


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«IT IS (NOT ONLY) THE WILL OF GOD»: THE KINGDOMS OF CYPRUS AND CILICIAN ARMENIA IN THE CRUSADER MEDITERRANEAN*

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ABSTRACT: *In 1196, Aimery de Lusignan, the lord of Cyprus, requested the establishment of the Latin Church of Cyprus. A year later, the Holy Roman Emperor Henry VI crowned him King of Cyprus. Likewise, Prince Leo of Cilician Armenia received his crown after negotiating with Henry VI. The pope also agreed in 1198 that the Armenian Church should be united with the Latin Church. Although seemingly ecclesiastical decisions, the rulers' goals in these cases were political, with the elevation of their respective principalities into kingdoms the reward for their spiritual efforts. In turn, they had to keep their ecclesiastical promises to maintain their political power throughout the thirteenth century. This paper, using papal correspondence, letters, chronicles, and relevant secondary studies, underlines the political aspects of ecclesiastical policy in the Latin East, specifically focusing on a comparative examination of the kingdoms of Cyprus and Cilician Armenia. Such comparison indicates that ecclesiastical change became a political tool, effective in diplomacy and aimed at fulfilling specific interests of the ruling elite. This paper also focuses on the relations between these two kingdoms and exposes the importance of the papacy, which, under certain conditions, condoned unorthodox practices for the sake of the political stability of the Latin East. Thus, this study argues that ecclesiastical and political institutions and policies were not mutually exclusive but, in fact, could be consciously mobilised for mutual benefit. A comparative perspective enables this article to analyse more deeply this mechanism for political change in the Crusader Mediterranean, than have other recent scholarly works focused on single kingdoms or polities.*

KEYWORDS: *Kingdom of Cyprus, Kingdom of Cilician Armenia, Crusader States, Latin church, Mediterranean politics.*

«QUESTO È (NON SOLTANTO) IL VOLERE DI DIO»: IL REGNO DI CIPRO E CILICIA ARMENA NELLA CROCIATA MEDITERRANEA

SOMMARIO: *Nel 1196, Amalrico di Lusignano, signore di Cipro, richiese al Papato la fondazione della Chiesa Latina di Cipro. L'anno successivo, l'imperatore del Sacro Romano Impero Enrico VI lo incoronò re di Cipro. Allo stesso modo, il principe Leone della Cilicia Armena ricevette la corona grazie alle trattative con lo stesso Enrico. Inoltre nel 1198, il Papa sancì l'unione fra la*

* Abbreviations: Rrh, (R. Röhricht, [ed.], *Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani*, 1097-1291, 2 vols., Innsbruck, 1893-1904); Rhc, (*Recueil des historiens des croisades*, [ed.], Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 16 vols., Paris, 1841-1906; This collection is divided into: Rhc, Arm. (Documents arméniens, 2 vols., 1896-1906); Rhc, Lois (Lois, 2 vols., 1841-1843); Rhc, Oc. (Historiens occidentaux, 5 vols., 1844-1895); Rhc, Or. (Historiens orientaux, 5 vols., 1872-1906); Rhc, Grec. (Historiens grecs, 2 vols., 1875-1881); Bullarium, (C. Schabel, [ed.], *Bullarium Cyprum, Papal Letters Concerning Cyprus 1196-1261*. vol. 1, Imprinta Ltd., Nicosia, 2010); Cartulary (N. Coureas, C. Schabel, [eds.], *the Cartulary of the Cathedral of Holy Wisdom of Nicosia*, Cyprus Research Centre, Nicosia, 1997); Synodicum (C. Schabel [trans.], *The Synodicum Nicosiense and Other Documents of the Latin Church of Cyprus, 1196-1373*, Cyprus Research Centre, Nicosia, 2001). Acknowledgements: I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Jonathan Jarrett, Dr. Luca Zavagno and Dr. Rebecca Darley for their support, suggestions and comments.

Chiesa Armena e la Chiesa Latina. Sebbene queste decisioni sembrano a prima vista di natura ecclesiastica, i due regnanti cercavano quei vantaggi politici che l'elevazione dei rispettivi principati a regni avrebbe loro garantito. A loro volta, essi dovevano mantenere le promesse ecclesiastiche così da mantenere il potere politico per tutto il XIII secolo. Questo articolo, analizzando la corrispondenza papale, le cronache e fonti secondarie, mira a sottolineare gli aspetti politici delle azioni ecclesiastiche nell'Oriente Latino, concentrandosi in particolare sui regni di Cipro e della Cilicia Armena, per tracciarne un quadro a carattere comparativo. Questo al fine di indicare i modi in cui le intraprese ecclesiastiche divennero strumenti politici e diplomatici tesi a soddisfare gli interessi specifici dei regnanti. Lo studio si concentra anche sulle relazioni tra i due regni e propone un rinnovato apprezzamento del ruolo del Papato in esse, sottolineando come il Soglio di Pietro, in certi frangenti, fosse incline a condonare pratiche non ortodosse per il bene dell'Oriente Latino. Le istituzioni ecclesiastiche e politiche non si annullavano a vicenda, ma piuttosto miravano a conseguir rispettivi vantaggi. In questo senso, questa ricerca si differenzia dai recenti lavori proprio grazie alla prospettiva comparativa adoperata per spiegare e analizzare più approfonditamente i meccanismi alla base dei mutamenti politici del Mediterraneo crociato.

PAROLE CHIAVE: *Regno di Cipro, Regno armeno di Cilicia, Stato crociato, Chiesa latina, politica mediterranea.*

Pope Celestine III rejoiced in the establishment of the Latin Church in Cyprus in 1196 and commended Aimery de Lusignan, the Lord of Cyprus and the future king, who pioneered the establishment of a Latin Church¹. The pope and Aimery were both overjoyed with the establishment as it meant that the island of Cyprus, which had been under Byzantine rule since the latter half of the tenth century and thus within the sphere of Orthodoxy, was finally under the Latin Church. According to Jean Richard, Aimery's primary motivation in contacting the pope to establish the Latin hierarchy in Cyprus was his ambition to ensure his own power on the island². While Aimery was trying to establish his kingdom, Leo II of Cilician Armenia was simultaneously cultivating his own position, using tactics which ended up following a similar path to an identical destination - the unification of the Armenian Church with the Latin Church in the Principality of Cilician Armenia by the request of Leo II and the coronation of Leo as king in 1198³. So, were these ecclesiastical changes motivated by religious conviction as they were presented at the time, or were they

¹ «We have plainly understood from the tenor of the letter of our beloved son the nobleman Aimery, lord of Cyprus, that he possesses knowledge of God, at least by His inspiration in the singularity of the faith, and he recognizes the Roman Church as the head and mistress of all churches» See Synodicum, n. X.1.

² J. Richard, *The Papacy and Cyprus*, in Bullarium, p. 1-3.

³ See I. Rapti, *Featuring the King: Rituals of Coronation and Burial in the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia*, in A. Beihammer, S. Constantinou, M. Parani, (eds.), *Court Ceremonies and Rituals of Power in Byzantium and the Medieval Mediterranean: Comparative Perspectives*, Brill, Leiden, 2013, p. 296, fn. 18.

actions deriving from political necessity in the East as later scholarly opinion has suggested? This comparative study suggests that the answer to this question cannot come from viewing the establishment of the Latin Church in Cyprus and Cilician Armenia as singular events in Mediterranean history. Rather, they should both be seen in the context of a pattern of crusader rulers' attempts to seek legitimation for their status and grow their power through ecclesiastical acts pleasing to papal authority, which worked to increase not only their dominance but also the legitimacy and control of their successors. This article delineates the core characteristics of that pattern through a close treatment of Cyprus and Cilician Armenia and suggests its potential application to other polities.

As Bernard Hamilton notes: «scholars interested in the religious history of this period have tended to treat ecclesiastical developments in isolation from their political context»⁴. The aim of this article, responding to this critique, is thus to reinterpret both sources and scholarship with respect to the role of politics in the birth of the kingdoms of Cyprus and Cilician Armenia, taking both the religious sentiments of the participants and their political aims and constraints seriously. It does not seek to subordinate the religious to the political but to understand the two as fundamentally interdependent for all parties in this region and period. Although there are studies in which scholars have outlined the politics in the Crusader east with respect to particular kingdoms, this work looks beyond the specificities of either polity in a synthetic thematic approach in an effort to identify how political and religious policies worked for two different kingdoms with politically comparable situations in the same period: the Kingdom of Cyprus and the Kingdom of Cilician Armenia.

To acknowledge the political results of particular actions is not to deny their ecclesiastical significance or the sincerity of the beliefs underpinning them but to draw a dynamic, complex, and interdisciplinary picture. Drawing out the comparison between the Kingdom of Cyprus and Cilician Armenia is useful for several reasons. First of all, at the end of the twelfth century, these two states, at that time principalities, had to strengthen politically weak positions stemming from the political turmoil in the Eastern Mediterranean in the aftermath of the Third Crusade. To do this, they had to ally with important political actors such as the pope and the Holy Roman Emperor, and this

⁴ B. Hamilton, *The Armenian Church and the Papacy at the time of the Crusades*, «Eastern Churches Review: A Journal of Eastern Christendom», 10 (1978), p. 61. See also B. Hamilton, *The Latin Church in the Crusader States: the Secular Church*, Routledge, London, 1980.

illuminates the way in which alliance and negotiation shaped political fortunes in this political and diplomatic landscape. Second, despite the fact that religion framed the actions of medieval states, especially the Crusader states, it is observable that some decisions explained in this study, which were religious in nature, were political in practice, helping to illustrate the complex inter-dependence of politics and religion in the Medieval Mediterranean. This study opts to discuss these decisions from the perspective of two smaller and more vulnerable states, rather than that of the larger or older states with whom they dealt because this allows a more intimate and detailed picture of the pressures and possibilities facing rulers and makes it easier to identify specific aims and how rulers sought to achieve them. It also focuses on their interrelationship, considering especially their intermarriages, derived from political necessity but gradually evolving into a situation that contradicted ecclesiastical rules, because this highlights the ways in which religious authorities were bound to the complexities of political affairs, just as much as political leaders were beholden to religious imperatives.

Pursuing this approach necessitates some parameters to make comparison useful and feasible. This study, for example, does not ignore the Latin East's century-long history of previous Crusader activity but does focus directly on the factors that led to the birth of these specific kingdoms in the late twelfth century. Their timelines mean that the analysis presented here begins roughly in the wake of the fall of Jerusalem, which had devastated the entire region, pushing its rulers to seek further alliances and changing the earlier and highly complex political and religious landscape, which is not the intention of this study to address. Although this political turmoil indubitably affected the whole Latin East, an appealing aspect of the comparison of the efforts of Cyprus and Cilician Armenia is that, despite different agendas and different histories, they ultimately achieved their goals in similar ways, highlighting particularities of this new, twelfth-century political landscape that are not simply timeless aspects of the Latin East. Of particular interest is their emphasis on religious sensitivities. This article thus asserts that despite both being Eastern Mediterranean states, the kingdoms of Cyprus and Cilician Armenia evolved quite differently yet followed the same pattern in their elevation to kingdoms. Leaders of these kingdoms were from different Christian denominations, proximate but different political milieus, and had their own distinctive motivations. Moreover, after being elevated, these kingdoms tended to follow different programs in pursuit of their interests and survival in the region. The specific moment of their elevation to kingdoms and the methods used to achieve it, therefore, provide a

snapshot of political possibilities and motivations in the midst of a very changeable political landscape. It identifies a pattern that was simultaneously widespread in the Eastern Mediterranean in the late twelfth century but also particular to it.

