaro de Bazán interrogated the Ottoman captain in order to find out Barbarossa's objectives, and according to his report to the emperor, under interrogation Şaban Reis declared the following:

> What [Barbarossa] discussed with his captains and with him was that they should head the coast of Calabria and that if there were anything (to be done) along the coast, they would do it; and that without losing time they would head straight to Tunis, to take that city and to use the place to store victuals so that they might (make) war against the Christians in the best manner possible[55].

This confession indicates that the conquest of Tunis was Barbarossa's objective from the outset, and in order to carry it out he did not want to lose much time attacking the Italian coast. Barbarossa had evidently shared with his captains his plan to use Tunis as a strategic base for future operations against the Christian states. The testimony of Şaban Reis, besides flatly contradicting Barbarossa's testimony in the *Gazavât*'s account, shows that Peçevî relies on firm historical evidence and cannot be disregarded or dismissed simply because his account was produced in the seventeenth century. Yet, the most interesting aspect of Peçevî's narrative is that he brought up an important topic that most sixteenth-century Ottoman sources had suppressed: Barbarossa's deception concerning Mulay Rashid.

Upon his arrival at Bizerta, Barbarossa spread the false news among the Tunisians that Rashid, brother of Mulay Hassan, was in the fleet with him. This created excitement among the populace, as Rashid seems to have had considerable support in the city. After the city had been occupied, when the people wanted to see Rashid and he did not appear, the Tunisians understood that they had been deceived and rebelled against Barbarossa. This was an integral part of the

[55] *1534 Alvaro de Bazán Hace Preso a Xaban Arráez, Capitán de Barbarroja, en La Isla Alhabiba*, Archivo de la Frontera, Alcalá de Henares, 2014, p. 9 (http://www.archivodelafrontera.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/1534-ALVARO-DE-BAZ%C3%81N-HACE-PRESO-A-XABAN-ARR%C3%81EZ-con-plantilla.pdf).

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sixteenth-century European narratives of the conquest[56]. However, from Bostan Çelebi to Seyyid Lokmân, none of the Ottoman sources had included the episode concerning Mulay Rashid in their accounts of the conquest. Most importantly, the *Gazavât* never acknowledged the fact that Barbarossa had cheated the Tunisians by creating false expectations when he spread the news that he had come with the Hafsid pretender to the Tunisian throne. Peçevî seems to be the first Ottoman historian to have used this piece of information, probably known but previously not circulated in any written form. Peçevî, like the sixteenth-century Spanish authors, López de Gómara and Gonzalo de Illescas, interpreted this deception as the key factor that had facilitated Barbarossa's rapid, initial advance in Tunis. In fact, Peçevî portrayed Rashid as the most important element of a greater strategic plan, of which Sultan Süleyman was certainly aware.

The account of Peçevî is recapitulated by Kâtib Çelebi, although with certain differences, in his famous work on maritime history, *Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr fî Esfâri'l-Bihâr*. He wrote this work after Peçevî's *History* and might have taken the story from him; or both might have used a common source. However, Kâtib Çelebi divides his account of Tunis into two episodes and explains the reasons behind Barbarossa's arrival at Tunis differently in each of them. In the first episode, he comments that while Barbarossa was heading from Sardinia to Algiers, the wind propelled the fleet westwards and they arrived at Tunisian coast. This resembles *Gazavât*'s account, which mentioned an adverse wind. In the second episode, Kâtib Çelebi offers an account of Barbarossa's memorandum and the sultan's authorization for the conquest in the same way as it was reported by Peçevî[57]. Thus, Kâtib Çelebi includes two logically incompatible explanations for Barbarossa's arrival in Tunis, as an unintended arrival, and as a predetermined strategy to conquer it, probably as a result of using information from the *Gazavât* and from Peçevî in turn.

All of the five approaches to be found in the Ottoman sources demonstrate that the narrative of the conquest of Tunis was transformed over time and according to genre. The picture resulting from the chronological analysis of the evolution of the narrative on Tunis is striking and requires little explanation. Bostan Çelebi's ignored *Süleymannâme*, if not that of Matrakçı Nasuh, explicitly indicated in the early sixteenth

[56] F. López de Gómara, *Guerras de mar del emperador Carlos V*, eds. M.Á. Bunes Ibarra, N.E. Jiménez, Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, Madrid, 2000, pp. 156-157; G. de Illescas, *Jornada de Carlos V á Túnez*, Real Academia Española, Madrid, 1804, pp. 8-10.

[57] K. Çelebi, *Tuhfetü'l-Kibar fi Esfari'l-Bihar* [The Gift to the Great Ones on Naval Campaigns], ed. O.Ş. Gökyay, Milli Eğitim Basımevi, İstanbul, 1973, pp. 66-67.

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century that there existed a sultanic order and that the seizure of Tunis was supported by the sultan. However, this earliest account of the conquest of Tunis, in fact, became the first and the last account in the sixteenth century to express clearly the sultan's involvement. Beginning from the 1540s, the contest over Tunis was either omitted from the histories or, if included, it was narrated differently. Senâyî's omission of Tunis from his *Süleymannâme* of 1540 can be considered as the first alarm bell indicating a problem in the perception of the conquest of Tunis. Around 1543, Seyyid Murad explicitly denied in the *Gazavât* that Barbarossa had any plan or intention beforehand to carry out an attack on Tunis. This idea, however, remained limited to the *Gazavât*, perhaps as a populist defence put forward by Barbarossa that avoided implicating the sultan and himself, and was not adopted by any other source.

The decisive change in the discourse occurred in the 1550s. Lutfi Pasha accused Barbarossa of arbitrarily overstepping the geographical limitations of the sultan's orders by attacking Tunis. Ârif Çelebi emphasized the recovery of Koron as the principal aim and described the conquest of Tunis as the outcome of Barbarossa's personal ambitions. After the 1560s, there were only two choices in front of Ottoman historians: either to omit the event from their histories or to imply that it was not authorized by the sultan. Thus, Celâlzâde opted for the first choice. If one reads his *Tabakât*, an authoritative and canonical chronicle on the reign of Süleyman, it would be impossible to learn anything about one of the most important events in the Mediterranean for that period. The second choice was adopted by Seyyid Lokmân, who isolated the sultan from the defeat at Tunis in all of his works until the end of his tenure as *şehnâmeci*. However, in spite of such historiographical interventions in the sixteenth century, the event was reinterpreted in the seventeenth century, with fresh information and a critical examination that reconsidered the sultan's involvement.

This chronology points out that the discourse of different works within a particular genre dealing with the same topic also changed over time. This is especially seen in the narratives of the *Süleymannâme*-style historical works. The drastic difference between the earlier and later *Süleymannâme*s is indicative of the problematic nature of official historical narratives concerned with controversial historical events. Bostan Çelebi probably experienced more autonomy in his historiographical practice than his later counterparts, who played different historiographical roles. Although he lived until 1570, Bostan Çelebi completed the last copy of his *Süleymannâme* in 1547 before the appearance of those composing the court *şehnâme* whose ultimate task was the glorification of Ottoman dynastic power. Recent studies have shown that the preliminary drafts of the historical

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productions of the *şehnâme* writers were monitored by the sultan and his intimate circle[58]. In this respect, Süleyman must have directly intervened at least in Ârif Çelebi's *Süleymannâme* and approved its final shape. At the same time, it is also probable that the damage that the Ottoman defeat in 1535 caused to the sultan's image and strategy in the Mediterranean was not seen very clearly at the time of the first *Süleymannâme*s. The concern of Bostan Çelebi and Matrakçı Nasuh seems to be limited to the representation of the ephemeral success of Barbarossa's conquest of Tunis and his subsequent defeat as a mere historical fact. In line with changes in the understanding of Ottoman dynastic image, later *Süleymannâme*s opted for a distinct variety of historical discourse to mask the damage it entailed to the reputation of the sultan and his struggle against the Habsburgs. Nevertheless, as is seen in Âşık Çelebi's *Meşâirü'ş-şuarâ*, non-political contemporary sources identified the year 1534 with Barbarossa and emphasized his Tunis campaign as a marker of that time.

Conclusions

The conquest of Tunis in 1534 provoked a swift retaliation from Charles V and resulted in Barbarossa's defeat by the emperor the following year. Charles V's victory was celebrated Europe-wide and gained an enormous popularity over time, equating the expulsion of Barbarossa from Tunis with the conquest of Carthage by Scipio. In fact, it was the only major setback for Süleyman and Barbarossa against the Habsburgs in the Mediterranean and was seen as an ineradicable stain on the careers of the sultan and his admiral. The outcome affected the way in which the struggle for Tunis was handled in Spanish and Ottoman historiographical traditions. Whereas Charles V's expedition became an important element of Habsburg propaganda over the years, Barbarossa's defeat turned the initial victory into a defeat, making it a problematic event about which Ottoman historiographers produced different narratives. The main divergence among the Ottoman chronicles dealing with this topic lay in their inconsistent explanations as to why Barbarossa took the sultan's fleet towards Tunis and conquered it. Some sources attributed it to the sultan's specific orders and some either denied the existence of any official instruction or avoided addressing the question by ignoring the campaign. The different forms of explanation that the

[58] F. S. Eryılmaz, *The Sulaiman-nama (Süleyman-name) as an Historical Source* cit., pp. 189-190.

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Ottoman historiographers went on producing over the years were not combined into a single, coherent interpretation. Thus, modern historiography on the conquest of Tunis has been caught between two extremes and has suffered from that uncertainty until today. This article, while dwelling upon the historiographical quandary that Barbarossa's conquest of Tunis in 1534 represented, has revealed that there was a real stalemate among the sources, which has turned the issue of the authorization of the conquest of Tunis into a conundrum.

Until now, modern historians have found the most obvious statement of sultan's authorization only in the mid-seventeenth century. The validity of this source has been challenged by the most recent literature basing that challenge on the belief that no contemporary source existed of an order by the sultan. This article has shown that an authorization by the sultan was alleged already in the early sixteenth century. Thus, immediately after the contest for Tunis, the main historiographical tendency was to emphasize the existence of an order by the sultan. After then, Ottoman historiographical practice experimented with silence, denial, accusation and manipulation in its handling of this topic. Especially, the emphasis of panegyric historiographical activity was constrained for a considerable time by the exigencies of dynastic concerns and dynastic propaganda. Their content was updated according to political and dynastic interests so that the sultan was totally removed from the decision and so entirely untouched by the humiliating defeat of Barbarossa in 1535. In a period when the Ottomans perceived themselves as exceptional in universal history and portrayed the sultan's struggle against Habsburgs and Safavids from imperial and messianic perspectives, it would have been impossible to recognize the failure at Tunis as a result of Süleyman's own plans, given that the emperor commemorated his victory for years to come as the greatest victory against the Ottoman Empire.

Would or could Barbarossa have dared to conquer Tunis without the consent of Sultan Süleyman? We cannot completely rule out an opportunistic move by Barbarossa, which would be completely compatible with his previous career particularly as the ruler of Algiers. However, there is no convincing evidence of this. The existence of different narratives, official interventions, deliberate manipulation and what appears in retrospect as an attempt to relegate it to oblivion only reinforces doubts over such an interpretation. Considering the period in which these narratives were produced and the historical genres in which they appeared, accepting that the conquest of Tunis in 1534 was the result of the sultan's authorization would surely be a more appropriate response and much closer to the historical reality.

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JUAN DE RENA AND THE FINANCING OF THE TUNIS CAMPAIGN: THE VIEW FROM BARCELONA'S DOCKYARDS

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ABSTRACT: *The struggle between Charles V and the Ottoman empire for control of the central Mediterranean spanned the whole of the emperor's reign and continued for much of the sixteenth century. It would come to an end with the final campaigns of the Ottoman fleet under the command of Cigalazade towards the end of that century. From 1529, when Süleyman first attempted to conquer Vienna, until 1541 when the imperial forces failed to take Algiers, the two great rulers based at opposite ends of the Mediterranean organised a series of campaigns against the other, relying for the most part on their maritime forces. During the 1530s in particular it is possible to detect a major shift in the emperor's strategic direction which would have important repercussions on the development of the Monarchy's principal Mediterranean ports, especially Barcelona and Malaga. This article illustrates and assesses the significant contribution of the city of Barcelona and its dockyards to the imperial campaign launched in support of the Hafsid sultan's attempt to recover the city of Tunis, which had been conquered in 1534 by the Ottoman fleet under the command of Hayreddin Barbarossa. It relies principally on the little-known manuscripts of Juan de Rena now housed in the Archivo General de Navarra, supplemented where possible with material relating to the costs of the expedition from the Archivo General de Simancas.*

KEYWORDS: *Barbarossa, galleys, Mediterranean warfare, shipbuilding.*

JUAN DE RENA E IL FINANZIAMENTO DELLA CAMPAGNA DI TUNISI DAI CANTIERI NAVALI DI BARCELLONA

SOMMARIO: *Lo scontro che contrappose Carlo V all'Impero Ottomano per il controllo del Mediterraneo centrale, oltre a marcare l'agenda politica dell'Asburgo per l'intera durata del suo regno, caratterizzò tutto il lungo Cinquecento. Di fatti, questo conflitto si affievolì solamente negli ultimi decenni del XVI secolo, quando si registrarono le ultime incursioni della flotta ottomana posta sotto il comando di Cigalazade nel Mediterraneo occidentale. Dal 1529, quando Solimano il Magnifico tentò per la prima volta di conquistare Vienna, fino al 1541, quando la flotta imperiale fallì nel tentativo di conquistare Algeri, Osmanli e Asburgo promossero una serie di campagne navali ai danni del rivale contando principalmente sulle proprie forze navali. In modo particolare, durante gli anni '30 del XVI secolo, è possibile rilevare un importante cambiamento nella strategia politico-militare adottata da Carlo V, che avrebbe avuto un impatto importante sullo sviluppo dei principali porti mediterranei della Monarchia ispanica, tra cui Barcellona e Malaga. In questo articolo si valuta proprio il contributo significativo della città di Barcellona e dei suoi arsenali alla campagna imperiale lanciata a sostegno di Muley Hassan, il sultano Hafside impegnato nel tentativo di recuperare la città di Tunisi dopo che, nel 1534, fu conquistata da Hayreddin Barbarossa, comandante della flotta ottomana. Tale indagine si basa principalmente su una serie di manoscritti di Juan de Rena ancora poco conosciuti e conservati presso l'Archivo General de Navarra, a cui si integra, ove possibile, il ricco materiale relativo ai costi della spedizione che si trova nell'Archivo General de Simancas.*

PAROLE CHIAVI: *Barbarossa, galere, Guerra mediterranea, costruzione navale.*

[*] Abbreviations: Argn, Ap Rena (Archivo Real y General de Navarra [Pamplona], Archivo Privado Rena); Ags, E (Archivo General de Simancas, Estado). Acknowledgements: This research was funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science (Project PGC2018-099152-B-I00).

The Tunis campaign is well known due to the numerous chronicles, many of which are readily available, as well as through the famous paintings and tapestries which were commissioned to celebrate the great victories of Charles V in the Gulf of Carthage[1], after which he was greeted in Italy as a triumphant emperor[2]. This should not hinder us from appreciating that the emperor's decision to go to North Africa in person remains curious and surprising. The imperial secretary, Antoine Perrenin, in what can be considered an official chronicle of the campaign, explained it thus:

Having seen and pondered with great sorrow the great damage, cruelty and tyranny which this Infidel and enemy, Barbarossa, also named Hayreddin Pasha, had inflicted on Christendom, and especially along the frontiers and ports of the kingdoms and maritime lands of His Majesty, where he had captured many Christians – men, women and children – taking them in chains as slaves and captives. [And having learnt that] the said Barbarossa had been named Captain General of the Ottoman fleet and had left Istanbul heading for the kingdom of Barbary with nearly three hundred sail, including galleys, foists and brigantines as well as other sailing ships, all well manned and provided with artillery and munitions, [and that] he had taken the fortress of the port of La Goletta in Tunis, as well as the city [of Tunis] and the ports of Bona and Bizerte which are on the border of the said kingdom of Barbary and near the kingdoms and maritime lands belonging to the emperor, in particular the islands of Sicily, Sardinia, Mallorca and Menorca...[3]

[1] S. Haag, K. Schmitz-Von Ledebur, *Kaiser Karl V. erobert Tunis Dokumentation eines Kriegszuges in Kartons und Tapisserien,* Kunsthistorisches Museum, Wien, 2003; H.J. Horn, *Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen, painter of Charles V and his conquest of Tunis, Paintings, Etchings, Drawings, Cartoons and Tapestries*, Davaco, Doornspijk, 1989. The campaign became one of the most important for the Habsburg dynasty, and the Vermeyen tapestries were used in public events more often than any others. The two candidates for the throne of Spain during the War of Succession both commissioned copies of the series. M. Falomir Faus, M.Á. Bunes Ibarra, *Carlos V, Vermeyen y la conquista de Túnez,* in J.L. Castellanos, F. Sánchez-Montes (eds.), *Carlos V. Europeísmo y Universalidad. Religión, cultura y mentalidad*, Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, Madrid, 2001, t. V, pp. 243-257.

[2] A. Chastel, *Les entrées de Charles Quint en Italie*, in J. Jacquot (ed.), *Les Fêtes de la Renaissance. II. Fètes et cérémonies au temps de Charles V,* CNRS, Paris, 1975; M.A. Visceglia, *Il viaggio ceremoniale di Carlo V dopo Tunisi*, in J. Martínez Millán (ed.), *Carlos V y la quiebra del humanismo política en Europa (1530-1558),* Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, Madrid, 2001, vol. II, pp. 101-108. It is very difficult at present to provide a synthesis of the different entries because of the sheer volume of publications relating to them in the last few years.

[3] A. Perrenin, *Goleta de la ciudad de Túnez, 1535. Jornada de Túnez*, in R. González Cuerva, M.A. Bunes Ibarra (eds.), *Túnez 1535: Voces de una campaña europea*, CSIC, Madrid, 2017, p. 59: «Viendo y considerando con gran pesar los grandes males y crueldades y tiranías que el infiel y enemigo Barbarroja, nombrado Carinbasa, había hecho en la Cristiandad, mayormente en las fronteras y puertos de los Reinos y tierras marítimas de Su Majestad, habiendo prendido muchos cristianos, hombres y mujeres

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However, the rapid reaction of Charles V on hearing that Barbarossa and the Ottoman forces had sacked much of the coast of Naples in 1534 and gone on to conquer Tunis, suggests that he may have already decided to take the initiative in the conflict against the Ottoman empire. What he particularly feared in 1534 was that the Ottoman squadron would attack the Mediterranean coast of Spain, and to counter this he ordered wide-ranging defensive measures to be implemented, as spies based in Venice reported[4]. The emperor wanted to take the initiative to halt the expansion of the Ottoman empire now that Barbarossa had destroyed the *statu quo* that had existed between the two great Mediterranean empires in the Maghreb. Some years earlier, Charles V had signed an alliance with Venice[5], which resulted in the conquest of Corón in the southern Peloponnese in 1532[6]. For tactical reasons, the emperor had in effect compartmentalised the Osmanli threat, creating two distinct fronts: one maritime, the other on land. He handed over responsibility for the defence of the German lands to his brother, Ferdinand I, and assumed full responsibility for the Mediterranean front[7]. The proximity of the Tunisian Hafsid princes to the Maghrebian states controlled by the successors of the Barbarossa brothers had already prompted the emperor to offer protection to various members of the Hafsid dynasty after 1530. He

y niños y llevados detenidos esclavos y cautivos. Teniendo el dicho Barbarroja la armada del mar del Turco, de que él era Capitán General, con la cual con cerca de trescientas velas, así galeras, fustas y bergantines, como otros navíos de mar bien proveídos de gente de mar, artillerías y municiones, se había partido de Constantinopla y venido al Reino de Berbería. Y había tomado la fortaleza del puerto de La Goleta de Túnez, y asimismo la ciudad y los puertos de África, de Bona y de Bizerta, fronteras del dicho Reino de Berbería cercanos de los dichos Reinos y tierras marítimas del Emperador, mayormente de las islas de Sicilia, Cerdeña, Mallorca y Menorca».

[4] The measures taken to defend Valencia have been studied by J.F. Pardo Molero, *La defensa del imperio. Carlos V, Valencia y el Mediterráneo,* Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, Madrid, 2001, pp. 289-306.

[5] «Antes de que recibiera la de v. majestad: yo havia entendido con esta Republica havia recibido cartas de sus embaxadores por los quales avisaban de lo que V. Majestad me escribe y sobre ello tovieron su consejo con los procuradores y el Príncipe y otros particulares personas principales y con el parecer del dicho Príncipe y de todos fue concluydo de entrar en la Liga y contribuye en ella de la manera que dire». Ags, E, 1366, n. 153, Gómez de Figueroa to Francisco de los Cobos, Genoa, February 1533. The ambassador is referring to the discussions relating to the creation of a League or alliance to mount an attack against Algiers, the chief corsair base in the region, where the Barbarossa had settled from the early sixteenth century. M.Á. Bunes Ibarra, *Los Barbarroja. Corsarios del Mediterráneo*, Aldebarán, Madrid, 2004.

[6] G. Varriale, *Nápoles y el azar de Corón (1532-1534)*, «Tiempos Modernos», 22 (2011), pp. 1-32.

[7] Ö. Kumrular, *El duelo entre Carlos V y Solimán el Magnífico (1520-1535)*, ISIS, Estambul, 2005.

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also agreed to give financial subsidies to the tribal leaders of lands surrounding the Spanish *presidios* (the fortified outposts they had established in the region) so as to ensure their continued support for these settlements. For example, he paid an annual pension of 500,000 *maravedíes* to the tribal leader they called the Infante of Bugía (Béjaïa, Algeria)[8] to reinforce the security of the small garrison stationed in that city under the command of Perafán de Ribera[9]. In fact, even before the 1530s the emperor had forged intimate contacts with the Hafsid dynasty, as evinced by the fact that a Hafsid princess who had converted to Christianity was given a dowry by the empress so that she could enter a convent in Barcelona. Even more telling - and a clear sign of respect for the longstanding relations between them, of course - was the fact that Charles V went to Tunis in person to restore Mulay Hassan to power over his dominions, rather than to conquer the region and take it for himself[10].

It is universally accepted that Charles V decided to mount the Tunis campaign so as to prove to his contemporaries that he was capable of personally commanding military forces, and to establish himself as the defender of Christendom[11]. What has not been studied or appreciated is that financially, the expedition was quite out of the ordinary, and that the campaign had a significant impact not only on the internal financial structures of the emperor's lands, but also on his foreign policy[12]. Quite simply, it was on a different scale from anything he had done to date. It is true that even before this, imperial campaigns had placed a great economic burden on his subjects, especially in Castile and the Low Countries; but he had never organised a campaign that

[8] Ags, 462, s. f., Charles V to the Council of the Finances, 14 February 1535. Summaries from some of these documents were included in É. De La Primaudaie, *Documents inédits sur l'occupation espagnole en Afrique (1506-1594)*, A. Jourdan, Alger, 1875, passim.

[9] R. Gutiérrez Cruz, *Los presidios españoles del norte de África en tiempos de los Reyes Católicos*, Consejería de Cultura, Melilla, 1997.

[10] S. Boubaker, *L'empereur Charles Quint et le roi Mawlay al-Hasan (1520-1535)*, in S. Boubaker, C. Ilham Álvarez Dopico (eds.), *Empreintes espagnoles dans l'histoire tunisienne*, Trea, Gijón, 2011, pp. 13-82.

[11] M.J. Rodríguez Salgado, *¿Carolus Africanus?: el Emperador y el turco*, in J. Martínez Millán (ed.), *Carlos V y la quiebra del humanismo político en Europa (1530-1558)*, Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, Madrid, vol. I, pp. 487-531.

[12] This aspect emerges clearly from the imperial negotiations for a closer alliance with Genoa: «... porque demás de ser la puerta de Italia tienen fuerças por la mar y aparejos para ellas más que en otra parte y dineros que aunque cuestan caros se hallan lo de aquí consiste todo en el príncipe mayormente que el que agora es duque y el son una...». Ags, E, 1366, n. 154, Gómez de Figueroa to Francisco de los Cobos, Genoa, March 1533.

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combined a huge fleet with a powerful, sophisticated land force and this proved to be much more expensive. The military and naval forces were levied not only from the emperor's vast, scattered territories, but also from allied lands, ranging from the sailors of Malaga to the German and Swiss landsknechts. To achieve his aim of defeating Barbarossa, Charles V seized the treasures that had come from the conquest of Peru and not just what belonged to the crown. He also confiscated the money and goods belonging to others, whether merchants, religious institutions or private individuals. These funds enabled Charles V to avoid calling the Cortes and demanding another extraordinary subsidy from Castile to pay for the war. However, this does not mean that Castile was spared financially. The campaign has been generally considered as the beginning of a long-term and highly damaging process that led to massive exports of specie and precious metals from Castilian lands[13].

Be that as it may, the campaign was unquestionably one of the most expensive foreign wars of the whole of the sixteenth century. Yet, unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to calculate the economic impact of this expedition because so much documentation has been lost, and what remains is dispersed and fragmentary. The very extent and complexity of the organisation required to put the campaign together makes it impossible to agree even on the number of people who took part in the conquest of La Goletta. The imperial forces had to be moved from their diverse places of origin to a single meeting point; something that could only be done piecemeal and over a considerable period of time. New contingents continued to join the expedition as late as the siege of La Goletta, as Charles V noted in a letter to the viceroy of Navarre[14]. From the west came contingents from the Netherlands and Portugal, and the soldiers and artillery of Malaga. The Iberian fleet was gradually assembled in the port of Barcelona. All ships still in Iberian waters were ordered to sail to the Sardinian port of Cagliari where they were joined by the Neapolitan and Sicilian galleys and other vessels under the command of the marquis del Vasto carrying soldiers from Lombardy, Naples, Sicily as well as German

[13] «Una gran parte de gasto se cubriría fuera de España. Aquí quedaría el dinero que costara lo que en casa se hiciera en las faenas de los astilleros, catalanes, murcianos y andaluces, donde se aprestaban las naves, y en la requisa de las embarcaciones fletadas con el mismo destino, y las obligaciones inherentes a la dotación de soldados y de marineros y la provisión de equipos, vituallas, artillería y todos los imprescindibles pertrechos». R. Carande, *Carlos V y sus banqueros,* Crítica, Barcelona, 1977, vol. II, pp. 104-105.

[14] Argn, Ap Rena, 76, n. 14, Charles V to the Viceroy of Navarre, count of Cañete, La Goleta, 30 June 1535.

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landsknechts[15]. From the outset, chroniclers and observers realised that the war was extremely costly, particularly as news that the Ottoman fleet under Barbarossa had arrived in Christian lands had already forced the emperor to organise extensive -and expensive - defensive measures throughout the Mediterranean coastal areas. The chronicler Sandoval wrote:

The emperor ordered provisions to be sent and fortifications in the principal ports of Naples and Sicily to be reinforced, which was very costly, but he knew that galleys are like lightning: they may be visible and may even be heard, but it is impossible to predict where they will strike until the harm is done. Once he saw that the enemy had seized the whole of the kingdom of Tunis and forced Mulay Hassan to flee, he was determined to do everything in his power to remove Barbarossa from there. To achieve this, he sent his couriers to the pope, and ordered Andrea Doria, the viceroys of Naples, Sicily and Sardinia, the marquis del Vasto, Antonio de Leyva and others to amass as many troops and ships as they could, and to provide them with all the necessary armaments, munitions and victuals for the campaign but to do this secretly. He raised large sums of money, and ordered don Luis Hurtado de Mendoza, the marquis of Mondéjar, Captain-General of the kingdom of Granada, to levy men and prepare victuals in Andalucía and its ports. Finally, to make sure he had everything necessary to carry out successfully an expedition of such magnitude, he levied eight thousand Germans. He summoned the veteran soldiers from Coron and Naples, who numbered up to four thousand men and levied eight to ten thousand Spaniards in the Spanish kingdoms who were joined by the majority of the nobility from those realms. In Italy some eight thousand Italians were levied. The emperor gathered this vast war machine with all possible secrecy[16].

[15] A very interesting account written by a German soldier who was recruited for the campaign has been recently published by Rubén González Cuerva, giving us a different viewpoint of the event: N. Guldin, *Relato de la jornada del emperador Carlos V a Túnez*, in R. González Cuerva and M.A. Bunes Ibarra (eds.), *Túnez 1535* cit., pp. 109-134. Niklaus Guldin was a lowly infantryman, who seemed primarily concerned to secure the salary he had been promised and get a share of the booty taken during the brutal sack of Tunis, although he claims that they got relatively little out of it. The figures he gives for the fleet and soldiers are somewhat inflated: «Todos los barcos juntos han sido 300 – así naos como galeón, galeras, mediagaleras, fustas –, la gente de guerra junto con la gente de mar han sido 100.000». Ivi, p. 119.

[16] P. de Sandoval, *Historia de la vida y hechos del emperador Carlos V. Rey Catholico de España y de las Indias*, Bartholome Paris, Pamplona, 1634, book XXII: «Hizo, pues, el Emperador bastecer y fortificar los lugares más importantes de Nápoles y Sicilia, que costaron hartos dineros, conociendo que las galeras son como rayos, que si bien se ven y oyen, no se sabe dónde van a dar hasta que han herido. Mas después que vió cómo el enemigo se había apoderado de todo punto del reino de Túnez, echando de él Muley Hacem, puso todo su pensamiento en echarle de allí. Para lo cual envió sus correos al Papa; escribió, mandando guardar secreto a Andrea Doria y a los virreyes de Nápoles, Sicilia y Cerdeña, y al marqués del Vasto, y a Antonio de Leyva y otros para que se

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Other authors avoid giving any estimates of the different contingents that participated in this event. There are also notable differences in the figures given by those who took part, especially by the protagonists of the siege of La Goleta on the one hand, and on the other hand, authors who based their figures on on narratives written in the months immediately after the summer of 1535, or on secondary accounts[17].

Evidently, the Tunis campaign was unique in many ways besides the excessive cost for the emperor's lands. He managed to put together one of the most diverse, combined military and naval expeditions of the whole of the sixteenth century.

According to the chronicle of López de Gómara, the marquis del Vasto arrived with five thousand Italians and eight thousand Germans, not counting the cavalry under Maximilian Herberstein. He embarked these forces

in the thirty-eight ships he had fitted out in Portovenere … Thus, when the emperor reviewed the list of troops in Cagliari he reckoned that with these and the Spanish soldiers, he had 25,000 men. In addition to these, he had 2,000 cavalry, 800 of them fully armed, and light cavalry, so-called because their armour consisted only of a coat of mail. The total number of vessels, counting both large and the small ones, came to 700. There were about 70 Flemish hulks, 40 galleons, 100 round ships, 25 Portuguese caravels and some from Andalucia. The rest were made up of vessels such as *tafurcas*, *escorpachines*

juntasen cuanta gente y navíos pudiesen, apresтándolos con todas las armas, municiones y vituallas necesarias para tal empresa. Recogió gran suma de dineros, mandó que don Luis Hurtado de Mendoza, marqués de Mondéjar, capitán general del reino de Granada, recogiese gente y bastimentos y los aprestase en la Andalucía y puertos de ella, y finalmente, todo lo que era necesario para una determinación de tanta importancia. Mandó levantar ocho mil alemanes. Juntáronse los soldados viejos de Corón y de Nápoles, que serían hasta cuatro mil. En España se levantaron de ocho a diez mil españoles, con gran parte de la nobleza de estos reinos. En Italia se hicieron otros ocho mil italianos. Todo este aparato de guerra hizo el Emperador con el secreto posible».

[17] This is certainly the case for Francisco López de Gómara, a direct witness who wrote: «Mandó el Emperador hacer alarde de los caballos que había en su corte para embarcar, que los demás y de los soldados ya tenía nómina, y hubo hasta 1.500 con ricos jaeces y otras buenas guarniciones, que cada caballero procuraba de ir galán tan bien como armado. Las naves de armada que allí en Barcelona se juntaron, sin muchos bajeles chicos, fueron 25 carabelas con el galeón del rey, en que iban 2.000 portugueses, 60 o más urcas con bastimento, armas y municiones, especialmente pelotas y pólvora, 50 naos y galeones españoles donde iban hasta 8.000 soldados novicios y hasta 700 jinetes…Estando pues el Emperador con esta caballería y con 15 galeras que traía don Álvaro de Bazán, entró Andrea de Oria con tres galeones y 16 galeras en Barcelona». F. López de Gómara, *Guerras de mar del Emperador Carlos V*, eds. M.Á. Bunes Ibarra, N.E. Jiménez, Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, Madrid, 2000, pp. 161-162.

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and *açauras*. There were also many brigantines, frigates, foists and some galliots. There were 12 papal galleys, 4 from [the Order of the Knights of St. John of] Malta under Aurelio Botigela, the prior of Pisa, 15 of ours [i.e. Spanish] under Álvaro de Bazán, 19 under Andrea Doria, 10 Sicilian galleys captained by don Belenguer de Requesens, 9 Genoese galleys, 6 Neapolitan galleys under don García de Toledo, another 5 under Antonio Doria and 2 belonging to the lord of Monaco. In total 82 very well-armed and richly decorated galleys, because each captain wanted his galley to be the best whether in terms of speed, armaments or beauty[18].

García Cereceda, who took part in the Tunis campaign gives completely different figures, however. He refers to 113 high-sided vessels, 15 royal galleys – four of them carrying horses – 1 galleon, 1 *nave*, 22 caravels and an indeterminate number of galleons and hulks, in which were embarked 12,000 Italians and 7,000 German troops, as well as the soldiers from Spain and the papal states. As for the galleys he gives these figures: 15 Spanish; 3 papal; 13 Neapolitan; 15 belonging to the Doria family; 4 from Rhodes [meaning perhaps those of the Knights of St. John once based in Rhodes, but by then in Malta], 6 from Sicily and 2 from Palermo (*sic.*), 2 from Monaco, 12 from Genoa and 2 under Berenguel, as well as others belonging to unnamed individuals[19].

Until very recently we did not even know how important the Portuguese military contingents that arrived in Barcelona on 29 April 1535 under the command of the infante don Luis were. The fleet was made up of 11 galleons, 2 carracks and 2 caravels, and was carrying some 1500 men, counting both soldiers and mariners[20]. The Portu-

[18] Ivi, p. 163: «sin muchos caballeros que traía Maximiliano Ebersteyn, y embarcólos en 38 naos, que para esto estaban aderezados en Portuvenere… De manera, pues, que tuvo el Emperador por lista en Callar 25.000 soldados, los demás españoles. Había también 2.000 de caballo, los 800 llevaban todos armas, los de malla, que por eso se llaman ligeros. Eran los navíos 700, entre chicos y grandes. Había sobre de 70 urcas de Flandes, 40 galeones, 100 naves, 25 carabelas portuguesas y otras andaluzas, y demás era tafurcas, escorpachines, açauras y tales bajeles, había también muchos bergantines, fragatas, fustas y algunas galeotas. Galeras había 12 del Papa, 4 de Malta con Aurelio Botigela, prior de Pisa, 15 nuestras con Álvaro de Bazán, 19 de Andrea de Oria, 10 de Sicilia cuyo capitán era don Belenguer de Requesens, 9 de Génova, 6 de Nápoles con don García de Toledo, 5 de Antonio de Oria, 2 del señor de Mónaco. Así que todas eran 82, muy bien armadas y ricamente guarnecidas, porque cada capitán quería que sus galeras fuesen las mejores de remo, armas y gala».

[19] M. García Cereceda, *Tratado de las campañas y otros acontecimientos de los ejércitos del emperador Carlos V*, Sociedad de Bibliófilos Españoles, Madrid, 1873, vol. II, pp. 13-21.

[20] J.V. Pissarra, *O galeào S. Joâo (c1530-1551). Dados para una monografía*, in I. Guerreiro, F. Contente Domingues (eds.), *Fernando Oliveira e o seu tempo: humanismo*

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guese contingent has been considered among the decisive elements that gave the imperial fleet superiority over the Ottoman forces, because of the greater firepower of these large, high-sided vessels. Their participation had the additional benefit of demonstrating the close family alliance and mutual interest of the Avis and Habsburg dynasties to safeguard and control the Mediterranean[21]. It is the Portuguese squadron, and especially the flagship, the *Botafogo* – literally, the Firebreather, a name that neatly evokes its deathly artillery power – that is the main protagonist in the two Vermeyen tapestries that depict the imperial fleet. This is in stark contrast to Paulo Giovio's written account of the campaign. While he notes the Portuguese contribution, he gives totally different figures for those who took part in the campaign[22]. Although Giovio received first-rate information from many of the participants, his account was considered tendentious at the time as it focussed almost exclusively on the role of the Italians, both the soldiers and the ships, stressing the importance of the papal galleys and especially the role played by Andrea Doria as commander of the combined naval forces, to the detriment of the others[23].

In the present state of knowledge, we cannot resolve the vast discrepancies regarding the number of soldiers who took part in the campaign. Figures range between the 50,000 men which many

e arte de navegar no renascimento europeu (1450-1650), Patrimonia, Cascais, 1999, pp. 212-224.

[21] H. Carvalhal, *The Portuguese participation in the conquest of Tunis (1535): a social and military reassessment*, in E. García Hernán, D. Maffi (eds.), *Estudios sobre Guerra y Sociedad en la Monarquía Hispánica. Guerra marítima, estrategia, organización y cultura militar (1500-1700)*, Albatros, Valencia, 2017, pp. 169-187.

[22] P. Giovio, *Dialogo de las empresas militares y amorosas…*, Guillielmo Rouille, Lyon, 1562, cap. XLII, f. Cxvir. «Era venido también de Portugal el infante don Luis hermano del rey de Portugal, cuya hermana era mujer del Emperador con una armada de veynte y cinco naves de aquellas que se nombran Caravelas, avezadas a las navegaciones de las Indias, las quales trayan grandissimo numero de artillería y podían referir la furia del mar por más bravo que anduviesse y trayan muchas municiones. Entre estas carabelas avía un gran galeón bastecido de un grandissimo numero de artillería. En aquella armada havia dos mil infantes pagados sin los marineros».

[23] Referring to the Genoese admiral, Andrea Doria he wrote: «al qual el Emperador avia hecho general de toda la empresa de la mar, a quien solo por su singular fe y valor avia comunicado todo su parescer usando de una increíble presteza y diligencia, aparejó una armada de muchas naves gruessas y treinta galeras; entre las quales habia una quatrirreme, la qual en lugar de capitana havia de llevar al Emperador. Tenía esta toda la cubierta entretallada, toda la popa dentro y fuera dorada y pintada de riquissimos fullajes y pinturas: también estaba la popa cubierta de un tendal de brocado y terciopelo carmesí y todos los marineros y soldados vestidos de seda y muy bien armados. Avia también destribuydo por las naves gran quantidad de vitualla, instrumentos navales…». *Ibidem*.

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authors who did not participate personally accepted as accurate, to the 26-30,000 which are the estimates given by Lope de Soria, the resident imperial ambassador in Venice and which can also be found in contemporary, official accounts. As we alluded to earlier, the main impediment to reaching an accurate conclusion relates to the paucity and fragmentation of the surviving documentation on the organisation and financing of the campaign.

The papers of Juan de Rena suffer from similar limitations: they are patchy and limited, essentially concerning the construction of five galleys in the dockyards of Barcelona that were destined for the squadron of Álvaro de Bazán "el viejo" (senior), who was at this point the commander of the Spanish galley fleet. Nevertheless, the three bundles of documentation furnish us with the most detailed and concrete evidence to date of the costs involved in fitting out the fleet. They also contain information on the four ships added to the fleet to transport the many horses, which were also used as transports to bring a number of woodcutters and caulkers to Barcelona as they were in desperately short supply and essential to speed up the preparations. There was an acute shortage of skilled labour in the port given the volume of work to be done. Among Rena's documents two exceptional maps can be found showing the battlefield near La Goleta. However, it should be admitted at the outset that the documentation is particularly valuable for what it reveals about the emperor's consolidation of power over Navarre, rather than what it reveals about his foreign ventures. It is also very useful to trace the evolution of galley construction in the sixteenth century, and adds considerably to our scant knowledge of the Barcelona dockyards. But with respect to the Tunis campaign, at most, it can illuminate a specific aspect, that is the fitting out of a number of effectives in the Spanish galley fleet, and it is therefore of limited value when it comes to estimating the overall costs of the campaign[24]. The documents concern the building and fitting out of five galleys and of the horse transports. They do not give the overall cost of these vessels, nor do they give details of the cost of the artillery that they would need on board, because these aspects were dealt with by other paymasters and the funds came from different sources. Nor do they give any indication of wages or of what the men who came on board were paid. Although the nature of this

[24] «Por la de su Majestad vera v.s. y por las que escribiere el señor Príncipe y el protonotario micer Juan Rena a lo que se offreciere en lo del armada y en todo lo demás por lo qual en esta no tengo más que decir sino que no se perdiera tiempo en adereçar las cosas necesarias para la breve espedizion que será presto con la ayuda de Nuestro Señor». Ags, E, 1366, n. 144, Gómez de Figueroa to Francisco de los Cobos, Genoa, 12 February 1533.

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documentation is undoubtedly economic, its limitations highlight an interesting fact: the different paymasters were more interested in giving details of the contracts they had drawn up with providers, and with the provenance of the goods they had purchased than with giving precise details of the money they had paid to secure these products and services.

Juan de Rena was appointed as the *Comisario*, the official in charge of the construction and provisioning of the fleet destined for the Tunis campaign during 1534 and 1535 in the dockyards of Barcelona[25]. It is evident both from manuscripts found in the ARGN and from the information in the correspondence with Genoa during 1533 found elsewhere, that he was a specialist in galley construction and the fitting out of fleets, which accounts for the fact that he was assigned to both these tasks. He was born in Venice in 1480 and had risen to prominence in the years when Ferdinand the Catholic governed Aragon and Castile. He was already one of the king's counsellors when he arrived in Navarre in 1512 and played a key role in consolidating Castilian power over the newly-conquered kingdom[26]. The recent completion of cataloguing his entire archive has provided the information we needed to build up a picture of this complex and decisive individual who served both Ferdinand and Charles V until his death in 1539[27]. Besides being a royal counsellor, he was a merchant and a clergyman. No fewer than sixty-two different offices or functions have been attributed to him during his lifetime by taking into account his various public and religious offices and his private activities. Before taking up his new post in Pamplona he had acted as a royal official in the campaigns led by Pedro Navarro and financed by cardinal Cisneros that led to the conquest of Mazalquivir (Mers-el-

[25] M. Chocarro, F. Segura, *Inventario de la documentación de Juan de Rena. Archivo Real y General de Navarra,* Gobierno de Navarra, Pamplona, 2013. References to the different expeditions which both he and Charles V were involved with can be found in pp. 38-40, 43 and 47-54.

[26] J.M. Escribano Páez offered a general study of the manuscript collection in *Juan de Rena and the construction of the Hispanic monarchy (1500-1540)*, PhD thesis, European University Institute, 2016. His articles *Negotiating with the "Infiel": Imperial Expansion and Cross-Confessional Diplomacy in the Early Modern Maghreb (1492-1516)*, «Itinerario» 40:2 (2016), pp. 189-214; and *War, conquest and local merchants: the role of credit in the peripheral military administration of the Hispanic Monarchy during the first half of the sixteenth century*, «Economic History, Early Modern economic and social history and Early modern Spain», 14 (2013), pp. 1-19 are based on the information contained in the Rena papers of the ARGN.

[27] M. Chocarro, F. Segura, *Inventario* cit., and also the article by M. Chocarro, F. Segura, *El reino de Navarra en la Monarquía Hispánica: nuevos enfoques desde la documentación de Juan de Rena*, «Príncipe de Viana», 261 (2015), pp. 109-136 which is particularly relevant here.

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Kebir, Algeria) and Oran in North Africa in 1509. As soon as he arrived in North Africa, Rena had reconnoitred most of the ports of the region and written a description of these, and also of the characteristics of the local rulers, which probably accelerated his career in the service of Ferdinand II of Aragon. He became an expert in the fitting out of royal fleets, serving as the *proveedor general* (a naval Comptroller or Clerk in charge of procurement) for the fleet destined for the joint campaign with England in 1512 during the War of the League of Cambrai for example. He played a similar role in the preparation of the fleet that Charles V sent to Italy in 1526, and the ships that sailed to Italy and the Low Countries during 1527 and 1528. In 1529 he was also chosen by the emperor as one of the select group that would accompany him from Barcelona to Bologna for his coronation as Emperor by pope Clement VII (22 February 1530). Rena was again in charge of fitting out the fleets sent to Coron and Patras in 1532 and 1533 respectively[28], and was on board the ships that fought against the Ottoman fleet in the gulf of Lepanto. He returned with the emperor to the Iberian Peninsula in 1533[29]. The construction and fitting out of the ships that admiral Álvaro de Bazán commanded in the Tunis campaign during 1534 and 1535 would be his last major contribution to the Mediterranean fleet and the wars against the Muslims in the region[30].

The fact that he was a clergyman, as much as the sheer number of offices he accumulated, tell us a great deal about the way that Charles V organised the fleets destined to fight the Ottomans. From 1508 until 1538 Rena also held the office of royal chaplain. His benefices included parishes in the dioceses of Pamplona, Seville, Palencia, Calahorra, Ciudad Rodrigo and Sigüenza. He was Vicar General of the diocese of Pamplona from 1521 onwards, the year in which he also had charge of the rents collected there. His growing importance was reflected in the appointments he held in the bishopric of Pamplona as an apostolic or papal protonotary from 1525 to 1534, and as deputy collector of

[28] G. Varriale, *Nápoles y el azar de Corón* cit., pp. 1-32.

[29] M. de Foronda y Aguilera, *Estancias y viajes del emperador Carlos V*, S.n., S.l., 1914, remains a very useful source for tracing the many journeys undertaken by the emperor.

[30] These are all the references in Juan de Rena's papers relating to Mediterranean affairs in the 1530s: Argn, Ap Rena, 76, n. 13, *Registro de Juan de Rena de instrucciones, relaciones y cuentas de la construcción de 20 galeras para la armada a Túnez, 1534-1537*; Argn, Ap Rena, 76, n. 14, Charles V to the Viceroy of Navarre, count of Cañete, La Goleta, 30 June 1535; Argn, Ap Rena, 76, n. 15, Gómez de Figueroa to Francisco de los Cobos, Genoa, 5 August 1537; Argn, Ap Rena, 76, n. 16, *Relación de la cuenta de Francisco de Segura por los gastos en el camino a Valencia en la búsqueda de aserradores y calafates para ir a Barcelona desde el 7 de diciembre de 1534 a 11 de enero de 1535.*

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papal revenues in 1531-1532. In 1534 he was promoted to the bishopric of Alghero in Sardinia, reaching the zenith of his ecclesiastical career in 1538 when he was given the bishopric of Pamplona. Charles V had sought to have him named as bishop of Alghero in order to facilitate not just the organisation of the fleet against Barbarossa, but in particular to ease the negotiations with the papacy, whose military and financial contributions to «the campaign against the Infidel» were considered vital[31].

As already mentioned, Juan de Rena was also an experienced merchant, agent and expert adviser on all matters relating to North Africa since the early years of the century. His knowledge of the region combined with his long experience with various maritime ventures under Charles V made him an ideal person to take charge of fitting out the fleet in the campaign against Tunis. He had been involved in the complex military world of the Mediterranean since at least 1505 when Mazalquivir was occupied by the Spaniards. That campaign had been undertaken with a combination of galleys from Barcelona and round ships originating both in Andalucía and the Cantabrian coast. It had involved the embarkation of over 7,000 men in the 170 ships that had been gathered in Malaga. As with other fleets in this period, it was a multinational enterprise which required extraordinary coordination, having to move and provide for both maritime and military personnel as well as securing victuals from many different points, and providing large quantities of artillery, both in terms of the normal complement required for each participating vessel, but also the siege and other artillery required which was normally kept on land and had to be embarked for these campaigns. The extraordinary complexity of organising large fleets in this period led to the development of a permanent, professional naval administration headed by a recognised expert (the *Proveedor General*), assisted by a number of officials of different ranks. It was the only way that fleets of this kind could be organised and ships

[31] «Pour l´Espagne, il s´agissait généralement du Viceroi de Catalogne ou du Capitaine général du Royaume de Grenade; parfois des deux comme ce fut le cas en 1535, l´Empereur ayant choisi Barcelone comme port de reunión de l´armada proprement espagnole. Lorsque le projet était la conséquence d´une ligue internationale, la partie espagnole était représentée par une seule personne. Le plus souvent un prélat comme l´éveque de Pampelune en 1538. Cette qualité devait indubitablement faciliter les négociations avec la Papauté dont les concours financier et militaire ne pouvaient être négligés». R. Quatrefages, *La Proveeduria des Armadas: de l´expédition de Tunis (1535) a celle d´Alger (1541),* «Mélanges de la Casa dde Velázquez», 14 (1978), p. 218. As he had not consulted Juan de Rena's papers, Quatrefages did not identify the Bishop of Alguer (Alghero), this being the title with which he signed all the documents relating to the building and fitting out of the galleys in the dockyards.