Sources and Historiography

The primary documents regarding late-twelfth- and early-thirteenth-century Cyprus are predominantly papal correspondence, other letters, and chronicles. However, although the primary evidence for the involvement of the island in Crusading activity in subsequent centuries is relatively significant, fewer surviving documents relate to the early Lusignan period in Cyprus⁵. Likewise, in Cilician Armenia, the late twelfth century is poorly served. The scarcity of documents is perhaps the outcome of the colonial structure of Cyprus and the multifaceted political history of the Latin East; historical documents will have been vulnerable to loss in times of crises or drastic changes. The archives of the kingdom and those of the military orders have either been lost due to the island's beleaguered past or are rather insubstantial. Moreover, the Genoese (1373), the Mamluk (1426), and the Ottoman (1571) invasions, in addition to the «Trial of the Templars», which eventually led to the dissolution of the Order in 1313, also caused the destruction of archival evidence. Therefore, studies of the Latin East, especially those concerning Cyprus and Cilician Armenia, usually rely on archives external to the regions of study, which differ from region to region⁶. Materials

⁵ For a selection of primary sources as collections, see Rrh, which is composed of formal documents, letters, and charters produced between 1097 and 1291 in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, Cyprus, Armenia and the principalities of the Latin East, holds a significant place as a widely available and far-reaching compendium of the source material. Another important collection of primary documents, composed in the nineteenth century, of several documents regarding the Latin East and the Crusades, is *Rhc*. This collection includes documents from Western European, Greek and the Armenian writers. *Rhc* is a collection of five series (See «Abbreviations»). Another significant work specifically regarding the documents related to the Lusignans is Louis Mas Latrie's *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le regne des princes de la maison de Lusignan*, which brings together a wide range of sources, as well as providing important synthesis. L. Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan*, 3 vols., Imprimerie impériale, Paris, 1852–1861.

⁶ For Armenian documentary evidence in Vatican archives, see J. S. Arlen, *Armenian Manuscripts in the Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana*, «Manuscripta», 62-1 (2018), pp. 1-32, especially pp. 9, 14-15, 18-21. For the dissolution of the Templars, see N. Coureas, *Fluctuating Territoriality: The Military Orders and The Crown of Cyprus: 1191-1313*, in M-A Chevalier, (ed.), *Ordres Militaires et Territorialité au Moyen Âge: entre Orient et*

originating from the archives of the Latin East are frequently damaged or only exist as transcriptions. Thanks to the papal archival policy, which had developed especially fully by the time of Innocent III at the beginning of the thirteenth century, certain church records are available and new documents continue to come to light. These constitute an important body of primary source material, but it is often one-sided, meaning that while papal letters still exist and form the bulk of this archival record, the replies to these letters are usually lost⁷.

As for modern historiography, several decisive studies have shaped the writing of Cypriot and Cilician Armenian history and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future⁸. Sir George Hill's four-volume work, *A History of Cyprus*, and especially the second and the third volumes specifically focused on Frankish and Venetian Cyprus, is still considered by many modern historians to be the starting point for studies on Cyprus, despite being published between 1940 and 1952⁹. Peter Edbury's *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades 1191-1374* and *The Kingdoms of the Crusaders from Jerusalem to Cyprus*, shed light on politics in the crusader states, the royal houses and the noble families in the Latin East¹⁰. On the Latin Church, Nicholas Coureas' studies hold particular importance; his *The Latin Church in Cyprus 1195-1312* is a significant work, focusing on the establishment and development of the Latin Church on the island, involving not only internal affairs but also relations with other polities, and highlighting the contribution of the military orders, which established themselves in Cyprus. Coureas also began to draw a comparative picture of Cyprus and

Occident, Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, Paris, 2020, pp. 125-133; M. Barber, *The Trial of the Templars* (2nd ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012.

⁷ Among archival works, predominantly composed from the church registers and invaluable for studies of ecclesiastical history, see Synodicum cit.; Cartulary cit.; Bul-larium cit.

⁸ Jonathan Riley-Smith, also focusing on political history, contributed not only to the history of Cyprus but also to that of the Latin East. For some of his works on the Crusaders in the Latin East, see J. Riley-Smith, *Crusaders and Settlers in the Latin East* cit.; Idem, *Feudal Nobility and The Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174-1277*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1974; Idem, *The Knights of St. John from Jerusalem and Cyprus 1050-1310*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1966; Idem, *The Crusades: A History*, Yale University Press, London, 2005.

⁹ G. Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, 4 vols., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1940-1952.

¹⁰ P. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades 1191-1374*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991; Idem, *Kingdoms of the Crusaders from Jerusalem to Cyprus*, The Boydell Press, Woodbridge, 1997. See also Idem, *The State of Research: Cyprus under the Lusignans and Venetians, 1991-1998*, «Journal of Medieval History», 25-1 (1999), pp. 57-65.

Cilician Armenia in his *Lusignan Cyprus and Lesser Armenia 1195-1375*, upon which this study builds¹¹. For the Armenian Church, almost all existing studies have used Bernard Hamilton's article 'The Armenian Church and the papacy in the time of the Crusades', which remarks on the interconnection between these two actors in ecclesiastical and political terms¹². Additionally, the *Actes du Colloque «Les Lusignans et l'Outre Mer»*, edited by Claude Mutaftian, is essential background for different aspects discussed here, with contributions by scholars such as John France, Gilles Grivaud, and Mutaftian himself, focusing on the two kingdoms¹³.

Social and Ecclesiastical Diversity in Cyprus Before the Establishment of the Latin Church

When the Latin Church was established in Cyprus, the island was a populous, culturally diverse place. The population was overwhelmingly Greek; and, by religion, Orthodox. Until a few years earlier, it had been under Byzantine rule and within the jurisdiction of the Orthodox church hierarchy. However, religious identity was not uniform, in the sense that several groups existed alongside the Greek, Orthodox majority, including western Catholics, Armenians, Jews, Maronites, Jacobites, Nestorians, and Muslims¹⁴. The Armenians of Cyprus were

¹¹ N. Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus cit.*; Idem, *Lusignan Cyprus and Lesser Armenia 1195-1375*, «Journal of the Cyprus Research Centre», 21, (1995), pp. 33-71. Besides these works see also Idem, *Friend or Foe? The Armenians in Cyprus as Others Saw them During the Lusignan Period 1191-1473*, in C. Mutaftian (ed.), *La Méditerranée des Arméniens, XIIe-XVe siècle*, Geuthner, Paris, 2014, pp. 75-83; Idem, *Religion and Ethnic Identity in Lusignan Cyprus: How the Various Groups Saw Themselves and Were Seen by Others*, «Identity/Identities in Late Medieval Cyprus», (2014), pp. 13-25; A. Nicolaou-Konnari, C. Schabel, (eds.), *Cyprus Society and Culture cit.*

¹² B. Hamilton, *The Armenian Church and the Papacy cit.*, pp. 61-87; Idem, *The Latin Church in the Crusader States*, cit., On Leo II and the Armenian Church, see also I. Rapti, *Featuring the King cit.*, pp. 291-335; P. Cowe, *The Armenians in the Era of the Crusades*, in M. Angold, (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Christianity*, vol. 5: *Eastern Christianity*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 404-429. For the Armenians and the periphery, see G. Dédéyan, *Les Arméniens entre Grecs, Musulmans et Croisés. Étude sur les Pouvoirs Arméniens dans le Proche-Orient Méditerranéen 1068-1150*, vol. 2, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, Lisbon, 2003.

¹³ C. Mutaftian, (ed.), *Les Lusignans et L'outre-Mer: Actes du Colloque*, Poitiers, Lusignan, 1993.

¹⁴ See A. Varnava, N. Coureas, M. Elia, (eds.), *The Minorities of Cyprus: Development Patterns and the Identity of the Internal-Exclusion*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Cambridge, 2014. For the Nestorians and the other communities' image in Pope Honorius III' letter in 20 January 1222, see Cartulary, n. 35; Synodicum, n. X.9; For detailed information, see C. Schabel, *Religion*, in A. Nicolaou-Konnari, C. Schabel, (eds.), *Cyprus*

quite active in relations with other communities, also giving rise to substantial plurality. By the latter half of the twelfth century, Armenian populations had already spread throughout central Anatolia, Crimea, Europe, and Iran¹⁵. Although the Armenians were presented as important allies of the Greeks during Richard the Lionheart's conquest, and while the Latins treated the Armenians in a positive fashion, Greeks perceived them negatively, mostly due to their rites, such specific ways of fasting, which differed from those of the Greek church. Bishop Wilbrand of Oldenburg who visited Cyprus in 1211, stated that the Armenians obeyed the Latins as serfs¹⁶.

One explanation for the very mixed image of the Armenians in our primary sources might be that although the Armenians had served in the military under the rule of Isaac Komnenos, they had also adapted nimbly to the new political situation on the island after its conquest

Society and Culture, p. 165; These groups were also separated into sub-groups; among the Catholics, French dialect speakers, Catalans from the Iberian Peninsula, and those of Italian origins such as the Venetians and the Genoese. Muslim groups were predominantly Arabs, Circassians, and Turks while Eastern Christians included groups such as Jacobite Syrians (also Syrian Melkites of Orthodox rite) and Copts from Egypt, who were Monophysite Christians: see N. Coureas, *Religion and Ethnic Identity* cit., p. 13; A. Nicolaou-Konnari, *Greeks*, in A. Nicolaou-Konnari, C. Schabel, (eds.), *Cyprus Society and Culture*, p. 14. For the multicultural and ethnic structure of Cyprus before and after 1192, see Ivi, pp. 14-21, 157-171; P. Edbury, *Kingdoms of the Crusaders from Jerusalem to Cyprus* cit., XX, pp. 1-9; Idem, *The 1191 Conquest of Cyprus Revisited*, in the *Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Cyprus Studies*, Eastern Mediterranean University Publications, Famagusta, 2013, pp. 1-12.

¹⁵ C. Mutaftian, *La place de L'Arménie Cilicienne dans l'Arménologie*, «Iran and the Caucasus», 10-1 (2006), pp. 7-16; Idem, *Migrations Arméniennes des XIe et XIIIe Siècles et Création de Nouveaux Pouvoirs au Proche-Orient*, in C. Picard, B. Doumerc, (eds.), *Byzance et ses Périphéries, Mondes Grec, Balkanique et Musulman: Hommage à Alain Ducellier*, Presses Universitaires du Midi, Toulouse, 2020, p. 206; N. Coureas, *Famagusta: A Lifeline for the Kingdom of Cilician Armenia*, in M. J. K. Walsh, (ed.), *The Armenian Church of Famagusta and the Complexity of Cypriot Heritage: Prayers Long Silent*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p. 44.

¹⁶ Wilbrand of Oldenburg, *Peregrinatio*, in C. D. Cobham, (ed.), *Excerpta Cypria*, at the University Press, Cambridge, 1908, p. 180; C. D. Cobham, *An Attempt at a Bibliography of Cyprus*, Nicosia, 1900, p. 13; P. Edbury, *Feudal Nobility of Cyprus 1192-1400*, PhD thesis, University of St. Andrews, 1974, p. XVII; C. Schabel, (ed.), *The Status of the Greek Clergy in Early Frankish Cyprus*, in idem, *Greeks, Latins, and the Church in Early Frankish Cyprus*, Variorum Collected Studies Series 949, Ashgate, Farnham, Burlington, 2010, I, p. 185; N. Coureas, *The Foundation Rules of Medieval Cypriot Monasteries: Makhairas and St. Neophytos*, Cyprus Research Center, Nicosia, 2003, p. 96; Idem, *the Armenians in Cyprus* cit., pp. 75-76; Also see, G. Dedeyan, *Regard sur les Communautés Chrétiennes Orientales*, «Arabica: L'Oeuvre de Claude Cahen: Lectures Critiques», 43-1 (1996), pp. 98-115; Idem, *Les Arméniens à Chypre de la Fin du XIe au Début du XIIIe Siècle*, in C. Mutaftian, (ed.), *Les Lusignans et L'outre-Mer: Actes du Colloque*, Poitiers, Lusignan, 1993, pp. 122-131; G. Grivaud, *Les Minorités Orientales à Chypre, Époques Médiévale et Moderne*, in Y. Ioannou, F. Metral, M. Yon, (eds.), *Chypre et la Méditerranée Orientale*, Maison de l'Orient et de la Méditerranée, Lyon, 2000, p. 45.

by the Crusaders and, thanks to Guy of Lusignan's encouragement, many more coming from Cilician Armenia and Syria settled on the island, meaning that references in our surviving sources to 'Armenians' on Cyprus likely refer to people with a wide range of backgrounds and histories on the island.¹⁷ In Leontios Makhairas' chronicle, it can be observed that the cooperation between the Latins and the Armenians continued, as he comments that Armenians served in the Cypriot army as mercenaries in the fourteenth century¹⁸. This quick change of loyalties might also have engendered a negative view of the Armenians among some communities on the island, further complicating any uniform evaluation of the status of Armenians in Cyprus.

Despite the domination of the source material by records of the papacy, it is nonetheless clear that the papacy did not always exercise complete control even over the different components of the Latin Church in the East. The military orders in the Eastern Mediterranean are perhaps the clearest example of this, since they emerged as semi-independent (sometimes independent) organisations, involved in politics yet with a clearly ecclesiastical identity. At the end of the twelfth century, the Templars, the Hospitallers, and the Teutonic Order had already established themselves in the Eastern Mediterranean. In Cilicia in the twelfth century, for instance, Armenians had built relations with the Hospitallers and the Templars – albeit with ups and downs. The Hospitallers received endowments and sustained a relatively unobtrusive presence in Cilicia in the first half of the century, while Templar-Armenian relations tended to be shaped by the activities of the surrounding polities such as the Principality of Antioch and the Byzantine Empire. After Leo took over in 1187, he endeavoured to maintain a fortified position in the region and belatedly had an opportunity to engage with the Teutonic Order, a valuable ally through which diplomatic relations with the Holy Roman Emperor would become possible¹⁹.

¹⁷ The Frankish armies had employed Armenians since the First Crusade alongside the Maronites. See J. France, *Crusading Warfare and Its Adaptation to Eastern Conditions in the Twelfth Century*, «Mediterranean Historical Review», 15-2 (2000), pp. 55, 59.

¹⁸ In his work Makhairas demonstrates his negative opinion towards the Armenians, expressing a belief common among the Greek population. Leontios Makhairas was probably born in a family serving the Lusignan rulers. For his life and chronicle, see N. Coureas, *The Armenians in Cyprus* cit., pp. 76-77; A. Nicolaou-Konnari, *Diplomatics and Historiography: The Use of the Documents in the Chronicle of Leontios Makhairas*, in A.D. Beihammer, M.G. Parani, C. Schabel, (eds.), *Diplomatics in the Eastern Mediterranean* cit., pp. 293-326.

¹⁹ M-A. Chevalier, *Les Ordres Religieux-Militaires et les Pouvoirs Arméniens en Orient (XIIIe -XIVe siècles)*, in P. Jossierand, L. F. Oliveira, D. Carraz, (eds.), *Elites et Ordres*

The military orders were involved in politics in different ways. Naturally, they acted as mediators between the papacy and the Crusader states. One of the best examples is the conflict that took place between 1229 and 1233 in the Latin East which involved local feudal lords, the military orders, the papacy, and the Holy Roman Emperor²⁰. During the conflict, the Grandmaster of the Teutonic Order, Hermann von Salza, who had visited both Cyprus and Cilician Armenia in 1212, acted as mediator between the Order, the emperor, and the pope, even though the Teutonic Order had different interests to those of the other military orders²¹. In later years a Teutonic bailiwick of Armenia and Cyprus was to be established. Since both kingdoms were vassals of the Holy Roman Empire, they, and especially the Armenians, relied on Teutonic support for defense against their enemies²². In the first quarter of the thirteenth century, Leo granted additional privileges and possessions, predominantly situated across the northwestern and eastern borders of the kingdom, to the Teutonic Order and the Hospitallers, who, overjoyed by these grants, supported the king militarily and diplomatically²³.

The military orders sometimes had to take sides between lords, support local actors (receiving privileges in return), and typically, run businesses in the region. The Templars, the Hospitallers, and the Teutonic Order were also involved in the trade in cash crops, which was equally important for local rulers²⁴. The Hospitallers and the Teutonic Order contributed particularly to the agricultural complexity in Cyprus, cultivating various crops produced in the South, including in the diocese of Limassol, some of which were exempt from taxes on

Militaires au Moyen Age: Rencontre autour d'Alain Demurger, Collection de la Casa de Velázquez, Madrid, 2015, pp. 334, 337.

²⁰ N. Morton, *The Teutonic Knights During Ibelin Lombard Conflict*, in J. Upton-Ward, (ed.), *The Military Orders*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2008, p. 139; D. Abulafia, *Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992; P. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus* cit., 52; N. Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus* cit., pp. 173-174.

²¹ N. Morton, *The Teutonic Knights during the Ibelin Lombard Conflict* cit., p. 139; H. Kluger, *Hochmeister Hermann von Salza und Kaiser Friedrich II: Ein Beitrag zur Frühgeschichte des Deutschen Ordens*, Elwert, Marburg, 1987, p.163.

²² H. Houben, *The Teutonic Knights in Palestine, Armenia, and Cyprus* cit., p.151.

²³ M-A. Chevalier, *Les Ordres Religieux-Militaires* cit., pp. 337-338; Idem, *Les Fortresses des Ordres Militaires en Arménie: un atout Indispensable dans l'accomplissement de leur Mission*, in C. F. Fernandes, (ed.), *Castelos das Ordens Militares*, vol. 2, Direção Geral do Património Cultural, Lisboa, 2014, pp. 205-225.

²⁴ H. Houben, *The Teutonic Knights in Palestine, Armenia, and Cyprus* cit., p.151. See also M. Solomidou-Ieronymidou, *The Crusaders, Sugar Mills and Sugar Production in Medieval Cyprus*, in S. Rogge, Michael Grünbart, (eds.), *Medieval Cyprus: a Place of Cultural Encounter*, Waxmann, Münster, New York, 2015, pp. 147-175; P. Edbury, S. Kalopissi-Verti, (eds.), *Archaeology and the Crusades*, Pierides Foundation Publication, Athens, 2007.

export²⁵. As Cypriot ports grew important enough to support rulers' and the military orders' material needs, this mutual relationship affected their political fortune too, in which the papacy was also involved. One may define this relationship as 'symbiotic'.

As for the Orthodox community on the island, the documents regarding the end of the twelfth century and the beginning of the thirteenth century are quite scarce²⁶. Before the establishment of the Latin Church, even after the conquest of Richard the Lionheart, it is clear that the Orthodox Church still functioned as it had before the conquest²⁷. However, at the time of the establishment of the Latin Church a considerable number of clergymen on the island fled, alongside the Greek nobility who were the greatest benefactors of the Orthodox Church²⁸. Within the wider Orthodox Church, the hierarchy on the island had a sort of independence, since the archbishops of Cyprus were appointed from candidates offered by the bishops on the island and a strong organisational infrastructure²⁹. Nevertheless, the Orthodox Church of Cyprus suffered organisationally in various ways from the political situation in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Especially in the first years of the conquest of Cyprus, the Latin Church was incapable of adopting an aggressive policy toward other denominations, as the new church had not sufficiently organized and

²⁵ N. Coureas, *Hospitaller Estates and Agricultural Production on Fourteenth and Fifteenth Century Cyprus*, in E. Buttigieg, S. Phillips, (eds.), *Islands and Military Orders, c.1291-c.1798*, Ashgate, Farnham, Burlington, 2013, pp. 215-216. For some of the early thirteenth-century grants, see E. Strehlke, (ed.), *Tabulae Ordinis Theutonici: ex tabularii regii Berolinensis codice potissimum*, Weidman, Berlin, 1869 (reis. Kessinger Publishing, Whitefish, 2009), pp. 51, 266, 270-274. n. 71, 298, 302, 303; G. Bresc-Bautier, (ed.), *Le Cartulaire du Saint Sépulcre de Jerusalem*, Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, Paris, 1984, pp. 331-332, n. 174. For trade in sugar and carobs trade originating in Limassol, see N. Coureas, *The Structure and Content of the Notarial Deeds of Lamberto Di Sambuceto and Giovanni Da Rocha, 1296-1310*, in A. D. Beihammer, M. G. Parani, C. Schabel, (eds.), *Diplomatics in the Eastern Mediterranean 1000-1500: Aspects of Cross Cultural Communication*, Brill, Leiden, Boston, 2008, p. 229.

²⁶ For a different set of documents regarding the Orthodox community, see Cartulary cit.; Synodicum cit.; C.N. Sathas, (ed.), *Bibliotheca Graeca Medii Aevi*, vol. 2, Olms Verlag, Venice, 1872; J.P. Migne, (ed.), *the Patrologia Graeca*, 161 vols., Paris, 1857-1866, vols. 142 and 158. For secondary scholarly works, see N. Coureas, *the Foundation Rules of Medieval Cypriot Monasteries* cit., 2003; G. Grivaud, *Les Lusignans et leurs Archontes Chypriotes 1192-1359*, in C. Mutfian, (ed.), *Les Lusignans et l'Outre Mer: Actes du Colloque*, Poitiers, Lusignan, 1995, pp. 150-158; E. Kaffa, *the Greek Church of Cyprus, the Morea and Constantinople During the Frankish Era 1196-1303: A New Perspective*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle, 2014.

²⁷ C. Schabel, *Religion* cit., pp. 184-186.

²⁸ Ibidem.