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maintained. In the 1530s the office was made permanent and its headquarters established in the port of Malaga.

The only accounts that survive in Rena's papers concern the five galleys commissioned from shipbuilders based in the dockyards of Barcelona, and those relating to the conversion of the four other galleys destined to transport the large number of horses that were embarked in Spain, mostly belonging to the numerous nobles who took part in the campaign[32]. Clearly, the expenditure contained in Rena's documents is but a small part of the total. The numerous ships that were embargoed in the Spanish ports had to be paid for, but we have no surviving evidence of the cost of this. However, it is possible to give some indication of the cost of constructing another two galleys built in Mallorca, although we have only indirect references for these. In the absence of documentation, it is impossible to say what differences there were in ship construction in the different Spanish ports, but there must have been some as monarchs expressed preference for some over others. Among the active dockyards of the period, for example, it appears that Charles V preferred those of Barcelona to those of Seville. True, this could be due to the shortage of wood in the vicinity of the southern port after so many years of excessive demands for such primary materials from that region. As for the Neapolitan dockyards, they had the reputation of producing ships of lesser quality and at a higher cost than those of the Drassanes Reials (Royal Dockyards) of Barcelona. Quality and convenience rather than cost may have affected the emperor's decision to use Barcelona for this campaign. For example, we know that the cost of building a galley in Gibraltar, without artillery, came to between 2143 and 2243 ducats, somewhat cheaper than those he ordered from the Catalan dockyards. As the ambassador, Figueroa, confirmed, the cheapest of all shipbuilding bases available to the emperor were to be found in Genoa, but the emperor did not want to place an order for galleys or other shipping with them at this juncture, although they were allies and close collaborators[33].

Returning to the detailed information from Rena's accounts we get a glimpse of the complexity of the process of fitting out fleets in the sixteenth century. The accounts for the different galleys were signed by Luis del Puerto, mosén Fernando Ranese or Antonio Busto. It is an

[32] A. de Ceballos-Escalera Gila, *Guerra y Nobleza en la jornada de Túnez: Los Capitanes del César*, in A. Alvar Ezquerra, J.I. Ruiz Rodríguez (eds.), *Túnez 1535: Halcones y halconeros en la diplomacia y la monarquía española*, Gremio de Halconeros del Reino de España, Madrid, 2010, pp. 123-153.

[33] R. Quatrefages, *La Proveeduria des Armadas* cit., pp. 223-224 which relies on the documents from the Consejo de Guerra (Council of War) to be found in Ags, Guerra Antigua, 12, n. 107.

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indication of the importance of the tasks he was undertaking that at such times as Juan Rena was absent, the viceroy in Cataluña took over his role, in particular supervising construction to ensure that progress was maintained, and taking the necessary measures to cover costs in a timely fashion so that these ships could be ready when required and would not delay the departure of the whole fleet.

The costs of constructing each of the new galleys were comparable and provide us with conclusive data to prove that costs of galley construction were increasing throughout the sixteenth century. The data also give us interesting information about the military materiel which each of the galleys was to be given and the cost:

Tab. 1: Materiel to equip each galley (ARGN, AP Rena, 76, n. 16)

120 pieces of body armour with the royal insignia and emblems	50 ducats
20 round shields	20 ducats
20 coselets (light armour)	15 ducats
40 harquebuses with their powder flasks and complements	130 ducats
Lead: 1 quintal and 10 pounds of lead to make shot	2 ducats
Gunpowder: 1 quintal and 21 ½ pounds @ 10 ducats per quintal	12,5 ducats
Match: 5 pounds	2 ducats & 2 *sueldos*
100 Pikes	17 ducats

The emperor also paid for the richly-decorated galley in which he embarked for Tunis. It was a cuatrirreme, a larger and faster vessel with four men to an oar rather than the usual three. It stood out principally as a result its lavish decorations and covered quarters of red velvet and damask with gold trimmings. All the pennants were painted and decorated[34].

Until early 1535 Rena and his officials were charged with fitting out the new galleys and horse transports; thereafter, they were involved in procuring whatever was still needed for the whole fleet. Luis del Puerto, one of Juan de Rena's officials, was delegated with the task of fitting out all the ships under the command of Álvaro de Bazán, as and

[34] Argn, Ap Rena, 76, n. 16, *Relación de la cuenta de Francisco de Segura...*; also Giovio in note 23.

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when they were required, whether they were old or new[35]. Costs rose exponentially once they had to procure gunpowder, harquebuses, and the hundreds of other things that a fleet required before it was fully functional[36]. Because this was an official imperial campaign, all ships were required to display the emperor's arms and insignia, thereby increasing the cost of the expedition, since new flags and pennants had to be made, and painters and designers were commissioned to design and paint the emperor's coat of arms and other insignia. All these decorative elements had to be paid for. It is surprising that the emperor should have felt the need to repeat orders so that this was done[37]. Painters in Barcelona were the first to paint the emperor's moto, Plus Ultra, in the pennants and flags, many of which also displayed the imperial two-headed eagle.

Thanks to Rena's accounts we also know the names of the galleys built in Barcelona in 1534 and 1535 which were incorporated into the Spanish squadron: Esperanza (Hope), Monte Calvario (The Mount of Calvary), La Garza (The Heron), Victoria (Victory), Toro (The Bull), Leona (The Lioness), Princesa (Princess), La Envidia (Envy) and San Marcos (Saint Mark). The four galleys allocated to the transport of horses belonged to Genoese captains: Baltasar Ranascero, Bernardino Pagia and Baptista Justianiani commanded one apiece; captain Vicencio Sent was in charge of the Galley San Nicolás.

Barcelona provided much of what was required by these ships, although a good deal of what was required to victual the fleet had to be brought over from Genoa. Both ports provided the cloth necessary to make the sails as well as other items. The documentation extant in Pamplona leaves no doubt as to the fact that the entire Spanish galley

[35] P. Fondevila Silva, J.J. Sánchez Baena, *Las galeras de la Monarquía Hispánica: elemento fundamental del poder naval durante el siglo XVI*, in A. Alvar Ezquerra, J.I. Ruiz Rodríguez (eds.), *Túnez 1535* cit., pp. 91-119; F.F. Olesa Muñido, *La galera en la navegación y el combate*, Ariel, Barcelona, 1972.

[36] «Que se haze cargo al dicho Antonio Botto de doszientas y quarenta bolsas de arcabuz que he recibido de Diego de Carvajal, cintero, que del se compraon para provisión de galeras, ... que se le reciben en quenta quarenta bolsas que dio a una de las cinco galeras nuevas que se consiganron a don Álvaro con quarenta arcabuzes de que capitán Simón de Fina», Argn, Ap Rena, 76, n. 16, f. 151r, *Cargo de bolsas de cuero de arcabuz.*

[37] «Cargo de banderas: Que se haze cargo al dicho Antonio Botto de doszientas y dieciocho banderas que recibio de ciertos pintores, vecinos de Barcelona, que de ellos se compraron como parece por nómina de xxiiii de março, y entre las dichas banderas uvo dieciocho tallamares». The document specifies that thirty-six of them were given to the five new galleys, and the rest, which were to complete the 218 that had been commissioned, were distributed among the rest of the Spanish fleet. This suggests that there was an average of eighteen decorated flags per galley. Argn, Ap Rena, 76, n. 16, f. 155r, *Cargo de banderas de las cuentas de Luis del Puerto.*

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fleet was either constructed or renovated, as well as fully equipped, for the campaign, and where necessary the ships had their victuals replenished so that they were all combat ready when they sailed in 1535. This meant that costs kept rising and quite substantially. The imperial officials faced sudden and unexpected demands, such as the order to provide another fifteen vessels with armaments, lead and gunpowder. Two of the most expensive items they had to procure were oakum and tar, which were necessary for caulking the ships. They were forced to look far afield for caulkers as there were not enough of them in Cataluña for the purpose. They also had to import such items as compasses and clocks, hessian sacks from Genoa, as well as cotton to make the sails in Barcelona. Other objects such as ships' lanterns and lamps were imported from Milan[38].

Details of the embargo and requisitioning of ships to transport men, materials and horses to the embarcation points can be found in a variety of inventories that have survived. These tended to be small- to medium-sized vessels, between 150 and 300 tons. Besides those taken from the northern Cantabrian coast, the majority of them came from the area around the Straits of Gibraltar and were normally engaged in commerce between Iberia and America, which was clearly adversely affected as a result. Curiously, the extant documentation gives no information as to whether shipping in Cataluña was also embargoed for such purposes[39].

We turn now to another important aspect of the campaign: the provision of artillery to arm the galleys and of heavy siege trains and weapons to enable them to besiege the fortress of La Goleta and the city of Tunis. This was increased in part as a response to the reports of spies which confirmed the information coming from Italy, especially after Barbarossa's most recent attacks along the Italian coast, that his fleet was now equipped with powerful artillery. It was suspected that his French allies had provided him with these weapons. Their suspicions were confirmed first, when during the siege of La Goleta they saw that some of the cannon balls were decorated with the fleur-de-lis, and second, when they took the fortress and found it protected by powerful siege canon emblazoned with the French monarch's initials and insignia[40].

[38] Quatrefages states that between 2143 a 2243 ducats were allocated for each new galley. R. Quatrefages, *La Proveeduria des Armadas* cit., p. 224.

[39] Ivi, pp. 225-231.

[40] «La artillería que se halló en La Goleta era hermosa, y así en piezas grandes como medianas cuatrocientas piezas. Y, entre ellas, había una muy hermosa y grande que tiraba una pelota de grandor de un sombrero. Y algunas de las grandes y principales piezas estaban sembradas de flores de lis, y otras de FF, con la salamandra y la divisa que decía *nutrisco e extingo*». A. Perrenin, *Goleta de la ciudad de Túnez* cit., p. 88.

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Rena's papers do not provide much information on artillery, but other documents stored in the archive of the kingdom of Navarre enable us to shed some light on the matter. The majority of the crown's artillery during these years was stored in warehouses in the city of Malaga. From February 1535 onwards, the emperor put even greater pressure on all the officials involved in preparing the campaign to finalise their various tasks so that everything would be ready for an early departure. He ordered more harquebuses to be made in the province of Vizcaya, and demanded that they be handed over as soon as possible, having been fully tested to ensure they were safe and in working order. They were to be sent to Malaga, where they would be shipped with all haste to Barcelona and distributed among the galleys there. On reading this, Francisco de los Cobos, Secretary of state and one of the emperor's two leading ministers, warned that they could not be sent to Malaga because the port could not cope with what they had already been assigned to do by the authorities. He suggested that they should take the best of what weapons were available to make up the 12,000 pikes, 4,000 harquebuses and 50 muskets that were needed[41].

The correspondence between Cobos and the marquis of Mondéjar, who was Captain General of the kingdom of Granada, make frequent references to the need for money to be sent urgently to enable imperial officials to fulfil the orders emanating from Madrid and Barcelona. Unless the imperial council provided prompt and full payment it would not be possible for everyone and everything to be on board and ready to sail on time. This was vital as the Spanish fleet had to rendezvous at the designated time with the other naval squadrons being prepared in four other Western Mediterranean ports[42]. Orders were issued for the authorities in Malaga to provide the necessary girths, powder horns, fodder and victuals for the several thousand horses and their attendants who had embarked in Barcelona. That was before they were asked to add provisions for the fifty Albanian horses that had been taken on board ships in Naples, part of a contingent of light cavalry that would go on to distinguish itself in action on several occasions during the campaign. Vermeyen depicted them in his tapestries.

The most acute problem Mondéjar faced was finding enough shipping to transport the large number of soldiers to North Africa.

[41] Ags, E, 30, s. f., Málaga, 25 February 1535.

[42] «Recibí las cartas de v. mg. de xvi y de xviii de febrero y puede presuponer que lo que a mí toca de hazer quanto la embarcación de la jente de a pie ninguna cosa ay que detenga el armada, sino la falta de dinero. Si ay manera de prover de otra parte más breve que de Sevilla, V. Mg. lo mande prover porque para tan grande cantidad como es menester acá no se puede suplir». Ags, E, 30, s. f., Málaga, 25 February 1535.

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These papers give us a very different perspective from what has prevailed to date in that they reveal the vital contribution made by the Portuguese in this respect:

As I have written before to Your Majesty, there are not enough ships available, other than the numerous caravels, *tafurcas*, Sevillian vessels and *chalupas* that I have requisitioned in Seville and el Puerto [of San Lucar?]. The request I sent to the Portuguese ambassador asking them to send ships from there will not, as Your Majesty writes, delay the dispatch of their caravels. On the contrary, it will hasten it, because I specified in my letter that these ships had to be in Malaga by the eight of March because that was the date that Your Majesty had set for the fleet to sail. However, I wrote at once to inform them what Your Majesty has written to me. The king of Portugal's factor has informed me that they have written to him from [Portugal] that their fleet will be ready to sail by mid-March and not before that. From this we can deduce without doubt that it will not be here before the end of March. Nevertheless, if we can finalise the preparations here before that date we shall do so[43].

Mondéjar was critical of the decision to organise the Iberian fleet and embark the troops in Barcelona because he argued that this would increase costs, and it required them to ship the soldiers north, that is, further from their final destination. Moreover, the merchants he was dealing with in Andalucía were unwilling to provide victuals for the fleet in Cataluña because that year Catalan wheat was cheaper than in the markets of Granada, and they refused to send it to the port if they were paid at the lower price[44]. Another, more acute problem the commissioners encountered was the shortage of lead. The great deficit of lead in 1535 would be a recurring feature in the preparation of

[43] Ags, E, 30, s. f., Málaga, 25 February 1535: «De navíos ay falta, como a v. mg. tengo scripto, más de carabelas y tafurcas y barcos sevillanos y chalupas que para este tiempo tendré rrecabdo por que en el Puerto y Sevilla tengo embargados cantidad dellos/ Esto que escribí al embaxador de Portugal que enviase de allá naos no ay el inconveniente que v. mg. dice de dilatárse la venida de las carabelas, antes las dará más prisa por que le escriví que las naos que me avia de embiar fuesen en Málaga ocho de março por que para este tiempo quería v. mag. Que el armada se hiziese a la vela, más todavía le escribí a la ora lo que v. mag. Manda/ El fator del rey de Portugal me dice que le escriben de alla que el armada está presta para mediado março y no antes de manera que se puede rrazonablemente inegar que no será aquí antes del fin de março, sin embarco desto si lo de aquí pudiere antes estar en horden se hará».

[44] «Con mercaderes e puesto en platica que lleven alguna cantidad de trigo y cebada a Barcelona y no se determinan a llevarlo por lo suyo porque dicen que tienen aviso que vale allá barato y si esto es tampoco conviene llevallo por de v. ma., ni es necesario v-mg. mandara que se me de aviso de lo que den esto de no haear que en Barcelona dicen que valía a xx de enero a xvi sueldos la quarterola, que sale a cinco reales y 3 maravedís la anegada». Ags, E, 30, s. f., Málaga, 25 February 1535.

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subsequent Mediterranean fleets, especially – as demonstrated from documentation in Malaga – during the fitting out of the fleet of 1614-1616, the so-called "jornada secreta" or secret campaign[45]. To meet the needs of the Tunis campaign it proved necessary to import lead from Genoa, because - as the emperor was informed from Malaga - «I do not believe it can be found here even at a high price, and less so at low cost»[46]. As the sixteenth century progressed, it would be purchased with greater frequency from Milan and the Low Countries, where it was easier and cheaper to buy lead for the Mediterranean galleys.

Conclusion

Due to the fragmentary nature of the evidence it is impossible to make well-founded calculations that could give a sense of the overall cost of the Tunis campaign, but that has not stopped some historians from attempting to do so. Using mainly the orders issued by the empress during its preparation, and the accounts of payments made to foreign creditors at the Castilian financial fairs, the economic historian Carande reckoned that the campaign had cost a million and a half ducats. Many years later, and relying on documentation such as the payment of wages to soldiers participating in the campaign, as well as on accounts of the funds allocated for the construction of new vessels, and of payments made to compensate owners whose ships were embargoed or rented, James D. Tracy came up with a revised estimate that is not that different from Carande's:

For the months of June through September, with October as the going home month, wages would have been 432.000 ducats for the 24.000 infantry on the emperor's payroll, and 39.000 for the cavalry. The cost for fifty galleys for five months would have been 125.000, bringing the total to 596.000. Adding 20% for victuals, officers pay and the 300 transport ships, plus 1125.000 ducats for the emperor´s household expenses for the year, the overall cost of the Tunis campaign may be estimated at 840.200 ducats. This does not count the cost of building new ships for the expedition, including the

[45] M.Á. Bunes Ibarra, *La jornada secreta de Argel: recursos de la Monarquía de Felipe III para la organización de una operación anfibia*, in E. Martínez Ruiz, J. Cantera Montenegro, M. De P. Pi Corrales (eds.), *La Organización de los ejércitos,* vol. I, Cátedra Extraordinaria Complutense de Historia Militar, Madrid, 2016, pp. 594-626.

[46] Ags, E, 30, s. f., Málaga, 25 February 1535: «porque acá caro ni barato creo que no se podrá aver».

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emperor's quadrireme. Because expenses for the galleys fitted out at Barcelona came to 118.226 ducats, it seems reasonable to double this figure. Thus total cost for the Tunis campaign would come to 1.076.652 ducats[47].

Those are the best current estimates available, but it is worth emphasising that, as has been amply demonstrated here, we have only fragmentary information, and even that is for a relatively small part of the fleet. Of the twenty galleys which were fitted out in Barcelona, for example, we only have data relating to five of them, the ones that Juan de Rena was responsible for, as well as the four horse transports that he also organised. And even for these we cannot give a clear indication of the total cost.

The Tunis campaign of 1535 was one of the greatest military challenges that Charles V's lands faced during his reign. It was an enterprise of extraordinary complexity and it is unfortunate that it should be so problematic to estimate the overall cost with any degree of precision given the paucity of information. The timely arrival in Seville of a large quantity of specie and money from Peru solved the most pressing financial problems, enabling the emperor to pay for the contingents required to initiate this campaign. But it did nothing to solve the structural problems of the Monarchy which the campaign laid bare. To organise fleets of this magnitude it was necessary to count on a permanent, complex infrastructure that could meet the multiple needs of such a campaign. As they found out to their cost, for example, it was not possible to acquire sufficient artillery at short notice and in the quantity needed, as the hard-pressed officials in Malaga explained at the end of February 1535 with the departure date fast approaching:

> we are making all haste to cast the artillery for the galleys, but such a large quantity cannot be made in so short a time, particularly as the gun foundries had not been very active. As for the many items which the captain of the artillery set out in his memorandum, we are endeavouring to provide them all, but despite our great diligence it seems to me that we would need three months to do this. We are doing everything possible to meet his requirements, but to ensure that as little as possible is left undone, if it proves impossible to do everything, it would be as well if the captain were to come here and take charge of the operation[48].

[47] J.D. Tracy, *Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War. Campaign strategy, international finance, and domestic politics,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 155.

[48] Ags, E, 30, s. f., Málaga, 25 February 1535.

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Evidently, the organisation of large, amphibious operations was only in its initial stages, but the Tunis campaign enables us to see clearly that the Spanish Monarchy was already creating the necessary mechanisms to cater for the needs of campaigns of great magnitude and complexity. The attempts by historians such as Ramón Carande, James Tracy and René Quatrefages to give an overall estimate of the cost of the campaign, despite using different sources and methodologies, confirm the evidence of the fragmentary information we have added: that the whole structure was entirely dependent on the decisions taken by the sovereign, and transmitted by him and the Council of War. But it also gives us a glimpse of how the *proveedurías*, the different officials charged with procurement, were evolving in order to meet the requirements of the Monarchy's enormous offensive-defensive engagements in the Mediterranean.

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«NO GREAT GLORY IN CHASING A PIRATE». THE MANIPULATION OF NEWS DURING THE 1535 TUNIS CAMPAIGN

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ABSTRACT: *Charles V's conquest of Tunis in 1535 remains one of the best known incidents of his reign. It played a key role in the projection of a positive image of the emperor as an idealistic crusader. The propaganda has obscured how the event was understood at the time. This article examines the tactics used to control and manipulate information, both on the part of the emperor and, in particular, by the French and English courts. It traces the strategy of secrecy and misinformation used by the imperial chancelry during the preparations for the campaign, and the emperor's extraordinary efforts to control information in 1535. Why this failed and how the French and English courts responded to these events takes up much of this study, which sets out the varied tactics used by these Christian monarchs to deprive the emperor of publicity. A fascinating example of how news manipulation and falsification as well as propaganda shaped world politics then as much as they do now.*

KEYWORDS: *Tunis 1535, Charles V, Barbarossa, Henry VIII, Francis I, control and manipulation of news, propaganda.*

«NON VI È GRANDE GLORIA NELL'INSEGUIRE UN PIRATA». LA MANIPOLAZIONE DELLE NOTIZIE DURANTE LA CAMPAGNA DI TUNISI DEL 1535

SOMMARIO: *La conquista di Tunisi da parte di Carlo V nel 1535 è stata spesso trattata come un avvenimento epico, uno degli episodi più noti del suo regno. Tale conquista, infatti, giocò un ruolo fondamentale nella costruzione e diffusione di un'immagine positiva dell'imperatore in quanto prototipo ideale del cavaliere crociato. La qualità e la quantità delle opere d'arte che si generarono a partire da quell'episodio sono state oggetto di molti studi, nonostante ciò abbia oscurato la coeva percezione dell'evento. Al fine di recuperare tale dato, questo articolo si propone di esaminare le strategie di controllo e manipolazione delle informazioni adottate sia dall'imperatore, sia dalle corti francesi e inglesi. Partendo dalle reazioni cristiane nella prima parte della presente indagine si delineano le strategie segrete e le manovre di disinformazione messe in atto dalla cancelleria imperiale durante i preparativi per la campagna, nonché gli straordinari sforzi compiuti nel 1535 per controllare l'informazione e gestire la sua diffusione. Successivamente, lo studio mette in rilievo il fallimento di queste strategie e il modo in cui le corti francesi e inglesi risposero agli eventi del 1535, illustrando, in modo particolare, gli stratagemmi usati da questi monarchi per privare l'imperatore della sua notorietà. Questa indagine, dunque, risulta essere di notevole interesse affinché si possa comprendere come la manipolazione e la falsificazione delle notizie, o la stessa propaganda, furono (e continuano ad esserlo) elementi fondamenti per plasmare una politica globale.*

PAROLE CHIAVI: *Tunisi 1535, Carlo V, Barbarossa, Enrico VIII, Francesco I, controllo e manipulazione delle notizie, propaganda.*

[*] Abbreviations: Ags, E (Archivo General de Simancas, Estado); *Ang*, Carpi (J. Lestocquoy [ed.], *Acta Nuntiaturae Gallicae. Correspondance des Nonces en France, Carpi et Ferrerio, 1535-1540*, Presses de l'Université Grégorienne/ Editions E. de Boccard, Rome & Paris, 1961); Asm, Ag, b. (Archivio di Stato di Mantova, Archivio Gonzaga, busta); *Cdcv* (M. Fernández Alvarez [ed.], *Corpus Documental de Carlos V*, vol. I, Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca, 1971); *Charrière* (E. Charrière, [ed.], *Négotiations de la France dans le Levant*, vol. I, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1848); *Cdcv* (K. Lanz [ed.], *Correspondenz des Kaisers Karl V*, vol. II, F.A. Brockhaus, Leipzig, 1845); *Csp Sp* 5 (1) (P. de Gayangos [ed.], *Calendar of State Papers, Spain, vol.5 pt.1, 1534-5*, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1886, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/

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Charles V's conquest of Tunis in 1535 was greeted by his supporters with words such as «glorious», «magnificent» and «miraculous». It remains a major event in his reign and is often given heroic treatment, earning him the accolade of The Last Crusader[1]. Imperial propaganda and the control of information have often been credited with the creation of this successful image. Duchhardt dubbed it the first systematic propaganda campaign of modern times, and the beginning of political modernity[2]. The multi-media production of chroniclers, poets and artists still exerts a powerful attraction[3]. Not so well known but crucial in this process, was the contribution of the imperial secretariat who accompanied Charles V, issuing letters and official reports even from the battlefields to disseminate the emperor's version of events. Although historians have occasionally issued injunctions not to confuse propaganda with reality, the message is frequently overwhelmed by the volume and aesthetic value of the

spain/vol5/no1/); *Du Bellay* (R. Scheurer [ed.], *Correspondance du Cardinal Jean du Bellay*, vols. I and II, Librairie C. Klincksieckt, Paris, 1969 and 1973); *KFI* V (B. Hofinger et al. [eds.], *Die Korrespondenz Ferdinands I. Familienkorrespondenz, vol. V: 1535 und 1536*, Böhlau, Wien, 2015); *LP* (J. Gardiner [ed.], *Letters & Papers, Foreign and Domestic, Henry VIII*, Her Majesty's stationery Office, London, vol. VII, 1883; vol. VIII, 1885, vol. IX, 1886, in *http://www.british-history.ac.uk/letters-papers-hen*); *PEG* (Ch. Weiss [ed.], *Papiers d'État du cardinal de Granvelle*, vol. II, Imprimerie royale, Paris, 1841).

[1] A classic example of this is M. Fernández Álvarez, *El último cruzado: Túnez*, in his *Carlos V, el César y el Hombre*, Fundación Academia Europea de Yuste and Espasa Calpe, Madrid, 1999, pp. 487-513, an idea he took from H. Duchhardt, *Das Tunisunternehmen Karls V. 1535*, «Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs», 37 (1984), pp. 35-72. Duchhardt argued (p. 63) that the campaign had briefly revived the medieval ideal. My thanks to Miguel Ángel Bunes Ibarra for inviting me to join this fascinating project and to Rubén González Cuerva for securing a number of important secondary works for me.

[2] H. Duchhardt, *Das Tunisunternehmen* cit., esp. pp. 64-67 – «während des Tuniszuges erstmals eine wirklich systematische Informationspolitik betrieben wurde» (p. 67). He dismisses Francis I's propaganda efforts as inferior (p. 68).

[3] H. Duchhardt, *Das Tunisunternehmen* cit., esp. pp. 66-68; R. González Cuerva, M.Á. de Bunes Ibarra, *Túnez 1535. Voces de una campaña europea*, Polifemo, Madrid, 2017; *Carlos V. Las Armas y Las Letras*, Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, Madrid, 2000, pp. 28-30. The tapestries became iconic symbols of royalty and legitimacy. H.J. Horn, *Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen, painter of Charles V and his conquest of Tunis*, Davaco, Doornspijk, 1989, 2 vols. M.A. de Bunes, M. Falomir, *Carlos V, Vermeyen y la conquista de Túnez*, in J.L. Castellanos, F. Sánchez-Montes (eds.), *Carlos V. Europeísmo y Universalidad. Religión, cultura y mentalidad*, Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, Madrid, 2001, pp. 243-257.

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materials produced[4]. Others have cautioned against the seductive narratives offered by the chroniclers, without undermining their influence[5].

Yet there is a general agreement that the political, military and pragmatic consequences of the campaign were limited, even negligible, which is one reason it has left such faint traces in general histories. For recent historians of England and the German lands the conquest of Tunis appears distant and irrelevant, and if mentioned at all, it is dealt with briefly[6]. There is little inducement to include the defeat of two Muslim powers by a Christian-Muslim coalition in recent histories of the Maghreb and the Ottoman empire[7]. As for France, despite the acceptance of Ursu's 1908 statement that the Tunis campaign of 1535 led French diplomacy to take «the decisive step» to forge an alliance with the Ottomans, it has not figured significantly in recent biographies of Francis I. Only the nature of the 1535-6 agreement remains a matter of debate[8]. None the less, the impression endures

[4] Sylvie Deswarte-Rosa includes it in an article devoted to the heroic themes used for Charles V: *L'expédition de Tunis (1535): images, interprétations, répercussions culturelles*, in B. Bennassar, R. Sauzet (eds.), *Chrétiens et Musulmans à la Renaissance*, Honoré Champion, Paris, 1988, pp. 75-132, this at p. 96.

[5] C. Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel. The Ottoman and French alliance in the sixteenth century*, I.B. Tauris, London and New York, 2011, blames Paolo Giovio, pp. 144-145, 182, but as Bunes and Falomir pointed out – *Carlos V, Vermeyen y la conquista de Túnez* cit., p. 255 – the imperialists rejected Giovio's account. M.Á. de Bunes Ibarra, *Charles V and the Ottoman war from the Spanish point of view*, «Eurasian Studies», 1 (2002), pp. 161-182.

[6] H. Duchhardt, *Das Tunisunternehmen* cit., p. 35, begins citing Bernd Moeller's comment from *Deutschland im Zeiltalter der Reformation*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1977, p. 140: «Für den Türkenkrieg... hatte das Jahr 1535 keine hervorgehobene Bedeutung». It scarcely figures in R.B. Wernham, *Before the Armada. The growth of English foreign policy 1485-1588*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1966, or in J.J. Scarisbrick, *Henry VIII*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1968.

[7] For example J.M. Abun-Nasr, *A history of the Maghrib in the Islamic period*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, pp. 150 and 169; A.C. Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1978, pp. 72-73. H. Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire. The classical age 1300-1600*, Phoenix, London, 1994, p. 36, and S.N. Faroqhi, K. Fleet (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Turkey, vol. II. The Ottoman Empire as a World Power, 1453-1603*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, include it indirectly with Barbarossa.

[8] Brief references in R.J. Knecht, *Renaissance Warrior and patron. The reign of Francis I*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 234, 276 and 299; La Forêt's mission in pp. 329-330. C. Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel* cit., mainly challenges the negative vision of the 1543-4 campaign. I. Ursu, *La Politique Orientale de François Ier (1515-1547)*, H. Champion, Paris, 1908, pp. 83-96: «la politique française se décida à faire le pas décisif en faveur de l'alliance franco-turque» (p. 87). This and *Charrière* remain essential reading. References to the 1535-6 treaty debate in D. Nordman, *Tempête sur Alger, L'expédition de Charles Quint en 1541*, Editions Bouchene, Condé-sur-Noireau, 2011, pp. 46-47.

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that the imperial victory of 1535 must have made a considerable impact, even if, as in the case of Kohler, the unsubstantiated claim that it had «a very positive effect» throughout Europe is accompanied by a warning that the importance of the campaign should not be exaggerated. Similarly, Horn, after acknowledging that «the effect of the Tunis expedition on the political situation in the Mediterranean was slight and of short duration», argued that «most people must have thought of the expedition as a resounding victory»[9]. It is a supposition, made all the more plausible as it was impolitic, if not impossible, given Christian ideology for other powers in Christendom to express hostility to a campaign against Muslim forces.

To test these assumptions, this article considers the information strategy adopted by Charles V and the response of Francis I and Henry VIII to the campaign. Both monarchs were at peace with the emperor but the French were hostile due to unresolved conflicts, especially over Milan, and the English afraid of imperial retaliation due to the king's adoption of a Protestant faith and repudiation of his first wife, Katherine, who was the emperor's aunt. The study of French and English responses is difficult in part because of the problems reconstructing an accurate chronology of the receipt of news due to limited data, the habit of amassing information before accepting news, and the abundance of false news in circulation. Complications also arise due to the use of Tunis as short-hand for events in North Africa as well as for the state and the city; and of Barbarossa to refer indiscriminately to the man, to his Algerian forces, and to the Ottoman forces he now commanded[10]. Moreover, we are dealing with consummate practitioners of dissimulation. Despite these problems the research reveals a great deal about propaganda, international politics and diplomacy in the sixteenth century, and further erodes the myth of a crusade, contributing to the creation of a more balanced and nuanced picture of these events.

The art of saying nothing: Charles V's official declarations before the campaign.

After the Ottoman-corsair conquest of Tunis in 1534 the emperor appealed for aid from fellow Christian princes for a campaign to dislodge them, on the grounds that it was a significant step towards

[9] A. Kohler, *Carlos V, 1500-1558*, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2000, p. 259. H.J. Horn, *Vermeyen* cit., II, p 113.

[10] The original correspondence of several ambassadors who were in Tunis has not been found, including that of Claude Dodieu de Vély, the French ambassador, or his English counterpart, Richard Pate.

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Süleyman's dominance of North Africa and that the union of Ottoman and corsair forces represented a novel and extremely dangerous threat to Christendom, and Italy in particular. He also claimed that «Barbarossa's enterprise is intended solely to favour the interests of the said king of France», since Francis I was known to be considering an alliance with the Ottomans[11]. Despite the danger, most Italian states refused to support the imperial campaign. The Venetians were allied to Süleyman and, along with the rest, feared an imperial victory would make Charles V more powerful in the peninsula[12]. Only Genoa and Paul III agreed to send naval contingents, the former paid for by imperial funds and the latter in exchange for military support against the duke of Urbino and Henry VIII, neither of whom Charles V wanted to attack[13]. The high cost of their support prompted several imperial counsellors to advise against a campaign in North Africa; others opposed it on the grounds that Francis I was a more serious threat. Only a few imperial counsellors urged immediate action to expel the Ottoman-corsair forces from Tunis[14], among them Andrea Doria, Genoese admiral of the imperial fleet and one of Charles V's most influential military advisers. Doria was convinced that if left alone, Barbarossa would also take Sardinia[15]. Security concerns fused with considerations of honour. As Gómez Suárez de Figueroa put it to Charles V, the whole world was watching «to assess what forces you have to destroy such a powerful enemy»[16]. Imperial advisers were also divided whether to strike against Barbarossa in Algiers or Tunis. The former would remove a great danger to Iberia; the latter would benefit Italy[17].

[11] Charles V's instructions for Adrian de Croÿ, 1 February 1535, *KFI*, V, pp. 161-169, this at 163 and cit. 164.

[12] *Csp Sp*, 5 (1), n. 100, Count of Cifuentes to Charles V, Rome, 18 October 1534.

[13] Doria and other imperial officials were instructed to solicit aid from the pope and others, *Csp SP*, 5 (1) the emperor's instructions to Tello de Guzmán, 7 December 1534.

[14] Ags, E, 1367, ff. 96-97, Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Charles V, 18 October 1534.

[15] Ags, E, 1367, f. 20, Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Charles V, 11 November 1534. Gregorio Casale to Cromwell, 24 October 1534, *LP*, vii, n. 1298 reporting Doria's visit to Rome.

[16] Ags, E, 1367, ff. 104-107, Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Charles V, 12 December 1534: «por importar tanto a v. magd. este negocio para el venefiçio de la empresa y honrra de sus reynos q todo el mundo esta a mirar el esfuerço y pod[e]r de v. Magd. para deshazer tan Rezio enemigo».

[17] M.J. Rodríguez Salgado, *¿Carolus Africanus?: el Emperador y el turco*, in J. Martínez Millán (ed.), *Carlos V y la quiebra del humanismo político en Europa (1530-1558)*, Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, Madrid, 2000, vol. I, pp. 487-531, esp. 504-507; J.M. Jover Zamora, *Carlos V y los Españoles*, Rialp, Madrid, 1963, explored the "Spanish" position.

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In December 1534 Charles V issued a formal declaration that he was preparing a campaign against Barbarossa and the Turks[18]. Soon after, the emperor sent letters to other monarchs, instructions to his ambassadors and officials and materials for publication, so that the world would know it was his intention to act against the «common enemy of Christendom»[19]. A heroic note was struck by stressing that he would act alone, which also justified withdrawing his promise of aid to the Hungarian front[20]. But his forces were so substantial – some 25,000 men and 150 ships – that Christian territories became seriously alarmed[21]. Far from stifling speculation, the vague proclamation stoked fear, with both Francis I and Henry VIII suspecting that they were the real targets[22]. Charles V sought to reassure the English monarch by informing English Catholics that he could not help them for now and opening informal negotiations with Henry VIII, ostensibly to hinder the conclusion of an alliance between the English and French monarchs[23]. It was enough to persuade Henry VIII to remain neutral.

Francis I veered from fear of the imperial forces amassing at the frontier, to joy at the thought that the Ottoman-Algerian threat would force Charles V to give him back Milan[24]. Unable to persuade the English to join him, he renewed his efforts to obtain a formal anti-Habsburg alliance with Süleyman and Barbarossa. An interim agreement for a three-year treaty of amity was rapidly concluded with Barbarossa, who offered to persuade Süleyman to join the agreement. It was enough for Francis I to argue, as the Venetians, that he could not join a Christian campaign against these Muslim rulers as it would contravene a formal alliance[25]. Thus far, however, the alliance was only with Barbarossa and to conclude a treaty with Süleyman a formal embassy was sent to the Ottoman court. La Forêt, was instructed to

[18] *LP*, viii, n. 18, Charles V to Chapuys, 5 January 1535.

[19] Asm, Ag, b. 287, f. 304. Agnello informed the duke of Mantua on 7 December 1534 that the fleet was «per rispetto di Barbarossa». *PEG*, II, 277, Charles V to Hannart, 5 & 10 January 1535 to inform the French court from where it was sent to England *LP*, viii, n. 186, ca. 8 February 1535; *LP*, viii, n. 18, Charles V to Chapuys, 5 January 1534/5 for Henry VIII.

[20] *KFI*, V, 129 – «und yetz allain thuen muessen wider den Barbarossa, so mit allen des Turcken schief und gewalt auf dem mer vorhanden».

[21] Asm, Ag, b. 588, f. 8, Agnello to the duke of Mantua, 19 January 1535.

[22] *LP*, viii, n. 48, Chapuys to Charles V, 14 January 1535; n. 186 (February 1535), Hannart to Granvelle.

[23] *LP,* viii, n. 272, Charles V to his ambassador in England, Eustace Chapuys, 26 February 1535.

[24] *Ang*, Carpi, 11, Rodolfo Pio di Carpi (nuncio in France) to Ambrogio Ricalcato (papal secretary), 26 February 1535.

[25] Charles V's criticism of Francis I's policies, *PEG*, II, 293-294, to Hannart, 25 February 1534/5.

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begin negotiations with «le seigneur Haradin-Begii-Baschia, roy d'Arget», both as a sovereign in his own right and as Süleyman's representative. Francis I requested financial, military and diplomatic aid to regain what he considered his rightful possessions, including Genoa, Milan, Asti and sovereignty over Flanders and Artois. He also wanted Ottoman aid to place Janus Zapolya on the throne of Hungary and prevent Charles V's brother Ferdinand I from taking the kingdom. A coordinated campaign was proposed, beginning with the conquest of Genoa, on the grounds that this would enable Francis I to assist the Ottoman-corsair forces to defend Tunis and Algiers, and would protect the subjects, commerce and mutually beneficial enterprises of all three signatories. Francis I offered to help his Muslim allies to take Corsica, Sardinia and Sicily. He requested the right to choose the new king of Sicily, although it was to be an Ottoman possession that would pay tribute to the sultan, and suggested the island's revenues should be used to recoup the costs of the allied campaign. The three sovereigns agreed to abide by the three-year treaty of commerce while they negotiated a full offensive-defensive treaty[26].

Christian-Muslim alliances were frequent by this period, but there was still opprobrium attached to them. Francis I expected criticism, and to deflect this he claimed that his aim was to seek a universal peace. He also publicised a list of the multiple Christian embassies to the Ottoman court in recent years, many of them from the Habsburgs. The emperor countered this with claims that his embassies were different and licit, because he always informed the pope first, and acted for the defence of Christendom[27]. It seems to have made little difference, although French claims that they were making a commercial alliance were met with cynicism or derision. Henry VIII smiled when referring to the dispatch of a French ambassador to the Ottoman court «to make a trere marchande»[28]. His chief minister, Thomas Cromwell, commented that to recover Milan Francis I would call not just on the Turk but also on the Devil[29]. The emperor's leading minister, Nicolas Perrenot de Granvelle, denounced it as a mere cloak for military and political negotiations[30].

The papal nuncio at the French court, Pio di Carpi, was convinced that the French were acting out of fear rather than ambition, however.

[26] Instructions of Francis I to M. de la Forêt, 11 February 1534/5, *Charrière*, I, pp. 255-263, esp. 256-8 and 260-2.

[27] *Ang*, Carpi, pp. 3-4, Carpi to Ricalcato, Lyon, 11 February 1535, *Charrière*, I, Instructions to La Forêt, pp. 259-260. *PEG*, II, p. 265, Charles V to Hannart, 5 January 1535.

[28] *LP*, viii, n. 189, Chapuys to Charles V, 9 February 1535.

[29] *Csp Sp*, 5(1), n. 157, Chapuys to Charles V, 5-8 May 1535.

[30] *PEG*, II, p. 283, Granvelle to Hannart, s.d. [January 1535].

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The lord of Vély, French ambassador at the imperial court, kept them well informed of the emperor's military preparations but could not confirm the emperor's target, and the uncertainty exacerbated divisions among French councillors. This, argued Carpi, was making French policy erratic – «negotiano a salti» – and had driven them into the arms of the Ottomans[31]. The nuncio was alarmed when Francis I showed his approval of Süleyman's decision to reinforce Tunis because the greater the danger, the easier it would be to recover Milan and to put Zapolya on the throne of Hungary. The stronger Barbarossa and Süleyman were, the happier the French were[32]. Paul III continued to demand that Francis I join the campaign against Barbarossa, alternating persuasion with threats but all in vain[33].

The instability caused by the emperor's refusal to declare where his forces would strike affected even his closest collaborators, including his siblings Mary of Hungary and Ferdinand I, whom he had promised to keep informed[34]. They shared what secret information they gleaned with each other, but not with imperial officials, since they did not know who to trust. In April 1535 the imperial secretary Antoine de Perrenin revealed in a secret missive to Mary that Charles V would command an expedition against Tunis. They did not believe it at first, convinced he would surely have informed them of such an important decision[35]. On 10 and 13 May, the imperial secretariat issued another raft of official letters, proclamations and pamphlets with orders to disseminate them widely, announcing the emperor's decision to embark for Italy «to visit» Naples and Sicily, and his decision to attack Barbarossa and Süleyman. There was still no indication of where his forces would strike[36]. By then he was estimated to have over 300 sail

[31] *Ang*, Carpi, pp. 11-13, cit. p. 12, Carpi to Ricalcato, 26 February 1535.

[32] *Ang*, Carpi, pp. 8-10 (22-23 February 1535) and pp. 18-19 (12 March 1535), Carpi to Ricalcato.

[33] *Ang*, Carpi, p. 28, Instructions for Latino Giovenale, special envoy to Francis I, Rome, 3 March 1535. *LP*, viii, n. 498, Gregorio Casale to Cromwell, Rome, 4 April 1535; n. 535 (12 April 1535); n. 545 (13 April 1535). *Du Bellay*, I, p. 471, Charles Hémard de Denonville to Jean du Bellay, Rome, 15 April 1535.

[34] Hannart, for example, *PEG*, II, pp. 329 and 333, 14 April 1535. *KFI*, V, p. 171, Charles V to Ferdinand I, 3 February 1535.

[35] *KFI*, V, p. 199, Mary of Hungary to Ferdinand I (1 April 1535), ivi, p. 212 (12 April), Ferdinand I to Mary (25 April), p. 225. Salinas to Ferdinand I (21 February 1535), cit., p. 238.

[36] Examples of Charles V's letter from Barcelona ca. 10 May 1535 to Ferdinand I (*KFI*, V, 226-228) who disseminated it to princes and institutions in the Holy Roman Empire and in his own lands (Ferdinand I to Charles V, 7 June, ivi, p. 246); *PEG*, II, p. 354, to Francis I; *Csp Sp* 5(1), n. 158 and *LP*, viii, n. 697, to Henry VIII; *Cdcv*, I, pp. 423-425 to Lope de Soria for the Venetians. Once the pope had it, multiple copies were disseminated, *Du Bellay*, I, p. 485, Gregorio Casale to [Jean du Bellay], 14 May 1535.

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and c. 50,000 men[37]. Consequently, the announcement led to more fear, speculation and a multiplicity of false rumours, including one that he had declared war on Süleyman[38]. The few individuals who knew his decision to lead a campaign against Tunis were sworn to secrecy[39]. Some, including the minister Francisco de los Cobos was still pleading ignorance of the emperor's motives and target, but besides Perrenin, others were beginning to talk. Andrea Doria told the Mantuan ambassador in confidence[40]. Perrenot de Granvelle revealed the truth to the papal nuncio, but such was the level of suspicion and disinformation that the nuncio did not believe him, and claimed that the emperor was lying to his own ministers to spread confusion[41].

Francis I laughed at the emperor's announcement, scornfully noting that no monarch had ever needed 300 ships and thousands of troops to escort him to his own lands. The proclamation strengthened his conviction that Charles V was about to invade, not visit, Italy. Pio di Carpi disagreed, but was highly critical of the emperor's tactics, condemning the mix of hypocrisy and obfuscation of the imperial proclamation[42]. The French court was prey to wild rumours regarding the emperor's intentions[43]. Unable to ascertain the emperor's target, without confirmation of Ottoman help, and with such powerful forces on his borders, Francis I announced that he would maintain peace with the emperor during the campaign against the Muslims, making some propaganda capital out of necessity[44].

Henry VIII was more frustrated than amused by the emperor's letter. Having read it in silence, he curtly asked the imperial ambassador if he had further information. Eustace Chapuys admitted he did not, nor could he confirm or deny rumours that the emperor was heading for Naples, or personally commanding an expedition against Tunis. This prompted Henry VIII to speak at length of the great power of the Ottoman sultan. He accused Chapuys of disseminating false rumours that Süleyman had been defeated when the opposite

[37] *LP*, viii, n. 744, Thomas Badcock to Cromwell, 6 and 21 May 1535.

[38] *Csp Sp.*, 5 (1), Lope de Soria to Charles V, 21 May 1535.

[39] *KFI*, V, pp. 226-228, Charles V to Ferdinand I, 10 May 1535; ivi, p. 248, Ferdinand I to Charles V, 7 June 1535; ivi, p. 251, second letter same date. Ferdinand did not reveal that he knew; ivi, p. 258, Ferdinand I to Mary, 7 June 1535. Charles wrote in his own hand and apologised for not having revealed this earlier.

[40] Asm, Ag, b. 588, f. 69, Agnello to the duke of Mantua, 13 May 1535.

[41] Asm, Ag, b. 588 ff. 32-33, Agnello to the duke of Mantua, 6 April 1535.

[42] *Ang*, Carpi, pp. 34-35, Carpi to Ricalcato, 23 May 1535.

[43] *Du Bellay*, I, p. 485, Gregorio Casale to [Jean du Bellay], Rome 14 May 1535; *LP*, viii, n. 874, Edmund Harvel to Thomas Starkey, Venice, 15 June 1535; ivi, viii, n. 807, Casale to Cromwell, Rome, 1 June 1535.

[44] *CKKV*, II, p. 186, Charles V to Mary of Hungary, s.d. [early July 1535].

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was true, and made disparaging references to the emperor's shameful withdrawal from Coron, emphasising that local Christians had failed to support him and returned under the rule of the Ottomans. Chapuys justified what he had said about Süleyman on the grounds that he believed it to be true, and he went on to make an interesting point: «to affirm or deny that news was a matter of indifference and did not alter the case … each party might construe the report according to his wishes». He went on to attack the Christian credentials of his host by arguing that Coron would still be in Christian hands if other princes had supported the emperor, and that Charles V would not be facing such dangers if Henry VIII emulated his noble predecessors who led crusades to the Holy Land. The king answered coldly that those were different times, when England had Guyenne which facilitated these expeditions[45]. A day after this tense audience, on 6 June, Chapuys received the emperor's announcement that he had set sail for Italy, but before he could inform the English king, the French ambassador disseminated news from the imperial court that Charles V and the Venetians would attack Istanbul. Chapuys thought this was false, but without information from the emperor he could not refute it[46]. The stir caused by the Persian victory over Süleyman died down when the Venetians confirmed they would not abandon their alliance with Süleyman and Charles V failed to offer to lead such a campaign[47].

The French ambassador to the Porte, La Forêt, returned from his talks with the Ottoman court at the height of these wild rumours and his return caused hardly a stir. The concern remained what the emperor's true target might be[48]. Duchhardt argued that the one important consequence of the imperial campaign against Tunis, indeed its masterstroke, was the success of imperial propaganda condemning Francis I's alliance with the Muslims, which he believes isolated the French king[49]. But it was precisely his isolation that made

[45] *Csp Sp.*, 5(1) n. 170, Chapuys to Charles V, 5 June 1535, variants in *LP*, viii, n. 826.

[46] *Csp Sp.* 5(1), n. 174, Chapuys to Charles V, 6 June 1535.

[47] Ags, E, 1311, f. 20, Lope de Soria to Charles V, 21 May 1535. *LP*, viii, n. 876, Chapuys to Charles V, 16 June 1535; n. 899, Edmund Harvel from Venice, 19 June 1535.

[48] *LP*, viii, n. 807, Gregorio Casale to Cromwell, 1 June 1535; n. 874, Harvel to Thomas Starkey, 15 June 1535; Bernandin Sandro to Thomas Starkey, Padua, same date. Thomas Batcock to Cromwell on 22 June with details of the emperor's forces and confirming he would attack Tunis.