²⁹ N. Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus* cit., p. 252.

embedded itself on the island.³⁰ When Richard conquered the island, there were Latin communities, consisting mainly of Venetians, and some churches with a couple of priests, but it is hardly possible to refer to an organized ecclesiastical institution on the island. After the conquest, the properties, churches, and incomes of the Greek clergy were confiscated, but this was not peculiar to the Orthodox community as the new rulers also confiscated property from the Venetians, granting these to the Latin Church, the military orders and the new nobility on the island. By refraining from provoking and harming the local population, the Latin church built up its superiority in a leisurely fashion³¹. Contrary to older perspectives, which claimed that the Latin Church absorbed or simply neglected the Orthodox Church, modern scholarly work indicates that Innocent III adopted a policy of maintaining amicable relations, avoiding doctrinal conflict and attempting to keep the Greek bishops in the predominantly Greek sees. Moreover, the Greek clergy took an oath to the pope and the Latin Church in the early thirteenth century. Until 1222, the Orthodox Church was allowed to maintain fourteen bishoprics on the island. However, a serious change took place in the political organisation of the island from this date, resulting in the gradual subjugation of Greek Church³².

The Establishment of the Latin Church in Cyprus

By the time Richard the Lionheart conquered the island in 1191, Christendom was in a state of panic and yearned to recover what the Crusaders had lost to Saladin before and after the fall of Jerusalem in 1187. However, when Latin rule was established in Cyprus, the population was rebellious. Most especially, they had shown their hatred

³⁰ C. Schabel, *Religion* cit., pp. 171-172; N. Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus* cit., pp. 252-253.

³¹ Ibidem.

³² C. Schabel, N. I. Tsougarakis, *Pope Innocent III, the Fourth Lateran Council, and Frankish Greece and Cyprus*, «The Journal of Ecclesiastical History», 67-4 (2016), pp. 742-744; Idem, *The Status of the Greek Clergy in Early Frankish Cyprus*, in idem, (ed.), *Greeks, Latins and the Church in Early Frankish Cyprus*, Ashgate, Farnham, Burlington, 2010, I, pp. 168-169. When the Latin Church was established, the Orthodox Church had maintained fourteen bishoprics. In 1202, Pope Innocent III confirmed Pope Celestine III's organization on the island. However, the number of Greek bishoprics reduced to four from fourteen in 1220 and 1222 agreements, under Pope Honorius III. For a discussion regarding the confusion about the reduction of the Orthodox bishoprics in primary and secondary literature, see C. Schabel, *The Myth of Queen Alice and the Subjugation of the Greek Clergy on Cyprus*, in idem, (ed.), *Greeks, Latins and the Church in Early Frankish Cyprus*, Ashgate, Farnham, Burlington, 2010, II, pp. 262-264.

toward the Templars by objecting to the new government and taking arms against the knights, eventually forcing the Templars to sell their new investment, only recently purchased from Richard³³.

In 1192, Guy of Lusignan's rule began in these conditions. He had to keep the rebellious population under control, strengthen his authority and give alms to those who had lost their lands in the Eastern Mediterranean and settled in Cyprus³⁴. To take the population under control, Guy and his successors adopted a policy of avoiding offense to the native residents of the island³⁵. Economically, however, Guy's fiscal policies and significant donations endangered the financial state of the island - a situation that Aimery had to face when he succeeded his brother. As a suzerain, Aimery was obliged to protect and assist his inferiors in an atmosphere in which economic conditions were already fragile and in which total economic collapse could easily ruin the chances of the Lusignan venture. The great majority of the Greek nobility on the island had fled and only a small proportion of those who remained continued as local leaders under the new government³⁶. Therefore, it was necessary to support the only remaining institution with genuine, socially-embedded power in Cyprus, the Church³⁷. To secure its political, economic, and administrative position in the Eastern Mediterranean, the establishment of the Latin Church and a collaborative relationship between the nobility and clergy was an absolute must for the Lusignan family, and Aimery was smart enough to see the advantages of cooperation with the papacy to this end³⁸.

While Aimery focused on strengthening his position, high on the papacy's agenda and a matter of great urgency for it was restoring the Kingdom of Jerusalem. The acquisition of Cyprus was an opportunity to achieve this end. Additionally, Saladin's sultanate had hitherto been in turmoil but was now stabilizing as his two sons succeeded him in 1196, which changed political conditions in favor of the Muslims.

³³ For the sale of the island, see *Rhc Occ.*, pp. 189-190; M.R. Morgan, (ed.), *La Coniunction de Guillaume de Tyr 1184-1197*, Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, Paris, 1982, pp. 134-137; N. Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus* cit., pp. 121-122; For the Templar rule and the Greeks on the island, see, P. Edbury *the Templars in Cyprus* cit., pp. 189-195. For the documentation on the conquest of Cyprus see P. Edbury, *The 1191 Conquest of Cyprus Revisited*, cit.

³⁴ J. Phillips, *The Latin East, 1098-1291* in J. Riley-Smith, (ed.), *The Oxford Illustrated History of The Crusades*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, pp. 126-127.

³⁵ A. Nicolaou-Konnari, C. Schabel, Introduction to *Cyprus Society and Culture*, p. 13.

³⁶ N. Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus* cit., p. 3; For a detailed discussion on the Orthodox Church at the time of the beginning of the Frankish rule on the island, see C. Schabel, *Religion* cit., pp. 184-218.

³⁷ N. Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus* cit., p. 3.

³⁸ In 1195, Aimery granted some lands including a chapel in Nicosia, see *Rrh*, n. 723.

Under these circumstances, Aimery's offer to establish the Latin hierarchy on the island and his desire to elevate its status to a kingdom, under the authority of a powerful emperor, Henry VI, was not just ecclesiastically appealing but also politically rational. For the pope, the development of Cyprus was crucial for the future of other Crusader states in the East. Thus, for instance, on November 20th, 1198, Pope Innocent III sent a letter advising the military orders, the Crusader states, and the principalities to support Aimery, a good example of the political support available from an ecclesiastical policy that courted papal favour³⁹.

The pope's protection was exactly what Aimery sought, and his policy brought results in terms of his capacity to defend his kingdom - a crucial element of sustaining his authority. Obviously, Aimery needed soldiers to improve the severely weakened defences of the island⁴⁰. The military orders, especially the Templars, the Hospitallers, and the Teutonic Knights, perfectly suited his purpose, and, granting lands and alms, Aimery encouraged them to establish themselves on the island. Their support was not only significant in protecting the kingdom from internal strife but was also a vital bulwark against external threats⁴¹. On the papacy's side, moreover, the presence of the military orders on the island gave them a valuable base for future expeditions to the Holy Land, and fully justified their presence. This dual role of the military orders worked well at the beginning of the thirteenth century, although it proved of more variable benefit in the long run⁴².

The problems Aimery faced were not limited to a rebellious population and the direct military threat of Muslim and Byzantine action. He also faced a crisis of external legitimacy with the potential to cause long-term difficulties. His position and the position of Cyprus in the

³⁹ O. Hageneder, A. Haidacher, A.A. Strnad, (eds.), *Die Register Innocenz III 1198-1199*, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Graz, 1964, vol. 1, pp. 661-2, n. 438; C. Schabel, (ed.), *Bullarium*, vol. 1, pp. 113-5, n. b-2 and b-4; Rrh, n. 747d.

⁴⁰ However, the island had natural protection, for which, and the Pryor thesis, see P. Edbury, *Kingdoms of the Crusaders*, XI cit., 235-6; J.H. Pryor, (ed.), *Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2019; Idem, *Geography, Technology and War: Studies in the Maritime History of the Mediterranean 649-1571*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988.

⁴¹ For Templar and Hospitaller fortifications, see N. Coureas, *Fluctuating Territoriality: The Military Orders*, cit., pp. 125-127, 130-131, 141-143; Idem, *The Latin Church in Cyprus* cit., p. 121. For the relations with the Teutonic Order, see below.

⁴² The only military order that transferred their headquarters to Cyprus was the Templars, who purchased the island in 1191. However, their rule did not last long. The Hospitallers and the Teutonic Order, on the other hand, established their headquarters on Rhodes and in Prussia, not on the island. For a detailed discussion, see Ivi, pp. 156-158.

political landscape of the East needed to be clearly articulated and presented as legitimate. Guy had bought the island from Richard as a possession but it was not clear if holding the possession meant that Guy could legally pass the island as an inheritance to his next of kin. After Guy's marriage with Sibylla, regent to the throne of Jerusalem, and appointment of his brother Aimery as the constable, «Leper King» Baldwin IV had designated him lieutenant in 1183. However, upon Saladin's expansion, Guy fell from grace resulting in his removal from the office. Nevertheless, upon the deaths of both Baldwin IV's son, Baldwin V and Sibylla's son, in 1185 and 1186 respectively, Guy became the king of Jerusalem, which did not last long as he was soon defeated and taken captive at Hattin. After his release, Guy's situation worsened until he officially withdrew his claim on the throne. As compensation, however, King Richard I (the Lionheart) sold Cyprus to Guy. Meanwhile, Aimery, had also been taken captive by Count Henry of Champagne, only to be released as a result of the protests by his barons and the military orders⁴³. When Guy died towards the end of 1194, Richard had already returned home without making any claim on the island, thus allowing Aimery to assume his brother's position, being

⁴³ P. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus* cit., p. 25; J. Phillips, *The Latin East, 1098-1291*, cit., pp. 125-126; B. Hamilton, *The Leper King and His Heirs, Baldwin IV and the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 218-220. For the detailed information about the marriage and rumors that Sibylla and Guy were already lovers, see J. Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility* cit., p. 106. For the division among the lords of the East, see Ivi, pp. 109-111; B. Hamilton, *The Leper King*, cit., pp. 220-221; For the coronation date of Guy and Sybilla, see Ivi, p. 222. For the worsened relations with Conrad of Montferrat, one of the survivors of Saladin and the designated successor of Guy, and his supporters, see Rhc, Occ., vol. 2, pp. 154-155; J. Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility* cit., pp. 114-117; P. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus* cit., p. 27. For support to Conrad, see W. Stubs, (ed.), *Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, London, 1864, pp. 334-335. On April 1192, Conrad was murdered by two assassins, who were believed to be the followers of master Rashid-ad-Din Sinan of the sect known as the Assassins. An alternatively and commonly held view is that Richard instigated the murder, although this was denied by Rashid ad-Din himself when Philip's messengers visited him. See S. Painter, *The Third Crusade: Richard the Lionhearted and Philip Augustus* in K.M. Setton, R. L. Wolff, H. Hazard, (eds.), *A History of the Crusades: The Later Crusades, 1189-1311*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Milwaukee, London, 1969, p. 80. Another explanation asserts that Conrad had seized a ship and its cargo belonging to the Assassins, and therefore was killed. See Ivi, pp. 80-81. Rashid-ad-Din Sinan was also known as the Old Man of the Mountain, *Vetus de Monte*. See H. E. Mayer, *The Crusades*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990, p. 148; B. M. Bolton, *A Matter of Great Confusion: King Richard I and Syria's Vetus de Monte* in A.D. Beihammer, M.G. Parani, C. Schabel, (eds.), *Diplomatics in the Eastern Mediterranean. 1000-1500 Aspects of Cross-Cultural Communication*, Brill, Leiden, 2008, p. 172; To clear Richard's name, English writers fabricated a letter as if written by Rashid-ad-Din Sinan. For a discussion, see Ivi, pp. 171-199. P. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus* cit., 29. See also Idem, *Kingdoms of the Crusaders* cit., VII p. 121.

elected by the fief-holders of the island. However, the position Aimery and his house held remained vulnerable to possible future claims on the possession. Insuring against this was not particularly easy, and both Aimery and his brother Guy had troubles with the lords of the East⁴⁴.

The establishment of the Latin Church on the island was necessary to be crowned as king, since reigning without a Latin church hierarchy in a kingdom ruled by a western Latin dynasty would be almost impossible. Henry VI of Hohenstaufen presented a perfect opportunity, as he was a powerful emperor who had recently conquered Sicily and was planning a crusade to the East⁴⁵. For Henry, having Cyprus under his suzerainty was favorable for his plans to influence the East, while Aimery could strengthen his position in Cyprus, Syria, and the Holy Land. An alliance bringing Cyprus under the protection of the Holy Roman Emperor would also ward off any possible future attacks by Byzantium⁴⁶. Aimery's concern with a possible Byzantine attack was not imaginary as, in 1201, Emperor Alexios III Angelos approached Pope Innocent III, claiming that the island had been Byzantine property when seized by Richard and therefore had to be restored. The emperor stated that he preferred not to shed Christian blood so he would not send the powerful navy he possessed to press this claim, but requested that it be recognised by the pope and in return, Alexios promised to support the military orders. The pope responded to Alexios, stating that the island had been captured by the Latins from a usurper who did not answer to the Byzantine Empire and warned the emperor not to persist with his claim. Innocent also sought information regarding the position of Cyprus by contacting the Latin rulers⁴⁷.

⁴⁴ G. Hill, *History of Cyprus: the Frankish Period, 1192-1432*, vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1949, pp. 43-44. From the papal documents dated after the establishment of the Latin Church and the coronation of Aimery as the King of Cyprus, one can observe that he secured his rights on the island. Pope Innocent III's letter dated 20 November, 1198 shows Aimery's standing with the pope: «...Christo filium nostrum Almericum, illustrem regem Cypri» see C. Schabel, (ed.), *Bullarium*, vol. 1, pp.113-114, n. b-2.

⁴⁵ T. Gregory, *A History of Byzantium* cit., p. 273; D. Abulafia, *Frederick II* cit., pp. 84-86.

⁴⁶ P. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus* cit., p. 31.

⁴⁷ Rhc Occ. vol. 2, p. 209; For Innocent III's letter issued in 1201, see Bullarium, vol. 1, pp. 129-131, n. b-15; O. Hageneder, A. Haidacher, A.A. Strnad, (eds.), *Die Register Innocenz III 1198-1199*, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Graz, 1964, vol. 2, pp. 461-2. Byzantine naval power had rapidly weakened from 1180 onwards, and although Aimery and Pope Innocent were afraid of a Byzantine attack, it was not likely to happen. For the Byzantine naval power by the time of the establishment of the Lusignan rule in Cyprus, see P. Edbury, *Kingdoms of the Crusaders* XI cit., pp. 225-28. For the Byzantine attack in 1186, see G. Hill, *A History*

In 1195, Aimery sent Renier de Giblet as his ambassador to Henry, who accepted Aimery's homage. Henry sent two archbishops from Trani and Brandisi with a royal sceptre, but Aimery's coronation was to be held later in Syria, where the emperor himself was going to be present, and was thereafter postponed along with Henry's departure for the East⁴⁸. It is possible that Aimery's brother Guy may have brought ecclesiastics with him when he bought Cyprus, but the first donation to the Latin Church, dating to September 29, 1195, is by Aimery⁴⁹. Papal bulls of February 20, 1196, and January 2, 1197 indicate that, after his first donations, Aimery sought to end the schism by placing the Orthodox Church under Latin authority, and requested the pope to establish the Latin Church on the island. He did this by sending his chancellor Alan, who was to be the first archbishop of the island, along with archdeacon B. of Laodicea⁵⁰, who was to be the future Bishop of Paphos, to Rome in 1195⁵¹. In the bull of February 10, it can also be seen that Aimery sent a letter (which is now lost) and petitions to Pope Celestine III. Overjoyed with an ambitious Aimery, the pope authorized Alan and archdeacon B. to assist Aimery with the establishment of the Latin Church⁵².

Aimery's request for the establishment of the Latin Church reflects more than his religious ambitions, since he also proposed to the pope that the bishops be paid by the kingdom, which would considerably increase his control over the clergy⁵³. In his letter of December 13, 1196, Pope Celestine clearly stated that clerics should not transfer their rights without the knowledge and consent of the archbishop, and that the churches should be under the officials' control only for the latter's lifetime⁵⁴. He also clarified that the Church's possessions in Cyprus were conceded to the archbishop and permitted him to use the pallium⁵⁵. The new Church was organized as one archdiocese, under

of Cyprus: to the Conquest of Richard Lion Heart, vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1940, p. 314.

⁴⁸ N. Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus* cit., p. 173; T., Gregory, *A History of Byzantium* cit., p. 273.

⁴⁹ Rrh, n. 723; Cartulary, n. 45; Also see N. Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus* cit., p. 4.

⁵⁰ His name is not clear in the original document.

⁵¹ Bullarium, vol. 1, pp. 95, 103, n. a-1 and a-3; Cartulary, n. 1 and 3; Synodicum, n. X.1.

⁵² Bullarium, vol. 1, p. 95, n. a-1. The full name of the archdeacon is not specified.

⁵³ However, Celestine rejected the offer, believing that it would make the Church dependent on the crown. The pope probably aimed to preclude proprietary churches as a general policy in any case. See N. Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus* cit., p. 4.

⁵⁴ Bullarium vol. 1, p. 97, n. a-2.

⁵⁵ Ibidem; Synodicum, n. X.2.

which three suffragan dioceses were placed. The archdiocese was situated in Nicosia and the suffragan bishoprics were established in Paphos, Famagusta, and Lemessos⁵⁶.

Later, the emperor, Henry VI, sent his envoys, bishop Conrad of Hildesheim, and Adolf, Count of Holstein, to Cyprus, and Aimery was crowned king in September 1197⁵⁷. Aimery's efforts to achieve this were long-term: to gain the emperor's sympathies, he had already given privileges to the citizens of Trani in Apulia to travel and to trade in Cyprus in May 1196⁵⁸. In the same year Aimery granted money to the Teutonic Order in Palestine and again, in February 1198, granted lands and privileges to collect alms for the Order and freed them from taxes in Cyprus⁵⁹. The Teutonic Order was newly established and enjoyed the favor of the emperor and the pope, so supporting the Order was beneficial for Aimery's cause in two ways: first, Aimery needed support in controlling and defending his lands in Cyprus, and, secondly, he had an opportunity to gain the support of the papacy and the emperor at the same time⁶⁰.

The Lusignans seem to have managed the process of the establishment of the Church efficiently. It has been stated that the newly established Latin Church obtained properties and privileges from the former Orthodox institutions on the island. This is true to a degree, but the Lusignans were aware that they had to rely on Greek loyalty to be able to rule the island. Greeks were employed in various positions, and their church, although impoverished, survived, operating with a sort of autonomy in daily activities⁶¹. Moreover, the properties taken over by the new rulers and the Latin Church were not only the ones that had hitherto been in the control of the Orthodox bishops. There was also a considerable amount of deserted land that had

⁵⁶ Cartulary, n.1-4, 8; Synodicum, n. X.1-X.3. For the church organization, see also C. Schabel, *Religion* cit., p. 171; N. Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus* cit., 4.

⁵⁷ Aimery is described as king in the letters of late 1196 and early 1197. See R. Hiestand, *Papsturkunden für Kirchen im Heiligen Lande. Vorarbeiten zum Oriens Pontificius III, Abhandl.*, cxxxvi, Göttingen, 1985, p. 362; Rrh, n. 729; L. Mas Latrie, *Histoire* vol. 2 cit., p. 30; *Bullarium* vol. 1, pp. 102-4, 105-108, n. a-3, a-5; P. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus* cit., p. 31; Idem, *Franks* in A. Nicolaou-Konnari, C. Schabel, (eds.), *Cyprus Society and Culture*, p. 67.

⁵⁸ L. Mas Latrie, *Histoire* vol. 2 cit., p. 30, Rrh, n. 729.

⁵⁹ E. Strehlke, *Tabulae Ordinis Theutonici* cit., pp. 27-28, n. 34.

⁶⁰ H. Houben, *The Teutonic Knights in Palestine, Armenia, and Cyprus* cit., p. 151; In 1190, Guy of Lusignan promised the Teutonic Knights (not then elevated into an Order) a hospital and fulfilled this as soon as he captured Acre, see E. Strehlke, *Tabulae Ordinis Theutonici* cit., p. 22, n. 25.

⁶¹ P. Edbury, *Kingdoms of the Crusaders*, XX cit., p. 6; Wilbrand stated that there were 12 Greek bishoprics and 1 archbishopric on the island, see Wilbrand of Oldenburg, *Peregrinatio*, in C. D. Cobham, (ed.), *Excerpta Cypria* cit., p. 180.

belonged to the Greek Church, the Byzantine emperor, and the Greek nobility, mostly Constantinopolitan, who had already left the island. In comparison with Crete and the Morea, where native resistance challenged the rule of their leaders, in Cyprus the Lusignan regime managed to secure itself, primarily owing to Guy and Aimery, who attracted new settlers with whom the Greeks coexisted. In time they were successfully integrated as a political force within the polity⁶². This in large part explains why only a few and insignificant revolts occurred under Lusignan rule, while there had been serious revolts against both King Richard and the Templars in a short period of time before Lusignan rule began⁶³. If the establishment of the Latin Church on the island had been motivated purely by ecclesiastical concerns, the Orthodox Church would not have been left such clear opportunities to survive and carve out its own niche. This particular manoeuvre not only secured the early years of Lusignan rule on the island but also cemented the foundation of the political order that was being established by the new rulers.

If being the king of Cyprus was important, being King of Jerusalem was even more critical and prestigious and was a goal which Aimery eventually achieved. In 1197, Henry of Champagne visited Aimery and they formed an alliance, deciding Aimery's sons were to marry Henry's daughters⁶⁴. Such an arrangement was to become common among the Latin rulers of the East, including the Armenians. This particular one was important since it helped Aimery to prevent any possible future claims by Henry on Cyprus⁶⁵. Soon after, Henry died, leaving his wife Isabel a widow with the crown of Jerusalem. In October 1198, Aimery's status rose when the High Court designated him King of Jerusalem (by marrying Queen

⁶² T. Papacostas, *The Byzantine Tradition in Late Medieval Cyprus* in A. Lymberopoulou, (ed.), *Cross-Cultural Interaction Between Byzantium and the West, 1204-1669: Whose Mediterranean Is It Anyway?* Routledge, London, New York, 2018, p. 110-111; P. Edbury, *Kingdoms of the Crusaders*, XX cit., pp. 6-7; C. Schabel, (ed.), *The Status of the Greek Clergy*, cit., pp. 170-173.