[49] H. Duchhardt, *Das Tunisunternehmen* cit., esp. pp. 58-61. «Der Tuniszug war unter diesem Gesichtspunkt also auch eine politische Meisterleistung, die über den momentanen militärischen Erfolg weit hinauswies» (p. 61) but notes it made no difference to his pro-Ottoman stance.

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Francis I turn to them as Christian princes appreciated. Even the joint campaign of 1543-4 and the use of Toulon as a Muslim base did not result in universal condemnation of Francis I[50]. The king instructed La Forêt and other officials to disseminate information highlighting the power of the Ottomans and their allies, their many victories over the Persians, and Barbarossa's powerful defences in Tunis. They claimed there were 150,000 men under Barbarossa's command and that further reinforcements from Istanbul were on their way to Tunis[51]. At the same time they emphasised the emperor's weakness. Ultimately, Francis I's strategy was to heighten fear of the Muslims to put pressure on the emperor to give him back Milan in exchange for aid against the Turks[52]. It did not work. Charles V was supremely confident of his forces. The Venetians reckoned Christendom had not seen such a force for a long time and that Barbarossa would not withstand an attack[53].

Ever the pragmatist, once he knew that Charles V was on his way to Tunis, Francis I sent a secret envoy (Baugé) to the imperial court with two sets of instructions. One was to be used if Charles V decisively defeated Barbarossa and destroyed the Muslim fleet, gaining total dominance of the sea; the other if Barbarossa survived and gained the upper hand. Evidently, they reckoned there would be a decisive outcome but could not predict the winner[54]. The French council continued to debate what could be done about Milan if Barbarossa was conclusively defeated. To prepare for this eventuality they proposed a meeting between Queen Leonor, and her sister Mary of Hungary, governor of the Low Countries. Presented as a family reunion, it was universally understood as a political summit which might be used to initiate negotiations[55]. Despite a flurry of diplomatic activity during June and July 1535, Christian Europe was in a state of suspended animation: «all are waiting for the result of the Emperor's

[50] M.J. Rodríguez-Salgado, *A masterclass in Justification: Francis I, Charles V and Pope Paul III in the 1540s*, in J.C. D'Amico, J.-L. Fournel, M. Merluzzi (eds.), *François Ier et l'espace politique italien : états, domaines et territoires*, École Française de Rome, Rome, 2018, pp. 397-420.

[51] *Ang*, Carpi, p. 39, Carpi to Ricalcato, 6 June 1535.

[52] *Du Bellay*, II, Instructions, 24 June 1535.

[53] In Venice his forces were given as 450 sail, 30,000 foot, 2,000 horse, plus soldiers in the ships and large numbers of adventurers, *LP*, viii, n. 874, Harvel to Thomas Starkey, 15 June 1535.

[54] *Ang*, Carpi, p. 50, Carpi to Ricalcato, 10 July 1535: «porta gran commissione per servirsene co/ S.M. Cesarea in caso peró che quella totalmente extirpasse Barbarossa, et sua armada et restasse patron del mare, et ancora per valersene contrariamente se per sorte Barbarossa restasse vivo et il disopra». The experienced envoy, Baugé, was one of Montmorency's men.

[55] *Ang*, Carpi, p. 50 (cit.), Carpi to Ricalcato, 15 July 1535, repeated in p. 54.

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enterprise». If things went badly for Charles V, Gregorio Casale argued, «all the world» would want to be friends with Francis I and Henry VIII. If the emperor died or lost a large part of his army, Francis I would be welcomed in Italy as their saviour. Similar concerns motivated some German princes to approach Francis I. The Venetians were not alone in hoping the emperor's victory would not be decisive[56]. There were also Italians who feared that if Charles V was defeated Barbarossa would invade Genoa, Tuscany, Rome, Naples and Sicily[57].

Information flows during the imperial invasion of Tunis

The basic facts of the Tunis campaign in 1535 are well established and need not be rehearsed in detail here[58]. Charles V set sail from Barcelona on 30 May 1535 and reached Mahón in the island of Menorca on 3 June, joining the rest of his forces at Cagliari. On 15 June they reached the gulf of Tunis. Fierce skirmishes and the siege of the fortress of La Goleta outside Tunis occupied them until 14 July when La Goleta fell. Some 80 ships were taken or destroyed but Barbarossa and his veteran forces withdrew towards the city. Despite the lack of the promised military aid from the deposed Tunisian "king", Mulay Hassan, Charles V followed them. Prevented by Christian captives and renegades from entering the city, Barbarossa and some 4,000 troops withdrew to Bona and left on their remaining ships. On 21 July Charles V's troops entered and brutally sacked the city, despite the fact that it had surrendered. They released around 20,000 Christian slaves and restored Mulay Hassan to power (treaty of 6 August 1535), but annexed La Goleta. Charles V landed safely in Sicily on 20 August.

Imperial officials in Tunis issued detailed letters and reports of these events at frequent intervals with only minor variants, instructing recipients to disseminate them in all media, including manuscript, print and sermons. Hence the abundance and similarity of accounts of the expedition. Couriers were sent around 20 June with reports describing the journey, landing and siege of La Goleta; others around mid to late July with details of the defeat and flight of Barbarossa, and

[56] *Ang*, Carpi, p. 51 (cit.) and 53, Carpi to Ricalcato, 15 July 1535.

[57] *LP*, viii, n. 1121, Gregorio Casale to Cromwell, Ferrara, 27 July 1535.

[58] A fair narrative can be constructed from the letters in French by the emperor to Hannart and Mary of Hungary on 13, 23, 24 and 28 June, 14, 22, 26 and 28, and 23 July (sic), 16 and 31 August, in *CKKV*, II, 186-204; those in Spanish mainly for Lope de Soria in *Cdcv*, I, pp. 408-444, in particular 15 July, pp. 434-435, and 25 July, pp. 438-440; brief, factual account in J.D. Tracy, *Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, pp. 143-149 and 154-157.

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soon after with news of the conquest of the city of Tunis[59]. González Cuerva argued that these tactics worked particularly well in the Holy Roman Empire because in the absence of German ambassadors, they depended on official sources. But his own work uncovered independent accounts by German soldiers which could have circulated, as manuscripts often were[60]. Because Charles V had claimed to be on a visit to Naples and Sicily, protocol required ambassadors to travel with him, and they provided independent accounts to their governments. All but Ferdinand I's envoy, Salinas, who was too ill to embark went to Tunis, even the French ambassador, Vély, whom the emperor tried to dissuade[61]. Ferdinand I immediately sent a special envoy to cover for Salinas, and several of his couriers made it from Vienna to Tunis and back with dispatches and verbal reports[62]. It has been assumed that ambassadors merely transmitted information issued by the imperial court[63]. There is no reason why this should be the case as they were able to report as eyewitnesses, and the few documents we have suggest that there was a considerable diversity of information. To control and perhaps intimidate Vély and the English ambassador Richard Pate, Charles V put additional soldiers on their ship and assigned two close aides, Jehan de Vandernesse and Anthonie Badia, as Vély's minders. But Vély and Baugé evaded controls. They sent armed servants to roam the camp, who used underhand tactics («suspectement et à mensongières occasions»), to enter the tents of members of the imperial council and even that of the emperor. They managed to get a copy the plans to fortify La Goleta. Charles V accused Vély and Baugé of «excessive curiosity» and of fabricating news reports, which they sent for publication in England[64].

[59] Compare *KFI*, V, pp. 283ff, Charles V to Ferdinand I, 23 July 1535 to *CKKV*, II, pp. 196-199, to Mary of Hungary. The editors of *KFI*, V, got the same results comparing the emperor's letters to Ferdinand I of 23 and 24 June, pp. 262-264, of 14 July, pp. 279-281; of 16 August, pp. 290ff, with those to Hannart in *CKKV*, II, pp. 188-92, 192-193, 199-201. *PEG*, II, pp. 361-362, Charles V to Francis I, 23 July 1535; ivi and same date, pp. 362-363, Charles V to Leonor. Ambassadors and allies got more details, e.g. *PEG*, II, pp. 363-367, Charles V to Hannart, 24 July 1535; *KFI*, V, p. 275, Ferdinand I to Charles V, 13 July 1535; p. 286, Charles V to Ferdinand I, 23 July 1535.

[60] R. González Cuerva, M.Á. Bunes Ibarra, *Túnez 1535* cit., pp. 49-54. H. Duchhardt, *Das Tunisunternehmen* cit., p. 50, argued there was no enthusiasm in Protestant areas for these news.

[61] *PEG*, II, pp. 359-360, Charles V to Hannart, 30 May 1535.

[62] *KFI*, V, p. 258, Ferdinand I to Mary, 7 June 1535.

[63] R. González Cuerva, M.Á. Bunes Ibarra, *Túnez 1535* cit., p. 50, suggests that Charles V invited ambassadors to go so that the official interpretation of events could be disseminated further, and H. Duchhardt, *Das Tunisunternehmen* cit., pp. 67-68, assumes they transmitted Charles V's version. Neither point is proven.

[64] *PEG*, II, p. 394, Charles V to Hannart, 23 October 1535.

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Despite the tight control of couriers, the emperor's official missives from Tunis usually arrived after the news was known, serving as confirmation rather than announcements and therefore less likely to impose a single vision of events. This was the case even for Ferdinand I, who invariably had news before his brother's letters, which normally took between three to four weeks to arrive. Trusted sources in Venice, Rome and Naples informed him of the emperor's victory long before the official letter of 23 July arrived in Vienna on 28 August[65]. Mary of Hungary often got information earlier, usually from Genoa, and sent it on to him. She heard of the sack of the city from French officials while she was with Leonor in Cambrai and would not believe it until it was confirmed by the duke of Milan, a Habsburg ally[66]. Leonor believed it and informed Ferdinand I, who already knew by the time her letter arrived[67]. Merchants, some of them supplying the forces, often provided information first. Sicilian merchants were the first to inform of the emperor's landing and siege of La Goleta at the end of June, and the news spread widely through the papal nuncio network[68]. The duke of Florence had a dedicated service with brigantines and horses to ensure that news from Tunis reached Florence via Livorno in four days or less[69].

Sharing such information was integral to the normal exchanges of favour and friendship. For example, the sieur de Langy provided the English ambassador in France, Wallop, with a copy of the treaties between Charles V and Mulay Hassan[70]. During May-June 1535 Paolo Giovio composed a detailed description of Tunis and La Goleta and had a map made which he shared, lent and gifted to many important individuals[71]. The pope, eager to court both the French and the Venetians, shared news as soon as it arrived, often through Nicolas Raince or Renzo, a member of the bishop of Mâcon's household. On 13 July Raince summarised a letter of 23 June from Guidiccione, the papal nuncio who was in Tunis, which the pope had received the previous day. The pope also sent copies directly to the French court, including sketches of the imperial camp and of La Goleta[72]. He had obtained those from a dispatch sent from «the camp near Tunis» that arrived with the official accounts for the count of Cifuentes, imperial

[65] *KFI*, V, pp. 314-315, Ferdinand I to Charles V, 3 September 1535. Charles V's letter from Tunis of 23 July (283ff) was received on 28 August with a verbal report from Jean du May (ivi, p. 300, Ferdinand I to Charles V). *KFI*, V, notes when letters were received.

[66] *KFI*, V, P. 307, Ferdinand I to Mary of Hungary, 27 August 1535.

[67] *KFI*, V, P. 339 Ferdinand I to Leonor, 8 October 1535.

[68] *Ang*, Carpi, P. 45, Ricalcato to Carpi, 1 July 1535.

[69] *LP*, viii, n. 1121, Gregorio Casale to Cromwell, Ferrara, 27 July 1535.

[70] *LP*, ix, n. 338, s.d. [September 1535].

[71] S. Deswarte-Rosa, *L'expedition de Tunis* cit., pp. 82-90.

[72] *Charrière*, I, pp. 268-272, Raince to Francis I, Rome, 13 July 1535.

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ambassador in Rome. The courier also brought packets of correspondence from other ambassadors and individuals in Tunis for their patrons and friends in Rome and beyond, but Cifuentes refused to release these until he had an audience with the pope and delivered fresh details directly from Charles V. This was usual practice as it enabled the ambassadors to put their own spin on the information before sovereigns had access to the accounts of their envoys. Raince accused him of exaggerating for effect during the audience and in the triumphalist account he subjected Raince to when he came to pick up the dispatch that Vély and Baugé had sent for the French authorities[73].

Francis I's response to Charles V's victories in Tunis

On July 10 the French court was in a state of anxiety because they had no idea of Charles V's whereabouts; five days later they knew he had arrived in Africa. A courier on his way from Spain to the Low Countries claimed that the emperor had won a victory and destroyed part of the Muslim fleet, putting Barbarossa to flight. Few believed him[74]. By 26 July Francis I was overwhelmed with news from all sides but as «no two reports about the emperor and his forces have ever been the same» he had no idea what was happening[75]. News of the taking of La Goleta and fall of Tunis quickly spread from Naples to Rome on 28 July and from there to other parts[76]. The pope refused to believe it until confirmation arrived from his nuncio in Tunis, or the commander of the papal galleys there, the count of Anguillara[77]. This was normal practice, but often such delay was a tactic to gain time to consider the implications and decide the best way to react. The imperial ambassador in Venice communicated the «splendid victory» to the Doge on 9 August on the basis of unnamed correspondents from Sicily[78]. The French court had reliable first-hand accounts by then. A report from Vély dated 15 July probably arrived on or before 7 August with Richard Pate's dispatch describing the conquest of La Goleta, Barbarossa's escape with part of the fleet, and the emperor's march to

[73] Ivi, p. 272.

[74] *Ang*, Carpi, p. 50, Carpi to Ricalcato, 10 July 1535; p. 53, (15 July), pp. 54-5 (18 July).

[75] *Du Bellay*, II, p. 29: «je n'ay jamays eu de quelque cousté que ce soit deux advis semblables de l'Empereur ne de son armee, dont je ne me puis trop esmerveiller», Francis I to Du Bellay, 26 July 1535.

[76] *LP*, viii, n. 1144, News from Rome 28 July, from Bologna, 30 July; n. 1155, Sir Clement West [to Cromwell, 31 July], with accurate details.

[77] *Ang*, Carpi, p. 59, Ricalcato to Carpi, 3 August 1535.

[78] *Csp SP* 5(1), n. 192, Lope de Soria to Charles V, 9 August 1535.

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Tunis, which was expected to fall easily. That was the last trustworthy news for several days[79]. On 17 August, thanks to information from the Venetian ambassador and sources in Naples, the French court had solid information of events in Tunis up to 6 August, including the fall of the city, Barbarossa's escape and the emperor's imminent departure for Sicily. The king shared the information with Mary of Hungary and Leonor in Cambrai; Leonor immediately ordered a service of thanksgiving[80].

By the time that Francis I received the emperor's letter officially informing him of the «defeat of Barbarossa» and the taking of Tunis, he had been given enough time to consider how best to respond. Charles V wrote that he was confident Francis I would be delighted with the good news, not least because of the benefit to Christendom and the 20,000 captives who had been released[81]. The imperial ambassador, Hannart, confirmed that the «glorious victory at Tunis had been received with the utmost joy» and that Francis I declared Charles V the greatest of all Christian conquerors over infidels, adding that if he wished to continue, they needed to make a closer alliance[82]. The French ambassador in England complained that the emperor had not asked Francis I to accompany him to Tunis[83]. Carpi wrote, unhelpfully, that the news would have «the impact that could be expected» on the French[84]. Ferdinand I thought it would lead to a firm peace[85]. As did Hannart, much to the alarm of Pio di Carpi who feared it obviated the need for Paul III to mediate and would deprive him of the opportunity to lead the next campaign against the Infidel[86]. Mary of Hungary was not so certain. She thought the victory had helped restrain and frighten the French, but only because they had not succeeded in getting allies. Francis I's ambitions in Italy had not been dented, and he would pursue them whatever it cost. At best he might

[79] *Du Bellay*, II, p. 33, Francis I to Du Bellay, 15 August 1535, mentions Vély's letter and the lack of news thereafter. Carpi only mentioned receipt of Pate's letters; the king may have kept Vély's report secret. *Ang*, Carpi, p. 60, Carpi to Ricalcato, 7 August 1535.

[80] Archives Generales du Royaume, Brussels, Audience, 48, ff. 137r-142v, Mary of Hungary to Charles V, Brussels, 31 August 1535. The meeting took place between 16 and 19 August.

[81] *PEG*, II, pp. 361-362, Charles V to Francis I, 23 July 1535.

[82] *Csp Sp*, 5(1), n. 202, Hannart to the empress Isabel, 6 September 1535.

[83] *LP*, ix, n. 58, Chapuys to Charles V, 10 August 1535.

[84] *Ang*, Carpi, 60, Carpi to Ricalcato, 7 August 1535.

[85] *KFI*, V, p. 298, Ferdinand I to Mary of Hungary, 24 August 1535: «J'espere que les bonnes nouvelles de Tunèz viendront à cestuy afere fort à propos. Je prie le Createur que viegne à quelque bonne conclusion».

[86] *Ang*, Carpi, pp. 69-73 this at p. 72, Carpi to Ricalcato, 26 September 1535.

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be less aggressive in his demands for an alliance[87]. She was right. Du Bellay had been sent to Italy to negotiate with potential allies in late June, and despite the intervening events his instructions were not altered[88].

Once the niceties of the formal audience were over, there was silence from Francis I. Carpi's correspondence, so frequent and full of other matters, did not mention Tunis again until 29 September, when he reported that Francis I and his council had been meeting frequently in secret to discuss the implications of the emperor's victory, but failed to agree on strategy. His secret informant also told him some counsellors favoured an alliance with the emperor if he provided a kingdom for the king's younger son in Africa or elsewhere. Others proposed accepting imperial expansion in North Africa in exchange for Milan[89]. Francis I, usually so open and loquacious with some diplomats, would not speak on the matter. He admitted to the Venetian ambassador, Marin Giustiniano, that his alliance with the Turks was regrettable but vital to undermine the emperor and to secure the return of Milan, and would not be drawn on the impact of the imperial victory in Tunis. In the absence of information, Giustiniano was reduced to *imagining* what the French king was thinking, and sent this to the Doge and his advisers in Venice in lieu of a factual report. Given his intimacy with Francis I, it is worth considering.

Giustiniano reckoned that the French saw Charles V's victory as a serious blow against the Turks and their naval forces, and that it had substantially strengthened the emperor. The victory had transformed the international situation and radically altered the direction of French policy, he argued. Whereas before Francis I had regarded himself as the emperor's rival, Giustiniano believed he was now afraid of Charles V. Before, Francis I's primary goal had been to recover Milan; now, it was to contain imperial power[90]. As for the relationship with

[87] *KFI*, V, p. 317, Mary of Hungary to Ferdinand I, 4 September 1535: «Et croy que les bonnes nouvelles de l'emp. qu'ilz eurent de la prinse de Thunès y a aydé …mais quoy qu'il couste, ilz auroient voulentiers ung pied en l'Ytalie, toutesfois qu'ilz s'en resfroidissent de le demander si expressement». Knecht argues that Admiral Chabot was hostile to the king's inactivity, *Francis I* cit., pp. 276-277.

[88] *Du Bellay*, II, pp. 1-10 instructions, 26 June 1535; first negotiations, 35-50, s.d. [mid-August 1535].

[89] *Ang*, Carpi, pp. 69-73 this at pp. 71-72, cits. p. 72, Carpi to Ricalcato, 26 September 1535.

[90] *Relation de Marin Giustiniano ambassadeur en France, 1535*, in M.N.Tommaseo (ed.), *Relations des ambassadeurs Vénetiens sur les affaires de France au XVIe siècle*, vol. I, Imprimerie Royale, Paris, 1838, pp. 41-111, this at p. 64; fear at p. 66 and in p. 56: «Quindi è nasciuto tanto timore … ora primieramente hanno l'occhio alla grandezza di Cesare, e secondariamente a Milano».

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Süleyman, that too had changed from being an additional tool to an essential requirement, as the Ottomans were the best allies available against the emperor[91]. An adherent of a "domino theory" of politics, Giustiniano saw Tunis as the start of a run that would give Charles V control of Italy and the German lands, then Ghelders and England, finishing with Denmark which his niece would rule. Francis I would be completely isolated and forced to do the emperor's bidding. However, Giustiniano also appreciated that Francis I believed he could benefit from the emperor's victory, as it could make the Venetians and the pope fearful enough to call on him to preserve their freedom[92]. In this he was certainly correct. The Pope had already discussed with the Venetian ambassador in Rome how best to prevent Charles V from getting more power over Italy, and mooted a league with France.[93] Francis I deliberately stoked fears, accusing Charles V of seeking hegemony – *monarchia* – and offering the pope support if the emperor attempted to coerce him[94]. Consequently, when the imperialists publicised details of Francis I's negotiations with Süleyman taken from intercepted documents, few joined them in condemnation[95]. Even the emperor's Italian allies wanted Francis I as a credible counter-balance.

The unusual levels of secrecy and the scant public attention given to the emperor's victory in the French court was made possible by Francis I's decision to tour the French provinces during these months. This enabled him to avoid large, public audiences and deprived the imperialists of the fora that the frequent, public occasions in Paris would have provided to extoll the emperor's success. It also gave the French time to digest the news and discuss the implications in secret. Once the initial impact of the victory passed, it was soon apparent that it had not been decisive. All the planning beforehand had considered scenarios where one or other of the contenders destroyed the other. On 17 August the French government learnt from the Venetian ambassador that Barbarossa had embarked safely in Bona for Istanbul with twelve galleys packed with troops, as Doria had failed to

[91] Ivi, p. 66.

[92] Ivi, p. 56.

[93] *Csp Sp*, 5 (1), n. 197, Lope de Soria to the Emperor, 22 August 1535. *Du Bellay*, II, pp. 102-110, Du Bellay and Denonville to Francis I, Rome, 23 September 1535.

[94] *Ang*, Carpi, pp. 63-65, Carpi to Ricalcato, 21-22 August 1533: «non haver alcun che possa impedir' ch'el [Charles V] non arrivi a la Monarchia eccetto il Re di Francia» (p. 65). *Du Bellay*, II, p. 104, Du Bellay and Denonville, 23 September 1535, boasted to Francis I: «Et de ce ... nostred. Sainct-Pere a eu en partie advis par les siens mesmes, en partie nous luy avons si bien insinué et faict insinuer qu'il le tient pour tout veritable».

[95] *Du Bellay*, II, pp. 93ff. details of the incident.

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intercept him[96]. Other sources put the number of galleys at anything between twenty-five and thirty-seven or more. Many reports stressed the inferiority of the imperial fleet. Rumour had it that Charles V thought Doria's galleys so useless they might as well be at the bottom of the sea[97]. Doria was widely accused of cowardice[98]. By mid-August it was known that Charles V had made virtually no territorial gain as he had restored Tunis to Mulay Hassan and taken only the vulnerable islet of La Goleta outside the port, which had to be fortified and garrisoned[99].

The papal and French courts were also influenced by the reports of the papal admiral, Anguillara, who emphasised the problems the emperor faced during and after the campaign. On 28 July he reported from La Goleta that Charles V had almost been captured, and that while Barbarossa had lost 40 galleys and other ships, he still had about 50 vessels and some 4,000 Turkish soldiers as well as other troops at his command, and consequently he would easily recover – «si rifarà facilmente». By contrast, Charles V had spent huge sums of money and made little profit from the sack of Tunis, and was facing huge problems disbanding and paying his forces. Du Bellay was delighted at the impact on the pope of the negative reports regarding the emperor sent by Anguillara and Baugé that September[100]. Süleyman's desire to exact revenge and continue the war was also widely discussed. The pope was said to have commented that this would be a good thing as it might force Charles V to be reasonable and accept a mediated peace in Christendom[101]. Francis I welcomed the prospect of another Ottoman campaign, but shared the misgivings of Venice that they might be asked by both sides for support[102]. In other words, the situation was in flux and so unstable it soon overshadowed the imperial victory.

[96] *Ang*, Carpi, pp. 61-62, Carpi to Ricalcato, 17 August 1535. The Venetian ambassador's letters from Tunis were dated 6 August; those from Naples, 15 August.

[97] *LP*, ix, n. 526, Wallop's News (English ambassador in France), 3 October 1535, passing on news from Venice dated 7 September 1535.

[98] *Ang*, Carpi, p. 79, Carpi to Ricalcato, 19 October 1535.

[99] *Ang*, Carpi, pp. 60-61, Ricalcato to Carpi, 12 August 1535.

[100] *Charrière*, I, pp. 274-275; *Du Bellay*, II, p. 104, Du Bellay and Denonville to Francis I, 23 September 1535.

[101] *Du Bellay*, II, p. 69, Du Bellay and Denonville to Francis I, 3 September 1535.

[102] *Csp SP* 5(1), n. 192, Lope de Soria to Charles V, Venice, 9 August 1535.

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Reactions in the English Court

Henry VIII was also away from his court in London throughout these crucial months, on an extended hunting excursion in the provinces with his chief ministers and courtiers. The ambassadors were ordered to remain behind in London. This facilitated even higher levels of secrecy and silence. The king's absence has been usually attributed to a desire to distance himself from the outcry following the despoliation of the English church and the executions of Thomas More and John Fisher. The news of their death reached Rome at the same time as the taking of Tunis, causing the pope great distress, and diverting attention from the emperor's success[103]. In England, the court was more concerned about the meeting between Leonor and Mary of Hungary than with events in Tunis, in case it laid the foundations of a Franco-imperial alliance[104].

Trustworthy news from Tunis reached Henry VIII in early or mid-August. On 11 July Gregorio Casale sent him copies from Rome of the emperor's letters to the pope dated 29 June and 2 July, as well as details that the imperial camp was short of provisions and would suffer heavy losses from disease if the campaign continued into August as was likely[105]. It is possible they could have reached the king by 12 August, when a full report from the ambassador in Tunis, Richard Pate, arrived[106]. Casale and others continued to send Henry VIII up-to-date news from Italy, including details of the conquest and sack of Tunis and Barbarossa's escape[107]. There must have been other letters from Pate, but they have not been found and the king did not admit to having them. Additional information came from the most varied sources, such as Joan Batcok, a resident in the empress' court in Spain, who obtained copies of letters from Charles V to the viceroy of Navarre and sent them to her uncle, John Batcok, who forwarded them (and the copy of a letter from the bishop of Palencia) to Cromwell on 5 August, along with details he had gleaned from talking to men already back from the North African war. These alleged that

[103] *Ang*, Carpi, 58, Ricalcato to Carpi, 3 August 1535.

[104] *LP*, viii, n. 189, Chapuys to Charles V, 3 August 1535; and n. 190, to Granvelle, same date; n. 193, to Charles V, 10 August 1535.

[105] *LP*, viii, n. 1053, Gregorio Casale to Cromwell, Rome, 16 July 1535.

[106] Chapuys found out later, *LP*, ix, n. 178, to Charles V, 25 August 1535; the fate of Pate's dispatch reported by Carpi, *Ang*, Carpi, p. 60.

[107] Some of his letters have been cited already, see also *LP* Henry VIII, viii, n. 1120, s.d. Certayne newes of themperor, and n. 1144, News from Rome 28 July, Bologna 30 July, Tunis, 6 July, and undated from Naples; *LP* ix, n. 127, Bernardino Sandro to Thomas Starkey, 19 August 1535. *LP*, viii, n. 1155, Sir Clement West [to Cromwell], 31 July 1535.

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Barbarossa had escaped with 10,000 Turks and renegades and had such a powerful force he did not fear Charles V[108].

Chapuys was ignorant of all this. As of 10 August the latest credible news he had were the emperor's letters of 13 and 28 June[109]. He may have received William Lok's letter from Antwerp of 20 July reporting that news of the emperor's victory at Tunis and Barbarossa's escape had been proved false[110]. It was not until 14 August that Chapuys learnt of what he called the glorious and most important victory in La Goleta from the imperial ambassador in France, and sent a courier to Henry VIII with the news. There was no public audience where it could be publicised. Henry VIII gave the envoy some money as customary, and sent a deer he had hunted to the ambassador, which was interpreted as a sign of his great pleasure. Later Chapuys found out that Henry VIII had already known of the emperor's success and had neither celebrated it or shared the information. In fact, the king distanced himself as far as possible without breaching protocol. He instructed Cromwell to relay his «pleasure» at the emperor's success and Cromwell did so in writing rather than in person. By contrast, when they heard that the French ambassador had news of the meeting between Mary of Hungary and Leonor, he was summoned to speak with the king and taken hunting[111]. Among the news he transmitted was false information that suggested Süleyman had been victorious in Persia and was free to retaliate[112].

In an effort to make an impact, Chapuys sent Cromwell details of the campaign as he received them. His servant arrived at the king's residence to deliver one such letter at the same time as a courier from the English ambassador in France, who brought news that Charles V had taken the city of Tunis. As the news had originated in Rome Henry VIII dismissed it as false. Aware of the offence this would cause if the news were true, Cromwell wrote to Chapuys assuring him that he thought the news credible, and that Henry VIII would accept it once the ambassador provided confirmation[113]. The emperor's letters dated 23 July with the «happy news of the miraculous and immortal victory of your Majesty against Barbarossa, and the capture of Tunis» arrived some time after. The dispatch included letters from Charles V to Henry

[108] *LP*, ix, n. 33, J. Batcok to Cromwell, 5 August 1535.
[109] *LP*, ix, n. 58, Chapuys to Charles V, 10 August 1535.
[110] *LP*, viii, n. 1071, William Lok to Henry VIII, 20 July 1535.
[111] *LP*, ix, n. 178, Chapuys to Charles V, 25 August 1535. He received Hannart's letters on 14 August and acknowledged receipt of the emperor's letters with news of La Goleta (dated 13 July) on 28 August, as he commented in *LP*, ix, n. 287, to Charles V, 6 September 1535.
[112] *LP*, ix, n. 178, Chapuys to Charles V, 25 August 1535.
[113] Ivi, n. 287, Chapuys to Charles V, 6 September 1535.

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VIII and Cromwell and the norm was for such important documents to be presented at a formal, public audience. None was granted, so Chapuys sent another envoy with them. The king again instructed Cromwell to give him some money and to inform Chapuys that he could not have been more delighted with the victory if it had been his own, and that he congratulated the emperor warmly. On 10 September Cromwell transmitted the message in writing[114]. The offense was so patent, Chapuys reported the bare facts and commented bitterly: «God knows how much more he would have given [the envoy] for contrary news»[115]. According to the envoy, however, the reaction of the English king and courtiers to the news was extreme. He claimed that Cromwell had been left speechless, and the English courtiers so astonished and dismayed he thought they resembled a pack of dogs falling out of a window. Chapuys contrasted this with the rejoicing of «the English people» outside the court who loved Charles V[116]. The king and his court remained inaccessible to Chapuys, who persevered by sending information. He had to be content with polite letters from Cromwell informing him that Henry VIII was «very interested» in the details, and that some of the accounts were so vivid Cromwell could almost imagine himself there[117].

In other words, Henry VIII followed a similar strategy to that of Francis I. Both belittled the emperor's victory indirectly by starving it of publicity. Henry VIII took it a stage further by avoiding direct contact with the ambassador so that he was not associated with its promulgation or celebration. He deprived the imperialists of a public forum to disseminate the news and praise the emperor. It took repeated demands from the ambassador before even Cromwell agreed to meet him - on 13 October. Even then, it took place late in the day and in private[118]. Chapuys's disappointment is reflected in his comment that he hoped Henry VIII would be punished for «his impious folly and dishonourable joy at the descent of Barbarossa on Naples and at Tunis [in 1534]». To add insult to injury, false rumours spread that Charles V had written friendly letters to Henry VIII during the campaign and entrusted him with the defence of the Low Countries[119]. Worse still, the victory made no difference to Henry VIII's policy, nor did it ameliorate his treatment of the Catholics or of Queen Katherine and princess Mary, as the imperialists had hoped. Indeed its impact

[114] Ivi, n. 326, Cromwell to Chapuys, 10 September 1535.
[115] Ivi, n. 356, Chapuys to Charles V, 13 September 1535.
[116] Ivi, n. 357, Chapuys to Granvelle, 13 September 1535.
[117] Ivi, n. 484, Winchester, 30 September 1535.
[118] Ivi, n. 594, Chapuys to Charles V, 13 October 1535.
[119] From the summary in Ivi, n. 595, Chapuys to Granvelle, 13 October 1535.

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was negative: it heightened fears that Charles V would now attack Henry VIII, as the English Catholics were urging him to do[120]. Katherine thanked God for «the great victory» and the emperor's safe return because he could now devote himself to relieving the suffering of English Catholics, not least herself and Mary[121].

Henry VIII finally deigned to give the imperial ambassador an audience on 30 December 1535. He received Chapuys in public, put his arm around him in a show of friendship, and immediately moved into a private space so they could not be heard. The king's opening words were hardly complimentary: «The Emperor's affairs are not so flourishing as reported; there is no great glory in chasing a pirate». Henry VIII went on to compare the two conquests of Tunis in 1534 and 1535 before concluding that Barbarossa's had been the more impressive since he had not been supported by local "Moors", whereas, «I have it from my ambassador with the Emperor [Pate] that to the Moor's [Mulay Hassan] exertions, and to his valiant co-operation was your victory over Barbarossa in a great measure owing». Chapuys denied that Mulay Hassan had made a contribution and insisted that «Barbarossa was the general-in-chief under one of the most powerful princes in the world, and himself king of two kingdoms»[122].

It was not only the emperor's covert enemies but his closest relatives and supporters in England who called into question the value of his victory. Chapuys urged Charles V to devote his efforts to saving Catholicism in England which was his duty and more meritorious than anything he had done in Africa[123]. Some English Catholics publicly stated that helping them and organising a general Council of the Church were «more praiseworthy deed(s) than the conquest of Tunis, and more necessary than the recovery of the lands of Christendom from the Turk»[124]. Princess Mary, having praised his triumph in the «holy expedition», complained that he had clearly failed to understand the gravity of the situation in England since he had chosen to fight in Tunis. He must rectify now and do this service to God in England in order to gain «no less fame and glory to himself than in the conquest of Tunis or the whole of Africa»[125].

[120] Ivi, n. 594, Chapuys to Charles V, 13 October 1535.
[121] Ivi, n. 587, Katherine of Aragon to Charles V, 10 October 1535.
[122] *Csp Sp,* 5 (1), n. 246, Chapuys to Charles V, 30 December 1535.
[123] *LP*, ix, n. 435, Chapuys to Granvelle, 25 September 1535.
[124] Reported by Chapuys to Charles V, 13 October 1535, *LP*, ix, n. 594.
[125] *LP*, ix, n. 596, Princess Mary to Granvelle [sic., Chapuys], October 1535.

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Barbarossa's Revenge

A greater dent in the emperor's reputation was made by Barbarossa. His actions overshadowed and neutralised the impact of the emperor's victory. «He has left in tatters, defeated ... he will have to look to his own defence rather than to attack and offend others» («Va desecho y roto ... antenderá antes a guardarse que a offender y hazer daño»). With these confident words Charles V dismissed the threat from Barbarossa in August 1535[126]. The dignitaries who met the emperor in Sicily and Naples commented that he was only interested in talking «delle cose di Tunisi, delle quali ne tien memoria» and basking in adulation, as Paolo Giovio commented[127]. However, outside the imperial court, as September 1535 drew to a close it was yesterday's news. «I do not write about the taking of Tunis, as the news is known to all the world», wrote Bernardino Sandro to Thomas Starkey from Venice, writing instead of substantial Christian losses as a result of Barbarossa's latest depredations[128]. Doria's failure to intercept the Muslim forces was widely condemned[129]. Then came the shocking news of Barbarossa's brutal sacking of Mahón in Menorca[130].

On 1 September, Ottoman-Algerian forces with some 30 vessels and 3,000 troops docked where Charles V had stopped on his way to Tunis. They took the port on 5 September, sacking it and leaving the following day with some 800 captives and ample booty[131]. Charles V was informed on 16 September. Within a few days the news reached Rome and thence to France. Some accounts put Barbarossa's fleet at 50 ships; several stated that the captives and goods he had taken more than compensated for his losses in Tunis[132]. News of the raids of the Ottoman-corsair fleet all the way back to Istanbul also circulated and there was even speculation it might destroy the Spanish galley squadron – which it narrowly missed[133]. Distortions soon appeared.

[126] *Cdcv*, II, p. 443, Charles V to Lope de Soria, 16 August 1535.

[127] P. Giovio, *Lettere Volgari di Mons. Paolo Giovio*, Appresso G.B. et M. Sessa, Venezia, 1560, Giovio to Carpi, Rome, 28 December 1535. Charles V spent much of his meeting with Pier Luigi Farnese talking of «la victoire de Thunis», *Du Bellay*, II, p. 160, Du Bellay and Denonville to Francis I, 27 November 1535.

[128] *LP*, ix, n. 512, Sandro to Starkey, Venice, 1 October 1535.

[129] V.-L. Bourrilly (ed.), *Lettres écrites d'Italie par François de Rabelais (Décembre 1535-Février 1536)*, Honoré Champion, Paris, 1910, p. 49, note 2, citing Jean du Bellay's letter to Francis I, 5 November 1535.

[130] *KFI*, V, p. 260, Charles V to Ferdinand I, 13 June 1535.

[131] The controversial accounts of treason in Ags, E, 468 ff. 85 and 86, s.d. [ca. 6-18 September 1535] and in www.archivodelafrontera.com. My thanks to Miguel Deyá and Miguel Ángel de Bunes for information on the captives taken.

[132] *Du Bellay*, p. 109, Du Bellay and Denonville to Francis I, 23 September 1535.

[133] *Charrière*, I, p. 277, Lavaur to Jean du Bellay, Rome, 29 September 1535.

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From the imperial court, the English ambassador informed Henry VIII that «Barbarossa ... invaded, with 30 galleys ... he slew and took 3,000, sparing no age, besides setting everything on fy[re]»[134]. The Bishop of Mâcon wrote that 1000 Christians had been impaled and more than 4,000 enslaved[135]. These reports circulated alongside other false news that the Muslim forces had retaken Tunis and La Goleta, where the imperial garrison had been massacred. This information was sent from Rome to Portugal and France and thence to England[136]. It was reported that Henry VIII had shown «great pleasure and joy» at the news[137]. Other rumours in Rome that October described the situation in La Goleta as untenable and the emperor was said to still be in Sicily because he was too scared of Barbarossa to sail to Naples[138]. At the end of that month, the French ambassador in England disseminated news that Barbarossa had regained Tunis, Bona and La Goleta, to the delight of Henry VIII and his court, and the disgust of Chapuys who denounced this «false piece of intelligence» in vain[139]. On 3 October the English ambassador in France reported that the emperor's victory in Tunis mattered little to Francis I and his advisers now. What would make a real difference was whether Süleyman defeated the Sophy and retaliated, at which point Francis I «will little esteem the Emperor's peace, and will begin to practise for the annoyance of the Emperor, as formerly, and, as it is said, he now begins to do»[140]. Not long after this they learnt that Süleyman had made a favourable peace with the Sophy[141].

The disaster in Mahón merged with and neutralised the positive impact of the emperor's victory in Tunis even in Spain. On 30 September 1535 the empress Isabel, governor of the Spanish realms, reported that she had carried out the emperor's instructions to disseminate everywhere by letters and in print his victory in Tunis and La Goleta, and the treaty with Mulay Hassan, as well as the emperor's explanation why he had not proceeded to attack Algiers. She warned him, however, that as the devastating sack of Mahón and other Ottoman-corsair attacks were already well known, these publications

[134] *LP*, ix, n. 490, [A servant of Pate] to Master Philyp [Hoby?] who sent it to Cromwell, Palermo, [30 September 1535].
[135] V.-L. Bourrilly (ed.), *Lettres Rabelais* cit., p. 49, n. 2, 20 October 1535.
[136] *LP*, ix, n. 526, Wallop's News, 3 October 1535.
[137] *Csp Sp,* 5(1), n. 222, Chapuys to Granvelle, 1 November 1535.
[138] *Du Bellay*, II, pp. 125-126, Du Bellay to Chasseneuf, 20 October 1535.
[139] *Csp Sp*, 5 (1), n. 222, Chapuys to Granvelle, 1 November 1535.
[140] *LP*, ix, n. 526, Wallop's News, Dijon, 3 October 1535.
[141] *Charrière*, I, p. 277, Bishop Lavaur to Montmorency, Rome, 29 September 1535.

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were unlikely to satisfy the Spanish people, who were aggrieved that Barbarossa was unharmed and Algiers remained a serious threat[142].

Charles V was determined not to allow the sack of Mahón to impinge on his celebrations and he did his best to play it down. He described Mahón disparagingly as «une petite ville» and the inhabitants as cowards who had failed to defend it. He avoided giving details of the losses, even to Ferdinand I. He insisted on the strength of his defences, and taunted Barbarossa by claiming he had not been strong enough to hold Mahón[143]. An official proclamation was published accusing Mahón's inhabitants of treason, along with a denial that La Goleta had fallen, and a defence of Andrea Doria. The emperor accused Vély once again of fabricating and disseminating false news[144]. Historians are surprised «that the crown did not take more seriously the sack of Mahón»[145]. It is surely a question of presentation and propaganda rather than inability to appreciate the damage.

The emperor's detractors naturally made much of this defeat and speculated on the damage he would suffer from a counter-attack by Ottoman-Algerian forces. The pope reflected the growing fear of a Muslim invasion, declaring in October 1535 that «the undertaking against the Turk» was more important than anything else[146]. The warm welcome given to Barbarossa in Istanbul reinforced Christian concerns[147]. Most of all, Italian princes were afraid of the emperor and the pope tried to divert his attention by calling for Christian princes to act on his excommunication of Henry VIII[148].

In early November news from Milan electrified Christian European courts. The childless duke was dead and conflict over the duchy between Francis I and Charles V was now unavoidable[149]. This was why Henry VIII had finally agreed to see the imperial ambassador – to

[142] M.C. Mazario Coleto, *Isabel de Portugal*, CSIC, Madrid, 1951, p. 413, Isabel to Charles V, Madrid, 30 September 1535.

[143] *KFI*, V, p. 351, Charles V to Ferdinand I, 22 October 1535.

[144] *PEG*, II, pp. 391-392, Charles V to Hannart, 23 October 1535.

[145] M.J. Deyá Bauzá, *Prolegómenos y ecos de la conquista de Túnez en Mallorca*, in E. García Hernán, D. Maffi (eds.), *Estudios sobre guerra y sociedad en la Monarquía Hispánica. Guerra marítima, estrategia, organización y cultura militar (1500-1700*), Albatros, Valencia, 2017, pp. 189-204, this at p. 200.

[146] *Csp Sp*, 5(1), Cifuentes to Charles V, 13 October 1535.

[147] P. Giovio, *Lettere Volgari* cit., Giovio to Carpi, Rome, 28 December 1535.

[148] *LP*, viii, n. 1095, Papal brief, 26 July 1535; *LP*, ix, n. 601, Cifuentes to Charles V, 13 October 1535. *KFI*, V, pp. 346-347, Ferdinand I to Charles V, 22 October 1535; and 313-314 (3 September). The emperor's reply, p. 350 (22 October 1535).

[149] In Rome by 5 November 1535; Vienna on 8; *Du Bellay*, II, p. 129, 136 and 152. *KFI*, V, Ferdinand I to Mary of Hungary, pp. 354-355 (8 November); p. 361, Charles V to Ferdinand I (14 November); p. 362, Charles V to Mary of Hungary.

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find out what price the emperor was willing to pay for his alliance[150]. When news of Süleyman's latest defeat reached Europe, the pope's call for a campaign against the Ottomans went unheeded[151]. Ironically, Francis I now found it expedient to exaggerate the importance of the emperor's victory at Tunis, in order to increase fear of the emperor's power and facilitate an anti-Habsburg Christian alliance[152]. He also turned the emperor's propaganda against him. To make the point that he had no territorial ambitions, Charles V had given a great deal of publicity to his decision to give Tunis back to Mulay Hassan. This had prompted some negative propaganda presenting him as a lover of Muslims, more closely allied to them than Francis I. Now it gave the French a powerful argument: if Charles V could give a whole kingdom to a Muslim ruler who did not deserve it, why could he not give a Christian prince the duchy that belonged to him and thus guarantee peace in Christendom?[153] The fate of Milan was regarded as transcendental and overshadowed all other news[154]. As 1536 dawned, all the talk was of war between Charles V and Francis I.

Conclusion

The material provided by the imperial secretariat was impressive in quantity and in its method of dissemination, but it was far from the only material in circulation about the Tunis campaign. Its impact was short-lived for many reasons, not least the lack of substantial gains by the emperor, and the short time span between victory and defeat. Even supporters of the emperor such as the English Catholics diminished his triumph in an effort to call attention to their own cause; others feared his additional power and so muted their response. Francis I and Henry VIII chose not only to dissimulate, but to delay and stifle news from Tunis; in effect, to starve the news of the oxygen of publicity. By doing so they successfully limited the impact of the

[150] *Csp SP*, 5 (1), n. 246, Chapuys to Charles V, 30 December 1535.

[151] V.-L. Bourrilly (ed.), *Lettres Rabelais* cit., pp. 42-43, Rabelais to Geoffroy d'Estissac, Rome, 30 December 1535.

[152] *Ang*, Carpi, p. 86, Carpi to Ricalcato, 12 Novenber 1535. News arrived on 10 November. The nuncio wrote the previous day (ivi, pp. 85-86): «quelli che naturalmente non devono voler lo Imperatore così grande in Italia».

[153] P. Giovio, *Lettere Volgari* cit., Giovio to Carpi, Roma, 28 December 1535. *Ang*, Carpi, p. 242, Carpi to Ricalcato, 12 March 1537, reporting the complaint of Francis I, «che l'Imperatore é andato in Africa ad acquistar un regno, per lassarlo poi a un infidele et che ad un Re di Francia, suo cognato, non vol rendere'quel cosî ingiustamente si ritien del suo».

[154] *Du Bellay*, II, pp. 202 and 210.

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emperor's victory, depriving him of opportunities to project his power and promote his military prowess. But by the same token they could not project a counter narrative. In any case, the unstable situation meant that it suited them at times to emphasise the emperor's strengths, and at others his weaknesses. Directly or indirectly, and sometimes unintentionally, both friends and enemies of the emperor contributed to the creation of a vacuum in 1535 with regards to the emperor's victory that facilitated the manufacture a heroic, mostly unrealistic image of the campaign in the 1550s and beyond.

Even without the enduring attraction of the iconic art that resulted from Habsburg patronage, the Tunis campaign of 1535 might have secured an enduring place in the history of Europe later, because it provided one of the few notable victories in the centuries-long struggle with Islam. The propaganda was consonant with the distinctive and exclusive Christian European identity which triumphed. The reality was far from heroic or clear-cut and it was certainly not a clash of faiths or cultures. While ideology mattered, and war against the infidel was still important morally and in propaganda, it was more an ideal than a reality[155]. Nowadays, the Tunis campaign of 1535 with its blatant control and manipulation of news; the fabrication of information; the dissemination of lies and false news; the competing egos and clash of ambitions; not to mention the naked pragmatism and cross-ideological compromises, can produce a degree of unease, perhaps because of its very topicality. But a case can surely be made that an account that seeks to approximate closer to the compromised and brutal reality is arguably more fascinating than the fabricated version and heroic representation of the campaign that prevails.

[155] For example, in the case of France, G. Poumarède, *Pour en finir avec la Croisade. Mythes et réalités de la lutte contre les Turcs aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles*, Quadrige/Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 2004 and C. Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel* cit.; For Charles V: M.J. Rodríguez-Salgado, *La Cruzada sin cruzado. Carlos V y el Turco a principios del reinado*, in G. Galasso, A. Musi (eds.), *Carlo V, Napoli e il Mediterraneo*, Società Napoletana di Storia Patria, Napoli, 2001, pp. 201-237; M.J. Rodríguez-Salgado *¿Carolus Africanus?* cit.; M.J. Rodríguez-Salgado, *A masterclass in Justification* cit.