⁶³ G. Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. 2 cit., p. 47; P. Edbury, *Kingdoms of the Crusaders*, XXI cit., p. 45; Ivi, XX, pp. 2, 6-7; A. Nicolaou-Konnari, *Greeks* cit., p. 18; N. Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus* cit., 122.

⁶⁴ According to this arrangement, Aimery gave up all his claims on the county of Jaffa and the office of constable of Jerusalem. In return, Henry paid Aimery's remaining debt from the purchase of Cyprus. Aimery had three sons named Guy, John, and Hugh, and Henry had three daughters Mary, Alice, and Phillippa. However, only Hugh and Alice could get married since Guy, John and Mary were already dead in 1208. See G. Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. 2 cit., p. 58.

⁶⁵ P. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus* cit., p. 32.

Isabel)⁶⁶. Kingship was given to Aimery as a consequence of his previous actions and political manoeuvres. The establishment of the Latin Church strengthened his bonds with the papacy, which continued after Innocent III succeeded Celestine. The pope's support for Aimery being crowned as the king of Jerusalem gave him added prestige⁶⁷. When Henry died, the first candidate for the crown of Jerusalem was Ralph of Tiberias, seneschal of Jerusalem, but his supporters were few in number. By contrast, significant support for Aimery came from the chancellor of Jerusalem, Archbishop Joscius of Tyre, and the military orders, including the Teutonic Order, which had a close relationship with the Holy Roman Emperor and, as we have seen, now enjoyed various properties and privileges in Cyprus⁶⁸.

Soon before his coronation as the King of Jerusalem, in March 1198 Aimery was almost assassinated. Aimery blamed Ralph of Tiberias, his rival for the throne of Jerusalem, for the attempt and, once he was crowned, dispossessed Ralph of his fiefs and banished him from the Kingdom of Jerusalem⁶⁹. Now Aimery was assured of his titles and position thanks to his favorable relationships with the papacy, the emperor, and the barons of the East. The establishment of the Latin Church in Cyprus had thus been a boost for him in securing his rule, both politically and economically. Aimery's quest to ensure his position and defend his interests was complete and he had shown that suitable political manoeuvres could be effective in securing his rights on the island and protecting it against external threats. Meanwhile, in the Principality of Cilician Armenia, Leo II had his own troubles that pushed him to pursue a similar path.

⁶⁶ The Haute Cour, the High Court, was the governing body of the Kingdom of Jerusalem and the kings of Jerusalem were elected by the High Court. For the Haute Cour and the assizes of the Haute Cour, Jerusalem and Cyprus, see Rhc Lois, vols. 1-2. For the function of the High Court, see J. Richard, *The Institutions of the Kingdom of Cyprus*, in K.M. Setton, N. Zacour, H. Hazard, (eds.), *A History of the Crusades: The Impact of the Crusades on the Near East*, vol. 6, The University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin, 1985, pp. 150-175.

⁶⁷ P. Lock (ed.), *Marino Sanudo Torsello, The Book of the Secrets of the Faithful of the Cross: Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis, Crusade Texts in Translation*, Routledge, London, 2011, pp. 318-20; Rhc Occ., vol. 2, p. 223; Innocent III recommends Aimery to the Hospitallers in Rrh, n. 747d, and hearing that Aimery has been chosen as the King of Jerusalem, sends a letter supporting the new king: see O. Hageneder, A. Haidacher, A.A. Strnad, (eds.), *Die Register Innocenz III 1198-1199*, vol. 1 cit., pp. 661-2, n. 438; *Bullarium* vol. 1, pp. 113-116, n. b-2, b-4.

⁶⁸ At Acre: To the Hospitallers, Rrh, n. 747c; to the Teutonic Order, Rrh, n. 744.

⁶⁹ G.H. Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. 2 cit., pp. 61-62.

Cilician Armenia: Church, and Politics

Originally living in the Southern Caucasus, large numbers of Armenian people were displaced after the Battle of Manzikert between the Byzantine Empire and the Seljuk Empire in 1071, after which Byzantine authority in the region collapsed. By that time, some Armenian families had already resettled in Cilicia⁷⁰. Cilicia's mountainous geography proved to be a shelter for the Armenians, with multiple rivers preventing easy passage to the plains and the Mediterranean Sea making the region relatively secure⁷¹. During the First Crusade, the Armenians scattered around the East Mediterranean region assisted the crusading parties, who were seen as the saviors of Christendom⁷². According to Albert of Aachen, the first encounter between the Armenians and the crusaders occurred during the Siege of Nicaea, with Baldwin of Boulogne meeting the Armenian prince Bagrat who was a former officer in the Byzantine army and brother of prince Kogh Vasil⁷³. On their passage to Antioch, the Rubenid prince Constantine I assisted the crusaders and provided safe passage through Cilicia. During the siege of Antioch, some crusaders were stationed in Tarsus. In 1098, Thoros, Armenian Chalcedonian ruler of Edessa, welcomed Baldwin of Bolougne into the city, which soon became a crusader county. Between 1099 and 1187, three queens of the Kingdom of Jerusalem were of Armenian descent; the Rubenid Prince Thoros I's daughter Artā married Baldwin I, and their daughter, Melisende married Fulk of Anjou. Baldwin II also married Morphia of Melitene.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ For the late ninth and eleventh centuries, see G. Dédéyan, *Les Arméniens sur La Frontière Sud-Orientale de Byzance, Fin IXe-in. XIe Siècles, La Frontière*. «Seminaire de Recherche sous la Direction d'Yves Roman. Travaux de La Maison de l'Orient», 21 (1993), p. 67-85.

⁷¹ T.S.R. Boase, *The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia*, Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh, 1978, p. 2; P. Cowe, *The Armenians in the Era of the Crusades* cit., pp. 407-408.

⁷² J. France, *Crusading Warfare*, cit., p. 59.

⁷³ Kogh Vasil ruled the western Euphrates. See J. Ghazarian, *The Armenian Kingdom in Cilicia during the Crusades: The Integration of Cilician Armenians with the Latins, 1080-1393*, RoutledgeCurzon, London, New York, 2000, p. 96. For Albert of Aachen's chronicle, see S. B. Edgington, (trans.), *Albert of Aachen's History of the Journey to Jerusalem: The First Crusade, 1095-1099*, vol. 1:1-6, Routledge, London, New York, 2013.

⁷⁴ C. Mutafian, *Prélats et Souverains Arméniens à Jérusalem à l'époque des Croisades: Légendes et Certitudes: XIIIe-XIVe Siècle*, «Studia Orientalia Christiana, Collectanea», 37 (2004), pp. 115, 122; P. Cowe, *The Armenians in the Era of the Crusades* cit., p. 410; J. France, *La stratégie Arménienne de la Première Croisade*, in C. Mutafian, (ed.), *Les Lusignans et l'Outre Mer: Actes du Colloque, Poitiers, Lusignan, 1995*; J.H. Forse, *Armenians and the First Crusade*, «Journal of Medieval History», 17 (1991), pp. 13-22. There is a scholarly debate over whether Antioch fell to treachery and whether the traitor might have been an Armenian: see, J. France, *Victory in the East: A Military History of the First Crusade*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 257-258.

Relations between the Latins and the Armenians continued to develop in the twelfth century. In 1132, Leo I captured coastal territories from Bohemond II of Antioch, but intervention by the Byzantine Empire in Armenian affairs in 1137 and again in 1145 drew the Armenians and the Latins closer since the Byzantine emperor captured Cilicia, expelled the hierarchy of the Armenian Church and tried to restore rule by the Orthodox patriarchate in Antioch, over which Leo had asserted his suzerainty⁷⁵. The relationship between the Armenians and the Crusader states of the East had been complicated throughout the twelfth century, but the Armenian and the Latin churches were not straightforwardly foes. In this period, for example, the Latin Church made no real attempt to force the Armenian Church into a union. For instance, in 1145, it was Catholicos Gregory III who sent envoys to Pope Eugenius III, expecting him to arbitrate between the Greek and the Armenian churches about celebrating the Eucharist and the date for Christmas⁷⁶. During the first half of the century, the Byzantine Empire followed an aggressive policy towards Cilicia and Antioch. This continued until the 1160s when two agents, Nerses of Lampron and the imperial «protostrator» Alexios Axouch exchanged their ideas and undertook ecclesiastical discussions on reforming the Armenian Church⁷⁷. Nerses sought to assemble a synod but he died before achieving this end. Although the Armenian Church had been negotiating the union with the Orthodox patriarchate, the death of Emperor Manuel I Komnenos in 1180 and the economic and political turmoil in the Byzantine Empire terminated the discussion⁷⁸. As a result, deteriorating relations, which had already been fragile in this century, became a threat for the Cilician Armenians, and relations with the Byzantine Empire drastically worsened.

In the East, on the other hand, the threat of Saladin created an understanding among the eastern Christians, causing them to strengthen their relationship with each other in the 1180s. Among them, the Maronites of Lebanon had already acknowledged papal primacy in 1182. The

⁷⁵ B. Hamilton, *The Armenian Church and the Papacy* cit., 65; For twelfth-century Cilician Armenia, see G. Dédéyan, *Les Arméniens entre Grecs, musulmans et croisés*, vol. 2 cit.; K.M. Setton, R.L. Wolff, H. Hazard (eds.), *A History of the Crusades: The Later Crusades: 1189-1311*, vol. 2, The University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin, 2006, pp. 635-645.

⁷⁶ B. Hamilton, *The Armenian Church and the Papacy* cit., p. 66.

⁷⁷ P. Cowe, *The Armenians in the Era of the Crusades* cit., p. 413; C. Mutafian, *Prélats et Souverains Arméniens*, cit., p. 129.

⁷⁸ B. Hamilton, *The Armenian Church and the Papacy* cit., p. 68; Although it had religious motives, the massacre of the Latins was more of an outcome of economic problems. See, J. Harris, *Byzantium, and the Crusades*, Bloomsbury, London, 2003, pp. 123-131.

growing threat from the East and the Byzantines led the Armenians to send a letter to Pope Lucius III offering submission to the Roman Church in 1184⁷⁹. In return, Armenian Catholicos Gregory IV received a pallium and a copy of *Rituale Romanum* sent by the papacy. Despite the fact that the pope now believed the Armenian Church to be under papal authority, the Armenian attitude was more concentrated on gaining help from the West than on an actual union⁸⁰.

In the 1180s, Cilician Armenia, having survived Saladin's conquests, became important to the success of the Crusade of the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, and the papacy was therefore keen to maintain good relations with Cilician Armenia's lay and ecclesiastical leaders, Prince Leo II, and Catholicos Gregory IV. In 1189, Pope Clement III sent letters to Leo and Gregory urging them to assist the Crusaders militarily and economically⁸¹. Having defeated the Seljuks near Iconium, Frederick sent letters to Leo and soon received a response from the Catholicos Gregory. Pleased with the approach to the Armenians Frederick sent another message and stated that he was willing to crown Leo. Nerses of Lampron was an ideal mediator for Leo, who sent Nerses to meet with the catholicos first and then to meet the emperor afterwards, in Seleucia. Leo joined the meeting party to welcome the emperor, but the emperor died while crossing the Göksu River before meeting the Armenian party. Nevertheless, the Armenians had managed to contact the emperor via ambassadors before his death⁸². Even after Saladin died in 1193, Cilician Armenia sustained relations with the West to defend itself against a possible future Muslim attack or Byzantine intervention. According to the Muslim sources Leo, while on the one hand trying to establish his link with the Holy

⁷⁹ P. Halfter, *Papacy, Catholicosate and Kingdom of Cilician Armenia*, in R.G. Hovannisian, S. Payaslian, *Armenian Cilicia*, Mazda Publishers, Costa Mesa, California, 2008, pp. 114-116; T.L. Aloysius, (ed.), *Acta Romanorum Pontificum a S. Clemente ad Coelestinum III Pontificia Commissio ad Redigendum Codicem Juris Canonici Orientalis*, *Fontes: series 3*, vol. 1, Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, Vatican City, 1943, pp. 811-13, n. 395; P. Halfter, *Das Papsttum und die Armenier im Frühen und Hohen Mittelalter: Von den ersten Kontakten bis zur Fixierung der Kirchenunion in Jahre 1198*, Böhlau, Köln, 1996, pp. 150-151.

⁸⁰ K.M. Setton, R.L. Wolff, H. Hazard, (eds.), *The Later Crusades: 1189-1311 cit.*, p. 643; B. Hamilton, *The Armenian Church and the Papacy cit.*, pp. 67-69.

⁸¹ K.M. Setton, R.L. Wolff, H. Hazard, (eds.), *The Later Crusades: 1189-1311 cit.*, p. 645, fn. 18; Papal letters are not preserved in Latin, see L. Alishan, *Léon le Magnifique Premier roi de Sissouan ou de l'Arménocilie*, St. Lazare, Venice 1888, (reis. Hachette Groupe Livre, Paris, 2014), pp. 163-165; For the relations between Pope Clement III and the Armenians, see also P. Halfter, *Das Papsttum und die Armenier cit.*, pp. 172-77.

⁸² Ibidem; RHC Arm., vol. 1, pp. 422-23; C. Mutfian, *The Brilliant Diplomacy of Cilician Armenia*, in R. G. Hovannisian, S. Payaslian, *Armenian Cilicia*, Mazda Publishers, Costa Mesa, California, 2008, pp. 98-99.

Roman emperor, on the other hand tried not to provoke Saladin, aiming to convince him that the Armenians had not sided with the emperor but were nonetheless unable to dissuade Frederick's crusading army from passing through Cilicia. After Frederick's death, another letter was dispatched stating that the German army had been weakened by the emperor's premature death⁸³.

Despite this somewhat two-faced policy, Prince Leo II was keen that his principality should be raised to a kingdom by an emperor and, at the time, only one was commonly believed to have the capacity to do this, namely the Holy Roman Emperor Henry VI, Frederick Barbarossa's son. In an attempt to acquire legitimacy for his authority, Leo sent envoys to Henry VI as well as to Pope Celestine III, just as Aimery had done in the case of Cyprus. While negotiating with the western powers, a delegation led by Nerses of Lampron was also sent to Alexios III to discuss ecclesiastical issues and the emperor's intention, precipitated by the fact that the negotiations with Henry were now advanced, to grant Leo a crown. Although Alexios also offered a crown to Leo, embellished with gold and precious stones, and urged him not to don a Latin crown but his, since Leo's lands were closer to his than to Rome, Alexios III's offer achieved nothing. Indeed, it can have had very little significance for Leo's plans, as he could only hope to be treated as an equal of the other Latin princes if he were crowned by the Holy Roman Emperor, their notional superior, not if he were crowned by a Byzantine emperor whose power they did not recognise⁸⁴. Nevertheless, Leo received the Byzantine ambassadors kindly and presented lavish gifts in return, probably hoping not to offend Alexios and to secure room for further discussion if his negotiations with Henry failed.

However, political efforts like this by the Byzantine emperors were not peculiar to the Armenian rulers. Imperial hopes to recover its former lands, or at least to spread its sphere of political and religious influence over those areas once again, had become a fundamental part

⁸³ Ibidem, especially fn. 12. Mutaftian notes *Imad ad-Din al-Isfahani* and *Baha al-Din Ibn Shaddad* as the two main sources. See *Imad ad-Din al-Isfahani, Conquête de la Syrie et de la Palestine par Saladin*, H. Masse [trans.], Paul Geuthner, Paris, 1972, pp. 193, 229-30; *Baha al-Din Ibn Shaddad, The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin*, D. S. Richards [trans.], Ashgate, Aldershot, 2001, pp. 114-17.

⁸⁴ *Rhc Arm.*, vol. 1, p. 633; For Leo sending and receiving envoys, *Rhc Arm.*, vol. 2, p. 9-10; B. Hamilton, *The Armenian Church and the Papacy* cit., p. 70; P. Cowe, *The Armenians in the Era of the Crusades* cit., p. 415; For a discussion about the Byzantine attempt, see K.M. Setton, R.L. Wolff, H. Hazard, (eds.), *The Later Crusades: 1189-1311* cit., pp. 648-9, fn. 24. For the Armenians and the Byzantine Empire see also P. Halfter, *L'Église Arménienne entre la Papauté et les Byzantins aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles* in I. Augé and G. Dédéyan, (eds.), *L'Église Arménienne entre Grecs et Latins fin XIe-milieu XVe siècle*, Geuthner, Paris, 2009.

of Byzantium's eastern politics. Throughout the twelfth century, especially after the fall of Edessa in 1144, for instance, Antioch grew into one of the primary targets for the empire, which sought to enforce Greek authority in the region, with some success. The fall of Edessa was so disastrous for the Antiochenes that a shift of allegiance was inevitable even though there was a considerable anti-imperial sentiment among them. In the twelfth century, Byzantine emperors visited Antioch three times, offering military support, forging marriage alliances, and installing a Greek patriarch (by Manuel I Komnenos, during his visit in 1158), all of which was intended to implement imperial superiority⁸⁵. Nonetheless, the status of the empire fell from 1182 onwards, after Andronikos Komnenos took the throne. In this period, the Principality of Antioch stood between two larger polities, Byzantium and Jerusalem. Its shift of loyalties was directly related to the political atmosphere. Events in the latter half of this century changed the relations between Byzantium and the Principality of Antioch, and, after the defeat of Myriokephalon crippled the empire's power, it became less favorable for Antiochenes to sustain an alliance with the empire⁸⁶. Byzantium, therefore, sought to exercise its authority widely in the twelfth century, with Cilician Armenia playing a role in that.

To return to Cilician Armenia in this context, Emperor Henry, who had already welcomed the opportunity to crown Aimery, sent Conrad of Hildesheim and a papal legate, Archbishop Conrad of Mayence to arrange the coronation of Leo. The papacy made the unification of the churches a condition and requested that important feast days, canonical hours, fasts, and rituals should follow the Latin Christian calendar exactly, and that Armenian prelates should swear to implement these conditions before the coronation⁸⁷. Although Nerses, a pro-Latin,

⁸⁵ A.D. Buck, *The Principality of Antioch and its Frontiers in the Twelfth Century*, The Boydell Press, Woodbridge, 2017, p. 189-190. For the diplomatic consequences of the overlordship see I. Auge, *Byzantins, Arméniens et Francs au temps de la Croisade : Politique Religieuse et Reconquête en Orient sous la Dynastie des Commènes, 1081-1185*, Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, Paris, 2007, pp. 108-113. For a historiographical discussion about the politics and the Principality of Antioch, see A. D. Buck, *Politics and Diplomacy in the Latin East: The Principality of Antioch in Historiographical Perspective*, «History Compass», 15-9 (2017), pp. 1-9.

⁸⁶ A.D. Buck, *The Principality of Antioch*, cit., p. 214; H.E. Mayer, *Varia Antiochena: Studien zum Kreuzfahrerfürstentum Antiochia im 12. und frühen 13. Jahrhundert*, MGH Studien und Texte, Harrassowitz, Hannover, 1993, p. 163; C. Mutafian, *The Brilliant Diplomacy of Cilician Armenia*, cit., p. 97.

⁸⁷ P. Halfter, *Papacy, Catholicosate and Kingdom of Cilician Armenia*, cit., p. 118. Early requests of the papacy focused on a number of matters, such as celebrating the days of the saints on the same calendar, alterations to fasts such as the Nativity and Lent, and locating Church organisation inside church buildings; B. Hamilton, *The Armenian Church and the Papacy* cit., pp. 70-71. It is also said that Leo told the bishops

tried to implement the reforms the papacy requested, the majority of the clergy did not support them⁸⁸. The Armenian clergy at first refused to consider any concessions at all, but Leo II convinced an adequate number of them and on January 6, 1198, he was crowned; his principality was elevated to a kingdom and became a subordinate of the Holy Roman Empire. The coronation was so urgent for Leo that a Synod, which was necessary before the union, was not convened and an Act of Union was signed by just 12 signatories immediately before the coronation⁸⁹. Because of the Kingdom's dependence on western political support, the rulers of Cilician Armenia adhered to the union in theory⁹⁰.

It should be noted here that although the kingdoms of Cyprus and Cilician Armenia followed the same pattern of utilizing religious institutions for wider political interests, unlike the former in which the ruler was already subject to Latin Christianity, the latter never fulfilled what was required for a genuine church union, except for periods of high danger, when an appearance of compliance was vital for the future of the kingdom. Although some rituals were adopted by the Armenian Church, this did not ensure the union of the churches and the Armenian alliance with the West remained a political instrument. Above all else, for papal demands to be accepted, it was crucial to have the consent of the Armenian clergy; not only of those in Cilicia but also of those in Southern Caucasia. However, even if Leo and the Catholics were aware of this necessity, it was not achieved, or indeed attempted, because assembling a full synod would have meant postponing the coronation altogether, which was quite contrary Leo's political interests⁹¹.

As an indication of the state of the relations with the papacy, around the same time in 1201, there began an Antiochene succession crisis which would last almost twenty years. Simultaneously, Gaston, a former Templar Castle which had been taken over by Saladin, became a point of contention between the Kingdom of Cilicia and the

to obey the unification in theory, not in practice. *Rhc Arm.*, vol. 1, p. 423; K.M. Setton, R.L. Wolff, H. Hazard, (eds.), *The Later Crusades: 1189-1311* cit., p. 647.

⁸⁸ *Rhc Arm.*, vol. 1, pp. 568, 586-587; M. Angold, *The Byzantine Empire 1025-1204: A Political History*, Longman, London, 1997, p. 413. Nerses was a Latin sympathizer, which made him unacceptable as a successor to Catholicos Gregory IV when the latter died in 1193. Also see J. Ghazarian, *The Armenian Kingdom in Cilicia*, cit., p. 191.

⁸⁹ *Rhc Arm.*, vol. 1, pp. 422-4; For a detailed narrative about the ceremony held in Tarsus, see I. Rapti, *Featuring the King* cit., pp. 296-300.