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INFIDEL FRIENDS: CHARLES V, MULAY HASSAN AND THE THEATRE OF MAJESTY

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ABSTRACT: *The famous conquest of Tunis by Charles V in 1535 has been frequently interpreted as one of the last Christian crusades, a European campaign commanded by the virtuous Emperor Charles, a new Saint Louis of France. However, the voluminous propaganda around the campaign tended to overshadow that Charles V actually fought as protector of the Hafsids (the local Muslim dynasty) against the menacing expansion of the Ottoman Empire. While alliances between Muslim and Christian princes were not exceptional in the early modern Mediterranean, the meeting of Emperor Charles V and Mulay Hassan (Sultan Abû `Abd Allâh Muhammad V al-Hasan, known in Christendom as King Mulay) represents a unique inter-confessional encounter between two sovereigns who shared neither language nor religion. Consequently, the representation of their alliance (or more exactly, the Hafsid's vassalage to the Emperor) acquired a very performative character. Both sides attempted to show their shared princely culture through different representations. European chroniclers described the ceremonies during their encounters as a mute theatre where majesty and rank had to be negotiated. There were differences in their treatment, however. Spanish chroniclers, with their greater experience and long coexistence Muslims, tended to present the encounters as part of a familiar exchange, while Central European observers offered detailed depictions of what appeared to them an exotic and amazing event.*

KEYWORDS: *inter-confessional diplomacy, Hafsids, Habsburgs, crusade, propaganda.*

AMICI INFEDELI: CARLO V, MULEY HASSAN E IL TEATRO DELLA SOVRANITÀ

SOMMARIO: *La celebre conquista di Tunisi da parte di Carlo V nel 1535 è stata spesso ritenuta una delle ultime crociate cristiane: una campagna europea comandata dal virtuoso imperatore Carlo, un nuovo San Luigi di Francia. Tuttavia, la voluminosa propaganda creatasi attorno alla campagna stessa finì per adombrare il fatto che Carlo V avesse combattuto in difesa della dinastia musulmana degli Hafsidi per respingere la temuta espansione dell'Impero ottomano. Sebbene le alleanze tra i principi musulmani e cristiani non rappresentassero situazioni eccezionali nel Mediterraneo della prima Età Moderna, l'incontro tra l'imperatore Carlo V e Muley Hassan (il sultano Abû `Abd Allâh Muhammad V al-Hasan, più noto alla cristianità con il nome di re Muley) rispecchia un contatto interconfessionale unico, in cui i due sovrani non condividevano né lingua né religione. Di conseguenza, la manifestazione della loro alleanza (o, più esattamente, del rapporto di vassallaggio che unì gli Hafsidi all'imperatore) acquisì presto un carattere estremamente performativo. Entrambe le parti cercarono di mostrare la loro comune cultura principesca attraverso molteplici rappresentazioni. I cronisti europei descrissero i loro incontri come uno spettacolo di teatro muto in cui si negoziava la maestà e il rango a colpi di cerimoniale. Si crearono, tuttavia, differenti visioni e percezioni di tali situazioni. Se da un lato, i cronisti spagnoli, forti di una consolidata esperienza per via di una lunga convivenza con i musulmani, tendevano a presentare gli incontri come parte di uno scambio familiare, dall'altro lato, gli osservatori del centro Europa offrirono rappresentazioni dettagliate di ciò che appariva loro un evento esotico e del tutto sorprendente.*

PAROLE CHIAVI: *diplomazia interconfessionale, Hafside, Asburgi, crociata, propaganda.*

[*] Abbreviations: BNF (Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris); Ags, E (Archivo General de Simancas, Estado). Acknowledgements: This research was funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science (Project PGC2018-099152-B-I00).

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The *Kunsthistorisches Museum* in Vienna preserves the famous cartoons of the set of tapestries on *The Capture of Tunis* by Jan Vermeyen. In the corner of the twelfth of them (*The Sack of Tunis and The Re-embarkation of the Army at La Goleta*), we can see a small scene with the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V and the Muslim King of Tunis Mulay Hassan. They sat before the imperial tent and signed a treaty of friendship, aided by a translator, and surrounded by their respective escorts. In the sixth tapestry (*The Capture of La Goleta*), another small scene depicts the Emperor and the King sharing a bench on a boat while they seem to hold a conversation[1].

Fig. 1. J.C. Vermeyen, *The Capture of La Goleta* (det.), Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna (1545)

[1] S. Haag, K. Schmitz-Von Ledebur (eds.), *Kaiser Karl V. erobert Tunis. Dokumentation eines Kriegszuges in Kartons und Tapisserien,* Kunsthistorisches Museum, Wien, 2003, pp. 18, 104; F. Checa, *Imágenes hispánicas de otros mundos: turcos y moros en varias series de tapices en la Alta Edad Moderna*, in V. Mínguez, M.I. Rodríguez Moya (eds.), *Arte en los confines del imperio: Visiones hispánicas de otros mundos*, Publicacions de la Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, 2014, pp. 41-42.

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

Fig. 2. J.C. Vermeyen, *The Sack of Tunis and The Re-embarkation of the Army at La Goleta* (det.), Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna (1545)

In contrast with those episodes, the conquest of Tunis in 1535 was rhetorically constructed as one of the last Christian crusades, rightfully commanded by the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V. For Duchhardt, it constituted «the first modern political event to be 'sold' in a great publicist and propagandistic style»[2]. Such propaganda simultaneously legitimised the campaign and discredited Francis I of France, the ally of Sultan Süleyman and the Ottoman admiral Barbarossa. This bombastic vision has been repeated in later literature and popular tradition, as a manifestation of the Christian-European triumph over inferior infidels and of the timeless and

[2] H. Duchhardt, *Das Tunisunternehmen Karls V. 1535*, «Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs», 37 (1984), p. 66; S. Deswarte-Rose, *L'expedition de Tunis (1535): Images, Interprétations, Répercussions Culturelles*, in B. Bennassar, R. Sauzet (eds.), *Chrétiens et Musulmans à la Renaissance,* Honoré Champion, Paris, 1988, pp. 73-131; J. D. Tracy, *Emperor Charles V's crusades against Tunis and Algiers: appearance and reality*, Associates of the James Ford Bell Library, Minneapolis, 2001.

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indeterminate Christian-Muslim hostility motivated by the «clash of civilizations»[3].

That interpretation overshadowed the fact that Charles V fought as protector of the Hafsids, the local Muslim dynasty dethroned by the expansion of the Ottoman Empire led by Barbarossa. Before the battle against the latter's forces, the Emperor camped in the bay of Tunis and met the exiled king Mulay Hassan in July 1535. The two sovereigns spent a month together bound by a formal relationship of friendship. As recent research has shown, premodern peaceful relations among sovereigns, even when there was little trust between them, were expressed in the formal, rhetorical language of friendship which did not imply real, emotional ties[4]. We can narrate their cohabitation in three acts with an epilogue.

1st Act: The Meeting

This princely encounter was a bizarre episode in the early modern society of princes, and not just because it was a rather unprecedented inter-confessional event. Kings did not frequently meet each other because, as Montaigne warned, it required them to establish beforehand who the superior was[5]. Neighbours and by turns allies and rivals, the French and Spanish Kings only met three times throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (1525-6, 1538, and 1660)[6]. As Hengerer has stressed, «this history, too, of the early modern princely congress remains unwritten»[7]. Even less frequent were the

[3] B. Fuchs, Y.-G. Liang, *A Forgotten Empire: The Spanish-North African Borderlands*, «Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies», 12:3 (2011), p. 263.

[4] A. Würgler, *Freunde, amis, amici. Freundschaft in Politik und Diplomatie der frühneuzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft*, in K. Oschema (ed.), *Freundschaft oder amitié? Ein politisch-soziales Konzept der Vormoderne im zwischensprachlichen Vergleich (15.–17. Jahrhundert)*, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2007, p. 193; N. Weber, *Gute Miene zum bösen Spiel? Freundschaft, Kooperation und Vertrauen in den französisch-preußischen Beziehungen des 18. Jahrhunderts*, in B. Haan, C. Kühner (eds.), *Freundschaft: eine politisch-soziale Beziehung in Deutschland und Frankreich, 12.–19. Jahrhundert*, Deutschen Historischen Instituts Paris, Paris, 2013 (https://perspectivia.net/publikationen/8-2013/weber_freundschaft).

[5] M. de Montaigne, *Essais*, Simon Millanges, Bourdeaus, 1580, book I, ch. 13.

[6] M. de Foronda y Aguilera, *Estancias y viajes del emperador Carlos V*, S.n., S.l., 1914, pp. 260, 267-268, 455.

[7] M. Hengerer, *Access at the Court of the Austrian Habsburg Dynasty (Mid-Sixteenth to Mid-Eighteenth Century): A Highway from Presence to Politics?*, in D. Raeymaekers, S. Derks (eds.), *The key to power? The culture of access in princely courts, 1400-1750*, Brill, Leiden, 2016, p. 146. See also N. Rubello, *La présence des princes: gli incontri tra sovrani come momenti d'eccezione nei rapporti diplomatici tra gli Stati (XVI secolo)*, in E. Plebani, E. Valeri, P. Volpini (eds.), *Diplomazie. Linguaggi, negoziati e ambasciatori fra XV e XVI secolo*, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2018, pp. 139-160.

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encounters between Christian and Muslim rulers, due not only to religious differences but also to the very complicated negotiation of rank and reciprocity. Sultan Saladin explained it more clearly when Richard, King of England, arrived in Palestine in 1192 and sought a meeting with him: Saladin refused with well-founded arguments, reminding him that it was customary for kings to meet each other only after a peace treaty had been agreed, and thereafter «it is not seemly for them to make war upon each other»[8].

However, it was licit to meet a prince of a different religion as a victor or a protector, exhibiting preponderance and dominion. As a Burgundian ruler with a crusader background Charles V did not have a long tradition for such encounters but he did as king of Castile and Aragon[9]. The long coexistence between Christians and Muslims in the Iberian Peninsula throughout the Middle Ages enabled the development of a specific tradition of interreligious royal encounters which Charles V revived. From the foundation of the Nasrid Kingdom of Granada as a vassal of Castile to the final conquest of Granada by the Catholic Kings (1246-1492), these encounters gave rise to a specific iconographic tradition of submissive Muslim kings before Christian sovereigns. In the Chapel of Saint Catherine of the Cathedral of Burgos, for example, there is a fourteenth century wooden carving of Alhamar (Muhammad I, the first Nasrid king of Granada), kneeling before Ferdinand III of Castile and kissing his hand as a sign of vassalage. The delivery of the keys of the city of Granada from its last king, Boabdil, to the Catholic Kings (1492) was also repeatedly represented in Castilian contemporary art[10].

[8] J. Gillingham, *Richard I*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1999, pp. 20-21; I. Shoval, *King John's Delegation to the Almohad Court (1212): Medieval Interreligious Interactions and Modern Historiography*, Brepols, Turnhout, 2016.

[9] The Iberian *Reconquista* (from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries) was connected to the general movement of the Christian Crusades, but was often fought under specific rules and less violent forms of conquest due to the long coexistence and vicinity of Muslims and Christians. When the Christian Kings of Portugal or Aragon sought aid from Northern Europeans crusaders for conquering some cities, the result was catastrophic: both in the sack of Barbastro (1063) and Lisbon (1147), these northern knights killed and sacked whereas local capitulations forbade such actions. L. Villegas-Aristizábal, *Norman and Anglo-Norman Interventions in the Iberian Wars of Reconquest Before and After the First Crusade*, in P. Oldfield, K. Hurlock (eds.), *Crusading and Pilgrimage in the Norman World*, Boydell & Brewer, Woodbridge, 2015, pp. 103-122.

[10] Boabdil's surrender was carved in the choir of the cathedral of Toledo (by Rodrigo Alemán) and the Royal Chapel of Granada (by Felipe Vigarny). See F. Pereda Espeso, *Ad vivum? o cómo narrar en imágenes la historia de la Guerra de Granada*, «Reales Sitios», 154 (2002), pp. 2-20; M. Á. Ladero Quesada, *La rendición de Granada, en el gran lienzo de Francisco Pradilla*, in G. Anes, C. Manso Porto (eds.), *Isabel La Católica y el arte*, Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid, 2006, pp. 186-189.

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Fig. 3. Anon., *Vassalage of King Alhamar of Granada before Ferdinand III of Castile*, Chapel of Saint Catherine, Cathedral of Burgos (mid-14th century)

In contrast with Iberian tradition, Charles V's contemporary and rival, the French king Francis I, never met his ally the Ottoman sultan Süleyman the Magnificent. They communicated indirectly through agents and ambassadors perhaps to prevent the humiliating image of the submission of a Christian king before an "Infidel" ruler.

After the conquest of Granada in 1492, the Castilian tradition of satellite Muslim kingdoms moved to North Africa, where the kingdoms of Bejaia and Tlemcen (in current Algeria) were formally under Castilian protectorate from 1510[11]. The relationship between the Spanish Monarchy and the Kingdom of Tunis was not clearly established before 1534, but some records remain showing that there were contacts. For example, Mulay Hassan employed the Sicilian noble Visconte Cicala as his ambassador with the Knights of St John, and cooperated with them to contain Ottoman expansion[12].

[11] Charles V to the Marquis of Comares, 17 January 1534, Ags, E, 28, f. 132; J.M. Escribano Páez, *Negotiating with the "Infidel": Imperial Expansion and Cross-Confessional Diplomacy in the Early Modern Maghreb (1492-1516)*, «Itinerario» 40:2 (2016), pp. 192-194, 200-203.

[12] J.A. de Funes, *Coronica de la ilustrissima milicia y sagrada religion de San Juan Bautista de Jerusalem...*, Pedro Verges, Zaragoza, 1639, vol. II, pp. 95-97.

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Fig. 4. R. Alemán, *Surrender of Granada*, Lower Choir, Cathedral of Toledo (1495).

There are also testimonies of Mulay Hassan's contacts with Charles V before being dethroned by Barbarossa. Afterwards, he even offered one of his daughters as a lady-in-waiting for the empress Isabella of Portugal. It appears that the little girl was captured during the conquest of Tunis in 1535 and sent to Spain as a slave. Subsequently her father begged Charles V to provide her with a dowry to profess as a nun in a royal convent and she eventually became a member of the Poor Clare convent of Santa Isabel in Barcelona[13]. For their part, some Ottoman chroniclers (including Bostan Çelebi and Seyyid Muradi) insisted on the impious nature of the Hafsid King, who had allied with "Infidels" instead of agreeing with his coreligionists[14].

In other words, inter-confessional diplomacy in the Mediterranean lands was not exceptional, but the personal involvement and meeting of princes was. Mediterranean diplomacy is being currently analysed through the agency of frontier agents as a "diplomacy from below", but

[13] *Consultas* for Charles V, Toledo, May 1534, Ags, E, 28, f. 168v. She adopted the name sor Juana de África. *Consultas* for Charles V, Toledo, 28 March 1538, Ags, E, 42, f. 190; F. Marca OFM, *Chronica seraphica de la santa provincia de Cataluña de la Regular Observancia de Nuestro Padre S. Francisco*, Imp. Carmelitas Descalzos, Barcelona, 1764, part 2, pp. 364-371.

[14] See E. Türkçelik's article in this same volume.

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in this case we witness a courtly encounter[15]. Nevertheless, Rothman's argument that «all inter-imperial communication is mediated»[16] is also valid in this encounter between Charles V and Mulay Hassan. The two monarchs spoke through interpreters and their meeting was preceded by the negotiations of a group of go-betweens from Genoa and Granada. The Genoese, both as merchants and renegades, were the main European community in Tunis since the thirteenth century and benefitted from the profitable trade conditions set by the Hafsid dynasty[17]. The preliminary contacts between Mulay Hasan and the emperor appear to have been made through a Genoese renegade who is named in the sources as "Chimea" or "Ximaa" and was sent to the imperial court in November 1534 to beg for military support[18]. Another Genoese, Arnolfo Camughi, perhaps a merchant or even a captain of Mulay Hassan's Christian guard, sought help from the Knights of St John in Malta and from the imperial Viceroy of Sicily[19]. A third Genoese, the merchant Luigi Presenda, equally experienced in Maghrebian affairs, continued the contacts on behalf of Charles V. Presenda was given written instructions by the emperor, and letters for Mulay Hassan and his allies, but was not given the official title of ambassador to minimise the risk to the emperor's reputation. Presenda negotiated with Mulay Hassan and drafted the conditions of the imperial support, but his ambiguous status made him looking more like an enemy spy than an official diplomat[20]. His mission ended

[15] N. Planas, *Diplomacy from Below or Cross-Confessional Loyalty? The "Christians of Algiers" between the Lord of Kuko and the King of Spain in the Early 1600s*, «Journal of Early Modern History», 19:2-3 (2015), pp. 153-173.

[16] E.N. Rothman, *Afterword: Intermediaries, Mediation, and Cross-Confessional Diplomacy in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, «Journal of Early Modern History», 19:2-3 (2015), p. 249.

[17] E. Marengo, *Genova e Tunisi, 1388-1515*, Tipografia Artigianelli di S. Giuseppe, Roma, 1901; R. Salicrú Lluch, *La diplomacia y las embajadas como expresión de los contactos interculturales entre cristianos y musulmanes en el Mediterráneo Occidental durante la Baja Edad Media*, «Estudios de Historia de España», 9 (2007), pp. 77-106.

[18] L. del Mármol Carvajal, *Libro tercero, y segvndo volvmen de la primera parte de la descripción general de Affrica, con todos los sucessos de guerra, y cosas memorables…*, René Rabut, Granada, 1573, p. 247v; S. Boubaker, *L'empereur Charles Quint et le roi Mawlay al-Hasan (1520-1535)*, in S. Boubaker, C. Ilham Álvarez Dopico (eds.), *Empreintes espagnoles dans l'histoire tunisienne*, Trea, Gijón, 2011, pp. 20-21.

[19] J. A. de Funes, *Coronica de la ilustrissima milicia* cit., p. 134; Anfrano Camughi to the Viceroy of Sicily, Tripoli, 24 December 1534, Ags, E, 462, in É. De La Primaudaie, *Documents inédits sur l'occupation espagnole en Afrique (1506-1594)*, A. Jourdan, Alger, 1875, p. 92; S. Boubaker, *L'empereur Charles Quint* cit., pp. 20, 33, 47-48, 50.

[20] *Memorias de Luis de Presenda*, Madrid, 7 November 1534, Ags, E, 462, in É. De La Primaudaie, *Documents inédits* cit., pp. 87-92; Instructions by Charles V, Madrid, 14 November 1534, in P. de Sandoval, *Historia de la vida y hechos del emperador Carlos V*, en casa de Bartholome Paris, Pamplona, 1614, pp. 195-201; Charles V to Mulay Hassan,

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in failure when he was captured by Barbarossa in Tunis. After a thorough interrogation, he was executed[21].

Granada's noble families constituted the second group of go-betweens, with a rather different profile. They had a direct experience in dealing with Muslim conquered people and played a major role in Castilian expansion in the Maghreb, apart from having an easier access to the imperial court as elite actors. A group of noble families based in Granada like the Orozco (Lords of Pioz), Mendoza (marquises of Mondéjar) and Fernández de Córdoba (marquises of Alcaudete and Comares), dominated the government of the Castilian strongholds in Northern Africa, and they also took part in the Tunis campaign, where they intermediated with local authorities[22].

Despite their preliminary contacts, when Charles V's armada anchored in Carthage, the dethroned king Mulay Hassan remained hidden in the outskirts of the Bay of Tunis and sought confirmation that he would be accepted in the imperial camp[23]. According to the detailed chronicle of events by the imperial secretary Antoine Perrenin, one of the main worries of Charles V's ministers was how to ascertain the Muslim monarch's true intentions and to establish how to overcome the differences in their political cultures, so that they could exchange emissaries and letters. By emphasizing these questions, Perrenin showed the prevalence and centrality of what linguistic anthropology calls «metapragmatic discourse» in diplomatic writings, a «discourse that explicitly characterizes practices, without necessarily determining their social meaning», obsessed to evaluate such artefacts' authenticity based on their conformity to certain evolving standards[24].

Madrid, 14 November 1534, in *Memorial Histórico Español*, vol. VI, Academia de la Historia, Madrid, 1853, pp. 516-517; *Resumen de la conferencia con el rey de Túnez*, 23 July 1535, Ags, E, 462, in É. De La Primaudaie, *Documents inédits* cit., pp. 120-122.

[21] P. Giovio, *Segunda parte de la historia general de todas las cosas succedidas en el mundo en estos 50 anos de nuestro tiempo…*, Andrea de Portonarijs, Salamanca, 1562-1563, ff. 194v-195r; E. Sola, *Corsarios o reyes. De la saga de los Barbarroja a Miguel de Cervantes*, Archivo de la Frontera, Alcalá de Henares, 1998, pp. 51-53.

[22] L. Salazar y Castro, *Historia genealogica de la casa de Haro*, Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid, 1959, pp. 113-114; A. Gómez de Castro, *De las hazañas de Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros*, Fundación Universitaria Española, Madrid, 1984, p. 257; Y.-G. Liang, *Family and Empire: The Fernández de Córdoba and the Spanish Realm*, Pennsylvania University Press, Philadelphia, 2011, pp. 2-3, 149-169.

[23] Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Charles V, Genoa, 22 October 1534, Ags, E, 1367, n. 120; A. de Santa Cruz, *Crónica del Emperador Carlos V*, Imp. del Patronato de Huérfanos de Intendencia e Intervención Militares, Madrid, 1922, t. 3, p. 203.

[24] E.N. Rothman, *Afterword* cit., p. 251; M. Silverstein, *Metapragmatic Discourse and Metapragmatic Function*, in J.A. Lucy (ed.), *Reflexive Language: Reported Speech and Metapragmatics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 33-58.

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Thus, while Charles V had dispatched Luigi Presenda with official letters, Tunisian emissaries did not comply European diplomatic traditions because they did not show accreditations and their royal letters were not sealed. On 24 June 1535 a "Moor" was received by Charles V after assurances that he was a secret envoy of Mulay Hassan, and was said «to have lost his letters of credence along the way»[25]. The next day, «three large Moors on horseback» delivered to Charles V «a letter that they certified and assured him was from the King of Tunis […] and the letters of the signature were written according to the King's normal usage, and sent unsealed, according, as they said, to their customs»[26]. Trust was gradually built. A Spanish interpreter (most probably Alvar Gómez de Orozco "El Zagal", the Granada-born imperial translator) confirmed that the Tunisian envoys were acting according to their local traditions. In reciprocity, imperial presents were given to these emissaries showing the good will and munificence of Charles V: The first Tunisian emissary received «one hundred doubloons as a gift, with many rich cloths of gold and silk to show His Majesty's liberality», while the second mission was rewarded «with gifts of garments»[27]. At the same time, some precautions were taken: a Tunisian noble was kept as hostage while Orozco was sent to the Tunisian camp as Charles V's envoy[28].

With the preliminary exchanges over, the meeting of Charles V and Mulay Hassan on 29 June 1535 was carefully arranged. It was described in considerable detail in contemporary sources and chronicles, both as

[25] «Que había perdido en el camino las cartas de creencia». A. Perrenin, *Goleta de la ciudad de Túnez, 1535. Jornada de Túnez*, in R. González Cuerva, M.Á. Bunes Ibarra (eds.), *Túnez 1535: Voces de una campaña europea*, CSIC, Madrid, 2017, p. 76.

[26] «Tres moros grandes a caballo [*delivered to Charles V]* una carta que ellos certificaron y afirmaron ser del rey de Túnez […] Y estarán escritas las dichas letras de la firma acostumbrada del rey, sin sellos, que ellos dicen que ellos tienen esta costumbre». A. Perrenin, *Goleta de la ciudad de Túnez* cit., p. 77. This encounter is also detailed in the letter of Charles V to his brother Ferdinand I, camp before Tunis, 24 June 1535, in B. Hofinger et al. (eds.), *Die Korrespondenz Ferdinands I. Familienkorrespondenz*, V, *1535 und 1536*, Böhlau, Wien, 2015, p. 266.

[27] The first received «cien doblones en don, con muchos atavíos ricos de oro y de seda para mostrar la liberalidad de Su Majestad»], and the second departed «con presentes de vestidos». A. Perrenin, *Goleta de la ciudad de Túnez* cit., pp. 77-78.

[28] Mulay Hassan kept to this style of diplomatic communication – so uncomfortable to European Christians – in which trust was guaranteed by the delivery of gifts and not by the exchange of formal documents. In 1536, the King of Tunis wrote to the imperial secretary, Francisco de los Cobos, that he sent «faqui Mahoma cabeza de nuestros oficiales» to ask for further imperial support against the Ottomans. This Mahoma carried as gift «un caballo overo de crines largas». Bernardino de Mendoza, then governor of La Goleta, remarked that this envoy carried no proxy to negotiate, but that Mulay Hassan had asked that Mahoma be entirely trusted. Mulay Hassan to Francisco de los Cobos, 1536 (with addenda by Bernardino de Mendoza), in É. De La Primaudaie, *Documents inédits* cit., pp. 238-239.

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a unique event and as a precedent. Mulay was received «honourably as a king», escorted by three Spanish grandees (the duke of Alba, the count of Benavente and the marquis of Valle Siciliana). The arrival of the Muslim king was regarded as a major spectacle by the diverse imperial forces, so that almost all the soldiers (excepts the sentinels) crowded around to witness the scene[29]. However, the actual performance was limited to a selected courtly entourage and took place in the imperial pavilion. In the salutation, Charles V was bareheaded and eager to show his magnanimity with the dethroned king as well as his superior status. The result was a confusing scene during which Mulay tried to kneel before him and to kiss his hand, a gesture commonly understood as an act of submission in both Christian and Muslim cultures – including the Ottoman *el öpmek*[30]. However, Charles V refused to receive those compliments and instead put his arms around Mulay's shoulders, nearly embracing him. Mulay then kissed Charles's shoulders, a Muslim sign of homage, while the imperial ministers feared that he would attempt to kiss Charles V's neck. The official version of the campaign drafted by the imperial secretary Antoine Perrenin skipped this embarrassing moment, which is recorded by other witnesses[31]. Mulay seemed to feel humiliated by the Emperor's condescendence and physical contact, because he claimed himself to be the Commander of the Faithful (*Amir al-Mu'minin*) as the representative of the last old Arab dynasty, which considered Mamelukes and Ottomans as parvenus[32].

The formal and polite conversation between both princes was translated by Alvar Gómez Orozco, who was appointed as Mulay's companion and became his shadow throughout the campaign[33]. Apart from the confusion in the initial greeting, the scene was well-prepared

[29] N. Guldin, *Relato de la jornada del emperador Carlos V a Túnez*, in R. González Cuerva and M.A. Bunes Ibarra (eds.), *Túnez 1535* cit., p. 123; P. de Sandoval, *Historia de la vida* cit., pp. 245-247.

[30] P. Brummett, *A Kiss is Just a Kiss: Rituals of Submission along the East-West Divide*, in M. Birchwood, M. Dimmock (eds.), *Cultural Encounters Between East and West, 1453-1699*, Cambridge Scholar Press, Amersham, 2005, pp. 112-114.

[31] A. Perrenin, *Goleta de la ciudad de Túnez* cit., p. 80; A. de Santa Cruz, *Crónica del Emperador* cit., p. 271; P. Girón, *Crónica del emperador Carlos V*, CSIC, Madrid, 1964, p. 49-50.

[32] P. Giovio, *Segunda parte de la historia* cit., f. 201r. For the humbling symbolism of kissing shoulders to a superior in Persian tradition, P. Brummett, *A Kiss is Just a Kiss* cit., p. 110.

[33] A. de Santa Cruz, *Crónica del Emperador* cit., p. 271. Orozco was later appointed governor of Bona (Annaba, Algeria). R. Gutiérrez Cruz, *Crimen y corrupción en la frontera africana: el alcaide Alvar Gómez de Orozco, el Zagal*, in F. Toro Ceballos, J. Rodríguez Molina (eds.), *Fronteras multiculturales. Homenaje a Pedro Martínez Montávez*, Diputación de Jaén, Jaén, 2016, pp. 199-208.

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and avoided further cultural clashes. A dais with cushions was prepared for the king to sit on the ground (a practice familiar to Spaniards where the Iberian-Moorish tradition of domestic *estrados* was maintained long after the expulsion, albeit for noble women who continued to sit on raised platforms covered in cushions[34]). Moreover, Mulay and his retinue were offered suitable refreshments, sweet waters and delicacies that took into account and respected their restrictions with regards to wine and meat.[35]

2nd act: The campaign

Mulay Hassan was easily accepted in the society of princes: he was lodged in the pavilion of Louis of Flanders, a distant relative of Charles V, and received a company of German infantry as escort. In the public appearances during the campaign, the King of Tunis formed a monarchic triumvirate with Charles V and the *infante* Louis of Portugal, all of them separated from the rest of the military leaders[36].

The imperial chroniclers and painters had no major problem accepting Mulay Hassan and his retinue as a king with his court[37]. The Flemish painter Jan Vermeyen portrayed both the king and his eldest son, Mulay Ahmed (Abû al-`Abbâs Ahmed III al-Hafsi), who was referred to as «the prince», using the rhetorical devices of princely portraits[38]. Vermeyen followed with great interest the customs and

[34] B. Fuchs, *Exotic Nation: Maurophilia and the Construction of Early Modern Spain*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2009, pp. 14-15, 121-122.

[35] P. de Sandoval, *Historia de la vida* cit., p. 246.

[36] N. Guldin, *Relato de la jornada* cit., pp. 125, 126; L. del Mármol Carvajal, *Libro tercero, y segvndo volvmen* cit., p. 255r.

[37] S. Subrahmanyam, *Courtly Encounters: Translating Courtliness and Violence in Early Modern Eurasia*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass., 2012, p. xiv; E.N. Rothman, *Afterword* cit., pp. 258-259.

[38] J. L. González García, *"Pinturas tejidas". La guerra como arte y el arte de la guerra en torno a la empresa de Túnez (1535)*, «Reales Sitios», 174 (2007), pp. 33-34. Both oil canvases are lost, but an engraving of Mulay Hassan's portrait (1) and an etching (2) and a Rubens's copy of Mulay Ahmed's portrait (3) remain: (1) S. de Parijs (after Vermeyen), *Mulay Hassan* («Cecy est le roy de Thonis contrefaict a la vie»), Antwerpen, 1535, Bnf, Cabinet des Estampes, reproduced in S. Haag, K. Schmitz-Von Ledebur (eds.), *Kaiser Karl V. erobert Tunis* cit., p. 49. (2) J.C. Vermeyen, *Portrait of Mulay Ahmad*, circa 1535-1536, etching, Rotterdam, Museum Boijmans Van Beuningen. (3) P.P. Rubens (after a painting by J.C. Vermeyen), *Portrait of Mulay Ahmad*, circa 1609, oil on panel, Boston, Museum of Fine Arts, studied in J. S. Held, *Rubens' 'King of Tunis' and Vermeyen's Portrait of Mulay Ahmad*, «Art Quarterly», 3 (1940), pp. 30-36.

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Fig. 5. P.P. Rubens (after J.C. Vermeyen), *Portrait of Mulay Ahmad*, Museum of Fine Arts, Boston (ca. 1609).

traditions of the Tunisian «retinue», which is how he defined the group who joined the imperial camp[39]. Other contemporary observers from the Netherlands and Germany, less accustomed to such sights, marvelled at these courtiers sitting on the ground and particularly at the sight of a king who sat by squatting on a «tapestry» in their midst as was his custom. They were embarrassed by the small number of soldiers he had brought to the campaign, as well as the unceremonious character and loud and (as they saw it) disrespectful voices of Mulay Hassan's noble entourage even when they were with him[40]. Meanwhile, the Granada-born chronicler and eyewitness Luis de Mármol Carvajal lamented the decadence of this exiled court by contrast with the situation before 1534. Tunis, he explained, had been organised according to a strict, social hierarchy with well-defined offices and clear precedence, a system comparable to the European framework. According to him, the Hafsids had followed the same style for eating and negotiating as the Kings of Fez, thus highlighting the awareness of some of these chroniclers of the different courtly traditions and societies across the Mediterranean[41].

[39] J.C. Vermeyen, *King Mulay Hasan and his retinue at a repast in Tunis*, circa 1535, engraving, New York, Metropolitan Museum of Art, studied in S. Borsch, *Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen: King Mulay Hasan and his retinue at a repast in Tunis*, «The Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin», N.S., 52:2 (1994), p. 22.

[40] The King «la mayor parte del tiempo, o casi siempre, estaba sentado en tierra sobre un tapiz que le ponían, y estaba siempre sentado en cuclillas, que era cosa de ver, mas así es la costumbre de la tierra. Y así estaban todos alrededor de él en tierra, vestidos mal y desnudos, sin mucha ceremonia. Antes, muchas veces hablaban todos juntamente tan alto, más que el mismo rey, aunque siempre retenía en sí alguna majestad real». A. Perrenin, *Goleta de la ciudad de Túnez* cit., p. 87.

[41] L. del Mármol Carvajal, *Libro tercero, y segvndo volvmen* cit., pp. 244v-245v. Some modern authors have assumed that there was a general courtly Maghrebi style, humbler and more public than contemporary Ottoman protocol. J. Dakhlia, J. Valensi, *Le spectacle de la Cour : éléments de comparaison des modes de souveraineté au Maghreb et dans l'Empire ottoman*, in G. Veinstein (ed.), *Soliman le Magnifique et son temps*, La Documentantion Française, Paris, 1992, pp. 148-152.

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Fig. 6. J.C. Vermeyen, *King Mulay Hasan and his retinue at a repast in Tunis*, Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York (ca. 1535).

The rules of the princely game were clear to both sides, so that the recently acquired bond of protection was expressed through the exchange of gifts, which were much richer from the imperial side. Charles V gave the king 40.000 ducats and a costly cargo of brocade and silk, i.e., the money and clothes required for Mulay Hassan to appear again as a real king. For his part, Mulay offered an auburn mare, aware that Maghrebian horses were much appreciated in Christian Europe[42].

Mulay Hassan needed more than new clothes and the presentation of gifts to demonstrate his royal status. He was deliberately concerned with performing and thereby demonstrating his nobility. Christian eye-witnesses were unanimous in characterising him as a «courteous and liberal» prince who «demonstrated that he was a king despite being expelled from his city»[43]. His dignity was comparable to that expected from a Christian king, except for his sexual vices, which were said to

[42] P. de Sandoval, *Historia de la vida* cit., pp. 247, 255.

[43] «Cortés y liberal». L. del Mármol Carvajal, *Libro tercero, y segvndo volvmen* cit., p. 253r. «Era hombre de buena persona, que demostraba ser Rey aunque echado de su ciudad». P. Girón, *Crónica del emperador* cit., p. 59.

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include polygamy and paedophilia[44]. The imperial chroniclers' writers had a difficult balancing act: they needed to stress his majesty despite his religious and other forms of deviance, because as the friend and ally of the Emperor he could be an infidel, but not worthless.

However, the most efficient and visual way to demonstrate his aristocratic excellence was through chivalric skills. During the campaign of Tunis, Mulay Hassan and his entourage took part in a game of canes[45]. This was a type of tournament which had originated in Muslim courts and remained very popular among the Iberian Christian nobility, and to a lesser extent in Italy. Vermeyen depicted these Tunisian tournaments as an exotic event for a Flemish audience in three drawings: one entitled *A Fantasy in Tunis: the Game of Canes*[46] and two others both known as *Military tournament in Tunis*[47]. However, it is unclear whether these scenes really depicted the events in Tunis in 1535, or similar tournaments held in Naples (1536), Valladolid (1536) or Toledo (1539), because it was normal for the Christian participants to dress up as Moors, often with clothing bought in the Kingdom of Tlemcen[48]. The game of canes was also used as a distinctive Spanish contribution to celebrate and enhance important royal events all around Europe, such as during the celebration of Phillip II and Mary Tudor's marriage in London (1554). Games of canes were more habitual in Italy where Iberian influence was greater, such as Naples, Rome, Milan, and Bologna, but Italians were also very familiar with the customs of neighbouring North African Moors and the Ottoman Empire[49].

[44] «Era viciosísimo, sucio en las torpezas de la carne en todo género». P. de Sandoval, *Historia de la vida* cit., p. 247.

[45] N. Guldin, *Relato de la jornada* cit., pp. 126-127; P. Giovio, *Segunda parte de la historia* cit., ch. 14; P. de Sandoval, *Historia de la vida* cit., p. 247.

[46] J.C. Vermeyen, *Une fantasia à Tunis : le jeu des cannes*, s.d., Louvre, Cabinet des dessins, Fonds des dessins et miniatures, Inv. 19191, reproduced and commented in J.C. Hernández Núñez, *Fantasía caballeresca en Túnez*, in A.J. Morales (ed.), *La Fiesta en la Europa de Carlos V*, SECC, Sevilla, 2000, p. 375; T.-H. Borchert, *Reiterphantasie in Tunis*, in L. Altringer et al. (eds.), *Kaiser Karl V. (1500-1558): Macht und Ohnmacht Europas*, Kunsthistorisches Museum, Wien, 2000, notice 371.2.

[47] J.C. Vermeyen, *Tournoi militaire à Tunis*, s.d., Louvre, Cabinet des dessins, Fonds des dessins et miniatures, Inv. 19192 and 19193, reproduced and commented in T.-H. Borchert, *Das "Mohrenturnier"*, in L. Altringer et al. (eds.), *Kaiser Karl V.* cit., notice 371.1.

[48] H.J. Horn, *Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen, painter of Charles V and his conquest of Tunis, Paintings, Etchings, Drawings, Cartoons and Tapestries*, Davaco, Doornspijk, 1989, vol. I, p. 25; N. Dacos, *Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen, Martin van Heemskerck, Herman Posthumus. À propos de deux livres récents*, «Revue belge d'archéologie et d'histoire de l'art», 60 (1991), p. 100; S. Deswarte-Rose, *L'expedition de Tunis* cit., p. 118.

[49] B. Fuchs, *Exotic Nation* cit., pp. 94-101; J. Irigoyen-García, *'Poco os falta para moros, pues tanto lo parecéis': Impersonating the Moor in the Spanish Mediterranean*, «Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies», 12:3 (2011), pp. 356-357.

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Fig. 7. J.C. Vermeyen, *A Fantasy in Tunis: the Game of Canes*, Louvre Museum, Paris (ca. 1535).

By showing his mastery in the riding style of the *gineta* (in which riders used shorter stirrups that allowed for an easier manoeuvring of the horse and in spear-throwing), Mulay Hassan both demonstrated his aristocratic skills, which compared well with those of Spanish noblemen, and deeply impressed the northern European members of the campaign for whom it was more of a novelty[50]. It is recorded that the Tunisian riders engaged with Christian riders in this game, as happened again in Naples in 1543. On that occasion, as Mulay Hassan began another period of exile, a game of canes was held in his honour, with Spanish, Italian, and Tunisian knights all participating in these equestrian games. It can be hypothesized that the game of canes served as the expression of a shared cultural practice between the three Mediterranean realms[51].

[50] N. Guldin, *Relato de la jornada* cit., pp. 126-127; R. Puddu, *'Toros y cañas': I giochi equestri nella Spagna del Secolo d'Oro*, «Quaderni Storici», 117:3 (2004), 807-829.

[51] P. de Sandoval, *Historia de la vida* cit., p. 247; G. De Spenis, *Breve cronica dai 2 giugno 1543 a 25 maggio 1547*, ed. by B. Capasso, «Archivio Storico per le provincie napoletane», 2 (1877), pp. 518-521. There are also later testimonies of such mock battles between Moors of Tlemcen and Christians of the garrison of Oran in J. Irigoyen-García, *'Poco os falta para moros* cit., p. 362.

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Returning to the Tunis campaign, it should be pointed that despite these signs of trust and acceptance, the Emperor ensured that Mulay did not have freedom of movement. Orozco was his permanent escort, his eternal guard and his means of communicating with Charles V. Furthermore, Mulay Hassan was not allowed to take part in the imperial war council, although he knew the local situation much better than any of them. The imperial generals appreciated this and discreetly consulted him on the strategy to follow during visits in which they showed him all due reverence[52]. The King had a limited ability to impose his views, both because of the limitations in communication and lack of financial or military means with which to apply pressure. At times he resorted to the most pathetic means to make his opinion clear. After the conquest of the fortress of La Goleta, the imperial generals were reluctant to risk an attack on the city of Tunis and the option of withdrawing was raised. Orozco informed Mulay Hassan of this debate and the King refused to eat and sleep until the lieutenant general, the Marquis of Vasto, assured him that it had been decided to proceed with the conquest of the city[53]. Mulay Hassan soon lamented this, because after the city's surrender, the imperial army subjected it to a cruel sack that impacted even Charles V's chroniclers. The power of Mulay Hassan was minimal at that critical moment: his former vassals clamoured for him to intercede on their behalf, but Charles V's gracious promises were meaningless in the face of the troop's appetite for booty[54].

3rd Act: The Treaty

After the conquest of the city of Tunis and with much of the old state that Mulay Hassan had governed under their control, the two rulers negotiated a treaty of vassalage. In effect, Charles V imposed it on his powerless new client on 6 August 1535. The document has been repeatedly presented as the start of a diplomatic revolution, normalising trans-religious pacts. The most salient element of its many detailed clauses was the declaration of perpetual friendship, a key element of treaties among Christian princes, rather than stipulating that the alliance was merely for a few years as it was customary with similar agreements

[52] P. Giovio, *Segunda parte de la historia* cit., f. 201v; G. de Illescas, *Jornada de Carlos V á Túnez*, Real Academia Española, Madrid, 1804, pp. 25-27.

[53] L. del Mármol Carvajal, *Libro tercero, y segvndo volvmen* cit., pp. 255r-255v.

[54] P. de Sandoval, *Historia de la vida* cit., p. 279; L. del Mármol Carvajal, *Libro tercero, y segvndo volvmen* cit., pp. 259r-260r.

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with Muslim powers.[55] The direct imposition of conditions by Charles V is fully appreciated if we study its language: a feudal terminology alien to Maghreb political culture is employed, including the option of dethroning again Mulay Hassan if this imperial "protégé" failed to pay the *parias*, that is the agreed contributions, for three consecutive years. The annual payment of money and a symbolic gift in exchange for military protection were deeply rooted Medieval traditions. In this case, the King of Tunis had to deliver an annual tribute of 12.000 ducats, six good horses and twelve falcons. Additionally, he ceded the strategic stronghold of La Goleta, which secured the entrance to the Tunisian port, accepting the creation of a Spanish presidio – a fortified settlement – there.[56] In the aforementioned tapestries by Vermeyen, the scene of the treaty's signature is represented with Charles V in a dominant position and Orozco acting as translator. The event seems discreet and secluded: for Vermeyen, neither the signing of the treaty nor the journeys of the Emperor and the King were central to the narrative of the campaign he depicted in this series.

It would have been unprecedented if Orozco had been the only translator and participant in such an important performative and illocutionary act as the signing of the treaty[57]. In fact, two Spanish Franciscan friars, fray Diego Valentín and Bartolomé de los Ángeles, complemented this work, which was under the strict control of imperial officials[58]. The texts, with Spanish and Arabic versions, had imperial and royal seals affixed, following the usage of the imperial chancellery. Since it was impossible to have a single ceremony for the oath under the name of the same god, the performance was flexibly interpreted. Charles V put his hand over a cross woven in the vest of a commander of the Order of Saint James, thus adding an element of crusade into to the act. Meanwhile, Mulay Hassan performed the ceremony of obedience (*bay'a*) usual in Muslim political practice: he drew his sword one span and swore in the name of Allah and the Coran. The scene continued with Mulay's reverent

[55] P. Marino (ed.), *Tratados internacionales de España. Periodo de preponderancia española, Carlos V*, II, *España-Norte de África*, CSIC, Madrid, 1980, pp. xvi, xci; H. Duchhardt, *Das Tunisunternehmen* cit., pp. 68-70.

[56] S. Boubaker, *L'empereur Charles Quint* cit., pp. 29-36.

[57] B. Stollberg-Rillinger, *The Impact of Communication Theory on the Analysis of the Early Modern Statebuilding Processes*, in W. Blockmans, A. Holenstein, J. Mathieu (eds.), *Empowering Interactions. Political Culture and the Emergence of the State in Europe 1300-1900*, Ashgate, Farnham 2009, p. 315.

[58] P. Marino (ed.), *Tratados internacionales de España* cit., p. 52; A. de Santa Cruz, *Crónica del Emperador* cit., p. 246.

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words towards his new master and with the Tunisian knights kissing Charles V's hand[59].

Charles V immediately sent the Spanish version of the treaty to his wife Isabella and another in French to his brother Ferdinand I, and they both sponsored the publication of the document in their respective lands. After only three months, it was available in print in Spanish, French, German and Italian[60]. Before that, Italian diplomats escorting Charles V to Tunis, like the Milanese orator Giovanni Tomaso Gallarati, got manuscript summaries of the negotiation, but did not obtain a copy of the final treaty until it was printed[61]. Charles V demonstrated with this text the right way to interact with a Muslim prince: acting as a magnanimous master while obtaining substantial concessions from him, by contrast with the humiliating conditions imposed by Ottoman diplomacy to other Christian princes[62]. To dissipate doubts on the credibility of Mulay Hassan's oath, Charles V declared that his word could be trusted because Mulay was an honourable king, albeit African[63]. However, this European idea of honour and dynastic legitimacy was challenged by evidence of Mulay Hassan's lack of local support. Charles V confessed to the ambassador of Ferrara and also wrote to his brother Ferdinand I that in effect he did not trust the reinstated king because Mulay Hassan had no supporters in Tunis. He was aware that Mulay Hassan's former vassals who had dethroned him one year ago, hated him even more after the savage sack of the city[64]. In spite of Charles V's well-

[59] A. de Santa Cruz, *Crónica del Emperador* cit., p. 292; P. de Sandoval, *Historia de la vida* cit., p. 287; S. Boubaker, *L'empereur Charles Quint* cit., pp. 35-36.

[60] Isabella of Portugal to Charles V, Madrid, 30 September 1535, Ags, E, 31, f. 205v; Charles V to Ferdinand I, La Goleta, 16 August 1535, in B. Hofinger et al. (eds.), *Die Korrespondenz Ferdinands I.* cit., p. 292; *Vertrags artickel Römischer Keis. Ma. vnd des restituirten Königs von Tunisi: Sampt jrer Maiestet ankunfft in Jtalien, vnd ettlichen andern frischen zeytungen; 30. Septembris. 1535*, s.l., 1535; *Capitoli dello Appontamento fatto tra la Cesarea Maesta dello Imperatore [et] il Re di Tunisi*, Antonio Blado, Roma, 1535.

[61] Giovanni Tomaso Gallarati to the Duke Francesco II of Milan, Di galera a Capo Zafrano, 17 August 1535, in D. Muoni, *Tunisi: Spedizione di Carlo V Imperatore, 30 maggio--17 agosto 1535*, Giuseppe Bernardoni, Milano, 1876, pp. 88-89.

[62] The restitution of Tunis to Mulay Hassan was not regarded as a concession towards Muslims but as another trait of Charles V's glory. In one of the triumphal arches for the imperial entry in Rome (1536), it was represented thus: «sua Maestà e tribunal sedere restituire la Corona al Re de Tunis, alli piedi del quale si legeua: *Mulfasses insigni victoria restitutus*». Z. Cessino, *La triumphante entrata di Carlo V. imperatore augusto innelalma* [sic] *citta de Roma*, Roma, 1536, p. 3v.

[63] «por ser de hombre Africano pudiera tenerla por sospechosa, el se fiaua della porque en vn animo de vn rey como el creya que confirmaría la fe que le daua». P. Giovio, *Segunda parte de la historia* cit., f. 201r; P. Marino (ed.), *Tratados internacionales de España* cit., pp. 50-52.

[64] Charles V to Ferdinand I, camp before Tunis, 14 July 1535, and Tunis, 23 July 1535, in B. Hofinger et al. (eds.), *Die Korrespondenz Ferdinands I.* cit., pp. 280-281, 284; J. Castillo Fernández, *Luis del Mármol Carvajal*, PhD thesis, University of Granada, 2013, p. 113.

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founded doubts, the performance of the act of vassalage which followed European traditions had been a success. With this, the imperial army was ready to depart.

Epilogue

As the Emperor suspected, his Tunisian client was incapable of consolidating his power and unable to win back the old Hafsid kingdom. In 1543, after eight years of unstable rule, Mulay Hassan travelled to Italy to meet his old friend (as he called him in his letters) Charles V again, and to beg him to give further support. In his absence from Tunis, his son, the prince Mulay Ahmed, usurped the throne and Mulay Hassan spent his last years of life in a venturesome exile.

There are four scenes in his last period that deserve our attention. His first stop after leaving Tunis in the spring of 1543 was Palermo, where he was honourably received by local gentlemen and lodged in the Palazzo di Aiutamicristo. Charles V had stayed in this same palace in 1535 after the conquest of Tunis, thus showing a parallel in kingship and dignity[65]. After Palermo he sailed to Naples, where the viceroy Pedro de Toledo treated him with royal magnificence. Don Pedro went beyond the city walls to meet him, but made clear the inferior nature of an infidel king by greeting him without dismounting his horse as he would have done for a Christian monarch, while Mulay Hassan made a reverence in reply. Among the many activities offered by both the viceroy and the king in the Neapolitan summer of 1543, the most outstanding one was the aforementioned game of canes in which, for the first time in Europe, the Moorish riders could demonstrate their skills and compete with Spanish and Italian knights[66].

After this, Mulay Hassan became an attraction in Christian European courts, playing the role of a friend of Christians, a disgraced but courteous and refined Muslim king. In 1547-1548, following an unsuccessful attempt to recover his kingdom that led to him being blinded by his son Mulay Ahmed, and fleeing again into exile, Mulay Hassan initiated a more extended European tour, escorted by a small retinue made up of five Tunisians and the interpreter Hernando de

[65] T. Fazello, *Le due deche del'Historia di Sicilia*, appresso Domenico, et Gio. Battista Guerra, Venetia, 1574, p. 915.

[66] G.A. Summonte, *Dell'historia della citta, e regno di Napoli*, a spese di Antonio Bulifon, Napoli, 1675, vol. IV, p. 155; G. De Spenis, *Breve cronica* cit., pp. 518-524; B. Capasso, *Muleassen re di Tunisi nel Palazzo Colonna (1543)*, «Napoli Nobilissima», 3:7 (1894), pp. 100-103; III/8, pp. 117-120; G. Varriale, *Dal simposio alla prigionia: gli ultimi hafsidi e il meridione italiano*, «Orientalia Parthenopea», 11 (2011), pp. 16-17.

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Fig. 8. N. Van Der Horst, *Muley Hazen Roy de Thunes*, in J. Chiflet, *Les marques d'honneur de la maison de Tassis*, Balthasar Moretus, Anvers, 1645, p. 76.

Velasco[67]. Mulay Hassan went to Augsburg for another personal meeting with Charles V, but before that he travelled extensively through Italy; his movements were widely disseminated by local chroniclers and especially by his friend the humanist Paolo Giovio. Giovio praised Mulay Hassan as a cultivated man who surprised his European interlocutors with his delicate taste for perfumes, his passion as a book collector and his proficiency in the philosophy of Averroes and judicial astrology, all common fields of discussion beyond religious difference[68].

Mulay Hassan also visited the viceroys of Sardinia[69], Sicily and Naples. During that second journey, the viceroy of Naples, Pedro de Toledo, granted him a dignified lodging and treatment, but, as a proof of Mulay Hassan's diminished status, the viceroy did not even visit him[70]. Mulay Hassan was received by pope Paul III in Rome on 28 January 1548, however, as his role as an enemy of the Ottoman sultan was considered more important than his Muslim faith. The blind king refused to convert to Christianity and showed a distant – even disdainful – attitude towards the Pontiff, by refusing to take part in the usual

[67] Ferrante Gonzaga to Charles V, 15 January 1546, Ags, E, 1117, n. 9; Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Charles V, Genoa, 1 december 1547, Ags, E, 1379, n. 255, f. 1v.

[68] The communication between both men was intermediated by Arabic translators, a situation that dismayed Giovio for «speaking through idiot interpreters» [«aunque hablábamos por intérpretes idiotas»]. P. Giovio, *Segunda parte de la historia* cit., ff. 201r, 206r-207v, 398r; J. Nauclerus, *Chronicon*, Quentel, Coloniae, 1564, p. 703; S. Deswarte-Rose, *L'expedition de Tunis* cit., pp. 117-118, 121-129.

[69] Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Charles V, Genoa, 1 December 1547, Ags, E, 1379, n. 255, f. 1v.

[70] «no le he podido ver, pero hele hecho tratar y recoger bien». Pedro de Toledo to Charles V, Naples, 9 December 1547, Ags, E, 1037, n. 145.

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Fig. 9 – N. Van Der Horst, *Muley Hazen Roy de Thunes*, in J. Chiflet, *Les marques d'honneur de la maison de Tassis*, Balthasar Moretus, Anvers, 1645, p. 77.

ceremony of prostrating himself before the pontiff and kissing the papal slipper. He deigned merely to kiss his knee[71].

Fully accepted as a royal figure, Mulay was also received by the Duke of Ferrara and his famed court surgeons vainly tried to heal Mulay's burnt eyelids[72]. Beyond these courteous encounters, Mulay failed in the main objective of his journey. When he arrived to Augsburg he had to settle for limited lodgings as the city was full with members of the Imperial Diet and the royal family. Charles V granted him an amicable audience on 8 May 1548 but did not keep his promises of sending further military aid[73].

Mulay Hassan was installed in Sicily under the protection of the viceroy, Ferrante Gonzaga, and died in July 1550 while taking part in an imperial expedition sent to conquer Mahdia in North Africa. He was finally laid to rest in a tomb in the Tunisian holy city of Kairuan[74].

The impact of Mulay Hassan's presence in Europe and the ambivalent feelings he provoked led to the creation of an incredible legend in seventeenth-century Flanders: according to it, Mulay Hassan had also stayed in Brussels, a visit that was supposed to have occurred in 1535 according to one version (when he was in hiding in the mountains of the

[71] P. Giovio, *Segunda parte de la historia* cit., f. 398r. In Ottoman protocol, kissing the foot meant the biggest symbol of respect and submission, as happened in the ceremonies of begging for forgiveness. P. Brummett, *A Kiss is Just a Kiss* cit., p. 116.

[72] G. Giraldi, *Commentario delle cose di Ferrara*, Sessa, Venetia, 1597, p. 179; A. Faustini, *Aggiunta alle Historie del Sig. Guasparo Sardi*, in G. Sardi, *Libro delle historie Ferraresi*, Giuseppe Gironi, Ferrara, 1646, p. 22.

[73] The prior of Granada to the master Bobadilla, Augsburg, 20 May 1548, in *Epistolae mixtae ex variis Europae locis ab anno 1537 ad 1556 scriptae*, A. Avrial, Matriti, 1898, p. 505; F. Arnoulet, *Les derniers princes hafsides a Tunis (1526-1574)*, «Arab Historical Review for Ottoman Studies», 15-16 (1997), p. 46.

[74] C. Baskins, *De Aphrodisio Expugnato: The Siege of Mahdia in the Habsburg Imaginary*, «Il Capitale Culturale», 6 (2017), pp. 28-35.

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Maghreb), or in 1555 (five years after his death) according to another, staying with Charles V and his family. In 1644, a celebratory publication on the grandeur of the House of Tassis included twin portraits of the King of Tunis and Jean Baptiste de Tassis, the Flemish nobleman who allegedly hosted his visit, both dressed *alla turca*[75]. By that time, an infidel royal friend, whose dresses were shared, represented an exotic mark of distinction rather than a problematic relationship.

Conclusions

The rhetorically constructed friendship between Emperor Charles V and Mulay Hassan of Tunis barely hid the reality of a Christian monarch acting as the superior and protector of a Muslim vassal prince. The relationship failed to meet expectations due to several factors. Despite all that was said, Mulay Hassan lacked legitimacy because he was unable to control the territory he had ruled, or overcome local opposition, and had failed to reward loyal tribes, as well as being turned into a vassal first by the Ottomans and then by the Emperor. He had accepted a Spanish garrison outside the main city of Tunis which was as unpopular as it was predatory on the surrounding area. However, the personal meetings and the negotiations and treaties between both princes had highlighted the possibilities of inter-confessional diplomacy in the Mediterranean.

As David Do Paço has expressed, models of exotic cross-cultural encounters do not apply for these Christian-Muslims contacts which were characterised by a long-lasting familiarity[76]. Neither does the traditional idea of a Mediterranean frontier diplomacy conducted "from below" by subordinate or marginal actors fit the case studied here. It is evident that there were military, commercial and clerical figures involved in the negotiations, especially from Genoa and Granada, but there was also direct participation by the Emperor, the King of Tunis and their respective ministers. This personal contact, and especially

[75] M. Mastelinus, *Necrologium monasterii viridis vallis ordinis canonicorum regularium S. Augustini congregationis Lateranensis et capituli Windezemensis in nemore Zoniae prope Bruxellam*, J. Meerbecius, Bruxellae, 1630, p. 73; J. Chiflet, *Les marques d'honneur de la maison de Tassis*, Balthasar Moretus, Anvers, 1645, pp. 70-78; E. Puteanus, *Bruxella, incomparabili exemplo Septenaria,* Joannes Mommaert, Bruxellae, 1646, pp. 34-36. Some details of the supposed Mulay Hassan's stay in Flanders (his riding style, his passion for spices and music) were copied from Paolo Giovio's book.

[76] D. Do Paço, *Trans-imperial familiarity: Ottoman Ambassadors in eighteenth-century Vienna*, in T. Sowerby, J. Hennings (eds.), *Practices of Diplomacy in the Early Modern World c. 1410-1800*, Routledge, London, 2017, pp. 167-168.

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the crushing conquest of Tunis, facilitated the signature of a harsh treaty that made Charles V's support the decisive factor for keeping order in the Kingdom of Tunis. There were constant allusions to the perceived inferiority of the Tunisian ruler. While Mulay Hassan's regal condition was undisputed, he never managed to be fully accepted into the European society of princes, nor was his daughter included among the Empress's ladies-in-waiting.

During the campaign against Tunis in 1535, the traditional diplomatic framework of Christendom had merged with a Mediterranean shared political culture overcoming religious difference which was hard for northern Europeans to grasp. Apparently exotic practices like the games of canes or the act of sitting on carpets were shared by Iberian aristocracy, and this familiarity in performative culture made the contacts easier to manage. This does not mean that they avoided misunderstandings and discomfort, which reappeared at key moments, such as the ceremonies of salutation and oath, because the performance of power relations had not yet been clearly established between them, and Hafsid diplomatic practices were deemed insufficient by imperial policy-makers. However, these and other episodes were dissimulated and overcome. Arguably the greatest relevance of the Tunisian campaign with regards to sixteenth century Mediterranean politics, was the fact that Charles V demonstrated he could act as a successful emperor against Ottoman expansion. The Ottoman sultans were the real enemies. The Emperor did not need to conquer every Muslim land to demonstrate his power: it sufficed to establish a protectorate.

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A BAROQUE VISION OF THE CONQUEST OF TUNIS IN 1535: CARLOS V, SOBRE TUNEZ BY JOSÉ DE CAÑIZARES

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ABSTRACT: *There is little doubt that Charles V and his supporters made use of the conquest of Tunis in 1535 to propagate a certain idea about himself and his political vision. There is ample proof of this, from the Emperor's subsequent journey around Italy to Vermeyen's tapestries. What might seem odd is the fact that almost two centuries later that military episode was used as the plot for a play by one of the most popular Spanish authors of the eighteenth century; an author who has been almost totally forgotten: José de Cañizares. It is even stranger that the author chose this military event for his play, as he seemed to prefer writing plays that dealt with very different topics. Also surprising is the fact that the play in question, entitled Carlos V, sobre Tunez (Charles V in Tunis), was still being performed many years after it was written and first performed. We know that the play was relatively successful in the second half of the eighteenth century, and during the War of Spanish Independence in the first few years of the nineteenth century. The aim of this paper is to analyse how that military operation, the Tunis campaign, was envisaged and depicted in Cañizares's play, with a view to establishing how far it reflects historical reality, and to study the way in which Charles V is portrayed as a Spanish King, Emperor and Christian leader against Muslim enemies.*

KEYWORDS: *War of Spanish Succession, War of Spanish Independence, theatre, Bourbon Spain.*

UNA VISIONE BAROCCA DELLA CONQUISTA DI TUNISI DEL 1535: LA COMMEDIA "*CARLOS V SOBRE TÚNEZ*" DI JOSÉ DE CAÑIZARES

SOMMARIO: *In questo articolo si analizza come José de Cañizares, uno degli autori più popolari del XVIII secolo, utilizzò e rappresentò la celebre campagna di Tunisi del 1535 all'interno della sua commedia "Carlos V sobre Túnez". Difatti, benché non vi sia alcun dubbio sul fatto che Carlo V ricorse alla conquista di Tunisi del 1535 per diffondere una certa idea di sé e del proprio progetto politico, sembra esser alquanto strano che quel medesimo episodio militare fu scelto due secoli dopo come trama di una commedia da parte di un autore non consono all'utilizzo di tali soggetti. Ripercorrendo la genesi e la diffusione di "Carlos V sobre Tunez", la presente indagine si propone, quindi, di perseguire due obiettivi specifici. In primo luogo, si vuole determinare la misura in cui l'immagine e la rappresentazione teatrale della conquista di Tunisi riflettano ciò che avvenne realmente nel 1535. In secondo luogo, invece, si analizza il modo in cui Cañizares rappresentò nella sua commedia una determinata figura di Carlo V, che si basava principalmente sugli archetipi del re spagnolo, dell'imperatore e del leader cristiano che lottava contro la minaccia musulmana.*

PAROLE CHIAVI: *Guerra di successione spagnola, Guerra d'indipendenza spagnola, teatro, Spagna borbonica*

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The author, the play and the edition used

José de Cañizares was born in Madrid in 1676 and died there in 1750[1]. He carried out his profession as playwright long after the historical episode he writes about. Throughout his life, which encompassed part of the reigns of Charles II and Philip V, and hence the War of Spanish Succession, Spanish foreign policy was not much concerned with North Africa, with the notable exception of the re-conquest of Oran in 1732. It is therefore not very likely that the political events that unfolded while he was alive had much influence on his choice of topic for the play. The rekindling of interest in North Africa at the end of the eighteenth century and beginning of the nineteenth century is a different matter. Cañizares was undoubtedly among the major exponents of baroque theatre when attempts at introducing French and neoclassical culture into Spain were being made under the new regime of Phillip V, despite the fact that the elites as well as the masses preferred more traditional and dynamic plays along the lines of those written by Calderón and Lope de Vega[2]. According to theatre experts, Cañizares's plays are related to those of Calderon. However, the play we are concerned with here has more to do with Lope de Vega's plays, and specifically with *El cerco de Viena y socorro de Carlos Quinto* [*Charles V comes to the aid of the besieged city of Vienna*]. Although there is no evidence that *El cerco de Viena y socorro de Carlos Quinto* was performed in Madrid between 1661 and 1819, this does not mean that he was unfamiliar with it[3]. From 1702 until his death, Cañizares held the position of *Fiscal de Comedias de Madrid* – that is he was a member of the Board of Theatrical Censors – and as a result of this he made enemies. He combined that role with another, as composer of Sacred Letters (mostly carols in the vernacular) for the Royal Chapel which he obtained in 1700 or 1701, although his official appointment to that position did not occur until 1736. Cañizares also held a military position as a Lieutenant in the cavalry, although this appears not to have lasted very long, but it could well have contributed to his interest in military topics[4].

[1] A.V. Ebersole, *José de Cañizares, dramaturgo olvidado del siglo XVIII*, Editorial Ínsula, Madrid, 1975, p. 7.

[2] Ivi, pp. 8, 11.

[3] A.M. Coe, *Catálogo bibliográfico y crítico de las comedias anunciadas en los periódicos de Madrid desde 1661 hasta 1819*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1935; R. Andioc, M. Coulon, *Cartelera teatral madrileña del siglo XVIII (1708-1808)*, Presses Universitaires du Mirail, Toulouse, 1996.

[4] J. Herrera Navarro, *Catálogo de autores teatrales del siglo XVIII*, Fundación Universitaria Española, Madrid, 1993, p. 76.

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There are several editions of *Carlos V, sobre Tunez.* The one we have used is the edition published by the printing house Santa Cruz de Salamanca, sometime in the eighteenth century according to the bibliographic description proffered by the National Library of Spain[5]. According to Jerónimo Herrera the work was printed under Cañizares's name in 1749, although the musician Inachi signed various receipts related to it dated 20 November 1730[6], in other words, prior to the occupation of Oran and before Philip V's North African foreign policy achieved its first success. It should be noted that the work, at least at that time, required music and that it was not published until almost forty years after its first performances in 1711, which means it had obviously been written before that date. The play was performed on the 29th, 30th and 31st of January 1711 and between the 1st and 5th of February in the Corral del Príncipe, eight performances in all with an average daily attendance of 439 spectators[7]. Varey and Davis believe that the first of those performances was the play's premiere, and that the theatre company that managed all the performances was the one belonging to José Garcés[8]. These days, there seems to be no doubt that the year the play premiered was 1711[9]. It was performed again in October 1713, four times in the Corral del Príncipe by José de Prado's Company, with an average attendance of 653 spectators per performance[10]. There were further performances on the 25th, 26th and 27th of September 1717 in the Corral de la Cruz by Juan Alvarez's Company, with an average attendance of 635 spectators per performance[11]. According to Andioc and Coulon it was shown once more in several theatres in Madrid – in El Príncipe, in the theatre De La Santa Cruz, and that of Caños del

[5] Biblioteca Nacional de España, T/15061(8). This volume comprises the printed editions of several plays of the eighteenth century written by different authors. In the quotations that appear in this article both grammar and punctuation have been modernised. After each fragment we indicate inside brackets the page in the edition used. It is also worth noting that another edition was printed by the publisher Francisco Suriá, from Barcelona, in 1770. As we shall see, the play was performed on several occasions in that city. In fact, that edition was paid for by a theatre company which suggests that it must have been the same company who performed it. This is mentioned in the last page of the Catalan edition of the work which can be consulted in the Fondo Antiguo de la Biblioteca de Cataluña.

[6] J. Herrera Navarro, *Catálogo* cit., p. 78. This author refers to the play discussed here as a work written by Cañizares.

[7] J.E. Varey, C. Davis, *Los libros de cuentas de los corrales de comedias de Madrid*, Tamesis Books Limited, Madrid-London, 1992, p. 62.

[8] Ivi, p. 403 on the premier and 177 identification of the theatre company; J. Huerta Calvo (ed.), *Historia del Teatro Español*, Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 2003, p. II, 3021.

[9] J. Huerta Calvo (ed.), *Historia* cit., vol. II, p. 3021.

[10] J.E. Varey, C. Davis, *Los libros* cit., pp. 230, 385.

[11] Ivi, pp. 316, 385.

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Peral – in the years 1722, 1726, 1728, 1730, 1731, 1732, 1734, 1737, 1748, 1762, 1763, 1766, 1768, 1773, 1774, 1777, 1781, 1787, 1789, 1792, 1794, 1798 and 1805, although they do not mention the number of performances each year nor do they include the audience numbers. It was also probably performed in Madrid in the years 1738 and 1786[12].

The power that Cañizares eventually wielded over the theatre, and the enemies he made during his time as theatre censor probably contributed to the fact that after his death his work was almost immediately forgotten. Another reason why the play fell into oblivion was the vogue for French classical theatre and consequent decline in popularity of Spanish Baroque plays and those written in the style of Calderon which were generally more popular and less elitist.

The play is divided into three acts. The first begins with Barbarossa's attack on Tunis and ends with the Emperor's departure from Barcelona. The second act focuses on the taking of the fortified islet of La Goleta, and the third on the occupation of Tunis, Charles V's victory and the treaty signed with the king (as he was usually called) of Tunis, Mulay Hassan. As mentioned earlier, we know that at least when it was first performed, the play included music[13].

Genesis of the conflict between Charles V and Barbarossa, and development of the action

The beginning of the play presents the defeated Tunisian ruler, Mulay, who was deposed by Barbarossa in 1534. The corsair and Ottoman admiral is branded as a tyrant from that point on. Thus the cause of the war is presented as the consequence of the illegitimate seizure of power in Tunis. A foreign power that does not content itself with having dethroned the ruler – it also wants him dead:

No soldados os parezca
que cabalmente he vencido
si de mi furia sangrienta
huye Mulay y, así, para
que yo viva, Mulay muera (p. 1)[14].

[12] R. Andioc, M. Coulon, *Cartelera* cit., p. 650.
[13] J.E. Varey, C. Davis, *Los libros* cit., p. 385.
[14] «Soldiers don't think / that I have fully defeated Mulay / if he flees from my bloodthirsty fury / For me to go on living, / Mulay must die» (p. 1).

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In the same scene, an entirely fictitious female protagonist, Marfilia, provides us with vital information that defines Mulay, as the lawful and rightful ruler of Tunis. He is also given credibility by the fact that he spurns Marfilia, who loves him, because she is a sort of Sybil with supernatural powers, and he rejects her because of the spells she casts. The setting allows Charles V to be presented as the saviour who comes to set aright an illegal occupation by Barbarossa, referred to as «a pirate and a thief».

Two other characters who appear in the play were well-known personalities who participated with Barbarossa in the conquest of Tunis and other exploits: Sinan Reis, also known as Sinan the Jew, and Cachidiablo. Through the words of the latter we learn that Barbarossa is also angry with the Turks and with his overlord, sultan Suleiman. Barbarossa had sent Cachidiablo to Constantinople with gifts for Suleiman, including a hundred maidens, but his envoy returned to Tunis with this unwelcome news:

> Visires y Belerveyes
> refutaron la propuesta
> de hacerte Bajá, diciendo
> que puesto de gran grandeza
> en un bárbaro corsario,
> que sólo en robos, y presas
> fundaba su gloria, estaba
> como con baldón y afrenta (p. 5).

Interestingly, this adheres closely to the narrative included in the sixteenth-century chronicle of Prudencio de Sandoval[15].

Hence, Barbarossa is not only criticized by Mulay on moral grounds, and subsequently by Charles V and his collaborators, but also by the Turkish elite in Constantinople. Because of their refusal to raise him to the status he covets as Pasha, Barbarossa receives the title of Grand Admiral with disdain. He even threatens the sultan Suleiman, which turns him into a more evil and perfidious character[16]. Barbarossa goes on to describe some of his outstanding military operations, in particular his attacks on the Rock of Algiers, Sicily, Menorca, Ibiza and Valencia. In this, and throughout most of the work,

[15] P. de Sandoval, *Historia de la vida y hechos del Emperador Carlos V*, Atlas, Madrid, 1955, vol. II, p. 471: «Viziers and Belerveys / refused the proposal / to make you a Pasha, saying / that such an honourable office / does not befit a barbarian corsair, / whose glory is based / only on robbery and predation, which is / an infamy and affront».

[16] «Doesn't it suffice for Suleiman / that I should forgive him and through my bravery / fight for the Empires he rules over?» (p. 5).

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Cañizares is remarkably loyal to the historical facts[17]. Cachidiablo then announces to Barbarossa that a fleet is being put together in Barcelona and Barbarossa proclaims him General.

In the following scene the action moves to Barcelona, where Charles V appears with his closest counsellors, among them, the Marquis of Vasto whom we are informed will contribute 14,000 veteran soldiers (including Italians and men from Saxony) to the campaign. The Genoese admiral of the imperial fleet, Andrea Doria, is to transport 6000 Flemings on his ships, in addition to 10,000 Spanish soldiers[18]. The figures given are plausible, although it continues to be a matter of debate. The author, not unnaturally, takes the opportunity to comment on the Spanish soldiers, whom he refers to as Lions and Goths. The lion was a symbol associated with Spain in the days of Cañizares, although less so in the times of Charles V. They are also called Goths because of the Germanic tribes known to have settled in the Iberian Peninsula before Spain became a nation. He attributes to

[17] The Rock or Peñón of Algiers had fallen into Barbarossa's hands in 1529. J.F. Pardo Molero, *La defensa del Imperio. Carlos V, Valencia y el Mediterráneo*, Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, Madrid, 2001, pp. 239ff. This increased the danger for Spain as Barbarossa already had control over Algiers since 1521. From there he launched a series of attacks on the Spanish Levant, Sicily and Sardinia. M.Á. Bunes Ibarra, E. Sola Castaño, *La vida y historia de Hayradin, llamado Barbarroja*, Universidad de Granada, Granada, 1997, p. 18). It is worth mentioning the disaster of the Spanish squadron commanded by Portuondo which confronted Cachidiablo in the waters of Formentera (J.F. Pardo Molero, *La defensa* cit., p. 242) and the event, towards the end of August and beginning of September 1531, when Algerian vessels threatened the coast of Valencia and captured people from Mallorca and sixty others from Menorca (Ivi, p. 266).

[18] The figure of 14,000 men, comprising both German and Italian troops seems to us plausible if we bear in mind that some 8000 lansquenets were sent over from German lands alone. R. González Cuerva, *La aportación centroeuropea a una empresa mediterránea*, in R. González Cuerva, M.Á. Bunes Ibarra, *Túnez 1535: Voces de una campaña europea*, CSIC, Madrid, 2017, p. 29. There were 12,000 Spanish soldiers (10,000 infantry and 2000 cavalrymen), 5000 Italians, 2000 Portuguese plus some Flemings and Albanese. A. de Ceballos-Escalera, *Guerra y nobleza en la jornada de Túnez. Los capitanes del César*, in A. Alvar Ezquerra, J.I. Ruiz Rodríguez (eds.), *Túnez 1535: Halcones y halconeros en la diplomacia y la monarquía española*, Gremio de Halconeros del Reino de España, Madrid, 2010, pp. 123-153 estimates the total as 27,000: 25,000 infantry and 2000 horses with their riders; Davide Maffi, *Las guerras de los Austrias*, in L. Ribot (ed.), *Historia Militar de España. Edad Moderna. Escenario Europeo*, Ministerio de Defensa, Madrid, 2013, p. 105 puts it at 28,000. To these should be added the crews from the ships, nobles and their retinues, adventurers and other people not belonging to specific units. The fleet consisted of 82 galleys, 2 Flemish hulks, 40 galleons, 25 Andalusian and Portuguese caravels, 100 *ships* and an indefinite number of minor vessels and or/auxiliary boats. To confront the Emperor's troops, there were 8000 Turkish soldiers (1000 of them engaged in the defence of La Goleta), 800 Janissaries, 7000 Muslim archers and 7000 lancers as well as 8000 Alabar horsemen. A. de Ceballos-Escalera, *Guerra y nobleza* cit., pp. 134-135.

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the emperor a reflection on the special attributes of the Spaniards as soldiers:

> Aquesta sí que es gente para todo,
> que aunque Flandes, Italia y el Imperio
> llenando de esplendor el hemisferio
> encierran gente belicosa y fiera,
> no sé qué tiene España que en su esfera,
> los hombres, a pesar de la fortuna,
> soldados nacen ya desde la cuna (p. 7)[19].

Although he alludes to the international nature of the emperor's forces, the author thereby affirms the essential, Spanish nature of the campaign – contrary to more recent sources which underscore the expedition's European dimension[20]. The expression ºSpanish nature" remains relevant despite the participation of the Prince of Portugal, the Emperor's brother-in-law. In the play, prince Louis refers to Portugal as part of Spain. Although the union between Portugal and the rest of the Iberian realms did not take place until 1580 and lasted only until 1640. This identification between the neighbouring realms is not entirely surprising nor out of place, considering the close collaboration between the Spanish and Portuguese Monarchies over the centuries, particularly in the military arena, in the struggle against Islam[21]. What Cañizares does is to further enhance the reputation of Spain by making the Portuguese identify as Spaniards twice in the play. Before going into battle, Prince Louis remarks: «My Portuguese troops are also Spanish». It should be noted that the Emperor's praise for the Spaniards as excellent warriors not only served the purpose of exalting Spanish national feelings but also contributed to build up a picture of an Emperor who was becoming more Spanish-like in his ways. From that perspective, the references made to the Germans, Flemings and Italians besides adhering to reality, also provides another ingredient for the propaganda of a campaign in which the

[19] «These people are indeed good for everything, / for although Flanders, Italy and the Empire / fill the hemisphere with splendour / and have combative and fierce warriors, / there is something special in Spain, though I know not what this is / because the men there, whatever their fortune, / are born soldiers». The aptitude of the Spaniards for war is mentioned elsewhere; specifically, in the second act when just before going into battle to take La Goleta, the author puts the following words into the Duke of Alba's mouth: «That which the Spaniards cannot accomplish, / do not expect soldiers from another nation to achieve» (p. 18).

[20] R. González Cuerva, M.Á. Bunes Ibarra, *Túnez 1535* cit.

[21] P. Cardim, *Los portugueses frente a la Monarquía Hispánica*, in B.J. García, A. Álvarez-Ossorio (eds.), *La Monarquía de las Naciones. Patria, nación y naturaleza en la Monarquía de España*, Fundación Carlos de Amberes, Madrid, 2004, p. 367.

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collaboration between the troops from different origin seems to have been minimal[22].

Thereafter the action moves to Barcelona where fleet is being fitted, specifically to the Emperor's tent where the military leaders of the expedition – the Duke of Alba, the Prince of Portugal, the Marquis of Vasto, and the "Duke of Amalfi" come to discuss the expedition[23]. The Emperor immediately informs them that the Turk has greatly expanded his domains in the preceding years, taking advantage of the fact that Charles V was otherwise occupied

> en las guerras interiores
> y en los domésticos bandos,
> que mis pueblos dividieron
> y mi Imperio sublevaron,
> junto a las invasiones
> de los vecinos Estados (p. 8)[24].

These verses clearly evoke the problems arising from the Lutheran Reform but also to the different rebellions within his lands, and the wars with France. The Emperor continues recalling how the Turks took Rhodes from the Knights of the Order of Saint John of Jerusalem, but criticises the latter because they had «turned to France and the Pope for help, more so than to Spain»[25], and thus tries to minimise the opprobrium which Spain also deserved as no one helped the Knights. He also mentions the Ottoman invasion of Hungary and the death of his brother-in-law, king Luis, and notes that the rest of Europe did nothing against the Ottomans despite them penetrating into the heart of the continent. Here the author puts words into the Emperor's mouth which reflect eighteenth century notions of Europe. There are references to Christianity in general in the play, as in the case of the conversion of Muslim women, but Cañizares makes use of the concept of Christianity as if it was synonymous with Catholicism, again,

[22] R. González Cuerva, *La aportación* cit., p. 42.

[23] By the Duke of Amalfi the author means Andrea Doria, one of the leaders of the campaign along with the Duke of Alba, the Prince of Portugal and the Marquis of Vasto. The confusion seems to arise from the fact that the author mixes up Andrea Doria's real title as Prince of Melfi and the Duchy of Amalfi.

[24] «When civil wars / and noble conflicts / divided my people / and caused rebellion in my empire / as neighbouring powers invaded».

[25] This represents not just criticism of the other Christian nations, France and the Pope but a genuine self-criticism of the Spanish Monarchy although the author subsequently states that the Emperor granted to them (the Knights of St John) Malta and the nearby isles of Gozo and Comino («three islands for one: Rhodes – the one they lost to the Turk»).

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reflecting the views of eighteenth-century Europe rather than what was current from the sixteenth to the late seventeenth centuries.

The Emperor then makes a very important declaration concerning the ultimate reason why, after the seizure of Tunis by Barbarossa, he had decided to confront him. The previous conquests by the Muslims had been accomplished by a sovereign prince, albeit a barbarian, the Ottoman sultan:

Todas estas osadías,
todos estos desacatos
del Príncipe de los Turcos,
capitanes y vasallos,
aunque mi saña ofendieron,
mi vanidad no irritaron;
pues, aunque un bárbaro sea,
basta verle coronado
de la Dignidad suprema
entre su rústico bando
para que me den sus triunfos
enojo, más no enfado (pp. 8-9)[26].

But the attack on Tunis was carried out not by a sovereign but a commoner, a man described as a mere potter – which is how Barbarossa is presented to the audience – who became a corsair. This was intolerable because it dishonoured the emperor to be defeated by someone of such lowly status:

Más [h]oy, ni mi pundonor,
ni mi poder, ni mi garbo
puede tolerar ultraje
de un hombre que infame y bajo
se atreve a mi Dignidad,
sin que le cieguen sus rayos;
no ya como Emperador
de dos Mundos, como Carlos,
a darle castigo aspiro,
que es desdoro el que empleado
un César y un Rey de España
se mire contra un cosario,
que ayer un pobre Alfarero,
haciendo alhajas de barro,

[26] «All those bold, contemptuous acts, / committed by the Prince of the Turks, / along with his captains and vassals, / offended but didn't enrage me / for although he is a barbarian, / it suffices to see him among his rustic peoples / crowned and endowed / with supreme power / so that his victories irritate me / but do not anger me».

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míseramente vivía
del sudor de su trabajo,
ese Aradín Barbarroja (p. 9)[27].

We should note here that there is a common element, a fundamental agreement even between the oligarchy in Istanbul and the Emperor: both sides show hatred and contempt for a man who is not from the nobility, but from the lower classes, who aspires to the highest status. The Ottoman oligarchy is opposed to proclaiming Barbarossa a Pasha; the Emperor is insulted not by Barbarossa's conquest of Tunis but by the fact that the conquest was accomplished by a man from a low social stratum. Disdain by the upper class towards the poor unites two cultures that clash in almost all other areas. It also creates another element in which the campaign is shown to right wrongs.

The second argument outlined by the Emperor to justify military intervention is the defence of Europe. Once again here he is referring not to Christianity but to a concept: the notion of Europe, an idea intelligible for the public of the 18th century, but far less so for the Spaniards in 1535 for whom the key concept would be Christianity[28].

In that same scene Charles V describes Barbarossa as a second Grand Turk threatening Europe, for which reason they should be able to count on the support of the Pope and the King of France[29], something that actually did not happen in the case of the latter and only on a very small scale in the case of the Holy Father[30]. Subsequently, the first comparison is made, though subtly at this point, between Charles V and Scipio and also with Alexander the Great, the humanist and renaissance hero *par excellence*[31], yet this does not prevent the first reference being made to the campaign as a holy war. At that juncture, the Emperor reveals the reason for

[27] «But today neither my honour, / grace or power / can tolerate insults / from a despicable and lowly man /who dares to attack my dignity, / untouched by its powerful rays / I long to punish him / not as Emperor / of two Worlds, but as Charles / for it is a dishonour for a Caesar and a King of Spain / to be attacked by a corsair / who only yesterday was a poor potter, / making jewels out of clay / living miserably and sweating from / his petty work, / that man called Aradín Barbarossa» (p. 9). The reference to Barbarossa as a potter is historically correct, since that was his father's profession. D. Nordman, *Tempête sur Alger. L'expédition de Charles Quint en 1541*, Ed. Bouchene, Condé- sur-Noireau, 2011, p. 74.

[28] «I am afraid he will gobble up Europe / unless I contain him» (p. 9).

[29] «…the Pope owes me his help, / as does France…» (p. 9).

[30] The Pope contributed with six galleys. R. González Cuerva, M.Á. Bunes Ibarra, *Túnez 1535* cit., p. 67.

[31] «I bring four hundred ships, / and the best possible captains, / better than those that / Scipio or Alexander could gather» (p. 9).

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summoning the counsellors to this meeting: to debate whether he should lead the expedition, and if not him, who? Here another aspect of the Emperor's sense of superiority crops up in the presence of his counsellors. As the Duke of Alba, the Marquis of Vasto and Prince Luis get into a dispute about their right to command the task force, the Emperor interrupts them, naming the crucified Christ as General of the expedition and himself as his lieutenant. That sense of superiority is confirmed in the following scene when, exhausted, he falls asleep as Mulay heads towards his tent. Charles V dreams that he is in front of Mulay and promises to return his crown and kingdom to him – a commitment he ratifies when he wakes up.

The second act unfolds in Tunis after their arrival. It is worth noting that at this point, when Charles V appears for the first time with Mulay, the latter calls him the Christian Caesar and even Grand Sultan, as if he were the leader of the Islamic world. These are curious words coming from the mouth of a Muslim. Then several historical references follow. Tunis is presented to us as the successor of Utica, the homeland of Cato the Wise – the grandson of the Censor – who chose to commit suicide rather than live under the rule of Julius Caesar after his victory over Pompey. Also, Tunis is obviously the heir to Carthage, presented here, among other things, as «the Mistress of half of Spain»[32]. The historical reference that follows this is even more significant and concerns the death of Saint Louis: Mulay informs the Emperor that it was in that very place where the king of France had died while engaged in a crusade against Islam[33]. This is particularly interesting because the play hints at, though not as clearly as might be expected, the French king's refusal to participate in the military campaign of 1535. Likewise, it is worth emphasising that the play does not refer at all to the alliance between Francis I of France and the Turks in 1534. It would be odd if Cañizares – who was in other regards very well informed – was ignorant of these facts. The absence of explicit condemnation of France can perhaps be explained with reference to the political situation prevailing at the time

[32] The author is referring to the Treaty of the Ebro whereby Rome and Carthage split up the Iberian Peninsula into two zones of influence for their mutual advantage.

[33] This attempt to emulate Alexander the Great, Scipio and St. Louis has already been noted by other authors: M.Á. Bunes Ibarra, *La conquista de Túnez por los cronistas españoles*, in R. González Cuerva, M.Á. Bunes Ibarra, *Túnez 1535* cit., p. 10. Deswarte-Rosa even asserts that in the contemporary accounts (more or less) on the conquest of Tunis, the parallels drawn between Charles V and St. Louis are as numerous as those between the former and Scipio the African. S. Deswarte-Rosa, *L'expédition de Tunis (1535): images, interprétations, répercusions culturelles*, in B. Bennasar, R. Sauzet (eds.), *Chrétiens et musulmans à la Renaissance*, Honoré Champion, Paris, 1998, p. 94 and 103 where she points out that the parallels with St. Louis appear in chronicles of that period such as that of Alonso de Sanabria.

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the play was written. In 1711 Madrid had just been occupied definitively by troops of the French candidate to the Spanish throne, Philip de Bourbon, later Philip V.

Having used these historical arguments to exalt the Emperor, the play returns to the its moral theme, projecting Charles V's superiority through the order he gives to his troops to refrain from looting and other excesses, although we do know that excesses were actually committed[34]. The play continues to highlight also the moral and military superiority of the Spaniards on the battlefield by attributing to them the demand that they should be allocated the most dangerous tasks on the one hand, while renouncing plunder on the other. Whereas the first of these might well be true, it is very unlikely that any of them abstained from plundering. This may be simply a touch of literary license[35].

Two aspects in the description of the taking of La Goleta by the imperial troops should be noted as they are crucial to the messages the play is attempting to convey. In the first place, it again portrays the Spaniards as lions, an identification that can be found in the contemporary chronicle of Sandoval, albeit more briefly. Here, as in many other aspects, the play follows a popular pattern in Spanish Baroque theatre: the exaltation of the values that Spaniards attribute to themselves, in this instance, their bravery[36]. The second, and more important aim is to present a narrative of the battle that emphasises the importance of the emperor. It stresses that the assault was going badly for the Christians until the Emperor took his place at the head of the Spanish troops. Thus the turning point in the armed struggle, the success of this part of the enterprise is clearly attributed to the Emperor's presence on the battlefield. The second act ends with the

[34] For a selection of different accounts demonstrating how and why plundering was authorized see M.Á. Bunes Ibarra, *La conquista* cit., pp. 20ff. For a vision of the defeated (enemy) see A. Gafsi, *À propos des traces et des images de Charles Quint en Tunisie* in M.J. Rubiera (ed.), *Carlos V. Los moriscos y el Islam*, Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, Madrid, 2001, p. 271. In fact, Paul Achard and other authors consider the looting of Tunis as a typical example of that sort of military campaign. D. Nordman, *Tempête* cit., p. 253.

[35] Many contemporary sources and recent research state that quite the opposite happened, although some sources from that period or a little later point out that the Spaniards were more interested in the booty and blame the Germans in particular for the massacres: D. Nordman, *Tempête* cit., p. 253. Chronicles written by Germans who participated in the campaign, such as that of Niklaus Guldin assert quite the opposite, R. González Cuerva, *La aportación* cit., p. 43; R. González Cuerva, M.Á. Bunes Ibarra, *Túnez 1535* cit., p. 130. See also the semi-official chronicle of Perrenin in Ivi, pp. 98 and 14, which consists of seven dispatches sent by the Imperial Chancellery.

[36] The author puts the following words in the Emperor's mouth: «My lions from Spain/do not fear impossible tasks» (p. 22). P. de Sandoval, *Historia* cit., vol. II, p. 571. J.A. Maravall, *Teatro y literatura en la sociedad barroca*, Crítica, Madrid, 1972, p. 23 refers to «la exaltación de los valores que se atribuye la particular comunidad de los españoles».

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imperial conquest of the fortress of La Goleta, which had been stoutly defended by the Jewish corsair Sinan, and with Barbarossa's flight towards the city of Tunis[37].

The third act essentially deals with two aspects: on the one hand, it describes the Emperor's victory in Tunis; and on the other hand, it offers and a more in-depth account of his moral supremacy which is shown to stem in part from his being a legitimate sovereign. It is the latter issue with which the act commences: a face-to-face encounter between the Emperor and Mulay in which Charles V asserts that «Kings are Deities» and that he considers Mulay a brother. Thus, it is implied that the similarity and bond between kings is above and beyond differences between a Christian and a Muslim. However, the Emperor reproaches Mulay for the violence he had inflicted on his own family when he seized power in Tunis before Barbarossa's invasion: he had poisoned his father and murdered his brothers[38]. The play uses this to demonstrate the superiority of Western, Christian monarchies over their Muslim equivalents, in part because of the principle of primogeniture[39]. It also serves to condemn Muslims as practitioners of barbaric acts and for abiding to customs that are the opposite of the rationality and fairness which are attributed to Christian monarchies.

To that must be added an element of the utmost importance, especially because of its novelty: Charles V's recrimination of Mulay for his arbitrary and unfair rule over Tunis in the past, which also serves to enhance the Emperor's moral and political superiority:

> Vos sois cruel, ambicioso,
> desconfiado, inconstante
> y vengativo; no son
> de Rey estas propiedades
> no todo lo venga un Rey;
> arte de reinar es arte
> de disimular injurias,

[37] A detail that further illustrates the historical accuracy of the play in general.

[38] Many sources describe Mulay Hassan's cruelty both before and after the Emperor helped him to recover the throne: G. de Illescas, *Jornada de Carlos V á Túnez*, Rivadeneyra, Madrid, 1852, pp. xxi, 452. Some even assert that the hostility which some of the Tunisians felt towards him helped Barbarossa to conquer Tunis, P. de Sandoval, *Historia* cit., vol. II, pp. 472, 473, 474, 524. López de Gómara claimed that when Barbarossa was at the court in Constantinople, he said that Mulay's cruelty had facilitated the conquest of Tunis by the Ottoman-corsair forces: F. López de Gómara, *Guerras de mar del Emperador Carlos V*, Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, Madrid, 2000, p. 154. Other sources point to Mulay Hassan's tyranny as the cause of his own son's rebellion against him, A. de Ceballos-Escalera, *Guerra y nobleza* cit., p. 136.

[39] «…although it doesn't apply among the moors / (in Christian kingdoms) there reigns a just law / whereby the first son to be born is the heir…» (p. 25).

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que pecados generales
la Justicia en dos o tres
los reprime y satisface,
y queda el ejemplo a ser
castigo de los restantes (p. 25)[40].

This encounter serves more than one purpose: it provides an opportunity for Charles to exercise a degree of self-criticism by recalling his own experiences when the revolt of the Comuneros erupted. He attributes it to his own mistake in giving his leading Flemish adviser, Chièvres, too much power[41]. Having acknowledged this, he goes on to say that when he crushed the rebellion and the Council proposed that two hundred people be sentenced to death, he reduced that number to six, demonstrating his clemency. His words exemplify another popular aspect of Spanish Baroque theatre, which represented the authoritarian and hierarchical social structure as just and fair[42]. It is also important to stress that the emperor refers to the *comuneros* (literally, commoners) not as traitors but as people who had been deceived. Nor does he accuse the nobility of disloyalty or disaffection during the conflict. In fact he admits that he wore his Crown thanks to the behaviour of the aristocracy during that rebellion, something that has been challenged by historians of the period, but which fits with the play's reiterated defence of the hierarchical social structure[43].

[40] «You are cruel, ambitious, / mistrustful, inconstant / and vengeful; such features / are not becoming in a king / for a king cannot take revenge over everything; / The art of ruling is the art / of dissembling when offence is given / for as regards general sins / the Law soon takes care of them / repressing and providing justice / setting an example / that serves as punishment for others».

[41] Also at p. 25.

[42] J.A. Maravall, *Teatro* cit., pp. 32-33.

[43] Elliot characterises the nobility's response to the revolt as cautious; Belenguer calls it inhibition, and Kamen emphasises the division of the sector into those who collaborated with the rebels and those who repressed it. J.H. Elliot, *La España Imperial*, Vicens Vives, Barcelona, 1983, p. 161; E. Belenguer, *El Imperio Hispánico (1479-1665)*, Grijalbo Mondadori, Barcelona, 1995, p. 161; H. Kamen, *Una sociedad conflictiva: España, 1469-1714,* Alianza, Madrid, 1984, p. 133. It is likely that with exceptions like the great Andalusian noblemen with rights over large tracts of land, most Castilian nobles remained passive at first, but supported the King when the rebels threatened their seigniorial rights and privileges. M. Rady, *Carlos V,* Altaya, Barcelona, 1997, pp. 64-65. The repression was harsher than is presented in the play but it would have dented the emperor's portrayal as morally irreproachable to have acknowledged this. Rivero argued that out of the 285 people excluded from the general pardon, 23 were executed, and that the consequences were more political than anything else. Á. Rivero, *El mito comunero y la identidad nacional española*, in B.J. García, A. Álvarez-Ossorio (eds.), *La Monarquía* cit., p. 727. Others claim it was severe without providing quantitative data: A.M. Bernal, *Monarquía e Imperio*, Crítica-Marcial Pons, Barcelona, 2007, p. 87.

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Charles V continues criticizing Mulay for having personally participated in the looting of La Goleta, a disgraceful act unbecoming of royalty. In order for him to refrain from committing such an act again, the Emperor gives him 25,000 ducats. The Emperor's moral superiority is not only emphasised by the money given, but because he reprimands Mulay in private, as if a king could only be censured by another monarch without his subjects being witnesses. He goes on to reiterate that the wrath of a monarch must only be directed against another sovereign[44]. He then demands as tribute from the Muslim king not the usual monetary payment, but the promise that Mulay will respect his vassals and act mercifully towards them[45].

At the end of that scene an attack by Barbarossa is announced and, despite the danger and against the advice of some of his advisers, the Emperor refuses to withdraw, deciding instead to confront him in order to achieve a goal that once more puts him in a morally elevated position: rescuing Barbarossa's twenty thousand Christian captives. A sharp contrast, also of a moral nature, is made between the Emperor and Barbarossa. Whereas the former appears in the play at the head of his troops on various occasions, the latter insults and abuses his men when the battle turns against him. When the Jewish corsair Sinan tries to justify his defeat at La Goleta, the Spaniards are again presented as lions, but otherwise, the arguments that Cañizares attributes to him are similar to those included in the chronicle of Illescas[46]. At this point in the play, Barbarossa is presented in a more sinister light, ordering that if he is taken prisoner, the dungeons where the Christian captives are held should be set on fire[47].

During the battle that takes place as Barbarossa tries to retake La Goleta, Marfilia – the witch-like figure in love with Mulay – uses her magical powers to help the Spaniards:

las tropas de Carlos Quinto
deshacen y desbaratan
los turquesos escuadrones,
mas no con menos bizarra

[44] «Nobody other than another king / deserves to be the recipient of a king's enmity».

[45] «Pay homage to me in that / you will be merciful, / kind, attentive and affable, / towards your vassals / refraining from any blind passions» (p. 26).

[46] Compare Illescas's chronicle where Sinan declares: «I'm telling you, my Lord, that if I had to fight men, I wouldn't flee, but I was facing the devil and common sense told me to reserve myself for a more appropriate occasion» (G. de Illescas, *Jornada* cit., p. 455), with the play (p. 30): «Had you ordered me / to fight men I would have had no fear, / but confronting invincible devils; / and facing the furies of hell, / is an impossible task for any man».

[47] K. Brandi, *Carlos V*, Editora Nacional, Madrid, 1943, p. 306, believes this to be true.

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resolución Barbarroja
los rehace y los restaura…
Al conjuro de mi magia
haré que se turbe el Sol
y vagas nubes preñadas
de menuda artillería,
que el viento en su seno cuaja,
dando a las morismas huestes
la munición que disparan
en el rostro mostraré,
ya que no tengo otras armas,
que por Mulay mis ardides
hacen todo lo que alcanzan (pp. 30-31)[48].

The play does not reveal whether the Emperor's victory was influenced by this spell[49].

After the battle, with the Emperor in control of La Goleta, the Spaniards are praised. The emperor grants one hundred escudos to Pichon, who is cast as the *Gracioso* (the low status, comic character) in the play which he rejects it as an insult,

Eso conmigo no se habla.
Yo he venido a ganar honra.
Un español no se paga
con dinero, voto a Christo.
Para tropas alquiladas
es eso bueno. Dinero
ni cuanto vale Alemania
puede pagarme a mi un día
de hambre, calor y galbanas (p. 33)[50].

[48] «The troops of Charles V / defeat and throw into disarray / the Turkish squads, / but with as much bravery / and resolution, Barbarossa/ reforms and restores them … / With my magic spells / I shall obscure the Sun / and make vague clouds appear pregnant / with small artillery, / and with the help of the wind, / face the Moorish troops with the sight / of the ammunition they fire / being thrown back towards them / for I have no other weapons, / but to help Mulay / I will use all my cunning tricks to achieve this goal» (pp. 30-31).

[49] The involvement of magic is typical of baroque theatre, which was very popular in the first few years of the 18th century, particularly in Cañizares's plays, in which female characters played the role of magicians with extraordinary powers, E. Palacios, *El teatro tardobarroco y los nuevos géneros dieciochescos*, in J. Huerta Calvo (ed.), *Historia* cit., vol. II, p. 1563.

[50] «I'll have nothing of that. / I came here to earn honour. / A Spaniard cannot be bought / with money, by God. / Money is good / to buy mercenaries / Neither money nor all the riches / of Germany / can compensate me for a single day / of hunger, sweat or idleness» (p. 33).

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The Emperor marvels at the Spanish character while confirming the deeply rooted social hierarchy of the period:

> Está bien que, aunque gente baja,
> española ha de tener
> esta honra y esta jactancia (p. 33)[51].

The scene of Barbarossa's interrogation of the captive Spanish captain, Ripalda serves as a contrast and counterbalance to this encounter. Ripalda is a largely fictional character. He was not a captain but the commander of a regiment, and thus interacted closely with the emperor as it is shown in the play. He was a noble, not a commoner. He was wounded but not captured. Clearly the author changed the facts for dramatic effect[52], and to create an unblemished, heroic character who explains and facilitates the fate of the Christian captives in Tunis. The captain refuses to reveal the Emperor's plans and Barbarossa orders him to be locked up in the alcazaba, which is to be set on fire rather than let it fall into Christian hands. Barbarossa's evil plans are thwarted by Ripalda who overpowers the guards taking him to the dungeons and frees the other captives, who rebel against their jailers. In fact, the rebellion of the captives in Tunis appears to have been engineered by a Spanish renegade[53]. With this, Barbarossa disappears from the play.

In the next scene a new character appears linked to Charles V: Fame. The Emperor is presented as the new Scipio and the taking of the city is attributed to the heroic act of Captain Ripalda, who is now ennobled and given the much-coveted honour of a knighthood in a Military Order. This shows Charles V as king of Spain and head of the social hierarchy, the only one with power to confer nobility; it also identifies him as the champion of Christendom. While the hierarchical system is constantly reinforced, serving the Crown is presented as a way of transcending a lowly status.

[51] «It is good that the Spaniards / though of lowly status / should have such honour and pride» (p. 33).

[52] A. de Ceballos-Escalera, *Guerra y nobleza* cit., p. 144.

[53] The captives, estimated at between 16,000 and 20,000, were released as a result of the betrayal of the Spanish renegade Francisco de Medellín, who was pardoned by the Emperor as a reward, A. de Ceballos-Escalera, *Guerra y nobleza* cit., p. 137. All accounts – Muslim or Christian – agree it was a crucial factor in the Emperor's victory: K. Brandi, *Carlos* cit., p. 306; M.Á. Bunes, *La ocupación del Magreb por Hayreddin Barbarroja según el ms. 2459 de la Üniversite Kütüphanesi de Estambul*, in M.J. Rubiera (ed.), *Carlos* cit., p. 192; Seyyid Murad on the life of the Barbarossa brothers in M.Á. Bunes Ibarra, E. Sola Castaño, *La vida* cit., p. 124.

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Political context, validity and significance of the play

On the 28th of September 1710 Madrid was occupied by the troops of the Archduke of Austria, remaining there until the 3rd of December. Is there a link between the situation in the capital in the months before the play was premiered and the play? We think it cannot be a coincidence, particularly since Cañizares did not produce many historical works. Let us not forget that the central character of the play was Charles V, the founder of the Habsburg dynasty of Spain. We get a sense of the importance that Charles V, and in particular the Tunis expedition, had for the two main contenders for the Spanish throne in that both Philip of France and Archduke Charles ordered reproductions of the famous Tunis tapestry series designed by Vermeyen, who had been with the imperial forces in 1535[54]. While there is no direct evidence to link the play to the conflict for the crown, the fact that both contenders claimed the Emperor's inheritance for themselves gave the topic a contemporary relevance it would not have had otherwise. The play must have been written and its premiere organised during the period of Austrian ascendancy in the capital, which suggests that it could be interpreted as supportive of the Habsburg candidate, the Archduke Charles, a member of the same dynasty as the emperor. It is also worth noting that the text refers to Charles V as the Emperor (also as Caesar and Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire) and not to Charles I of Spain[55]. The fact that the play went ahead even after the French candidate, who became Philip V, recovered control of the capital, may have something to do with the fact that he too claimed to be the legitimate successor of Charles V. Quite possibly, Cañizares appeared above suspicion due to the multiple official posts he held. It is worth remembering, however, that the political ambiguity we can detect in the play may partly reflect the uncertainty of the times, and fits the curious situation whereby both candidates claimed descent from Charles V.

If the work was written as propaganda for the Austrian pretender, it is hard to explain the absence of criticism of the French and their past alliance with the Turks. However, it is worth considering that the

[54] M.Á. Bunes, *Vermeyen y los tapices de la Conquista de Túnez. Historia y representación*, in B.J. García García (ed.), *La imagen de la guerra en el arte de los antiguos Países Bajos*, Editorial Complutense-Fundación Carlos de Amberes, Madrid, 2006, p. 130.

[55] The House of Austria often resorted to literature on the subject of Charles V and specifically the Conquest of Tunis in 1535 to enhance its image, even as late as 1810 when the epic poem *Tunisias* was written in German by Johan Baptiste Ladislaus Pyrker. D. Nordman, *Tempête* cit., p. 306.

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play was not performed in Madrid for nearly seventy years, between 1717 and 1787, which is odd since the author was the chief theatre censor in the capital until his death in 1750. This fact might indicate that the play and/or its performance was programmed at a specific political time that corresponded to the domination of Madrid by the Archduke of Austria, and was regarded as such. It was performed subsequently in a very different political context that saw no danger or harm in it. There are other factors that might have influenced the pattern of performances. The fact that it wasn't performed at the Court between 1717 and the death of Cañizares in 1750 might indicate that the author didn't much value the piece, or that it had been produced in haste to meet specific political circumstances and the author deliberately applied self-censorship once the situation changed[56]. Nor can we entirely dismiss the possibility that the success of the play in 1711, 1713 and 1717 was due in large part to its scenic effects and not simply to its political topicality.

After these performances, we only have news of the play's revival in 1786 (Teatro de Santa Cruz), 1787 (performed on the 7th, 8th and 9th of September at the Teatro del Príncipe), 1798 (from the 11th to the 16th of November at the Teatro de Santa Cruz) and 1792 (from the 4th to the 9th of January at the Teatro de Santa Cruz)[57]. Clearly, the play enjoyed a degree of success in the later years of the eighteenth century in terms of number of performances. This is supported by the fact that it was also performed several times in Barcelona between 1775 and 1777 – unfortunately we have no specific data relating to these[58]. We do know that it was put on again on the 30th of January 1784[59], the 14th and 15th of November 1789[60], and the 9th, 10th, 30th and 31st of October 1790[61]. We can conclude that it was a successful play in Barcelona at the time, particularly in October 1790 with four performances, which was very unusual for the time. Its success there may have something to do with the fact that it was published by a printer from that city in 1790 at the request of a theatre company, as

[56] It must be stressed again that Cañizares wrote very few plays of a historical nature; the majority of his output dwelt on magic, saints and *zarzuelas*. J. Huerta, E. Peral, H. Urzáiz, *Teatro Español. De la A a la Z*, Espasa, Madrid, 2005, p. 126. We have already seen how this particular play includes some magical elements.

[57] A.M. Coe, *Catálogo* cit., p. 38.

[58] A. Par, *Representaciones teatrales en Barcelona durante el siglo XVIII*, «Boletín de la Real Academia Española», 16 (1929), pp. 337, 339.

[59] Specifically, by the Italian company consisting of Mariana and Teresa Tomba, Francisco Antonucci, Ángel Vallí, Gasparo Angelini, Antonio Tossi, Josephe Gradotti, Josephe Campana, Jaime Panti and Adriana Garioni. Ivi, p. 497.

[60] Ivi, p. 597.

[61] Ivi, p. 600.

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already noted. It was not only Barcelona, however. In Valencia, the play was performed on the 3rd and 4th of July 1790, on the 10th of December 1795, on the 7th of September 1796 and on the 30th of August 1797[62]. In Seville, we know it was performed on the 24th of August 1800, on the 11th of August 1806, on the 21st of January 1808, on the 19th of May 1813, on the 29th and 30th of October 1814, on the 10th and 11th of June 1815 and on the 30th of November and 1st of December 1816[63].

This revival of Cañizares's play appears to date from between 1775 and 1777, and should be seen in the context of foreign relations between Spain and North African powers of that period. Although during the reign of Charles III various peace treaties were signed – one with Morocco (1766)[64] and another with the Sublime Porte (the Ottoman Empire, in 1782) – relations with Algeria are best characterised as *guerre couverte*, an undeclared war against the corsairs based there. Piracy was so prevalent it had led to the near collapse of navigation in the Western Mediterranean, endangering the interests of the Balearic Archipelago and much of the Spanish Levantine coast. The punitive strike by Spain in 1775 against Algiers, the same year when according to our sources the play was performed for the first time in Barcelona[65], was a total disaster that led to many complaints and a wave of vicious satires[66] that brought about the dismissal of the Marquis of Grimaldi. Against this background, Cañizares's play could be seen as a useful piece of propaganda, and government ministers were not unaware of the power of the theatre in this respect. It presented a king who happened to have the same name as the current King of Spain as victor over the Muslim enemy[67]. The fact that Charles V's victory was in Tunis and not in Algiers wasn't of much importance: what mattered was the defeat of an infidel pirate, Barbarossa, at that time known as the King of Algiers, and therefore the embodiment of Algerian piracy. However, the confrontation

[62] A. Zabala, *El teatro en la Valencia de finales del siglo XVIII*, Institució Alfons el Magnànim, Valencia, 1982, p. 285.

[63] F. Aguilar, *Cartelera prerromántica sevillana. Años 1800-1836*, «Cuadernos Bibliográficos», 22 (1968), p. 15.

[64] This treaty did not prevent the war with Morocco of 1774 which had a considerable influence on the decision by Spain to attack Algiers in 1775. E. Villalba, *O'Reilly y la expedición de Argel (1775). Sátiras para un fracaso*, in A. Guimerá, V. Peralta (eds.), *El equilibro de los Imperios*, Fundación Española de Historia Moderna, Madrid, 2005, p. 571.

[65] The other two expeditions took place in 1783 and 1784.

[66] E. Villalba, *O'Reilly* cit.

[67] Jovellanos appreciated the value of history to nurture patriotism among the public, J.M. Caso, *Notas sobre la comedia histórica en el siglo XVIII*, in *Coloquio Internacional sobre el teatro español del siglo XVIII*, Piovan Editore, Padua, 1988, p. 129.

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between Spain and the Regency of Algiers might explain the play's revival at the time, but not its enduring popularity after 1786 when a peace treaty was signed between the two states[68]. The play's performances beyond that date must have been due to other factors. Firstly, we must point out that the work was publicised by being included in the catalogue of the companies that put on the play after 1775. Secondly, we must not forget that the public in the last quarter of the eighteenth century were very much in favour of historical plays, and particularly those with a military theme, and complex and baroque plots that were so different to those typical of neoclassical theatre[69]. Cañizares's plays in general and this one in particular, fitted the new vogue[70].

The first few years of the nineteenth century and particularly those corresponding to the Spanish War of Independence saw another revival of *Charles V in Tunis*. The vindication of great military feats by one nation (Spain) oppressed by another (France) may have given it renewed topicality. The play was revived on the same day in Madrid and in Palma de Mallorca in the reign of Joseph I, Napoleon's brother[71]. During the performance in in Madrid on the 2nd of November 1811 one scene in particular caused a great a stir, raising the audience's patriotic spirits so much that the French authorities ordered it to be removed from the next day's performance. The scene is in the second act, when Captain Ripalda describes his men to the emperor in these terms:

aquéllos son españoles,
gran señor, soldados viejos,
los que en Italia os han dado
a millares los trofeos.
Aquellos rotos vestidos,
aquellos semblantes negros
de los soles del verano
y de los fríos del invierno
aguantados en campaña
son, Señor, cuenta con ellos,
que aunque no vienen galanes
tiran bien y empujan recio.
Aquellos pobres andrajos,

[68] E. Villalba, *O'Reilly* cit., p. 585.
[69] D. Garcías, *Historia del teatro en Mallorca. Del Barroco al Romanticismo, 1600-1834*, Lleonard Ed., Palma de Mallorca, 2005, p. 378.
[70] Ivi, p. 379.
[71] M. Larraz, *Le Théâtre à Palma de Majorque pendant la guerre d'Indépendance (1811-1814)*, «Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez», 10 (1974), p. 347.

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galas son de Marte horrendo,
adornos son de su fama,
porque tantos agujeros
cuantos el vestido muestra
tienen en rostro y pechos
dados por vuestros contrarios;
con solo esos cuatrocientos
rotos y descamisados
he de entraros, vive el cielo,
en Túnez, aunque lo impidan
más demonios (p. 19)[72].

There was such an uproar in favour of its reinstatement that the authorities were forced to rescind the order and allow the scene to be reintegrated[73].

Conclusion

It is worth noting how, in the work of Cañizares, the Turks play a very minor role, although they remained a great power in the period the play was written. The author doesn't identify Barbarossa with the Ottomans who employed and supported him and under whose banner he fought. That runs contrary to the enduring Spanish tradition whereby the Turks were identified with Islam. As has been demonstrated, however, in general the play by Cañizares was loyal to the historical facts. Literary license is used, in particular to define the profile of the characters, especially that of Charles V. If there is a single feature that characterizes the Emperor in the play, it is his moral superiority. In that regard, the play makes use of one of the main

[72] «Those are the Spaniards, / my Lord, veteran soldiers, / the men who gave you so many victories / in Italy. / Those men wearing ragged clothes, / their faces scorched by the summer sun / and by the cold of many winters / endured in your campaigns. / You can count on them, Sire / for although they are not well-dressed gentlemen / they are good shots and fight hard. / Their wretched rags / are the drapes of fearful Mars / and the ornaments of their fame. / As numerous as the holes / in their clothes / are the scars in their faces and chests / caused by your enemies. / With just four hundred of those / ragged, half-naked soldiers / God willing I will enter Tunis on your behalf, / even if there are more demons there / to prevent it» (p. 19).

[73] M. Larraz, *Le Théâtre* cit., p. 331. According to Hüseyin Güngör Sahin, the play had been performed in Madrid in November 1810 but he wrongly dates the play to 1769, nineteen years after the death of Cañizares and more than half a century after its premiere. G. Shahin, *Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha, llamado Barbarroja, en el teatro español y latinoamericano como un instrumento de la propaganda*, in Ö. Seçkin (ed.), *El viejo mundo y el nuevo mundo en la era del diálogo*, Universidad de Ankara, Ankara, 2014, p. 794.

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characteristics of baroque theatre in the 17th century: glorifying the monarchy[74]. Thus, in the case of Mulay, portrayed as the legitimate King of Tunis, the Emperor is presented to the audience (and thus behaves) like a superior being not only because of his status as emperor and the fact that he is providing military assistance, but also because of his magnanimity since he gives Mulay back his kingdom. And more importantly, because he advises the Muslim king to change the way he rules, and to control his emotions when making decisions about government. Charles V's superiority vis-à-vis the nobles who appear in the play is also clear, and not just because the highest-ranking aristocrats cannot decide which of them has greater claim to lead the military operation, but because of the way the emperor settles the matter by saying that he will lead the campaign not as commander but as lieutenant of Christ, whom he sees as the true Captain General of the expedition[75]. It is further worth noting in this regard that all the noblemen who appear in the play are of relevance not because of who they are but because the Emperor had delegated authority to them. Only a fraction of the nobles from diverse lands who accompanied Charles V in the campaign are included here such as Alba, Vasto and Doria[76]. This enables the playwright to establish the supremacy of the king over his noblemen, and the pre-eminence of military expertise over the *nobilitas* inherited by birth. Likewise, important servants of the Emperor with no military functions who participated in the campaign are left out of the play, even the imperial secretary of state, Nicolas Perrenot de Granvelle, who witnessed the agreement between Mulay and Charles V[77], or his counterpart, Francisco de los Cobos. What is especially surprising is that Garcilaso de la Vega, an

[74] J.A. Maravall, *La función educadora del teatro en el siglo de la ilustración*, in *Estudios dedicados a Juan Peset Aleixandre*, Universidad de Valencia, Valencia, 1982, vol. II, p. 624. The same author revealed the way that monarchies and some republics in the eighteenth century created what he calls *resources of persuasion*, the basis of the culture of the Baroque within which there would be a propagandist attitude to disseminate it by various means; in the case of theatre by trying to integrate the public socially so that it supports the existing political powers. J.A. Maravall, *Teatro* cit., pp. 14-16, 22, 25, 26, 31ff.

[75] This episode appears in many other contemporary accounts, and after the event.

[76] For further information about the noblemen of the different territories under the rule or auspices of Charles V who participated in the Tunis Campaign see P. de Sandoval, *Historia* cit., vol. II, pp. 490-494. Some sources point out that the Tunis campaign was the last time that the noblemen were requested to participate in such military expeditions (A. de Ceballos-Escalera, *Guerra y nobleza* cit., p. 146). According to Nordman over 1,500 Spanish nobles participated in the campaign (D. Nordman, *Tempête* cit., p. 147).

[77] A. Alvar Ezquerra, *Los Mediterráneos de Carlos V y la empresa de Túnez*, in A. Alvar Ezquerra, J.I. Ruiz Rodríguez (eds.), *Túnez 1535* cit., p. 218.

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outstanding man of letters who participated in that war and was wounded in battle[78], does not appear[79].

Cañizares's work reflects the portrayal of Charles V in Tunis that can be found in the official chronicle of Perrenin, recently published and analysed by Miguel Ángel Bunes, who summarises it thus:

> A ruler who exercises his function as a military commander to perfection; a fair judge and a man who defends his soldiers and nobles … His treatment of a Muslim prince (Mulay Hassan) as an ally exemplifies a sovereign who respects rulers who practice a religion contrary to that of the Emperor providing that they accept the supremacy and boundaries of Christianity[80].

It is remarkable that we should find this in the work of Cañizares, written almost two hundred years after the event. It indicates not only the continuity in the image and portrayal of Charles V in Spain, but also the endurance of values personified in the character of the emperor, which are presented as timeless and endowed with exemplary moral superiority.

[78] Marqués de Sierra Bullones, *Garcilaso: cuatro apuntes en la ocasión de rememorar su participación en la Jornada Imperial de Túnez de 1535*, in A. Alvar Ezquerra, J.I. Ruiz Rodríguez (eds.), *Túnez 1535* cit.

[79] P. Girón, *Crónica del Emperador Carlos V*, CSIC, Madrid, 1964, p. 59.

[80] M.Á. Bunes Ibarra, *La conquista* cit., p. 13.

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

FONTI

Néstor Vigil Montes

UN MANUSCRITO EN EL ARCHIVO GENERAL DE SIMANCAS CON DOCUMENTACIÓN DIPLOMÁTICA PARA LA DIPLOMACIA ITALIANA DEL RENACIMIENTO

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RESUMEN: *En el Archivo General de Simancas se conserva un manuscrito que contiene la copia de 241 documentos sobre la diplomacia entre el Ducado de Milán y el Papado entre 1369 y 1515, que fue elaborado en el Archivo Ducal de Milano a instancias del Consejo de Italia en un momento indenterminado de la presencia española en el Milanesado. Se trata de un documento de enorme interés para la historia de la diplomacia italiana bajomedieval, puesto que alberga numerosas copias de documentos que por diversas razones no se conservan en el Archivio di Stato de Milano. Por ello, hemos considerado interesante realizar un estudio de sus características físicas, de su contenido (con especial atención a los tratados diplomáticos) y de su posible contexto de elaboración.*

PALABRAS CLAVE: *Diplomacia del Renacimiento italiano, Diplomática del documento para la diplomacia, Archivo General de Simancas, Consejo de Italia de la Monarquía Hispánica, Ducado de Milán.*

A SIMANCAS ARCHIVES MANUSCRIPT WITH DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS OF THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE DIPLOMACY

ABSTRACT: *In the General Archive of Simancas is preserved a manuscript containing 241 documents on diplomacy between the Duchy of Milan and the Papacy between 1369 and 1515, which was prepared in the Ducal Archive of Milan at the request of the Council of Italy in a indeterminate moment of the Spanish presence in the Milanesado. It is a document of great interest for the history of Italian Renaissance Diplomacy, since it has numerous copies of documents that for various reasons are not preserved in the Archivio di Stato of Milano. Therefore, we have considered interesting to study their physical characteristics, their content (with special attention to diplomatic treaties) and their possible elaboration context.*

KEYWORDS: *Italian Renaissance Diplomacy, Diplomacy Document Diplomatics, General Archive of Simancas, Council of Italy of the Hispanic Monarchy, Duchy of Milan.*

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1. Introducción[1]

En la búsqueda de cartularios destinados a conservar documentos para la diplomacia, fuimos advertidos[2] de la preservación de una interesante pieza denominada *Libro registro de tratados y convenios de los sumos pontífices con diversos príncipes. Comienza por la paz ajustada en Lucca en el año 1369 entre el papa Urbano, el emperador y la reina Juana de Nápoles*, que se encuentra custodiado en el Archivo General de Simancas, más concretamente dentro de la serie Visitas y diversos de la sección Secretaria de Nápoles del fondo Consejo de Italia[3].

Este hecho fue llamativo, puesto que no es habitual encontrarse con cartularios elaborados por los destinatarios de documentos para la diplomacia[4], en efecto, solamente conocemos la existencia de cuatro manuscritos de esta categoría: dos de ellos realizados en el Reino de Francia durante el reinado de Felipe IV (1285-1314)[5], y otros dos elaborados en el Reino de Portugal en el siglo XV[6]. Asimismo, en ninguno de los casos mencionados el cartulario se conserva fuera de sus archivos nacionales (Archives Nationales de la France y Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo) como ocurre en este caso. No obstante, este hecho podría explicarse en la compleja historia política de la península itálica en el Antiguo Régimen, y más concretamente, a la dominación de numerosos territorios por parte de la Monarquía Hispánica en la Edad Moderna. Por ello, bien podría ser un cartulario realizado durante el siglo XV por uno de los archivos de las entidades políticas italianas

[1] Abreviaturas utilizadas: Archivo General de Simancas (Ags), Biblioteca Nacional de España (Bne), Archivio di Stato di Milano (Asmi), Archives Nationales de la France (Anf), Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo (Antt).

[2] En este sentido quisiéramos agradecer a Óscar Villarroel González el hecho de notificarnos la existencia del manuscrito.

[3] Ags, Consejo de Italia, Secretaria de Nápoles, Visitas y Diversos, Secretarias Provinciales, Libro 63.

[4] N. Vigil Montes, *Cartularios para la diplomacia de las monarquías bajomedievales. La promoción de los cartularios para la diplomacia de la dinastía portuguesa de Avis*, en Rodrigo Furtado y Marcello Moscone (eds.), *Studies on Cartularies and Archival Memory in the Middle Ages*, FIDEM - Brepols, Basilea, 2019, pp. 309-324.

[5] Anf, JJ, docs. 5 y 16. Catalogados en H. Stein, *Bibliographie Général des Cartulaires Français ou relatifs a l'Histoire de France*, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, 2010, p. 198

[6] Antt, Gavetas, gaveta 18, maço 7, doc. 28. Estudiado y regestado en N. Vigil Montes, *«Tractados de pazes, aliança e concordia entre as duas coroas de Portugal e Inglaterra», un cartulario realizado a comienzos del siglo XV para consolidar el Tratado de Windsor entre los reinos de Inglaterra y Portugal (1386), la alianza permanente más prolongada de la historia*, «Espacio, tiempo y forma, serie III (Historia Medieval)», n. 32 (2019), pp. 469-498; y Antt, Leitura Nova, livro 61. Estudiado y regestado en N. Vigil Montes, *«Livro de demarcações entre estes reinos e os de Castela e de contratos de pazes»: un cartulario para las relaciones lusocastellanas en la baja Edad Media*, «Documenta & Instrumenta», n. 13 (2015), pp. 133-165.

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que posteriormente cayeron bajo soberanía hispánica como el Reino de Nápoles o el Ducado de Milán, y que por ello pudiera ser transferido al Consejo de Italia. No obstante, en ese caso lo normal es que el manuscrito finalmente recalase en alguno de los legajos italianos de la colección facticia Patronato Real[7] al no tratarse de un documento producido directamente por el Consejo de Italia.

Lo cierto es que todas las ideas preconcebidas sobre este documento se disiparon en el momento de consultarlo en el archivo. En primer lugar, y como acontece en muchos casos con la documentación de los archivos por falta de medios para realizar descripciones más precisas y actualizadas, el título otorgado al manuscrito es erróneo, o es, cuanto menos, inexacto. Esto se trata de algo que puede explicarse en el hecho de que probablemente el título parta de la descripción realizada para el inventario de 1826[8], así como aparece en la ficha de descripción aportada por el archivo para la pieza. Lo que parece entreverse de este título decimonónico es que el archivero únicamente accedió al primero de los documentos que contiene el manuscrito, y resumió el resto del contenido con un vago tratados y convenios de los sumos pontífices con diversos príncipes, que copia literalmente la descripción del lomo de la encuadernación, y que para nada refleja la diversidad política de la península italiana del Renacimiento, ni tampoco aporta luces sobre la naturaleza exacta del manuscrito. Tampoco se utilizó de forma adecuada la categoría registro, que para los diplomatistas se trata de un volumen en el que un órgano de expedición documental asienta el contenido de aquellos documentos que otorga[9], y que en este caso no puede serlo, dado que lo que aparece son copias de documentos expedidos por diversas cancillerías y notarías. Además, en ese primer vistazo al manuscrito pudo comprobarse por su escritura humanística del siglo XVI-XVII que se trataba de una elaboración auspiciada por el Consejo de Italia, y no de una incautación de un manuscrito medieval.

Todas las aseveraciones que acabamos de hacer en esta introducción van encaminadas a eliminar las ideas preconcebidas de una desafortunada descripción archivística y a señalar lo que el manuscrito no es. Pero nuestro objetivo es analizar la verdadera naturaleza del manuscrito, su contexto de producción y su importancia como fuente histórica, con tal fin daremos respuesta a preguntas tales como: ¿Quién pudo elaborar el manuscrito?, ¿En qué cronología se elaboró?,

[7] Ags, Patronato Real, legajos 41 y 42 (Nápoles y Sicilia), 43 y 44 (Milán), y 45 y 46 (Diversos de Italia).

[8] Inventario manual de las Secretarias Provinciales, formado de nuevo para el uso de este Real y General Archivo de Simancas. Año 1826

[9] M. Cárcel Ortí (ed.), *Vocabulaire Internacional de Diplomatique*, Universitat de València, Valencia, 1997, p. 38

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¿Para qué estuvo interesado en realizarlo?, ¿En qué categoría diplomática podemos encajar al manuscrito?, ¿Debería cambiar el título archivístico e incluso la sección en el archivo?, ¿Cuál es la importancia del documento y de documentos similares?

2. Descripción del manuscrito

El manuscrito *Libro registro de tratados y convenios de los sumos pontífices con diversos príncipes. Comienza por la paz ajustada en Lucca en el año 1369 entre el papa Urbano, el emperador y la reina Juana de Nápoles* es un libro en soporte papel que contiene unos 396 folios cuyas medidas son 242x346mm, es decir, ligeramente superiores al formato folio. Asimismo, está provisto de una sencilla encuadernación en pergamino cuyas medidas son 243x353mm. Por una parte, en el lomo de la encuadernación contiene algunos datos como posibles signaturas archivísticas antiguas: «29» y «m. 12», las datas límite de los documentos que forman parte de él: «1369-1515» y una descripción en latín de su contenido de la que únicamente se puede leer con claridad: «[Cap]ituli Summum Pontifici cum diversi [principi]». Una descripción que como hemos señalado fue empleada para la descripción archivística del libro. Por otra parte, en el dorso de la tapa tenemos posibles indicaciones de archivo, una de ellas tachada con el número 2097 y la otra con el número 302, las cuales se complementan con una pegatina en la contratapa con el mensaje: «Secretarias provinciales 23» y una impresión en tinta en la primera página con el número 2097.

Por los materiales utilizados en el soporte de escritura y en la encuadernación podemos lanzar la hipótesis de que no se trata de un manuscrito con enorme solemnidad que pudiera ser utilizado para aparato. Algo que podemos corroborar en que está realizado con una escritura cursiva, que no ofrece grandes florituras en la elaboración de los títulos de los documentos, y que en la disposición del contenido no aparecen unos grandes márgenes – los márgenes laterales a ambos lados son fijo y miden 40mm., mientras que los márgenes superiores e inferiores varían entre los 25 y los 35mm. La escritura empleada fue una humanística cursiva, la cual tuvo su origen en la península itálica durante la decimoquinta centuria[10] y no se popularizó en Castilla hasta la segunda mitad

[10] B. Louis Ullman, *The origin and development of humanistic script*, Edizioni di Storia e letteratura, Roma, 1960. J. Wardrop, *The script of humanism: some aspects of humanistic script, 1460-1560*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963. S. Zamponi, *La scrittura umanistica*, «Archiv für Diplomatik», 50 (2004), pp. 467-504. J.C. Galende Díaz, *La escritura humanística en la Europa del Renacimiento*, «Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, Serie III, (Historia Medieval)», 11, 1998, pp. 187-230.

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del siglo XVI, de ahí que también se la conociera como escritura itálica. La introducción de esta escritura primero tuvo lugar en la cancillería regia de la Monarquía Hispánica y progresivamente fue alcanzando otros sectores más reacios a abandonar la tradicional escritura gótica cursiva, la cual perduró hasta comienzos del siglo XVII[11]. Por tanto, al ser escrito en humanística cursiva el manuscrito no fue concebido como un mero documento administrativo interno y probablemente fuese redactado por una o varias personas cercanas a la cancillería de la monarquía hispánica y/o con una enorme influencia de la cultura italiana. Decimos que puede que fuera escrito por varias personas, dado que a partir del folio 355r. se observa un cambio de letra y de formato a la hora de acometer los títulos de los documentos.

Respecto al contenido, el manuscrito contiene un vasto número de documentos, un total de 233 documentos individualizados que alcanzan los 241 si se tienen en cuenta los 8 documentos insertos en algunos de ellos. Todos los documentos diplomáticos que fueron copiados en el manuscrito son relativos a la intensa actividad diplomática de las diversas formaciones políticas de la península itálica entre 1369 y 1515[12]. Los más importantes son un conjunto de dieciséis tratados diplomáticos de diversa índole (alianzas militares, tratados de paz, treguas...) que articulan a una serie de documentos relacionados que componen el grueso del manuscrito, puesto que, como podemos observar en el gráfico 1, los tratados solamente representan el 7% del manuscrito. Entre estos documentos de apoyo encontramos la cuantiosa correspondencia propia de un contexto en el que la epístola fue básica para la diplomacia[13], las numerosas ratificaciones en su mayor parte de pequeñas formaciones políticas dependientes de los grandes

[11] Sobre la cuestión de la introducción de la escritura humanística cursiva en la península ibérica resultan enormemente interesantes las aportaciones de la obra B. Casado Quintanilla y J.M. López Villalba (coords.), *Paleografía III: La escritura gótica (desde la imprenta hasta nuestros días) y humanística, Actas de las VI Jornadas de la Sociedad Española de Ciencias y Técnicas Historiográficas (Guadalajara 2008),* Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, Siero, 2011.

[12] Dentro de la prolífica bibliografía sobre la diplomacia italiana del siglo XV destacaremos la monografía I. Lazzarini, *Comunication and Conflict. Italian Diplomacy in the Early Renaissance, 1350-1520*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015.

[13] Esta reflexión es parte de las conclusiones de la obra de F. Senatore, *«Uno mundo de carta», Forme e strutture della diplomacia sforzesca*, Liguri, Nápoles, 1994. Asimismo, resultan interesantes F. Senatore et al., *Pratiche e norme di comportamento nella diplomazia italiana: i carteggi di Napoli, Firenze, Milano, Mantova e Ferrara tra fine XIV e fine XV secolo*, en *De l'ambassadeur. Les écrits relatifs à l'ambassadeur et à l'art de négocier*, École Française de Rome, Roma, pp. 113-162. C. Villanueva Morte, *La correspondencia diplomática entre los embajadores del ducado de Milán y la corte de los reinos hispánicos en la segunda mitad del siglo XV*, «Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez, Nouvelle série», 45-2 (2015), pp. 143-166.

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señoríos[14], u otras tipologías como las instrucciones o los poderes atribuidos a los embajadores para negociar[15]. En la negociación de las ligas de los años centrales del siglo XV, las potencias extranjeras requirieron al duque de Milán que obtuviese la ratificación de todos los señores que dependían de él, e incluso enviaban listados de aquellos que consideraban que debían formar parte de las ratificaciones. Esto provocó que se acumulasen varias decenas de documentos de esta tipología, por ello conforman la mayor parte del total del manuscrito con 107 documentos que constituyen el 44,4% del total, y al mismo tiempo, se generó un enorme cúmulo de correspondencia para gestionar esos procesos de ratificaciones, por lo que las epístolas aparecen en 71 ocasiones y representan el 29,46%. Lo más curioso es que para agilizar todo este proceso, la cancillería milanesa diseñó dos formularios en 1470: un modelo de epístola para solicitar la ratificación a los vasallos y un modelo de ratificación que se enviaba a los mismos vasallos[16].

El nexo en común de todos los documentos del manuscrito es el ducado de Milán y sus relaciones diplomáticas con otras formaciones políticas italianas, con especial atención al papado. La mayor parte de los documentos copiados proceden de los fondos del archivo ducal de Milán, ahora conservados en Archivio di Stato di Milano, y más concretamente de los libros de registro, tanto los *registri ducali* como los *registri delle missive*, en los que no solo se asentaban los documentos y correspondencia otorgados por la cancillería milanesa, sino que también incluían copias de documentos y correspondencia recibida. Sin embargo, existen documentos de procedencia desconocida que no se encuentran actualmente en los fondos del mencionado archivo, lo cual sucede con ocho de los dieciséis tratados diplomáticos del manuscrito. De esos ocho documentos existen dos que fueron transcritos por Luigi Osio en el siglo XIX a partir de un original en pergamino del Archivio

[14] Para comprender la complejidad de los actores políticos que actuaron en la diplomacia italiana del siglo XV es preciso acudir a I. Lazzarini, *Multilayered networks: the political geography of Italian diplomacy in the early Renaissance (1350-1520 ca.)*, en N. Vigil Montes (ed.), *Comunicación política y diplomacia en la Baja Edad Media*, Publicações do CIDEHUS, Évora, 2019.

[15] Sobre los documentos de preparación de embajada como las instrucciones o los poderes contamos con interesantes análisis en S. Péquignot, *Les instructions aux ambassadeurs des rois d'Aragon (XIIIe-XVe siècles). Jalons pour l'histoire de la fabrique d'une parole royale efficace*, «Cahiers d'études hispaniques médiévales», 31 (2008), pp. 17-43; y en M. C. Cunha, P. Pinto Costa, D. Babo Marinho, *The Preparation of Embassies and the Protocols Followed by Royal Portuguese Ambassadors in the Late Middle Ages*, «e-Journal of Portuguese History», 17-1 (2019).

[16] Ags, Consejo de Italia, Secretaria de Nápoles, Visitas y Diversos, Secretarias Provinciales, Libro 63, 323v.-325r.

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di Stato di Milano[17], pero que actualmente no se encuentran en el *carteggio visconteo-sforzesco*, lo que puede indicar una posible pérdida. Otro de ellos es el breve pontificio otorgado en 1515 por León X por el que reconoció a Francisco I de Francia como duque de Milán, del que conocemos la existencia de copias en Francia y en Florencia, pero del que no sabemos si formó parte del archivo milanés. De los restantes cinco documentos no tenemos noticia alguna ni en el archivo, y tampoco en los grandes corpus en los que se recopila documentación similar[18], por lo que la copia en nuestro manuscrito podría ser la única prueba que se conserva de su existencia.

En la conformación del manuscrito no se ha respetado el orden cronológico. Por una parte, el bloque realizado por el primer escribano comienza por la cronología inicial del manuscrito, el año 1369, y contiene documentos hasta 1484, con un gran vacío cronológico situado entre 1376 y 1451 (con la excepción de dos documentos datados en 1428). Por otra parte, el bloque elaborado por el segundo escribano comienza con un salto hacia atrás en el tiempo para abarcar una serie de acuerdos situados entre 1442 y 1444, y posteriormente seguir con documentación desde 1486 hasta la cronología final del manuscrito, el año 1515. Cabe destacar que la mayor parte de los documentos cuyos originales no se encuentran en el archivo milanés son los que aparecen en esta segunda parte, por lo que el segundo escribano pudo decantarse por los pergaminos del *carteggio* frente a los asientos de los *registri* que parecen ser la fuente principal del primer escribano. No cabe duda que los *registri* son la principal base de información, por ello, como se puede observar en el gráfico 2, predominan los documentos situados en los años de ingente actividad de Cicco Simonetta en las cancillerías ducales de Francesco Sforza (1450-1466) y de Galeazzo Maria Sforza (1466-1476)[19], el cual suscribía los documentos de la siguiente manera: «Et ego Cichus Simoneta, filius Antonii de Gucia,

[17] Hacemos referencia a dos tratados de paz de Francesco Sforza con el papa Eugenio IV (1442 y 1444) que fueron transcritos por L. Osio, *Documenti diplomatici tratti dagli Archivi Milanesi*, tomo 3, Tipografia de Giuseppe Bernardoni di Giovanni, Milán, 1872, pp. 267-269 y 312-315.

[18] Nos referimos a obras como la de Luigi Osio, pero también a otros precedentes más globales como G. W. Leibinz, *Codex juris gentium diplomaticus in quo tabulae Authentica Actorum Publicorum Tratatuum*, 3 vols., Abraham Wolfgang, Amsterdam, 1693; J. Bernard, *Recueil des traitéz de paix, de trève, de neutralité de confederation, d'alliance, de commerce...*, 4 vols., Chez Henry et la veuve de T. Boom, Amsterdam 1700; P. Dumont, *Corps universel diplomatique du droit de gens...*, 7 vols., Chez P. Brunel, Amsterdam, 1726-1731; J.C. Lünig, *Codex Italiae Diplomaticus*, 4 vols., Imprensis Haeredum Lanckisianorum, Frankfurt, 1725-35.

[19] I. Lazzarini, *Corrispondenze diplomatiche nei principati italiani del Quattrocento. Produzione, conservazione, definizione*, en A. Giorgi y K. Occhi (ed.), *Carteggi fra basso medioevo ed età moderna*, FBK – Instituto Storico Italo-Germanico, Bolonia, 2018, p. 24.

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ducatus Calabriae, publicus imperiali auctoritate notarius, judex ordinaris ac privati, domini comitis constituentis cancellarius publicus», y se reducen en otras cronologías, hecho muy notable para la documentación de época del dominio de los Visconti (1369-1450), que se resume en catorce documentos en los que no tenemos presencia de correspondencia alguna, lo cual probablemente se debe a la destrucción del archivo de los Visconti en los últimos compases de su gobierno[20]. En todo caso, la cronología parece abarcar en lo máximo posible la historia del Ducado de Milán, desde sus orígenes en la familia Visconti a finales del siglo XIV hasta su última pérdida de independencia con la invasión de Francisco I de Francia en 1515.

Para orientar al historiador en el contenido del manuscrito hemos creído conveniente aportar cuatro materiales a modo de anexos: dos tablas y dos gráficos: en la tabla 1 hemos descrito esos dieciséis tratados que vertebran el contenido del manuscrito ordenandos de forma cronológica y con las referencias a su existencia en el archivo o a su copia en diversas colecciones documentales; en la tabla 2 hacemos un esquema de la estructura del manuscrito en el que se separan las diferentes partes correspondientes a cada uno de esos dieciséis tratados y se analiza su contenido ordenado de acuerdo a su aparición en el libro; en el gráfico 1 analizamos el peso de las diversas tipologías documentales en el manuscrito, para así conocer la importancia numérica de cada una de ellas; y en el gráfico 2 se puede observar la desigual distribución cronológica de los documentos copiados en el manuscrito.

3. Contexto de creación del manuscrito

El manuscrito apenas aporta informaciones sobre su contexto de creación y tampoco aparece mención alguna en la documentación del Consejo de Italia, por ello no podemos atribuirle una autoría o una fecha de elaboración exactas. Lo único que podemos afirmar es que fue elaborado por encargo del Consejo de Italia de la Monarquía Hispánica en una data indeterminada que por la escritura podemos situar entre los siglos XVI y XVII. Por consiguiente, nos vemos obligados a tener que sugerir hipótesis sobre todas las cuestiones acerca de su génesis.

El libro no es una *rara avis*, sino que es una entre las numerosas iniciativas de copia de documentación llevadas a cabo en el reinado de Felipe II, las cuales se llevaban a cabo para tener pruebas que ayudasen en las discusiones con la Santa Sede sobre primacía, derechos y

[20] F. Leverotti, *L'archivio dei Visconti signori di Milano*, «Reti Medievali», 9 (2008). Disponible en https://doi.org/10.6092/1593-2214/101

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regalías[21]. La más prolífica fue la encargada por el soberano a Diego de Ayala, tenedor de las escrituras que están en el Archivo de Simancas (1561-1593), para la transcripción de los documentos de mayor interés para el archivo, la cual tuvo como resultado la creación de 33 volúmenes que se conservan actualmente en la colección Patronato Real[22], correspondiendo cuatro de ellos a los diversos territorios italianos[23]. Asimismo, resulta importante la iniciativa llevada a cabo por Juan de Verzosa (o Berzosa), archivero de la embajada española ante la Santa Sede (1562-1574)[24], en la que elaboró 21 volúmenes que se conservan en la sección Estado del Archivo de Simancas[25], los cuales contienen documentación procedente de los archivos pontificios[26] con piezas justificativas de los privilegios y derechos de la Corona, bulas pontificias referentes a la Iglesia española, y tratados con la Santa Sede relativos a las posesiones hispánicas en Italia y a otras potencias[27]. Tampoco debemos olvidar las comisiones enviadas para recoger documentos de Iglesias y Monasterios como las de Ambrosio de Morales, Jerónimo de Zurita y los licenciados Rosales y de la Torre[28].

[21] L. Martínez García, *El Archivo de Simancas en el Antiguo Régimen: secreto, patrimonio, justificación y legitimidad real*, «Boletín de la ANABAD», 49-2 (1999), pp. 98-99.

[22] Ags, Catálogo X, Libros de Copias de documentos, sacados por orden de Felipe II (inventario realizado por Ricardo Magdaleno), Valladolid, 1927.

[23] Para el Reino de Nápoles existen dos libros (libros 19 y 20), para el Reino de Sicilia uno (libro 23) y para el Ducado de Milán otro (libro 24). El libro de Milán comienza en 1385 y no contiene documentos sobre diplomacia. Ags, Patronato Real, Libros de Copias, libros 19, 20, 23 y 24.

[24] El documento de nombramiento de Juan Verzosa como archivero de la embajada española ante la Santa sede a fecha de 14 de septiembre de 1562 se encuentra conservado en Ags, Estado, 892, 68. Editado en J. L. Rodríguez de Diego, *Memoria escrita de la Monarquía Hispánica. Felipe II y Simancas*, Universidad de Valladolid, Valladolid, pp. 223-229. Para conocer más sobre la labor de Verzosa en Roma recomendamos I. Aguirre Landa, *Archivi e documentazione política: Juan de Verzosa, archivista dell'ambasciata di Spagna a Roma*, en F. Cantú y M. Antonietta Visceglia (eds.), *L'Italia di Carlo V Guerra, religione e politica nel primo Cinquecento. Atti del convegno internazionale di studi, Roma, 5-7 aprile 2001*, vol.1, Viella, Roma, 2003, pp. 233-254; y J.M. Maestre Maestre (ed.), *Anales del reinado de Felipe II de Juan de Verzosa*, Centro Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Madrid, 2002, pp. XLII-XLVI.

[25] Ags, Estado, vols. 2002-2022.

[26] En 1565 el papa Pio V proyectó el Archivo Central de la Santa Sede, germen del futuro Archivo Secreto, como respuesta a la iniciativa de la creación del Archivo de la Embajada Española en Roma. L. Martínez García, *El Archivo de Simancas en el Antiguo Régimen: secreto, patrimonio, justificación y legitimidad real*, «Boletín de la ANABAD», 49-2 (1999), pp. 98-99.

[27] Ags, Catálogo XIV, Secretaria de Estado, Negociación de Roma, Primera parte, años de 1381 a 1700, Valladolid, 1936. I. Aguirre Landa, *El fondo Juan de Verzosa en el archivo de Simancas*, «Calamus Renascens: Revista de humanismo y tradición clásica», 4 (2003), pp. 7-22.

[28] J. L. Rodríguez de Diego, *Instrucción para el gobierno del Archivo de Simancas (Año 1588)*, Ministerio de Cultura, Madrid, 1989, pp. 40-42.

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En las instrucciones del Consejo de Italia otorgadas en 1579 se explicita la necesidad de conformar una serie de libros «para la buena orden y estilo de los negocios, y que con facilidad se haga lo que tocare a cada materia», los cuales «se guardaran muy bien ordenados y rubricados de los regentes en la pieza del Consejo si hubiese lugar o en la casa del Secretario». De las descripciones de los siete libros, ninguna de ellas se ajusta a nuestro manuscrito, pero resultan interesantes las referidas al libro para jurisdicciones eclesiásticas, al libro de títulos e investiduras y al libro de leyes municipales, constituciones, pragmáticas y costumbres particulares. Estos tres libros también son concebidos como libros de copias de documentación conservada en los archivos italianos, los cuales son llevados a cabo por los regentes del Consejo de Italia que son los encargados de reconocer las posibles necesidades, de dar la orden de búsqueda y copia a los ministros de Italia, y de ordenarlo correctamente por provincias[29].

Lo cierto es que en los primeros años del reinado de Felipe II, el Archivo Ducal de Milán fue dirigido por Diego de Vargas, secretario de los reinos de Nápoles y Sicilia y ducado de Milán (1554-1576). Aunque si bien recibió el título de *conservatore dell'Archivio*, sabemos que el cargo fue ejercido por sus lugartenientes en el ducado de Milán: el cardenal Cristoforo Madruzzi y Agostino Monti[30]. En las instrucciones dadas al secretario Vargas en 1556 no aparece mención alguna a la elaboración de este manuscrito[31], pero el control directo del archivo por ese funcionario de la Monarquía Hispánica fue un momento propicio para llevarlo a cabo.

Pero el hecho de que el manuscrito se encuentre dentro de la serie Visitas y diversos de la sección Secretaria de Nápoles, unidad documental en la que se conserva la actividad de los visitadores de la monarquía hispánica en todos los territorios italianos, nos hace sugerir que ha sido conformado por uno de los visitadores a Milán. En este sentido, albergamos bastantes sospechas de que Luis de Castilla[32], arcediano de Cuenca y visitador del ducado de Milán entre 1581 y

[29] Bne, Ms. 968, 150r.-156r. Editado en Manuel Rivero, *Felipe II y el Gobierno de Italia*, Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, Madrid, 1998, pp. 250-261.

[30] D. Muoni, *Archivi di Stato in Milano. Preffeti o direttori (1468-1874)*, Tipografia C. Molinari, Milán, 1874, p. 30.

[31] Bne, Ms. 1752, 284r.-285v. Editado en M. Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el Gobierno de Italia*, Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, Madrid, 1998, pp. 238-239.

[32] G. Andrés, *El Arcediano de Cuenca D. Luis de Castilla (+1618) protector del Greco y su biblioteca manuscrita*, «Hispania Sacra», 35/71 (1983), pp. 87-141.

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1591[33], fuese el responsable de realizar el manuscrito, que bien podría ser uno de los dos grandes libros realizados en su labor como visitante, así como se indica en *los dichos y hechos del rey Phelipe II* de Baltasar Porreño[34]. En la biblioteca del propio Luis de Castilla había numerosos manuscritos sobre documentación italiana, entre ellos unos 21 volúmenes de "Relaciones, discursos y papeles diferentes tocantes a las cosas y gobierno del Estado de Milán", así como aparece registrado en el inventario realizado en 1623 de los libros de la biblioteca de la casa vallisoletana de Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, Conde de Gondomar, persona que había adquirido la colección de libros de Luis de Castilla[35].

Dentro de la misma serie Visitas y Diversos de la sección Secretaria de Nápoles aparecen otros libros sobre relaciones diplomáticas realizados en un contexto similar como el *Libro registro de tratados y capitulaciones de los venecianos con diversos príncipes*[36], el *Libro registro de tratados y capitulaciones de los suizos con diversos príncipes*[37], el *Libro registro de tratados y capitulaciones de los duques de Milán con diferentes príncipes*[38], el *Libro registro de tratados y capitulaciones de los duques de Milán con los cantones suizos, liga entre el rey Carlos IX de Francia y dichos cantones y liga hereditaria entre la casa de Austria y Borgoña con la Confederación Helvética*,[39] o el *Libro registro de tratados y capitulaciones de los duques de Saboya con diversos príncipes*[40].

Ante la carencia de informaciones no podemos saber el motivo concreto por el que el Consejo de Italia tuvo la necesidad de conocer con mayor profundidad todos los acuerdos diplomáticos entre el Ducado de Milán y la Santa Sede en la época precedente a la dominación española. Probablemente, los continuos enfrentamientos jurisdiccionales en el

[33] Durante su estancia de diez años generó bastante documentación sobre su actividad como visitador. Ags, Consejo de Italia, Secretaria de Nápoles, Visitas y Diversos, Secretarias Provinciales, Libro 995 y Legajos 289-335, 406-408 y 1903.

[34] B. Porreño, *Los dichos y hechos del rey Phelipe II, llamado con justa razón, el prudente*, Francisco Foppens, Bruselas, 1666, p. 332.

[35] Bne, Ms. 13594, 178r. Citado en P. Andrés Escapa, *Libros de Luis de Castilla (ca. 1540-1618) en la Casa del Sol*, «Avisos. Noticias de la Real Biblioteca», 70 (2013).

[36] Ags, Consejo de Italia, Secretaria de Nápoles, Visitas y Diversos, Secretarias Provinciales, Libro 64.

[37] Ags, Consejo de Italia, Secretaria de Nápoles, Visitas y Diversos, Secretarias Provinciales, Libro 65.

[38] Ags, Consejo de Italia, Secretaria de Nápoles, Visitas y Diversos, Secretarias Provinciales, Libro 66.

[39] Ags, Consejo de Italia, Secretaria de Nápoles, Visitas y Diversos, Secretarias Provinciales, Libro 67.

[40] Ags, Consejo de Italia, Secretaria de Nápoles, Visitas y Diversos, Secretarias Provinciales, Libro 68.

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Milanesado entre Felipe II y los diversos pontífices[41] por cuestiones como el debate sucesorio y la descartada opción de la infeudación[42] (en 1577 se volvió a solicitar al emperador la renovación del feudo del Ducado de Milán en favor de la Monarquía Hispánica[43]), la introducción de la Inquisición española[44] o la petición de renuncia a favor del papado del cobro de los derechos de la décima[45], provocaron que este órgano de la monarquía estuviera interesado en conocer con detalle las vicisitudes de las complejas relaciones entre los milaneses y los papas en los siglos XIV y XV[46]. Otra hipótesis es que el manuscrito sirviera para la preparación de la Santa Liga de 1571, y es que esta alianza entre la Monarquía Hispánica, los Estados Pontificios, la Orden de Malta, la República de Venecia, la República de Venecia y el Ducado de Saboya no dejaba de ser una reedición *sui generis* del esquema de Lodi por el que el papado tendría el papel dirigente y arbitral[47], es decir, del esquema de la diplomacia del quinientos. En ningún caso debemos olvidar que la mera importancia para la Monarquía Hispánica de las relaciones con la Santa Sede justificaba la creación de este manuscrito.

Del mismo modo que la Monarquía Hispánica estuvo interesada en registrar las relaciones de la Santa Sede con uno de sus dominios italianos, el papado también encargó en el siglo XVII la redacción de dos volúmenes en los que se recopilase la documentación para la diplomacia, uno para España y otro para Francia, es decir, las dos potencias que ejercían influencia en la península itálica. En un documento excepcional podemos observar que se propuso que la labor de búsqueda documental tendría que ser llevada a cabo por ocho o diez personas,

[41] M. A. Visceglia, *Convergencias y conflictos. La Monarquía Católica y la Santa Sede (siglos XV-XVIII)*, «Studia Historica, Hª Moderna», 26 (2004), pp. 155-190.

[42] C. Cremonini, *Considerazioni sulla feudalità imperiale italiana nell'età di Carlo V*, en F. Cantú (ed.), *L'Italia di Carlo V Guerra, religione e politica nel primo Cinquecento: atti del convegno internazionale di studi, Roma, 5-7 aprile 2001*, Viella, Roma, 2003, pp. 259-276.

[43] Ags, Consejo de Italia, Secretaria de Milán, Legajo 1246, Documento 23. Editado en R. Magdaleno, *Papeles de Estado, Milán y Saboya (siglos XVI y XVII)*, CSIC, Madrid, 1961, p. 140.

[44] G. Signorotto, *Lo Stato di Milano nell'età di Filippo II. Dalle guerre d'Italia all'orizzonte confessionale*, en L. Lotti y R. Villari (eds.), *Filippo II e il Mediterraneo*, Editori Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2004, pp. 39-40.

[45] M.C. Giannini, *L'oro e la tiara. La construzioni dello spazio fiscale italiano della Santa Sede (1560-1620)*, Il Mulino, Bolonia, 2004.

[46] El gobierno de los Visconti y de los Sforza en Milán es considerado como el momento de creación de una formación política independiente en detrimento de los intereses del Imperio y del Papado. G. Chittolini, *The Papacy and the Italian States*, en A. Gamberini, I. Lazzarini (ed.), *The Italian Renaissance*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 477. S. Dale, *Contra damnationis filios: the Visconti in fourteenth-century papal diplomacy*, «Journal of Medieval History», 33 (2007), pp. 1-32.

[47] M. Rivero Rodríguez, *Italia en la Monarquía Hispánica (siglos XVI-XVII)*, «Studia Historica, Hª Moderna», 26 (2004), p. 27.

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súbditas de los Estados Pontificios, mayores de 25 años y doctores en teología o en derecho[48].

4. Conclusiones

El *Libro registro de tratados y convenios de los sumos pontífices con diversos príncipes. Comienza por la paz ajustada en Lucca en el año 1369 entre el papa Urbano, el emperador y la reina Juana de Nápoles* del Archivo General de Simancas es un manuscrito de enorme interés para los interesados en la diplomacia italiana de la decimoquinta centuria y de los procesos de copia de documentos en la Edad Moderna. Gran parte de los documentos se encuentran en el Archivio di Stato di Milano e incluso fueron editados en obras clásicas como las de Leibnitz, Bernard, Dumont u Osio; pero parece que el paso del tiempo ha hecho que no dispongamos de los originales de algunos de ellos, lo que sin duda incrementa el valor del manuscrito para la historiografía.

Sabemos que se trata de un libro de copias de documentación relacionada con la evolución de las relaciones entre el ducado de Milán y el Papado en la etapa previa a la conformación del Milanesado español, realizado por iniciativa del Consejo de Italia en un momento indeterminado de la presencia hispánica en Milán para conocer esos precedentes diplomáticos y poder negociar con el papado con mayor conocimiento de la situación. La falta de indicaciones dentro del manuscrito y en la documentación del fondo Consejo de Italia del Archivo General de Simancas, nos impiden establecer una hipótesis exacta del proceso de elaboración, pero podemos relacionarlo con las iniciativas similares de copia de documento llevadas a cabo durante el reinado de Felipe II, y más concretamente con el gobierno de Diego de Vargas, secretario de los reinos de Nápoles y Sicilia y ducado de Milán (1554-1576), que fue nombrado también conservatore dell'Archivio del Archivo Ducal de Milán. Probablemente al mismo tiempo se conformaron los otros cinco libros de copias de documentos diplomáticos conservados en la misma serie archivística, los cuales pueden aportar informaciones interesantes a los estudiosos de la diplomacia italiana bajomedieval y moderna.

Finalmente, debemos proponer un cambio al título otorgado al manuscrito por el Archivo General de Simancas, el cual le otorga una naturaleza diplomática errónea, dado que no es un registro, y no

[48] Biblioteca Vaticana, Archivio della biblioteca, reg. 42, 318r.-317r. Editado en F. de Vivo, A. Guidi, A. Silvestri, *Fonti per la storia degli archivi degli antichi Stati italiani*, Ministero dei beni e delle attività culturali e del turismo, Direzione generale archivi, Roma, 2016, pp. 91-93.

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refleja su verdadera naturaleza al copiar el título otorgado en el lomo de la encuadernación y únicamente añadirle información sobre el primer documento. En su lugar estaría mejor un título más preciso como podría ser: Libro de copias de documentación diplomática de las relaciones entre el ducado de Milán y el Papado (1369-1515). Respecto a la ubicación archivística, a pesar de que tendría sentido trasladarla al subfondo del Ducado de Milán, creemos que no debe ser alterado al estar probablemente relacionado con algún gobernante de Nápoles y con esa serie de libros de copias de documentación sobre la diplomacia bajomedieval y moderna.

Anexos

Tab. I - *Tratados diplomáticos copiados en el manuscrito*

DATA	DOCUMENTO	SIGNATURA	REFERENCIAS
1369/03/24 (Lucca)	Tratado de paz entre el papa Urbano V, el emperador Carlos IV, Juana I de Nápoles, Bernabé Visconti de Milán, Nicolás II de Este de Modena y Ferrara, y Carrara	1r.-12r.	No se han encontrado
1375/06/04 (Bolonia)	Tregua de un año entre el papa Gregorio XI y los señores de Milán, Galeazzo II Visconti y Bernabé Visconti	13r.-27v.	Asmi, Registri ducali, reg. 1 (lett. VV), 1r.-10r. Dumont, *Corps diplomatique*, tomo 2/1, pp. 98-104 (79)
1376/07/19 (Olivetum, Bolonia)	Tratado de paz entre el papa Gregorio XI y Galeazzo II Visconti de Milán	28r.-39r.	Asmi, Registri ducali, reg. 1 (lett. VV), 20r.-30v. Dumont, *Corps diplomatique*, tomo 2/1, pp. 111-116 (84)
1376/07/21 (Olivetum, Bolonia)	Liga entre el papa Gregorio XI y Galeazzo II Visconti de Milán	42r.-49v.	Asmi, Registri ducali, reg. 1 (lett. VV), 35r.-39v.

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1428/05/03 (Castro Portae Jovis)	Compromiso de Felipe Maria Visconti de Milán hacia el papa Martin V de no entrometerse en territorio de la Iglesia ni en el Reino de Sicilia	50v.-51r.	Asmi, Registri ducali, reg. 8 (lett. F), 279r.-279v. Dumont, *Corps diplomatique*, tomo 2/1, pp. 215-216 (134)
1442/04/13 (Florencia)	Capitula entre el papa Eugenio IV, el cardenal Ludovico Scarampo Trevisan, arzobispo de Florencia, Cosme de Medicis de Florencia y Francisco Sforza de Milán	359r.-360v.	Osio, *Documenti diplomatici*, tomo 3, pp. 267-269 (246)
1444/09/30 (Perugia)	Capitula concordia entre el papa Eugenio IV y Franceso Sforza de Milán	355r.-357v.	Osio, *Documenti diplomatici*, tomo 3, pp. 312-315 (290)
1444/10/09 (Perugia)	Capitula entre el papa Eugenio IV y los embajadores de Venecia, Florencia y Milán	361r.-368v.	No se han encontrado
1467/01/17 (Roma)	Confirmación del duque de Milán del tratado de paz entre Galeazzo Maria Sforza de Milán, Fernando II de Aragón y Sicilia, y la república de Florencia	90r.-97v.	Asmi, Registri ducali, reg. 13 (litt. ZZ), 1r.-8v. Dumont, *Corps diplomatique*, tomo 3/1, pp. 354-357 (259)
1469/05/28 (Roma)	Liga entre el papa Paulo II y la república de Venecia. Deroga la liga italiana celebrada en Nápoles el 26 de enero de 1454	199r.-201r.	Asmi, Registri ducali, reg. 13 (litt. ZZ), 189r.-191r. Asmi, Registri ducali, reg. 17, 100r.-101v. Leibnitz, *Codicis diplomatici*, pp. 427-428 J. Bernard, *Recueil des traitez*, tomo 1, pp. 576-577

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			Dumont, *Corps diplomatique*, tomo 3/1, p. 405 (282)
1470/07/08 (Nápoles)	Liga entre Fernando I de Nápoles, Galeazzo Maria Sforza de Milán y la república de Florencia	231r.-243v.	Asmi, Registri ducali, reg. 17 (litt. CC), 1v.-10v. Dumont, *Corps diplomatique*, tomo 3/1, pp. 408-413 (287)
1477/03/23	Liga entre el papa Sixto IV, la república de Venecia, la república de Florencia y Galeazzo Maria Sforza de Milán (1477)	212v.-220v.	No se han encontrado
1484/08/07 (Brescia)	Tratado de paz entre el papa Sixto IV, Galeazzo Maria Sforza de Milán, Fernando II de Aragón y Sicilia, Hércules I de Este de Ferrara, y las repúblicas de Florencia y Venecia	341r.-354v.	Asmi, Registri ducali, reg. 32 (litt. R), 126v.-136r. Dumont, *Corps diplomatique*, tomo 3/2, pp. 128-135 (66)
1486/08/11 (Roma)	Tratado de paz entre Galeazzo Maria Sforza de Milán, Fernando II de Aragón y Sicilia, y la república de Florencia	379r.-380r.	No se han encontrado
1499	Confederación entre el papa Alejandro VI, Ludovico Maria Sforza de Milán, la república de Florencia, y Fernando II de Aragón	389r.-392v.	No se han encontrado
1515/10/13 (Viterbo)	Acuerdo de paz entre el papa León X y Francisco I de Francia. El papa reconoce a Francisco I como duque de Milán.	395r.-396v.	J. Bernard, *Recueil des traitez*, t. 2, pp. 56-57. Dumont, *Corps diplomatique*, tomo 4/1, pp. 214-215 (100)

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Tab. II - *Estructura de los documentos copiados en el manuscrito (Los tratados diplomáticos aparecen resaltados en letra negrita)*

1r.-12r. - Tratado de paz entre el papa Urbano V, el emperador Carlos IV, Juana I de Nápoles, Bernabé Visconti de Milán, Nicolás II de Este de Modena (1369)
13r.-27v. - Tregua de un año entre el papa Gregorio XI y los señores de Milán, Galeazzo II Visconti y Bernabé Visconti (1375)
28r.-39r. - Tratado de paz entre el papa Gregorio XI y Galeazzo II Visconti de Milán (1376)
39r.-42r. - Documentos sobre la liga entre el papa Gregorio XI y Galeazzo II Visconti de Milán (1376): • 39v.-42r. - Poder para un representante diplomático de Milán (1376) • **42r.-49v. - Liga entre el papa Gregorio XI y Galeazzo II Visconti de Milán (1376)**
49v.-51r. – Documentos sobre el compromiso de Felipe Maria Visconti de Milán hacia el papa Martin V de no entrometerse en territorio de la Iglesia ni en el Reino de Sicilia (1428): • 49v.-50v. - Poder para un representante diplomático de Milán (1428) • **50v.-51r. - Compromiso de Felipe Maria Visconti de Milán hacia el papa Martin V de no entrometerse en territorio de la Iglesia ni en el Reino de Sicilia (1428)**
51r.-195v.- Documentos sobre la confirmación de la paz de Lodi entre Galeazzo Maria Sforza de Milán, Fernando II de Aragón y Sicilia, y la república de Florencia (1450-1467): • 51r.-52v. – Instrucciones para un representante diplomático de Milán que gestiona la paz de Lodi (1451) • 52v.- 79v. - 24 epístolas entre diferentes poderes para gestionar la paz de Lodi (1451-1453) • 80r.-84r. - 2 instrucciones para unos representantes diplomáticos de Milán que gestionaron la paz de Lodi (1450) • 85r.-90r. - 2 poderes para unos representantes diplomáticos de Milán que gestionaron la paz de Lodi (1466) • **90r.-97v. - Confirmación del duque de Milán del tratado de paz entre Galeazzo Maria Sforza de Milán, Fernando II de Aragón y Sicilia, y Florencia (1467)**   ○ 90v.-97v. – Inserto de la paz de Lodi (1454) • 97v.-98v. – Poder para un representante diplomático de Milán que gestiono la ratificación de la confirmación de la paz de Lodi por parte de la ciudad de Lucca, vasallo del duque de Milán (1467) • 98v.-99r – Epístola del duque de Milán la obispo de Milán sobre la confirmación milanesa de la paz de Lodi (1467)

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- 99r.-100v. – 2 documentos de pregón de la confirmación milanesa de la paz de Lodi dirigidos a los vasallos del duque de Milán (1467)
- 100v.-101r.- Epístola de Florencia al duque de Milán comprometiéndose a confirmar el tratado de paz de Lodi (1467)
- 101r.-104v. - Confirmación florentina del tratado de paz de Lodi (1467)
- 104v.-106r. - Confirmación del rey de Nápoles del tratado de paz de Lodi (1467)
- 106v.-110v. - Designación de los poderes señoriales dependientes del Ducado de Milán que tienen que ratificar la confirmación de la paz de Lodi, realizadas por Florencia y el rey de Nápoles (1467)
- 111r.-115r. - 5 epístolas de diferentes vasallos del duque de Milán sobre su ratificación a la confirmación de la paz de Lodi (1467)
- 115v.-121r. - 2 designaciones de los poderes señoriales dependientes del Ducado de Milán que tienen que ratificar la confirmación de la paz de Lodi, realizadas por Florencia y el rey de Nápoles (1467)
- 121v.-122v. - 2 epístolas del duque de Milán al rey de Nápoles sobre la confirmación de la paz de Lodi (1467)
- 122v.-123r. – Credencial del representante de Florencia para negociar las ratificaciones a la confirmación de la paz de Lodi (1467)
- 123r.-123v. – Epístola del duque de Milán al rey de Nápoles sobre la confirmación de la paz de Lodi (1467)
- 123v.-153r. - 18 ratificaciones a la confirmación de la paz de Lodi de poderes señoriales que pertenecían al Ducado de Milán (1467)
- 153r.-153v. - Epístola sobre la ratificación del marqués de Mantua, vasallo del duque de Milán, a la confirmación de la paz de Lodi (1467)
- 153v.-193v. - 24 ratificaciones a la confirmación de la paz de Lodi de poderes señoriales que pertenecían al Ducado de Milán (1467)
- 193v.-195v. - 3 epístolas sobre la confirmación de la paz de Lodi (1467)

196r.-337v. – Documentos sobre la liga entre el papa Sixto IV, la república de Venecia, la república de Florencia y Galeazzo Maria Sforza de Milán (1468-1477)

- 196r.-197v. - Epístola referente a la promesa del duque de Milán de mantener tropas en Florencia ante la amenaza de la liga entre el papado y Venecia (1471)
- **199r.-201r. - Liga entre el papa Paulo II y la república de Venecia. Deroga la liga italiana celebrada en Nápoles el 26 de enero de 1454 (1468)**
- 203r.-203v. - 2 epístolas sobre la ratificación de la liga entre Milán, Florencia y el Imperio por el duque de Sabandia, vasallo del duque de Milán (1471)
- 203v.-207v. - Documento de protesto y documento de orden del duque de Milán a su vasallo, el duque de Sabandia, para que ratificase la liga (1471)
- 207v.-208r. - Epístola del duque de Sabandía al pontífice (1471)
- 208r.-209r. - Orden del duque de Milán a su vasallo, el duque de Sabandia, para que ratificase la liga (1471)

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- 209r.-209v. - 2 epístolas sobre la cuestión del duque de Sabandia (1472)
- 210r.-212v. - Mandato del duque de Milán sobre la liga con el papado, Fernando II de Aragón y la República de Venecia (1476)
- **212v.-220v. - Liga entre el papa Sixto IV, la república de Venecia, la república de Florencia y Galeazzo Maria Sforza de Milán (1477)**
  - 215r.-216v. – Inserto de la ratificación de la República de Venecia (1477)
  - 216v.-218r. – Inserto de la ratificación del duque de Milán (1477)
  - 218v.-219v. – Inserto de la ratificación de la República de Florencia (1477)
  - 219v.-220v. – Inserto de la ratificación del papa Sixto IV (1477)
- 221r.-226r. - 2 instrucciones y un poder a los representantes del duque de Milán en la negociación de la liga entre Fernando I de Nápoles, Galeazzo Maria Sforza de Milán y la república de Florencia (1469)
- 226r.- 227v. - 3 epístolas sobre la negociación de la liga (1469)
- 227r.-230r. - 2 poderes del duque de Milán para la negociación de la liga (1469)
- **231r.-243v Liga entre Fernando I de Nápoles, Galeazzo Maria Sforza de Milán y la república de Florencia (1470)**
  - 237v.-239v. - Inserto del poder para el representante de Milán (1470)
  - 240r.-241v. - Inserto del poder para el representante de Florencia (1470)
  - 243v. - Inserto de la ratificación en acta del consejo de Florencia (1470)
- 244r.-245v. - 3 epístolas del duque de Milán sobre la ratificación de la liga (1470)
- 245v.-246r. - Publicación de la liga en el ducado de Milán (1470)
- 246v.-247r. - Ratificación del duque de Milán (1470)
- 247v.-248r. - Testimonio de recepción de la liga por Florencia (1470)
- 248r.-251r. - Ratificación de la liga por la República de Florencia (1470)
- 251r.-252r. - Testimonio de recepción de la confirmación de Florencia por Milán (1470)
- 252r.-253r. - Ratificación de la liga por el rey de Francia (1470)
- 253r.-256v. - Ratificación de la liga por Fernando I de Nápoles (1470)
- 257r.-311r. - 47 ratificaciones (+ 8 documentos relacionados: 7 epístolas y un poder) de la liga por los poderes señoriales vasallos del Ducado de Milán (1470)
- 311r.-315v. - Publicación de los vasallos del duque de Milán que ratificaron la liga (1470)
- 315v.-316r. - 2 epístolas de Florencia y Nápoles notificando la recepción de la publicación de los vasallos del duque de Milán que ratificaron la liga (1470)
- 316r.-318v. - Publicación de los vasallos del duque de Milán que ratificaron la liga (1470)
- 318v.-320r. - 4 epístolas sobre la ratificación de la liga (1470)
- 320v.-322v. - Ratificación del duque de Milán (1471)

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- 323v.-324v. - Modelo de epístola para solicitar la ratificación de la liga a los vasallos del duque de Milán (1470)
- 334v.-325r. - Modelo de ratificación de la liga enviado a los vasallos del duque de Milán (1470)
- 325r.-326r. - Designación de Fernando I de Nápoles de los vasallos del duque de Milán que tienen que ratificar la liga (1470)
- 326r.-327r. – 2 epístolas sobre la designación de vasallos del duque de Milán que tienen que ratificar la liga (1470)
- 327r.-330v. - Designación del duque de Milán de vasallos que deben ratificar la liga (1470)
- 330v.-331r. - Testimonio de recepción de las ratificaciones de la liga de los vasallos del duque de Milán por Fernando I de Nápoles (1470)
- 331r.-332r. – Epístola de Florencia sobre la designación de vasallos del duque de Milán que tienen que ratificar la liga (1470)
- 332r. – Aceptación de sobre la designación de vasallos del duque de Milán que tienen que ratificar la liga (1470)
- 332r.-332v. – Epístola de Florencia sobre la designación de vasallos del duque de Milán que tienen que ratificar la liga (1470)
- 332v. – Aceptación de sobre la designación de vasallos del duque de Milán que tienen que ratificar la liga (1470)
- 332v.-337v. – 3 epístolas sobre la designación de vasallos del duque de Milán que tienen que ratificar la liga (1470)

339r.-354v. – Documentos sobre el tratado de paz entre el papa Sixto IV, Galeazzo Maria Sforza de Milán, Fernando II de Aragón y Sicilia, Hércules I de Este de Ferrara, y las repúblicas de Florencia y Venecia (1484)

- 339r.-339v. - Protesto de Venecia respecto al tratado de paz (1484)
- **341r.-354v. - Tratado de paz entre el papa Sixto IV, Galeazzo Maria Sforza de Milán, Fernando II de Aragón, Hércules I de Este de Ferrara, Florencia y Venecia (1484)**
- 347v.-354v. - 8 ratificaciones otorgados por los diversos participantes en el acuerdo (1484)

Salto temporal hacia atrás – Cambio de mano de escritura

355r.-357v. - Capitula concordia entre el papa Eugenio IV y Franceso Sforza de Milán (1444)

359r.-360v. - Capitula entre el papa Eugenio IV, el cardenal Ludovico, Cosme de Medicis de Florencia y Francisco Sforza de Milán (1442)

361r.-377v. – Documentos relacionados con la capitulación entre el papa Eugenio IV y los embajadores de Venecia, Florencia y Milán (1444)

- **361r.-368v. - Capitulación entre el papa Eugenio IV y los embajadores de Venecia, Florencia y Milán (1444)**
- 368v.-377v. – 4 poderes otorgados a los representantes diplomáticos de los diversos participantes en el acuerdo (1444)

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379r.-382v. – Documentos sobre el tratado de paz entre Galeazzo Maria Sforza de Milán, Fernando II de Aragón y Sicilia, y la república de Florencia (1486)

- **379r.-380r. - Tratado de paz entre Galeazzo Maria Sforza de Milán, Fernando II de Aragón y Sicilia, y la república de Florencia (1486)**
- 380v.-382v. - Copia de una epístola de Ascanio Maria Sforza a Ludovico Maria Sforza de Milán (1486)

383r.-394v. – Documentos sobre la confederación entre el papa Alejandro VI, Ludovico Maria Sforza de Milán, la república de Florencia y Fernando II de Aragón (1499)

- 383r.-388v. - Copia de los capítulos del tratado de paz entre el papa Alejandro VI, Ludovico Maria Sforza de Milán, la república de Florencia y Fernando II de Aragón
- **389r.-392v. - Confederación entre el papa Alejandro VI, Ludovico Maria Sforza de Milán, la república de Florencia y Fernando II de Aragón (1499)**
- 393r.-394v. - Acuerdo entre el papa Alejandro VI y sus cardenales (1499)

395r.-396v. - Acuerdo de paz entre el papa León X y Francisco I de Francia. El papa reconoce a Francisco I como duque de Milán (1515)

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Fig. 1 - *Tipologías documentales de los documentos copiados en el manuscrito*



Fig. 2 - *Distribución cronológica de los documentos copiados en el manuscrito*



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

Pax inter Papam Vrbanum,
Carolum Quartum Imperatorem,
et Reginam Johannam Scicilię,
et Marchiones Estenses,
et Bernabouem Vicecomitem,
et Carrarienses,
et alios,
Facta Lucę M CCC Lxjx.
Nono Calendas Aprilis.

In nomine Sanctę, et Indiuiduę Trinitatis felicitr. amen. Carolus Quartus Diuina fauente clemen.ª Romanorum Imperator semper Augustus, et Boemie Rex, ad perpetuam rei memoriam. Nobili Bernaboui Vicecomiti pro M.te Cæsarea Mediolani &c. gnali Vicario, et fideli dilecto, ac alijs Vniuersis, et singulis inspecturis presentia suis, et Imperij Sacri subditis, et fidelibus gratiam suam, et omne bonum, Rex Regum, et Dominantium Dominus Immortalis ille Imperator eternus ineffabil sua potentia dignę prouisionis, benigna sollertia Maiestatis Cęs.ra sublimen potentiam pro consolatione xpianę fidei, et xpicolarum salute et comodo potenter erexit ut ad instar Monarchię Celestis, ubi cuncta dulci, et eterna pace fruuntur. Cæsaris Aguste potentia Terrestris Imperij moderetur habenas adeo sollicite, et fidelis offitij indesinente studio, ut quantum humanę fragilitatis, possibilitatis hoc ualet attingere hec terrena gubernatorum Celestis regiminis amplitudine pro suis uiribus imitetur Sanctissimi fideles Cum in partibus Italię hactenus Guerrarum discrimina turbationes seditiones, et cedes immunire dampnose uiguerint in magnam, et grauem perniciem subiecti nobis fidelis ppli xpiani. Nos cui Interest obuiare scandalis, et amenę tranquillitati subditorum fidelium semper Intendere, ad laudem Creatoris Altissimi cuius pietate benigna Regni, et Imperij

Img. 1 - *Tratado de paz entre el papa Urbano V, el emperador Carlos IV, Juana I de Nápoles, Bernabé Visconti de Milán, Nicolás II de Este de Modena (1369). España, Ministerio de Cultura, Archivo General de Simancas, Consejo de Italia, Secretaria de Nápoles, Visitas y Diversos, Secretarias Provinciales, Libro 63, 1r.*

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

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Capitula confoederationis inter Sanctiss. Dnum Alex.m Papam Sextu, Ser.mu Regem Siciliae, excell.m Ducem Mli, et excel. Rempub. florent.

Additiones factae per Sanc.mi D. N.

Quod expectetur mandatum Florentinorum

In nomine Sanctae et indiuidue Trinitatis Patris, et filij, et Spus Sancti, Gloriosissimae Virginis Mariae, et totius celestis Curiae triumphantis, anno à natiuitate Dni 1499. Sanctissimus, et Beatiss.mus D. D. Alexander Papa sextus, et Ser.mus et excellentiss. D. Ludouicus Maria Sfortia Anglus Dux Mediolani, et Excelsa Respublica florentina, siue eorum procuratores, aut Mandatarij, ad finem pacis, et pro quiete ac pro conseruanda dignitate, et auctoritate sedis Apostolicae, proque defensione et conseruatione comuniu statuu partium praedictarum ad infrascriptam confoederationem, unionem, colligationem, intelligentiam, et ligam duraturam mutuis stipulacionibus interuenientibus et per singula capta, specialiter repetitis cum infrascriptis pactis, articulis conuentionibus, promissionibus poenis, obligationibus, renunciationibus, modis, et iuramentis per illud spatium temporis, et sub illis formis, et capitulis prout inferius continetur

In primis praefatus Sanctissimus Dns nr pro se, et successoribus suis canonice intrantibus, ac Sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae, suisque adherentibus comendatis, et subditis, nec non praelibati Sereniss. Rex Siciliae Ill.mus Dux Mli, et excelsa Respub. florentina pro se, et successoribus, ac adherentibus comendatis, et subditis siue procuratores aut mandatarij suprascripti nominibus quibus supra ineunt, et contrahunt bonam, meram, et puram unionem, confoederationem, intelligentiam, et ligam duraturam usque ad annos,

Img. 2 - *Confederación entre el papa Alejandro VI, Ludovico Maria Sforza de Milán, la república de Florencia y Fernando II de Aragón (1499). España, Ministerio de Cultura, Archivo General de Simancas, Consejo de Italia, Secretaria de Nápoles, Visitas y Diversos, Secretarias Provinciales, Libro 63, 389r.*

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

LETTURE

Diritto ed epidemie nell'esperienza giuridica moderna e contemporanea

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La situazione emergenziale che sta vivendo la società di oggi a causa della pandemia Covid 19 sta portando i giuristi ad interrogarsi sulle problematiche concernenti la compressione dei diritti e delle libertà fondamentali. Si tratta di tematiche di primo piano, la cui riflessione può partire da un confronto con le esperienze giuridiche del passato, quando ci si è trovati a far fronte ad altre devastanti epidemie come la peste nera del 1348, ripropostasi con ripetizione nei secoli successivi (basti pensare alle pagine del Manzoni che descrivono l'epidemia a Milano del 1630)[1], oppure come la più recente influenza 'spagnola' degli anni Venti del Novecento, di cui stanno circolando immagini d'epoca su giornali e social networks, quale messaggio di speranza per un ritorno alla normalità.

Oltre agli studi medici, economici, filosofici e teologici che le epidemie hanno generato nelle diverse epoche storiche e nelle diverse regioni d'Europa, furono soprattutto le questioni giuridiche a essere affrontate con particolare acume da accademici e pratici. Nel Medioevo, ad esempio, è possibile individuare la formazione di un 'diritto della peste' che finì per orientare gli interventi pubblici da adottare in materia di misure di prevenzione come salubrità del territorio, acque pubbliche, condotte, scarichi, inumazioni, divieti di esportazione per penuria, assistenza agli infermi, medici condotti e privati, ospedali e

[1] Cfr. i più recenti studi: T. Serafini, *Lo sguardo storico nella rappresentazione manzoniana della peste*, in *Carte italiane,* 1 (2003), pp. 69-81; A. Prosperi, *Manzoni, la peste, il terrore. Il complotto e la storia nel capitolo XXXI dei Promessi sposi,* in *Studi storici,* n. 1/18, pp. 23-46.

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regole dettate per disciplinare materie specifiche come i rapporti tra coniugi, le modalità di rogito di atti notarili, lo svolgimento delle attività giurisdizionali.

Su questo tema – che negli ultimi anni ha visto crescere l'interesse da parte della storiografia[2] - un punto di riferimento per un'ampia riflessione storico giuridica è certamente rappresentato dal recente volume di Mario Ascheri, *Rimedi per le epidemie. I consigli dei giuristi nel diritto europeo (secoli XIV-XVI)*, edito nel 2020 per i tipi della Aracne (Roma), che raccoglie alcuni studi svolti dall'Autore sull'argomento nel corso della sua prestigiosa vita accademica[3] e già pubblicati nel 1997

[2] Tra i principali contributi italiani in materia segnalo: M. Boscarelli, *Penuria, peste e potere (1628-1635)*, Milano, 1983; F. Della Peruta (a cura di), *Malattia e medicina (Storia d'Italia. Annali VII)*, Torino, 1984; G. Restifo, *Le ultime piaghe. Le pesti nel Mediterraneo (1720-1820)*, Milano, 1994; Id., *I porti della peste. Epidemie mediterranee fra Sette e Ottocento*, Messina, 2005; G. Iacovelli, *Ordinamenti sanitari nelle costituzioni di Federico II* (Atti delle seste giornate federiciane, Oria, 22-23 ottobre 1983), Bari, 1986; C.M. Cipolla, *Contro un nemico invisibile. Epidemie e strutture sanitarie nell'Italia del Rinascimento*, Bologna, 1985; Id., *Miasmi ed umori. Ecologia e condizioni sanitarie in Toscana nel '600*, Bologna, 1989; Id., *Il pestifero e contagioso morbo. Combattere la peste nell'Italia del Seicento*, Bologna, 2012; P. Lopez, *Napoli e la peste. 1464-1530. Politica, istituzioni, problemi sanitari*, Napoli, 1989; A. Pastore, *Crimine e giustizia in tempo di peste nell'Europa moderna*, Roma-Bari, 1991; J. Henderson, *La peste nera a Firenze: le risposte mediche e comunali*, in M.L. Betri, A. Pastore (a cura di), *L'arte di guarire. Aspetti della professione medica tra Medioevo e d età contemporanea*, Bologna, 1993; G. Benvenuto, *La peste in Italia nella prima età moderna. Contagio, Rimedi, profilassi,* Bologna, 1996; M. Binetti, *La salubrità dell'aria e dell'acqua nel Mezzogiorno normanno-svevo*, in *Quaderni medievali*, 23 (1998), 46, pp. 19-57; R. Salvemini, *A tutela della salute e del commercio del Mediterraneo: la sanità marittima nel Mezzogiorno preunitario*, in Id. (a cura di), *Istituzioni e traffici nel Mediterraneo tra età antica e crescita moderna*, Napoli, 2009; R. Canosa, *Tempo di peste: magistrati ed untori nel 1630 a Milano*, Roma, 2000; R. Sansa, *L'odore del contagio. Ambiente urbano e prevenzione delle epidemie nella prima età moderna*, in *Medicina & storia*, II, 3 (2002), pp. 83-108; R. Alibrandi, *Giovan Filippo Ingrassia e le Costituzioni protomedicali per il Regno di Sicilia*, Soveria Mannelli, 2011; Id., *In salute e in malattia. Le leggi sanitarie borboniche fra Settecento e Ottocento*, Milano 2012; G. Assereto, «*Per la comune salvezza dal morbo contagioso». I controlli di sanità nella Repubblica di Genova*, Novi Ligure, 2011; N.E. Vanzan Marchin (a cura di), *Le leggi di sanità della repubblica di Venezia*, 5 voll., Vicenza, 2012; F. Ammannati (a cura di), *Assistenza e solidarietà in Europa. Secc. XIII-XVIII*, Firenze, 2013; F. Antonielli (a cura di), *La polizia sanitaria: dall'emergenza alla gestione della quotidianità*, Soveria Mannelli, 2015; I. Fusco, *Il Regno di Napoli nelle emergenze sanitarie del XVII secolo. Istituzioni, politiche e controllo dello spazio marittimo e terrestre*, in *Storia urbana*, 147, 2, 2015, pp. 55-74; Milano, 2015; R. Cancila, *Salute pubblica e governo dell'emergenza: la peste del 1575 a Palermo*, «Mediterranea-ricerche storiche», 37 (2016), 231-272.

[3] L'argomento è stato oggetto di particolare interesse da parte dell'Autore nel corso di precedenti studi: M. Ascheri, *Rec. a E. Carpentier, Une ville devant la peste: Orvieto et la peste noire de 1348*, in *Studi Senesi*, 80 (1968), pp. 253-258; Id., *Diritto e peste dalla crisi del Trecento all'età moderna*, Siena, 1974 (ed. provvisoria); Id., *Le epidemie di peste e i giuristi: Introduzione alla trattatistica (1522-23)*, in *Proceedings of the Seventh International Congress of Medieval Canon Law*, ed. by P. Linehan, Cambridge 23-27 July 1984, Città del Vaticano, 1988, pp. 283-301. Per una biografia sull'Autore cfr. il profilo

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in una silloge a edizione limitata[4]. Come ricordato dallo stesso Autore, la pubblicazione era nata come una raccolta di materiali di studio con il proposito di far conoscere gli espedienti elaborati dai giuristi per far fronte alle terribili mortalità epidemiche che periodicamente si abbattevano con drammatica cadenza dopo quella del 1347-49[5]. Si tratta, infatti, di un'opera che riesce ad assolvere bene alla funzione divulgativa, grazie a un uso ridotto delle note e a una efficace organizzazione dei paragrafi, che sintetizzano le complesse questioni emerse nella dottrina medievale in materia di misure di prevenzione generale e speciale e dei *privilegia pestis* relativi a status delle persone, forma dei negozi giuridici, obblighi amministrativi e negoziali, amministrazione della giustizia,

Fonti principali di riferimento per l'Autore sono stati tre trattati cinquecenteschi che raccoglievano *consilia* e *quaestiones* giuridiche in materia di peste[6]: il *Tractatus iuridicus de peste* (1522)[7] del giurista pavese insegnante ad Avignone, Gianfrancesco Sannazzari della Ripa; l'inedito manoscritto (del quale si auspica la digitalizzazione da parte della Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana) del *Tractatus iuridicus de peste*

tratteggiato da F. Mastroberti, *Laudatio di Mario Ascheri*, in *Annali del Dipartimento Jonico*, Taranto, 2013, pp. 811-815 in occasione del conferimento del IV Premio Giovanni Cassandro al prof. Mario Ascheri.

[4] Edito già nel 1997 dal Dipartimento di Scienze Storiche, Giuridiche, Politiche e Sociali dell'Università degli Studi di Siena con il titolo *I giuristi e le epidemie di peste: secoli XIV-XVI*, il volume raccoglie saggi tratti dalla monografia *Diritto medievale e moderno. problemi di storia del processo, della cultura e delle fonti giuridiche*, Rimini, 1991, pp. 157-180 e dalla rivista *Quaderni Internazionali di Storia della Medicina e della Sanità,* n. 4 (1995), pp. 19-49 e n. 5 (1996), pp. 11-66.

[5] M. Ascheri, *Cosa possiamo imparare dalle epidemie del passato*, in *Ilcittadinoonline.it* (8 aprile 2020): «Diciamo governi "europei" perché gli autori delle opere qui prese in considerazione sono italiani, ma il diritto della necessità pubblica cui essi davano un apporto con le loro pagine era rivolto al pubblico indifferenziato a livello europeo cui si rivolgevano gli insegnamenti universitari. Qui le fonti legali utilizzate sono essenzialmente quelle del diritto romano e del diritto canonico che si insegnavano allora con gli stessi metodi in tutto il Continente, formando il cosiddetto 'diritto comune'. E si scrivevano in latino proprio per non avere ostacoli nella comprensione internazionale».

[6] Id., *Rimedi per le epidemie* cit., p. 13: «Insomma, il mondo del diritto con questi trattati e con tanti altri interventi su temi scottanti, non rispondeva soltanto alla domanda professionale di giudici e di avvocati, ma parlava ai ceri e gruppo che contavano per rivendicare di saper servire ancor sempre le istituzioni». Infatti, mentre i commentari avevano come destinatari quasi esclusivamente i giuristi, un libro sulla peste che affrontava l'inedito argomento a tutto tondo avrebbe raccolto l'interesse delle più diverse categorie di lettori.

[7] J.F. Ripa, *Juridicus de peste tractatus editus per excellentem iureconsultum d. Io. Franciscum de Sacto Nazario cognominatum de Ripa civem papiensem iura interpretantem in florenti achademia Avenionensi impressum fuit praesens opus in civitate Avenioni per solertem impressionem magistrum Iohannem de Channey anno domini 1522, die 12 septembris*, Avenioni, 1522. Sull'opera e sul giurista, cfr. M. Ascheri, *Un maestro del 'mos italicus': Gianfranco Sannazari della Ripa (1480-c.1535)*, Milano, 1970.

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(1523)[8] del giovane docente fiorentino nell'ateneo pisano, Silvestro Aldobrandini; il *Tractatus legalis de peste* (1524)[9] del dottore reggiano operante a Bologna, Gerolamo Previdelli. A questi trattati Ascheri ha dedicato il primo capitolo del suo volume, arricchito da una preziosa appendice bio-bibliografica dei rispettivi autori[10], che consente al lettore di conoscere alcuni dettagli in ordine al contesto culturale nel quale i tre giuristi operarono.

Questi tre trattati chiudevano il cerchio di un percorso dottrinale che aveva preso stura con le riflessioni avviatesi durante la peste nera del 1347 e che si sarebbe imposto quale punto di riferimento per i secoli a venire, determinando numerose riedizioni, man mano che si ripresentavano episodi epidemici di particolare gravità. Non a caso il trattato di Ripa fu ristampato ben 14 volte fino al 1601[11], con edizioni a Lugduni, Lipsia, Lione, Venezia e Torino, quest'ultima accompagnata da un apparato bibliografico di aggiornamento da parte del professore torinese Bernardo Trotto nel 1574[12]. Una tale diffusione è indice dell'interesse che l'opera suscitò non solo nei giuristi, ma anche nei medici, filosofi e uomini preposti al governo di affari temporali e spirituali, in considerazione della trattazione unitaria dei diversi e multidisciplinari aspetti connessi allo studio delle epidemie e della loro rilevanza sociale[13]: ne costituisce un valido esempio l'interesse dimostrato nel 1825 dal medico francese Renè-Nicola Dufriche Desgenette, celebre per aver fronteggiato l'epidemia esplosa tra le milizie napoleoniche in Egitto, il quale dedicò una puntuale segnalazione al trattato del Ripa nel *Journal complémentaire du Dictionaire des Sciences médicales*, ravvisando l'attualità delle misure preventive ivi contenute: «Presque

[8] S. Aldobrandini, *Tractatus de peste*, Bibl. Vat., MS Vat. Lat. 5843.

[9] G. Previdelli, *Tractatus legalis de peste, in quo continetur quid de iure fieri debeat et possit, tam circa ea, quae salubritatem civitatum respiciunt, quam circa ultimas voluntates, iudicia, et ceteros actus inter vivos, tempore quo peste affligimur quem Hieronymus Previdellus Regiensis minimus curis professor opusculi author ... libentissime subiicit, per Hieronymu de Benedectis*, Bononae, 1524.

[10] La bibliografia degli autori è stata di recente arricchita dalle voci pubblicate sul *Dizionario Biografico dei Giuristi italiani*, 2 voll., Bologna 2013 da Paolo Carta (voce *Aldobrandini, Silvestro*, vol. 1, p. 35) e dallo stesso Mario Ascheri (voce *Sannazzari della Ripa, Gianfrancesco*, vol. 2, pp. 1789-1790).

[11] Il *Tractatus* fu ristampato a Lugduni negli anni 1538 e 1542; a Lione nel 1548, 1554, 1559 e 1564; a Venezia nel 1560, 1569, 1575, 1685, 1601; a Torino nel 1574; a Colonia nel 1590 (soltanto il libro II); a Lipsia nel 1598. Cfr. l'appendice bibliografica contenuta in M. Ascheri, *Un maestro del 'mos* italicus' cit., pp. 143-144.

[12] J.F. Ripa, *Commentaria ad jus canonicum; item Tractatus de peste, et responsa*; *additionibus Bernardi Trotti illustrata*, Augustae Taurinorum, 1574.

[13] L'opera attirò l'attenzione del filosofo tedesco Johann Neldel, che ne curò la ristampa di Lipsia nel 1598, del bibliofilo Gian Vincenzo Pinelli, che redasse un compendio dei rimedi preventivi e curativi della peste indicati dal Ripa. Così M. Ascheri, *Un maestro del 'mos italicus'* cit., p. 55-57.

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toutes les dispositions pénales relatives à la peste et indiquées par Ripa, sont fondues dans notre loi sanitaire»[14]. Mentre l'opera del Previdelli, inizialmente ristampata solo nel 1528, ebbe una vastissima diffusione grazie all'inserzione nella raccolta veneziana del *Tractatus universi iuris* del 1584[15]: tale successo era la chiara riprova dell'utilità pratica di tali opere che fornivano non solo una efficace ricognizione dei vari espedienti giuridici adottati con riferimento a un'ampia casistica, ma davano legittimazione alle esperienze della prassi emergenziale nel quadro del diritto comune, consentendo di sistemare le risposte che fino ad allora, in modo disorganico, i *doctores iuris* avevano dato a sporadici problemi emersi in occasione delle epidemie.

Nell'obiettivo di presentare in maniera organica le materie contenute nei trattati, Ascheri raccoglie per argomento le diverse questioni (secondo l'ordine già riferito), seguendo soprattutto l'agile impostazione del Previdelli, che organizzava il suo volume occupandosi della salubrità dei luoghi, dei contratti ed agli altri atti *inter vivos*, dei giudizi e degli atti di ultima volontà, opportunamente integrato dalle puntuali osservazioni dell'Aldobrandini e del Ripa, il quale, sotto il profilo giuridico[16], dedicava più ampio spazio ai *privilegia pestis* ovvero alle diverse deroghe al diritto consentite a causa della peste[17].

L'efficace brevità espositiva dei *remedia pestis* – scrive Ascheri: «Qui di seguito, dunque, esponiamo sinteticamente quanto il lettore interessato ai particolari dovrà andarsi a cercare direttamente nelle tre opere richiamate»[18] – raggiunge l'obiettivo di offrire al lettore un *vademecum* di regole giuridiche medievali che toccavano le diverse problematiche della prevenzione, strettamente connesse a questioni di natura medica e religiosa (igiene pubblica e privata, controllo degli accessi in città, gestione dei malati e approvvigionamenti annonari, prevenzione dai peccati) e delle deroghe al diritto (*relaxationes*) in materia di obbligazioni, contratti, atti di ultima volontà e processo. Anche se non mancano approfondimenti sulle problematiche maggiormente dibattute dai giuristi medievali, in ordine alle quali vengono forniti

[14] *Notice sur un livrè fort rare de Saint-Nazaire de Ripa, publié en 1522, sur la peste*, in *Journal complémentaire du Dictionaire des Sciences médicales*, tome 25, Paris, 1826, pp. 149-157 (157). Cfr. Ascheri, *Un maestro del 'mos italicus'* cit., p. 58.

[15] *Tractatus universi iuris*, Venetiis, 1584, XVIII, ff. 171va-186vb.

[16] Il trattato del Ripa affrontava, infatti, non solo questioni giuridiche ma anche morali, religiose, politiche, igienico-sanitarie e amministrative. M. Ascheri, *Un maestro del 'mos italicus'* cit., pp. 56-57.

[17] Oltre agli «specialia seu privilegia pestis» (suddivisi in *specialia tractatuum, specialia ultimarum voluntatum, specialia judiciorum*), nell'ultima parte del volume Ripa si occupava dei *Juridica remedia*, contenenti indicazioni sulle misure di prevenzione generale e speciale.

[18] M. Ascheri, *Rimedi per le epidemie* cit., p. 35.

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dettagli sui diversi orientamenti dottrinali e sulle opinioni prevalenti. Si veda l'esempio del dibattito dottrinale sorto sulla validità degli atti rogati da notaio non immatricolato, che viene esposto dall'Autore con agevole facilità di lettura e comprensione anche dai non esperti in materie storico-giuridiche, riuscendo a condensare in poche battute un argomento di gran lunga complesso:

L'ipotesi è stata dapprima discussa ampiamente da Angelo degli Ubaldi nella *repetitio* alla l. *Si vacantia* del *Codex* (C.10.10.5) con riferimento allo stesso testo e alla l. *Ubi absunt* del Digesto (D.26.5.19) e la sua tesi ha avuto grande successo, venendo poi riteputa incidentalmente fino ai vari Tartagni, Bertacchini, Giasone, Sandei, Marsili e Filippo Decio. Sicché la dottrina del tardo diritto comune l'accetta pacificamente, discutendo se mai l'eccezione introdotta per i testamenti, per i cui rogiti le forme di diritto comune e particolare andrebbero osservate "a unguem", secondo l'insegnamento ancora ribadito dal Tartagni. Riprendendosi un'affermazione di Baldo, si argomenta in contrario che se il non immatricolato può essere teste, non gli si può disconoscere la possibilità di essere notaio. Piuttosto la dottrina di Angelo avanzava un'altra riserva di carattere generale solitamente accolta, che cioè non si trovassero in città altri notai. Ma a questo punto soccorre anche la dottrina dell'irreperibilità, quando appunto ve ne fossero altri in città, ma non disposti a presenziare. Con la conseguenza che l'affermazione di hi sostiene la validità dell'atto allegando l'irreperibilità di altri notai è fondata fino a prova contraria (*intentio fundata*), realizzandosi un'inversione dell'onere della prova[19].

L'esempio citato conferma l'efficacia espositiva del volume, che lo rende un valido manuale sul diritto delle emergenze epidemiche in età medievale e moderna, i cui *consilia* proposti dai *doctores iuris* avrebbero costituito un insuperato punto di riferimento per i giuristi dei secoli successivi, chiamati a cimentarsi ancora sulle problematiche derivanti dai fenomeni epidemici. Tanto vero che i rimedi degli uomini di legge contenuti nei trattati del Ripa e del Previdelli sarebbero stati ancora ricordati nel 1850 dal patologo Alfonso Corradi[20] nella sua poderosa raccolta in nove volumi, intitolata *Annali delle epidemie occorse in Italia dalle prime memorie fino al 1850*[21]. Pur contestando la loro

[19] Ivi, p. 75.

[20] Notizie biografiche in B. Zanobio, G. Armocida, voce *Corradi, Alfonso*, in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, Vol. 29, Roma, 1983, *a.i.*

[21] A. Corradi, *Annali delle epidemie occorse in Italia dalle prime memorie fino al 1850*, 9 voll., Bologna, 1865-1894. L'Autore sostenne che il trattato del Previdelli fosse una rielaborazione di quello del Ripa: «Due anni innanzi che venisse alla luce l'opera del Previdelli, Gian Francesco Riva di S. Nazzaro pubblicava in Avignone un Trattato giuridico intorno la peste da lui composto, stando lontano dalla città travagliata dal contagio, per mostrarsi grato agli Avignonesi che lo avevano chiamato ad insegnare legge in quella allora floridissima scuola fin dall'anno 1518. Il qual trattato senza dubbio ebbe

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originalità, trattandosi di prassi già adottate nella pratica dai medici[22], l'Autore ne riconosceva la forma innovativa nell'indicare le raccomandazioni sulla preservazione dei luoghi e sulla cura degli infetti, quali rimedi che sarebbero rimasti validi nei secoli a venire e che si fondavano sul principio dell'isolamento della città disposto dalla pubblica autorità, reso facilitato dall'esistenza delle mura.

Basti pensare alla peste di Messina del 1743, prolificata a dismisura a seguito della celebrazione di pubbliche penitenze e processioni, rivolte a ottenere un intervento divino che placasse il contagio, ma che ebbero l'effetto di accrescere «i contatti e la pubblica avventura»[23]. L'esplosione del morbo rese quindi necessario uno stringente apparato di controllo della città disposto dalla Suprema Deputazione Generale di Salute Pubblica del Regno, con la previsione di pene severe per chi avesse transitato da un luogo all'altro senza autorizzazione. Tra le altre misure di prevenzione fu disposta la chiusura delle botteghe, la sospensione dei divini uffizi, l'immediato seppellimento dei morti, l'apertura di un lazzaretto per gli infetti e i convalescenti, la disinfezione, tramite bruciatura, di letti, materassi e masserizie utilizzati dagli appestati[24]: istruzioni che sarebbero state compendiate nel 1749 nel volume *Governo generale di sanità del Regno della Sicilia*[25], al quale si sarebbe ispirato il governo borbonico per emanare nel 1751 le *Istruzioni generali in materia di sanità*[26], la cui materia avrebbe avuto nell'Ottocento una compiuta disciplina nel Regno di Napoli e negli altri

dinanzi a sé il giurista Reggiano quando componeva l'opera sua, benché punto non lo citi, e dica di scrivere su di nuovo soggetto: nondimeno il Previdelli si schermì dall'accusa di plagio manipolando in modo alquanto diverso da chi l'aveva così preceduto la trista materia». Ivi, vol. 2, Bologna, 1867, p. 81.

[22] Ivi, pp. 78 e 81.

[23] Ivi, vol. 4, 1876, p. 123.

[24] *Ibidem*. Sull'argomento cfr. G. Restifo, *Peste al confine: l'epidemia di Messina del 1743*, Palermo 1984; M.S. Pellizzeri, *Medici e appestati nella Sicilia del Cinquecento,* in Aa.Vv., *Malattie, terapie e istituzioni sanitarie in Sicilia*, Palermo, 1985, pp. 99-111; G. Cosmacini, A.W. D'Agostino, *La peste. Passato e presente*, Milano, 2008; R. Alibrandi, *In salute e in malattia. Le leggi sanitarie borboniche fra Settecento e Ottocento*, Milano, 2012; G. Martino, *Preserve salutevoli contro il contagioso morbo. Deputazione di Sanità e Lazzaretto di Messina in epoca borbonica*, Roma, 2014; D. Palermo, *La Suprema Deputazione Generale di Salute Pubblica del Regno di Sicilia dall'emergenza alla stabilità*, «Storia Urbana», n. 147 (2015), pp. 115-134; Id., *I pericolosi miasmi, Gli interventi pubblici per la disciplina delle attività generatrici di esalazioni nel Regno di Sicilia (1743-1805)*, Palermo, 2018.

[25] P. La Placa, *Governo generale di sanità del Regno di Sicilia e instruzioni del lazzeretto della città di Messina*, Palermo, 1749.

[26] Prammatica CXXXIII. *Istruzioni generali in materia di sanità*, Napoli 15 settembre 1751, in Nuova collezione delle prammatiche del Regno di Napoli, t. IX, Napoli, 1804, pp. 246-293.

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stati preunitari italiani, utilizzata per la edificazione della legislazione sanitaria nazionale[27].

Si trattava, quindi, di un protocollo di misure preventive che si ripetevano ciclicamente per la difesa dai contagi (non solo la peste, il cui ultimo fenomeno in Europa si registrò a Taranto nel 1945[28], ma anche il vaiolo o il colera nell'Ottocento), secondo una politica di governo della sanità[29] che si sarebbe andata delineando sempre più nel corso del tempo e che avrebbe previsto l'igiene pubblica e privata, l'istituzione di lazzaretti, la separazione dei malati dai convalescenti, la quarantena per le navi, la limitazione degli scambi commerciali, il divieto di assembramenti.

L'adozione di queste misure si fece però più difficile nel Novecento, quando la dimensione della città, non più cinta da mura, ma industrializzata, con flussi di merci e uomini in vortiginoso movimento, non consentiva un agevole «esilio a casa propria» (efficace espressione utilizzata da Albert Camus nel celebre romanzo *La peste*) come in passato. Ciò determinò le difficoltà di gestione verificatesi con l'esplosione, a livello mondiale, dell'influenza spagnola, la quale, diffusasi nell'ultima fase della Grande Guerra, non rese possibile quegli interventi che avevano avuto buon esito fino all'Ottocento, come restrizioni di viaggio, controlli alle frontiere o cordoni sanitari terrestri. Fu così, quindi, che i focolai epidemici viaggiarono insieme ai militari e ai prigionieri in transito, in un contesto nel quale la poca cura per l'igiene dei luoghi e delle persone favorì il contagio. Le strategie possibili, adottate dalle autorità sanitarie locali – con sensibili differenze da luogo a luogo – furono rivolte alla chiusura o limitazione di tutte le attività aggregative

[27] Sull'argomento rinvio a R. Cea, *Il governo della salute nell'Italia liberale. Stato igiene e politiche sanitarie*, Milano, 2019 ed alla bibliografia ivi contenuta.

[28] Cfr. A. Leone, *Taranto fra guerra e dopoguerra: il minamento della rada di Mar Grande (1943) e l'episodio epidemico di peste bubbonica (1945)*, «Cenacolo. Rivista storica di Taranto», N.S. XII (XXIV), 2000, pp. 149-188; B. Bramanti, K.R. Dean, L. Walløe, N.C. Stenseth, *The third plague pandemic in Europe*, Proceedings B Royal Society Publishing 2019, p. 4; G. Matichecchia, *La peste bubbonica nella Taranto del dopoguerra*, in *Buonasera Taranto*, Anno XXVIII, n. 62 (17 marzo 2020), p. 15.

[29] Osserva Ascheri, *Rimedi per le epidemie* cit., p. 38, che non si potrà parlare, prima del Settecento, di una scienza della legislazione e dell'amministrazione per il tempo di epidemia in senso moderno, perché il progetto dei giuristi delle epoche precedenti non discende da una piena e sistematica trasposizione sul piano giuridico-amministrativo delle esigenze sanitarie accertate dalla scienza medica del tempo, quanto piuttosto da un bagaglio di prescrizioni derivate per lo più dal sistema giuridico tramandato e vigente. Alla fine del Settecento, ad esempio, troviamo il primo trattato di igiene e sanità pubblica scritto da J.P. Frank, *Sistema compiuto di polizia medica*, Milano, 1829, nel quale l'Autore diede corpo scientifico a una impostazione amministrativa dell'igiene pubblica su cui fondare una politica sanitaria statuale. Cfr. Alibrandi, *In salute e malattia* cit., p. 17.

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possibili (scuole, chiese, mercati, ristoranti, cinema e teatri) e a una stringente campagna di disinfezione e sterilizzazione degli spazi pubblici e privati[30]. Tanti sforzi che trovarono un limite nelle conoscenze mediche e farmacologiche del tempo e nella differente applicazione da città a città delle misure di contenimento adottate, anche a causa di una non esatta percezione del contagio, determinata da una ridotta diffusione di notizie spesso censurate dai regimi dell'epoca. Ma a parte queste riflessioni in ordine all'efficacia dei rimedi, le prevenzioni che il mondo del diritto seppe suggerire anche in quella circostanza rimasero ancorate a quegli insegnamenti tramandati dalla saggezza medievale, di cui si è fatto portavoce il professore Mario Ascheri.

Stefano Vinci

[30] Cfr., fra i tanti, E. Tognotti, *La "spagnola" in Italia. Storia dell'influenza che fece temere la fine del mondo (1918-1919)*, Milano, 2015; L. Spinney, *1918. L'influenza spagnola. La pandemia che cambiò il mondo,* Venezia, 2018.

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

RECENSIONI & SCHEDE

Valentina Favarò, *Pratiche negoziali e reti di potere. Carmine Nicola Caracciolo tra Europa e America (1694-1725)*, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2019, pp. 204

La ricerca sulla vita e sulla carriera di Carmine Nicola Caracciolo è funzionale a interrogarci sia sulla natura della Monarchia spagnola, sulla sua costruzione e sulla sua sopravvivenza, sia sulle motivazioni che indussero molteplici esponenti delle *élite* dei differenti territori a legare e impegnare il proprio futuro al consolidamento e al successo della stessa Monarchia.

Molti studiosi hanno già provato a ricostruire dinamiche e percorsi di singoli individui, spesso figure eccezionali, o di fazioni o, ancora, di intere corti. Alcuni hanno descritto istituzioni e norme, altri invece hanno preteso di mettere in luce "ciò che è realmente accaduto". In ogni caso, indipendentemente dall'approccio storiografico adottato, la maggior parte degli studiosi ha rappresentato la *monarchia hispanica* come una sorta di ingranaggio formidabile, azionato da un *deus ex machina*: nonostante le continue debolezze, la Monarchia è sempre riuscita, come una fenice, a riprendersi costantemente.

All'interno di questo quadro, alcuni storici hanno individuato nella potenza militare il motore capace di muovere tale macchina, altri invece hanno attribuito un ruolo chiave alla produzione di documentazione – come fossero *chains of paper* – da parte di una struttura amministrativa sorprendentemente moderna ed efficiente. Infine, un terzo gruppo di studiosi ha suggerito la visione di una Monarchia caratterizzata da una struttura clientelare, all'interno della quale gli individui costruivano le loro relazioni e si legavano reciprocamente mediante vincoli sociali, politici ed economici. Ma, qualunque sia stato il modo in cui hanno scelto di raccontare questa storia, gli storici hanno spesso presentato straordinari attori con obiettivi chiari e chiare strategie su come raggiungerli, nonché con piena consapevolezza delle proprie possibilità. I loro successi e i loro fallimenti, di conseguenza, si sarebbero potuti spiegare logicamente e, anzi, in alcune occasioni sarebbe stato anche possibile prevederli.

Valentina Favarò non fa nulla di tutto ciò. Invece di seguire queste rotte già tracciate, ritrae un mondo estremamente caotico e avventuroso, in cui l'incertezza era più comune della sicurezza e in cui la mancanza di conoscenza era più frequente della capacità di pianificare. Ciò non appare palese esclusivamente nelle congiunture di grande tensione – quale fu la svolta della crisi successoria al

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passaggio dal XVII al XVIII secolo – ma anche nelle situazioni quotidiane. In ogni dato momento si presentavano più opzioni e la scelta tra ognuna di esse non era mai facile, né evidente. Inoltre, se onore e prestigio costituivano elementi essenziali, non di meno lo erano il riconoscimento, la capacità di accrescere il patrimonio economico, di rafforzare le relazioni sociali e di agire nel rispetto di un obbligo morale; se il servizio al re rappresentava un vettore diretto, la famiglia e le reti sociali ne costituivano un altro; se il successo veniva talvolta misurato in base al profitto economico o ai progressi professionali, in altri casi era collegato alla capacità di imporre i propri criteri, di garantire la pace, di essere considerati uomini leali o di tessere nuove importanti reti personali. In effetti, nella prima età moderna, non era così semplice discernere con chiarezza ciò che poteva essere considerato "successo" e ciò che era ritenuto "fallimento". In entrambi i casi, difficilmente se ne conoscevano e comprendevano le origini.

Lo Stato, la Monarchia, l'Impero hanno nel loro fondamento le aggregazioni di questi elementi costitutivi: il susseguirsi di una grande molteplicità di decisioni prese da una pluralità di attori, portatori di differenti interessi, di connessioni e di abilità individuali. Alcuni momenti, alcuni attori, alcune decisioni, avrebbero potuto essere più o meno eccezionali, più o meno importanti, con un esito più o meno forte, ma questo era un mondo in cui le dinamiche si sarebbero potute protrarre tanto a breve quanto a lungo termine, prive di ogni certezza e della possibilità di essere considerate definitive.

Il tempo scorreva con particolare lentezza. Valentina Favarò dimostra con successo, ad esempio, che la crisi di successione spagnola, che gli storici di solito relegano agli anni compresi tra il 1701 e il 1714, è in realtà iniziata precedentemente, rimanendo per diversi decenni sottotraccia. Secondo l'Autrice, infatti, già durante l'ultimo ventennio del XVII secolo era sorto un dibattito politico e giuridico, all'interno del quale si iniziarono a studiare e delineare i diversi scenari possibili. Tuttavia, sebbene la crisi fosse un evento annunciato, le parti interessate (e certamente tutte le parti erano interessate) sembrarono colte piuttosto impreparate. Il tempo, di conseguenza, avrebbe potuto essere una risorsa formidabile o, di contro, avrebbe potuto scorrere senza coglierne un significativo profitto.

La possibilità di comprendere quanto potrebbe essere realmente accaduto è data dall'analisi dell'Autrice sul funzionamento dello Stato, della Monarchia, dell'Impero, non da un punto di vista istituzionale, ma attraverso le esperienze di un attore; non dall'osservazione dei fenomeni "dall'alto", a volo di uccello, ma a livello degli occhi; non come una lunga continuità, ma come il concatenarsi di eventi spesso casuali. Tale approccio non solo può indurci a provare una forte empatia con i protagonisti degli eventi narrati, ma ci consente anche di comprendere perché le cose si siano verificate in una determinata maniera e, forse, anche quali siano state le loro conseguenze.

Quanto sono stati liberi gli attori di scegliere? Quali erano le loro opzioni? Cosa sapevano? Come lo sapevano? Si preoccupavano principalmente della costruzione della loro carriera o anteponevano gli equilibri familiari? Il prestigio era più importante del denaro? Era riconoscimento e potere? Era il servizio alla Monarchia spagnola l'unica opzione o gli stessi attori avrebbero potuto scegliere di rimanere ai margini, o

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addirittura di essere al servizio di un altro potere? In che misura i notabili locali come Carmine Nicola Caracciolo sono stati trasformati in *alter ego* del re e della monarchia?

Appartengo a un gruppo di studiosi che alcuni anni fa ha suggerito di considerare la Monarchia spagnola come una struttura policentrica che, invece di essere articolata con un centro (Madrid) e una serie di periferie, contava al suo interno una molteplicità di centri che coordinavano e comunicavano le loro attività, almeno in una certa misura. Nel suo testo Valentina Favarò sembra rispondere alla domanda su come funzionasse il policentrismo dal punto di vista delle *élite* che scelsero di integrarsi e servire la Monarchia. La sua ricostruzione propone che tali individui fossero, almeno in parte, veri cosmopoliti. Sebbene le loro origini fossero legate a un particolare territorio, erano cittadini del mondo, in qualche modo *global trotterers*, che si sentivano a casa in una varietà di luoghi. Carmine Nicola Caracciolo, ad esempio, si trasferì tra Napoli, Roma, Madrid e Lima come se non fosse importante dove si trovasse. Nei documenti non si rinviene alcuna indicazione che si sia mai sentito al di fuori dalla propria zona di *comfort*, fuori dal contesto o come straniero. Né ci sono chiare indicazioni circa la necessità da lui avvertita di acquisire nuove informazioni o nuove abilità, ovvero di modificare il proprio comportamento perché inserito in una realtà diversa dalle precedenti.

Coloro che hanno mosso contro di lui delle critiche o accuse, tanto durante il mandato viceregio a Lima quanto al suo scadere, all'interno del processo di *Residencia*, hanno affermato che, come un alieno, non avesse idea degli equilibri politici e delle tradizioni della città e del Regno. Ma nulla che sia verificabile dimostra che sia stato realmente così, o che la sua ignoranza – se tale ignoranza esisteva – dipendesse dalle sue origini o dalla sua traiettoria personale. Dopotutto, come potevano gli uomini al servizio del re spostarsi da un territorio all'altro qualora fosse stato così? In tal caso, come avrebbe potuto sopravvivere la Monarchia?

Tamar Herzog

Mirella Vera Mafrici, *Coniugare la politica, costruire alleanze. Elisabetta Farnese e la Spagna nell'Europa dei Lumi*, Aracne editrice, Ariccia (Roma), 2019, pp. 328

Mirella Vera Mafrici, natural de Reggio Calabria, estudió en la Università degli Studi di Salerno, donde actualmente es profesora de Historia Moderna. Es miembro de SISEM y de otras asociaciones históricas italianas y extranjeras, formando parte del Comité Científico del Mediterranean Maritime History Network. Es autora de numerosas publicaciones sobre historia económica, social y política de Italia, especialmente del reino de Nápoles, y de la Europa mediterránea. Hay que destacar entre otros temas su interés por la historia de las mujeres y la historia de las relaciones diplomáticas. Sus trabajos se centran en la edad moderna y preferentemente en los siglos XVII y XVIII.

Ha dedicado importantes trabajos a la figura de Elisabetta Farnese, princesa de Parma, después Isabel de Farnesio, reina de España, una de las mujeres más poderosas de la primera mitad del siglo XVIII. Hace ya veinte años publicó un interesante libro titulado *Fascino e potere di una regina. Elisabetta Farnese sulla scena europea (1715-1759)* (Cava de' Tirreni, Avagliano, 1999, 192 pp.) en que presentaba un nuevo

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perfil de la soberana. Caracterizada generalmente como una mujer ambiciosa, empeñada en encontrar buenos destinos para sus hijos, Mirella Mafrici descubría a una mujer inteligente que dirigía con suma habilidad la partida diplomática en el tablero de la Europa Mediterránea.

Continuación de esa misma investigación es un artículo, situando a Isabel de Farnesio en el contexto de las soberanas del Setecientos: "Elisabetta Farnese nella politica europea del XVIII secolo, en G. Motta, *Regine e sovrane. Il potere, la politica, la vita privata*, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2002, pp. 113-128.

Siempre en esa línea de interés por el escenario del Mediterráneo en el siglo XVIII, por las relaciones diplomáticas, por la historia de género y concretamente por la figura de Isabel de Farnesio, Mirella Mafrici participó en el magnífico congreso internacional, celebrado en Parma del 2 al 4 de octubre de 2008: "Elisabetta Farnese: principessa di Parma e regina di Spagna", organizado por la profesora Gigliola Fragnito.

La contribución de Mafrici se tituló "La politica spagnola in Italia: Elisabetta Farnese e le guerre di successione". Las Actas del Congreso se publicaron tiempo después (Roma, Viella, 2011).

Y ahora, como colofón a toda esa trayectoria, Mirella Mafrici nos ofrece un nuevo trabajo que culmina el redescubrimiento del personaje, Isabel de Farnesio, y de su obra como reina poderosa, dibujando el panorama del mundo mediterráneo y muy concretamente las relaciones entre Italia, su país de origen, y España, su país de destino. Isabel, princesa de Parma y reina de la Monarquía Española, nunca renunció a sus raíces italianas y defendió siempre como un bien máximo su herencia parmesana y toscana, logrando incluir sus derechos, traspasados a sus hijos, en un proyecto de alcance europeo.

Ser una princesa italiana fue lo que llevó a Elisabetta al trono de España, pues para Felipe V, decidido a no asumir la pérdida de los estados italianos sufrida en la guerra y ratificada en el tratado de Utrecht, era fundamental encontrar un medio para replantear inmediatamente el regreso español a Italia y nada mejor que el matrimonio con una princesa de la familia Farnesio, con derechos sobre el Ducado de Parma y el Ducado de Toscana. No eran los territorios perdidos por España en la guerra de Sucesión, pero eran dos bazas muy potentes para negociar cara al futuro. El casamiento de Felipe e Isabel en 1714 fue un hito fundamental de la política mediterránea desarrollada por la Monarquía Española.

Felipe V no podía renunciar a Italia, se lo impedía el deber principal de un rey que era conservar la monarquía que había heredado y transmitirla íntegra a su sucesor, no se lo permitía tampoco su honor como príncipe Borbón que había luchado en la guerra por defender su herencia, incluso era una cuestión personal por la enorme impresión que le habían causado sus estados italianos en la visita inicial de su reinado. Isabel lo comprendió perfectamente y colaboraría siempre con el rey, sumando sus propios objetivos a los de Felipe V y a los de la Monarquía Española. Volver a Italia no era solo una obsesión de los reyes, era una gran finalidad española, pues eran tan antiguos y tan importantes los lazos que unían las dos penínsulas, económicos, sociales, políticos, culturales, religiosos, familiares, que simplemente no se toleraba la ruptura.

Después de su matrimonio, ser reina de España fue lo que permitió y empujó a Isabel Farnesio a mover los hilos de la política mediterránea y de

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la misma política italiana, para conseguir, bien fuese a través de los acuerdos diplomáticos o a través de la guerra, el objetivo esencial de lograr destinos soberanos para sus hijos, siempre en el marco de una nueva forma de presencia de España en Italia, la de los tronos dinásticos borbónicos, cuando ya el principio del equilibrio de poderes hacía imposible en Europa un dominio directo como el que había tenido anteriormente la Casa de Austria.

Isabel de Farnesio fue una reina poderosa, porque fue una mujer inteligente, valerosa, tenaz. Quiso y supo aprovechar la oportunidad que tuvo como esposa de Felipe V para desarrollar su proyecto, que coincidía con el del rey. Su obra política y diplomática hay que enmarcarla en el proyecto político y diplomático general de la Monarquía española, para comprender cómo ella se movió dentro de ese marco general, pero sobre todo para apreciar lo mucho que influyó en él. Isabel de Farnesio fue esencial en el devenir de España y de Europa en la primera mitad del setecientos.

Como italiana y a la vez como española, Isabel conocía a fondo la complejidad de la política europea y supo explotarla en beneficio propio, con más o menos éxito en cada momento, pero con magnífico resultado final, pues logró ver a su hijo primogénito, primero reconocido como heredero de Parma y Toscana, y después, a través de la intervención española en la guerra de sucesión polaca, convertido en rey de Nápoles y Sicilia, la más bella Corona de Italia -como ella escribió en una de sus cartas-. Y años más tarde a su hijo el infante Felipe, tras la guerra de sucesión austriaca, asumiendo la herencia de los Farnesio como Duque de Parma.

Estos dos logros esenciales del regreso español a Italia, se complementan con un proyecto mucho más amplio, europeo, tendente a afianzar y desplegar el papel de la Monarquía española como gran potencia europea y gran potencia internacional, gracias a sus dominios americanos. Isabel de Farnesio tuvo una influencia decisiva en el diseño de la política matrimonial de sus hijos. De gran trascendencia fue la boda de Carlos con María Amalia de Sajonia, tratando de aproximar la Casa de Borbón española al Imperio. Igualmente significativo fue el enlace de Felipe con Luisa Isabel de Francia, hija primogénita de Luis XV, como medio de estrechar lazos con los Borbones franceses, tras el traumático fracaso años antes del proyecto matrimonial de la infanta española María Ana Victoria con el propio Luis XV. También frustrado resultaría el posterior enlace de la infanta María Teresa con el Delfín Luis de Francia, a causa de la prematura muerte de la Delfina solo un año después de la boda. Isabel se esforzaría en dar un destino soberano a todos sus hijos, María Ana Victoria, casada con José I fue reina de Portugal, María Antonia se casó con Victorio Amadeo III, y fue reina de Cerdeña, otro enlace con Italia que hizo muy feliz a Isabel de Farnesio. Solo quedó fuera el infante Don Luis, que disgustó profundamente a su madre al abandonar la brillante carrera eclesiástica que ella le había preparado.

Conjugar las políticas, construir alianzas, a ello se dedicó intensamente Isabel de Farnesio durante todo su largo reinado, de 1714, fecha de su boda, hasta 1746, fecha de la muerte de Felipe V, en que al perder al rey y al reino tuvo que apartarse del poder y retirarse al palacio de La Granja de San Ildefonso, dejando lo que era su verdadera pasión, la política. Ella fue siempre muy consciente de que el poder pasaba por el diseño y la elaboración cuidadosa de una

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vasta red de relaciones, a través de la cual se recibieran y se distribuyeran los múltiples impulsos de los diferentes agentes políticos de los diferentes países. El poder no tiene sentido en el vacío. El poder no es estático, está en permanente movimiento y hay que crear las vías para encauzarlo, dirigirlo y dominarlo. Isabel de Farnesio fue maestra en la creación de una vasta red de poder, que se centraba en el escenario mediterráneo, pero alcanzaba a toda Europa. Con su inteligencia y determinación definió con claridad sus objetivos, con su encanto personal -que lo tenía, no hay más que leer al Duque de Saint-Simon- o con su constancia, rayana en la tozudez, los persiguió incansablemente, sin ceder nunca al desánimo, ni abandonar ante los fracasos.

La reina Isabel sabía perfectamente que su poder dependía de la confianza que le otorgaba su esposo el rey y también de la debilidad derivada de la enfermedad de la melancolía que padecía y que le hacía refugiarse en la fortaleza indestructible de la reina. Pero sabía también que no podía encerrarse en esa relación dual, sino que para ser eficaz debía -como dice el título del libro- conjugar las políticas y construir alianzas. A ello se consagró día y noche, como Penélope a tejer su tela, pues las alianzas se hacían con grandes esfuerzos y desvelos y también se deshacían con alarmante facilidad. Pero ella tuvo una tenacidad insuperable y fue esa seguramente una de sus principales virtudes políticas y diplomáticas. Superó todas las adversidades y siempre se hizo respetar. Era una formidable aliada y una rival muy temible.

Reconstruir hoy esta vastísima red de poder a la que Isabel de Farnesio se consagró durante más de tres décadas no es tarea fácil. El trabajo de Mirella Mafrici está muy bien documentado. Se basa en la consulta de multitud de archivos, especialmente valiosa la realizada en los diversos estados italianos, muchas veces escasamente tenidos en cuenta frente a la atención mayoritaria prestada a los archivos de las grandes potencias de la época como el Imperio, Francia o España. Infinidad de informes diplomáticos, abundante correspondencia, documentos de todas clases encontrados en archivos y bibliotecas, apoyada toda esa documentación en un conocimiento profundo de la historiografía antigua y moderna, incluida la más reciente, son los cimientos sobre los que Mirella Mafrici ha construido este magnífico estudio, riguroso y renovador. El libro aporta muchos conocimientos nuevos, que contribuyen a resaltar la importancia de la figura de Isabel de Farnesio y su dominio de los recursos diplomáticos y de las relaciones internacionales.

Queda bien de manifiesto el complejo panorama de intereses, finalidades y objetivos que Isabel de Farnesio hubo de manejar para desarrollar su política mediterránea. Al conjugar tantas y tan diversas perspectivas la historia se enriquece y a la vez se problematiza. Se comprende mejor la multitud de caminos y de encrucijadas que a cada instante se abrían y se cerraban. Eran oportunidades de acierto y de error que había que afrontar, corriendo grandes riesgos, pero pudiendo también conseguir grandes éxitos. Todo ello contribuye a revalorizar todavía más la inteligencia y el valor de Isabel al tener la osadía de asumir el poder, sobre todo durante las crisis más graves de melancolía del rey y siempre como su sostén y ayuda. Se equivocó muchas veces, pero fueron muchas más las que acertó, por lo que, a pesar del alto precio que hubo de pagar la Monarquía española, en vidas y en recursos económicos, el balance final del

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reinado de Isabel de Farnesio, al lado de su esposo Felipe V, es claramente positivo, sobre todo desde el punto de vista dinástico, y también por el papel desempeñado por los monarcas en la historia de Europa justo en el arranque del Siglo de las Luces.

Pocas mujeres tuvieron en ese tiempo el poder de Isabel de Farnesio, todavía menos tuvieron el afán y la voluntad de asumirlo y de ejercerlo. Acusada en su época y en los siglos posteriores de ser una mujer ambiciosa y entrometida, que se infiltraba de manera ilegítima en el estricto ámbito de la soberanía personal del monarca, fue muchas veces infravalorada y despreciada, acaso por el simple hecho de ser mujer, en un mundo en que el poder se consideraba únicamente masculino. Mirella Mafrici, con claridad de visión y con voluntad de justicia, ha reivindicado en su libro a Isabel de Farnesio, como mujer, como madre y como reina. La historia de Europa, especialmente la historia de Italia y la historia de España, en el siglo XVIII no hubiera sido la misma sin Isabel de Farnesio. La historia de Isabel de Farnesio, la historia de Italia, la historia de España, en definitiva, la historia de Europa y la historia del mundo mediterráneo tampoco serían hoy las mismas sin el libro de Mirella Mafrici. Debemos agradecérselo sinceramente.

María Ángeles Pérez Samper

Carlantonio Pilati, *Di una Riforma d'Italia. Ossia dei mezzi di riformare i più cattivi costumi, e le più perniciose leggi d'Italia*, a cura di Serena Luzzi, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Roma, 2018, pp. CLXII-344

Sulla *Riforma d'Italia* dell'illuminista Carlantonio Pilati (1733-1802), opera di forte impatto già dal titolo intelligente e accattivante, pubblicata, in prima edizione, nel 1767 anonima e con falso luogo di stampa (Villafranca, ma in realtà Coira), è disponibile un'ampia mole di contributi, e altrettanto numerosi sono stati, nel tempo, i luoghi comuni storiografici e le classificazioni, spesso approssimative e fuorvianti, adottate per definire il libro e il suo autore, con equivoci di cui sarebbe stato responsabile, almeno in parte, lo stesso Pilati. La riscoperta dell'opera si deve invece a Franco Venturi, che nel suo *Settecento riformatore* ha richiamato l'attenzione sulla figura di Pilati, collocando pienamente lo scrittore, con acume e sensibilità, nel panorama culturale del Settecento europeo, e ritenendo la *Riforma d'Italia* un libro epocale nel contesto dell'azione riformatrice italiana.

La nuova edizione critica dell'opera, curata da Serena Luzzi e pubblicata nella serie «Settecento italiano» (diretta da Giuseppe Nicoletti e Renato Pasta) delle Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, risponde pienamente all'esigenza di esplorare in maniera più approfondita la vicenda umana e intellettuale del riformatore di origine trentina, offrendo una biografia della sua opera più nota scritta in una decisiva fase esistenziale e ideologica. Indagini archivistiche sistematiche condotte in numerosi archivi pubblici e privati in Italia e all'estero (con un pensiero grato, da parte della curatrice, anche al motore di ricerca Google e a tutte le biblioteche che hanno investito nella digitalizzazione del loro patrimonio librario) e nuovi strumenti interpretativi consentono infatti qui, non solo di comprendere la *Riforma d'Italia*, ma anche di proporre una biografia aggiornata di Pilati e uno studio attento del suo percorso culturale, assieme alla ricostruzione (e migliore comprensione) dei suoi progetti di riforma successi-

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vi, come la riforma del matrimonio cattolico e la riforma della giustizia penale.

Nato da un lavoro pluriennale della curatrice, che ha accolto le riflessioni e i suggerimenti emersi nel corso del convegno di Rovereto del 2002 dedicato a Pilati, il volume pubblica, con rigore filologico e importanti interventi in nota, l'«edizione seconda accresciuta di altrettanto», che consente di apprezzare il progetto di riforma dell'autore nella sua interezza (pp. 1-286); vale a dire, l'edizione in due tomi della *Riforma d'Italia* stampata nel 1770 (sempre a Coira, ma anch'essa adespota, con falso luogo di stampa – Villafranca – e senza l'indicazione del tipografo), utilizzando l'esemplare conservato nella Biblioteca comunale di Trento. Ma soprattutto, per contribuire a dare una risposta ai molti interrogativi sorti, il testo presentato è preceduto da un'ampia *Introduzione* che delinea il progetto secolarizzatore di Pilati, dalla nascita e passando attraverso la personalità, le inclinazioni, le passioni del suo autore e le persone, amiche e nemiche, attorno a lui (pp. XIII-CXXXVIII); è anche seguito da una *Postfazione* che fa il punto su «la breve ma intensa età di Carlantonio Pilati» (pp. 287-293), ed è corredato di un ricco apparato bio-bibliografico di Pilati (pp. CXXXIX-CLIX), iconografico (pp. n.n.) e bibliografico-critico relativo all'opera proposta e al suo autore (pp. 297-328).

La curatrice, studiosa esperta della figura e del pensiero di Pilati, ha cercato qui la via maestra per comprendere, apprezzare e contestualizzare la *Riforma d'Italia*, quindi gli orizzonti culturali che sostengono il programma riformatore, per nulla utopistico, pensato per l'Italia del 1766 e la cifra ideologica. Lo ha fatto, soprattutto, scegliendo di studiare l'edizione accresciuta data alle stampe nel 1770, nella quale si ripropone la versione originale pubblicata nel 1767, ma con l'aggiunta di tre nuovi capitoli. Questo ha consentito di avvicinarsi a un maggior numero di tematiche affrontate, alcune anche di notevole originalità, specie considerando il contesto italiano. Mi limito a segnalare, oltre alla necessità di una revisione radicale della scienza, della pratica e della formazione giuridica e alla preoccupazione di Pilati di educare gli italiani al buon gusto (come un fatto di «sana morale»), l'attenzione dedicata allo studio delle lingue straniere, francese e inglese in particolare, e alla lettura in lingua originale, nel quadro di una riforma dell'istruzione che si pone l'obiettivo di svecchiare la cultura italiana e di renderla capace di comunicare con la cultura europea. Anche gli argomenti sull'ateismo da preferire alla dannosità della religiosità superstiziosa, e ancor più quelli a favore della tolleranza, nella sua estensione più ampia, costituiscono un'opzione decisamente innovatrice (e rara, nel panorama culturale italiano degli anni Sessanta), con una stesura non proprio autonoma, ma sufficiente per mettere la *Riforma d'Italia* al bando.

Pagine giurisdizionaliste e anticuriali quelle di Pilati – dai contenuti ad alto rischio di sanzione, e con paternità, taciuta prudentemente sul frontespizio, rivelata solo dagli editori alla ricerca di recensioni – rivolte, con uno stile 'urlato' e talvolta con satire *ad personam* (con un isolato ricorso anche al *cahier de doléance*, in tema di condizioni economiche e sociali dello Stato della Chiesa), contro il potere temporale del papa, i diritti pontifici, le gerarchie ecclesiastiche (gli ordini regolari, in particolare), il culto dei santi e l'autorità dei Padri della Chiesa. Il tutto, sfidando la censura e ignorando le dinamiche della comu-

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nicazione politica che dello stile facevano sostanza. Una sfida però anche alla censura di stato viennese, che si abbatte su queste pagine a poche settimane dalla loro pubblicazione: una censura apparentemente inspiegabile, che Serena Luzzi ripercorre – con una condivisibile prospettiva interpretativa – evidenziando gli errori di valutazione compiuti dall'autore, cioè il suo tono aggressivo capace di insinuare qualche dubbio sulla religione in sé e la sua sottovalutazione della capacità di controllo statale sui libri. Le conseguenze della censura viennese (in realtà viennese-tridentina) sarebbero state invece soffocanti e durature per Pilati (che nell'opera aveva addirittura legittimato il ricorso alla censura secolare), e all'origine della censura veneziana e, a quanto pare, di quella romana – con decreto del Sant'Uffizio del 29 luglio 1767 – che avrebbe incollato alla *Riforma d'Italia*, parto di un ingegno maledetto, la marca di opera eretica.

Quella di Serena Luzzi è pertanto una valida messa a punto dell'opera di Pilati, che la curatrice dimostra essere un lavoro di compilazione, con un ricorso sovrabbondante agli scritti altrui, anche del giurisdizionalismo napoletano (come pure a quelle di autori protestanti all'Indice, esplicitamente menzionati, come Pierre Mussard, Conyers Middleton, Isaac de Beausobre e Jean Barbeyrac). Ma la *Riforma d'Italia* – apprezzata da Voltaire e da altri per i contenuti (tanto da essere tradotta in francese e in tedesco, ed essere inserita saldamente nella letteratura risorgimentale), e allo stesso tempo condannata da molti per lo stile – risulta essere, inoltre, l'esito di un percorso di emancipazione e di autoaffermazione del suo autore, insofferente nei confronti dei condizionamenti imposti dal suo tempo.

Milena Sabato

Georges Vigarello, *L'abito femminile. Una storia culturale,* Einaudi, 2018, Torino, pp. 298

Georges Vigarello, directeur d'études à l'École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales et spécialiste de l'histoire des corps et de leurs représentations, nous a habitué au cours des dernières décennies à ses descriptions claires et éclairantes des corps et de leurs contextes sociaux et culturels sur le long terme, soutenues par une documentation toujours originale et variée. Ce fut le cas, entre-autres, pour *Le Propre et le sale* (1985), les volumes de l'*Histoire du corps* codirigés avec Alain Corbin et Jean-Jacques Courtine (2005), et l'*Histoire de la beauté* (2004). Il en est de même pour son dernier ouvrage *L'abito femminile. Una storia culturale* (2018), la version italienne d'Einaudi de *La Robe. Une histoire culturelle. Du Moyen Âge à aujourd'hui*, originellement publié au Seuil (2017). Cette histoire du vêtement féminin et des enjeux sociétaux qu'il symbolise, couvrant près de huit siècles, est l'aboutissement d'un travail ponctué en 2012 par *La Silhouette. Naissance d'un défi*.

Le point de vue adopté par Vigarello est celui du vêtement de manière à revisiter l'histoire culturelle et sociale. Ce qu'il propose est une histoire contextuelle de la mode, dans la lignée des travaux de Daniel Roche (*La culture des apparences,* 1989). Alors que Roche livrait une analyse minutieuse de garde-robes associées aux différents groupes sociaux – nobles, bourgeois, classes populaires – reconstruites grâce à des documents notariés comme des inventaires après décès, Vigarello évacue pour la plus large partie de son ouvrage la différenciation de classes ou les aspects économiques pour se concentrer sur l'évolution de la silhouette des fem-

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mes, construite par la robe. Il livre ainsi, dans un style définitivement moins hermétique que celui de Roche, une analyse qui est davantage celle de la construction du rôle social des femmes à travers l'image de leur corps que celle du quotidien matériel et économique de celles qui endossent les variantes des modes de leurs époques. Sa réflexion s'étend jusqu'au XXe siècle alors que s'affirme le pantalon comme vêtement féminin, reflet d'une société où les femmes revendiquent l'égalité des sexes. Un pantalon qui devient un symbole de cette lutte politique; ici Vigarello ne s'aventure pas dans une analyse genrée comme celle de Christine Bard (*Une histoire politique du pantalon* et *Ce que soulève la jupe*, 2010). À la suite de Bard, toutefois, il soutient que la robe – comme le pantalon – est socialement construit et agit en tant que symbole de pouvoir. Mais il ne s'avance pas sur le terrain des luttes de genre contemporaines et des enjeux politiques actuels. La robe et les vêtements féminins sont ainsi une lentille à travers laquelle regarder l'histoire sociale des femmes, leurs rôles symboliques dans l'imaginaire occidental, les représentations que l'on se fait d'elles ainsi que les sociabilités qui caractérisent leur existence, dans une perspective qui rejoint l'*Histoire des femmes en Occident* de Georges Duby et Michelle Perrot (1990-1991).

La problématique du livre est celle du croisement entre l'évolution des formes et des modes du vêtement féminin et les grands changements de l'histoire de femmes et de la société occidentale : pourquoi certains éléments se transforment, apparaissent ou disparaissent? L'objectif est donc de voir, à partir d'un riche corpus de textes littéraires, de gravures, de peintures, puis de revues de mode pour les périodes plus récentes, comment le vêtement est utilisé par les femmes et comment il reflète les attentes sociales. Et dans tous les cas, la robe obéit à un contexte.

L'abito femminile. Una storia culturale est organisé chronologiquement autour de six grandes périodes, qui couvrent l'histoire de la société occidentale du XIIIe siècle au XXIe siècle. Le point de départ de la réflexion de Georges Vigarello se situe donc au Moyen Âge, qu'il qualifie comme la période où émerge et s'impose l'artifice dans le vêtement féminin. Les représentations repêchées dans les imageries des manuscrits enluminés et sur des tapisseries montrent comment les robes adhèrent au buste, de manière à accentuer la silhouette et à montrer les lignes de la partie haute du corps. Une claire séparation entre la partie supérieure et la partie inférieure de la robe apparait : la taille est modelée pour être rétrécie alors que la jupe s'élargit. Il se crée ainsi une symétrie entre la jupe et les épaules, une géométrie qui s'affirme à la Renaissance. Ce vêtement s'oppose à celui des hommes qui, lui, libère les jambes de manière à laisser la liberté de mouvement nécessaire au travail. Cette différenciation reflète la séparation sociale des rôles de genre: l'homme travaille alors que la femme est un apparat décoratif.

La seconde partie porte sur les XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, alors que s'affirme la prépondérance du buste, la partie supérieure du vêtement féminin. C'est ce que Vigarello a nommé le dispositif du piédestal : le visage est une fleur, le buste une stèle, et la jupe, un ample support (p. 41). Ce dispositif en vase de fleur s'affirme avec des corsets de plus en plus rigides et un élargissement de la partie basse. La contre-réforme intervient brièvement dans les années 1635-45 pour règlementer les dimensions des jupes, mais dès la seconde moitié du XVIIe siècle, elles s'élargissent de nouveau. Ce

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modèle se développe encore davantage au XVIIIe siècle: on adopte alors le *panier*, une cage solide qui permet de donner la forme voulue à la jupe.

Ce modèle commence à s'effriter au XVIIIe siècle avec les Lumières, sujet de la troisième partie, qui permettent de penser des vêtements qui offrent plus de commodité et de simplicité. De nombreuses innovations libèrent le mouvement : c'est le cas par exemple de la *tournure* qui, provenant de la mode anglaise, n'élargit la jupe qu'à l'arrière (p. 88). L'image du piédestal perdure. La robe est toutefois complètement redessinée dans les années 1790 : la ceinture se déplace sous les seins et devient une fine corde, retenant une jupe qui descend ensuite librement, en épousant le corps. Un changement qui est lié à la nouvelle identité adoptée par les femmes au cœur de la Révolution Française, qui revendique la naissance égale de chaque personne qui est propriétaire de son corps. Une liberté féminine qui s'estompe toutefois au lendemain de la Révolution.

Le retour aux formes antiques de la Restauration et du Second Empire est l'objet de la quatrième partie de *L'abito femminile* : la taille se resserre et les hanches s'élargissent. En parallèle toutefois, les vêtements masculins deviennent plus confortables, taillés pour un nouveau modèle d'élite, le bourgeois. Des changements qui reflètent la société de l'après-Révolution : l'homme est actif dans le monde du travail, alors que la femme est renvoyée à son statut d'épouse. Ce n'est qu'à partir des années 1860 que certaines robes se font moins amples et plus courtes. Des robes qui s'adaptent à la vie en ville et aux voyages, des espaces qui s'ouvrent aux femmes et qu'elles investissent. À la fin du XIXe siècle, finalement, apparait une nouvelle silhouette : la ligne se poursuit entre l'abdomen et la jupe, créant une continuité entre le haut et le bas du corps, ajustée grâce à un corset qui modèle les courbes en S, mettant en évidence les seins et le postérieur. Cette simplification de la robe reflète une société où les femmes travaillent de plus en plus, où s'atténuent les normes de la pudeur et où s'affirme toujours plus l'individu.

Le vingtième siècle amène un vêtement féminin plus léger et plus flexible, comme l'explique Vigarello dans la cinquième partie qui porte sur les années qui suivent la Grande Guerre. La jupe raccourcit, montre les chevilles, et se fluidifie pour permettre le mouvement, les tissus se font plus légers et malléables et finalement, le corset est éliminé. La silhouette des femmes se verticalise, avec des vêtements qui s'appuient sur les épaules et tombent librement en effaçant la taille. L'image de la femme n'est plus un objet de beauté mais représente plutôt une jeune femme active, qui fait du sport et travaille. Ce dynamisme se poursuit dans l'entre-deux-guerres, avec l'émergence de la garçonne, la femme qui sort, danse, fume, fait du sport, et adopte des vêtements de coupe masculine, comme le pantalon. La silhouette féminine se rapproche de celle de l'homme, reflétant une société agitée par les luttes féministes et les revendications d'égalité des sexes.

Au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, objet de la sixième partie, l'affinement de la silhouette devient un critère fondamental. Dans l'immédiat après-guerre, la taille de guêpe et les longues jupes qui ressemblent à des piédestaux refont brièvement leur apparition, alors que les années de privation ramènent l'idéalisation de la féminité. Dès les années 1950 cependant, le discours de la libération des femmes accompagne une exigence de mobilité physique et rapidement, des éléments

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nouveaux sont introduits, comme la tunique, la mini-jupe, le collant, les pantalons et les shorts. La mécanisation de la production permet la démocratisation de la mode et l'on présente toujours plus de vêtements simples, faciles à porter et à entretenir. À partir des années 1960, le pantalon est définitivement adopté et détrône la jupe. Un dernier tournant apparait dans les années 1980. Dans une société où s'épanouit l'individu à la recherche de sa propre unicité et de sa propre voie, le vêtement s'affirme par son originalité et devient le lieu d'inscription des goûts personnels. L'apparence quitte ainsi le champ extérieur pour se concentrer sur l'intérieur de l'individu. Le vêtement doit nous faire sentir bien.

L'histoire du vêtement féminin va de pair avec l'histoire des femmes et de leur rôle social; voilà la conclusion de Georges Vigarello. Le vêtement change au même rythme que fluctuent les attentes sociales auprès des femmes et les lignes des silhouettes et des habits se transforment, reflétant les changements majeurs de notre société. Les métamorphoses les plus radicales de la mode féminine viennent avec des changements majeurs dans la société. Par exemple, les quelques années de la Révolution française sont marquées par une simplification et un confort nouveau dans les robes des femmes devenues citoyennes; les années 1930 sont marquées par la mode garçonne, alors que les femmes entrent sur la place publique et le marché du travail; la mini-jupe fait son apparition dans les années 1960, en même temps que la révolution sexuelle.

Comme toujours, les descriptions de Georges Vigarello sont riches en détails, claires et précises, menant le lecteur au travers d'un parcours qui dialogue avec de nombreuses et éblouissantes sources iconographiques. Cependant, Einaudi a choisi de publier sa traduction italienne de *La Robe* en livre relié, ce qui diminue la force du dispositif iconographique mis en place par Vigarello et rendu parfaitement par l'adoption du format beau-livre par le Seuil dans le cas de la version française. Par ailleurs, l'édition d'Einaudi comporte quelques erreurs d'attributions et d'identification des sources iconographiques (p. 7 entre-autres).

L'abito femminile. Una storia culturale est un livre complet et exhaustif, qui se feuillette autant qu'il se lit. Vigarello y aborde toutes les modes du Moyen Âge à aujourd'hui, passant de l'Italie, à la France, aux États-Unis, dans un tour du monde occidental qui souligne les grandes tendances de chaque époque. On y apprend, dans cette histoire du long terme, comment le vêtement reflète sa société et vice-versa, comment les mouvements sociaux agissent sur les apparences. Il s'agit d'un ouvrage qui, certainement, est un apport important à l'histoire sociale et culturelle des corps.

Isabel Harvey

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