⁹⁰ The dangerous state of Cilician Armenia was described by Marino Sanudo, stating that the kingdom was surrounded by four beasts; a lion, namely the Tartars, a panther, namely the Saracens, a wolf, namely the Seljuks, and a serpent, namely pirates. See M. Sanudo, *the Book of the Secrets* cit., p. 65.

⁹¹ B. Hamilton, *The Armenian Church and the Papacy* cit., p. 71.

Principality of Antioch, in which the papacy had to interfere several times. To solve this problem, Innocent III sent letters and legates and as a result returned Gaston, which had been recaptured from Saladin by Leo, to the Templars. However, not wishing to ruin relations with the Armenians, the pope sent a vexillum to Leo⁹². In fact, the Armenian approach was similar to that of the Byzantine Empire, which also regularly played the unification card when this suited its political interests. One of the first effects of the so-called Armenian 'unification act' can be seen in 1199, when Leo II, reminding the pope of the union of the churches, asked for practical help against the Muslims, but in return received an answer from Innocent III stating that Leo should make the Armenian Clergy act according to the unification⁹³. Nevertheless, though pressure from Byzantium had been one of its short-term causes, Cilician Armenia's political dependence on the papacy did not end even after the Byzantine Empire was divided in 1204 and rendered unable meaningfully to threaten Cilicia. At that point, the Seljuks became a more dangerous threat to the kingdom, pushing the Cilicians to seek further military and diplomatic protection from the West and the Crusader kingdoms, such as the Kingdom of Cyprus⁹⁴.

As has already been demonstrated, Cilician relations with the papacy were not always stable. The conflict with Antioch exacerbated tensions until 1210, when the Patriarch of Jerusalem excommunicated Leo because the latter had confiscated the Templar properties in Cilicia. In reply, Leo took several measures against the Latin Church. Pope Innocent, in return, threatened to cut Leo off from all military aid⁹⁵. Although Leo confiscated Templar properties, however, he also granted lands to the Teutonic Order, since the Order was close to the Holy Roman Empire⁹⁶. This was not enough to keep him in papal favor, though, and Leo had to make peace with the Templars, which resulted in Innocent lifting Leo's excommunication in 1213. In the following years, relations between the Armenian Catholicos and the Latin

⁹² Ivi, p. 74; C. Mutařian, *The Brilliant Diplomacy of Cilician Armenia*, cit., p. 103. The pope intervened in the Antiochene problem by sending letters and legates: see O. Hageneder, A. Haidacher, A. A. Strnad, (eds.), *Die Register Innocenz III 1198-1199*, vol. I cit., pp. 462-69, 475-77, n. 242-244, 249.

⁹³ Ivi, pp. 409-10, n. 211.

⁹⁴ B. Hamilton, *The Armenian Church and the Papacy* cit., p. 73.

⁹⁵ J.J. Moore, *Pope Innocent III (1160/61-1216): To Root Up and to Plant*, Brill, Leiden, 2003, p. 205.

⁹⁶ E. Strehlke, *Tabulae Ordinis Theutonicici* cit., pp. 37-39, n. 46. In the same letter, Leo honored the Order by describing its members as the successors of the Maccabees. From papal letters dated to 1211 and 1215, it can be attested that the Teutonic properties and privileges in Cyprus and Armenia were affirmed by the popes Innocent III and his successor Honorius III. See Ivi, pp. 270-274, n. 302, 303.

Church developed in ways that usually generated excuses for the Armenian clergy to refuse to attend ecclesiastical meetings like councils, while Leo sustained his relations with the papacy on the political level, namely in cases of defence, political disputes, and property issues, operating under the official declaration of unity.

The Armenians did not pursue connection with the Latin Church at the level of theological conformity with Rome. From the beginning of the thirteenth century, it can be seen that dogmatic differences between the teachings of the two were not negotiated directly and although some new practices were introduced, others remained the same. It seems clear that the Armenians considered submission to be like homage, that is as an act intended to show respect to the successor of the Apostle Peter, rather than as something requiring conformity in practice⁹⁷. In 1201, Catholicos Gregory VI wrote to the pope stating that the Armenian belief remained the same, as the terms of relations with the Latin Church were not conversion, and the two churches were united under the universal church⁹⁸. The Armenian Church was flexible and responded positively to the implementation and reform of some liturgical rites, such as extreme unction, which was adapted in 1243. However, Catholic positions on major issues such as the *filioque* and Petrine primacy were not taken up by the Armenian clergy and provoked strong negative reactions, especially from the nobility in Southern Caucasia⁹⁹.

Armenian policies throughout the latter half of the thirteenth century are proof that claims of a church union and the correspondence and interactions around it were an outcome of the political interests of the Kingdom of Cilician Armenia¹⁰⁰. After the disastrous Fifth Crusade, Armenians realized that western support might no longer be as fruitful as it had been at the end of the twelfth century. However, hearing that Emperor Frederick II was launching a new crusade, Armenian King Hethum I did move closer to the papacy and the Emperor. During his reign, Hethum granted more lands and privileges to the Teutonic Order, since he found himself once again reliant on Western aid¹⁰¹. Later in 1237, Hethum married Isabelle, queen regent of the Kingdom

⁹⁷ Rhc Arm, vol. 1, pp. 422-423.

⁹⁸ K.M. Setton, R.L. Wolff, H. Hazard, (eds.), *The Later Crusades: 1189-1311* cit., pp. 647-8; B. Hamilton, *The Armenian Church and the Papacy* cit., p. 74.

⁹⁹ P. Cowe, *The Armenians in the Era of the Crusades* cit., p. 418.

¹⁰⁰ Rhc Arm, vol. 1, p. 648.

¹⁰¹ B. Hamilton, *The Armenian Church and the Papacy* cit., p. 78. For the grants to the Teutonic Order see E. Strehlke, *Tabulae Ordinis Theutonici* cit., pp., 65-66, n. 83. For the correspondence regarding Armenian approaches to the pope, which Sempad the Constable regarded as diplomatic, see Rhc Arm, vol. 1, p. 648.

of Cilician Armenia, in the face of which Bohemond V of Antioch claimed that the marriage was not valid and moreover that the situation required needed intervention by means of inquisition, since the Armenian Church should be subject to the Latin Church of Antioch. Pope Gregory V adopted this idea, and it caused a deterioration in relations between the Armenians and the papacy since Hethum strongly rejected the suggestion. Fearing the rising power of Frederick II in the West, Gregory decided not to risk his position in the East, recognized the marriage in 1239 and granted further authority to the Armenian Church. By sending a new pallium he sought to reiterate the union. Furthermore, Cilicia had recently been invaded by the Seljuks, who in 1233 imposed a tribute on the kingdom, which the pope feared might happen again¹⁰².

After the failure of King Louis IX of France's crusade, the Armenians turned their attention to the Mongols who had invaded Anatolia, and attempted to establish close relations with them and an alliance against the Muslims, most especially the Seljuks. After the Battle of Köse Dağ in 1243, in which the Seljuk Sultan Kaykhusraw's wife and daughter were lost to the Mongols, King Hethum openly sided with the newcomers¹⁰³. In 1247 he sent envoys to the Mongols, and afterward, in 1253, he visited Karakorum in person, ensuring that the Armenian Church would be free of taxes, and becoming the first leader to offer voluntary submission to the Mongols, which he thought would be politically profitable¹⁰⁴. Even in 1260, he supported a Mongol army invading Syria. When the Mongols captured Damascus, their general was accompanied by Hethum¹⁰⁵.

The Mongol invasion was not supported by the Franks of the East, who allowed free passage to the Mamluk armies, who would eventually beat the Mongols and drive them back. After this, knowing that the Franks would not help them, the Armenians attempted to maintain good relations with the Mongols. This choice by the Armenians of

¹⁰² K.M. Setton, R.L. Wolff, H. Hazard, (eds.), *The Later Crusades: 1189-1311* cit., p. 652; B. Hamilton, *The Armenian Church and the Papacy* cit., p. 79.

¹⁰³ A. Stewart, *The Assassination of King Het'um II: The Conversion of the Ilkhans and the Armenians*, «Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society», 15-1 (2005), p. 45.

¹⁰⁴ R. Amitai, *Dangerous Liaisons: Armenian-Mongol-Mamluk Relations, 1260-1292*, in C. Mutafian, (ed.), *La Méditerranée des Arméniens, XIIe-XVe siècle*, Geuthner, Paris, 2014, pp. 192-193; C. Mutafian, *The Brilliant Diplomacy of Cilician Armenia*, cit., pp. 104-108; I. Rapti, *Featuring the King* cit., p. 418.

¹⁰⁵ Some parts of the events of 1260 are only conveyed in RHC Arm, vol. 2, p. 751; For a discussion see R. Amitai, *Dangerous Liaisons*, cit., pp. 193-194. Also see, A. Stewart, *The Assassination of King Het'um II*, cit., p. 47; Idem., *Reframing the Mongols in 1260: The Armenians, the Mongols and the Magi*, «Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society», 28-1 (2018), pp. 55-76.

Cilicia had long-term consequences¹⁰⁶. Since the papacy had cautiously approached the Mongols, and the Mongols were allied with the Kingdom of Cilician Armenia, the Church union came to an end. Diplomatic relations between the papacy and Cilician Armenia continued and the papacy did not completely give up on the Armenians, since the future of the Latin states was also concerned. Despite the chances which the Armenians had to re-establish the union afterward, and the efforts made by some rulers and nobles¹⁰⁷, renewal was not eventually attempted. This was a decision made under political pressure in an atmosphere in which the clergy was nevertheless divided by the unification effort. Some of the Armenian church hierarchy had connections with the Latin Church and supported the union, while others vehemently opposed it. It was not until the decline of Ilkhanid power that the Armenians realized that the only ally upon which they could now rely would be the western powers and the Kingdom of Cyprus¹⁰⁸. In 1307, the Synod of Sis was held and the Armenian Church accepted all reforms of the Latin Church. However, this union would make no real difference to church practice, as this was again an attempt at serving their own political interests and there was no real acceptance of the changes among the Armenian clergy¹⁰⁹.

From the evidence presented it may be argued that, quite separately from the Armenian rulers, the Armenian community living in Cilicia and Cyprus was very capable of adjusting to the changing political environment. For instance, from the time of the Byzantine usurper Isaac Komnenos, through the rule of the Lusignans until Venetian rule began on the island, Armenians served in the armies of Isaac, the Lusignans, and the Venetians. According to George Boustronios' chronicle, in 1474 an Armenian party went to Famagusta to greet the

¹⁰⁶ R. Amitai, *Dangerous Liaisons*, cit., p. 196. For Mongol-Mamluk conflict in the thirteenth century see, Idem., *Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 1260–1281*, *Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995.

¹⁰⁷ Hethum (Hayton) of Korycos (Gorigos), brother of King Hethum I, proposed to organize a crusade to capture the Holy Land from the Mamluks with the help of the Armenians and the Mongols. For the relevant part of his work see RHC Arm, vol. 2, pp. 340–363. For an analysis of Hethum's work see, M. Bais, *Armenia and Armenians in Hethum's Flos Historiarum Terre Orientis*, «Medieval Encounters», 21, 2–3 (2015), pp. 214–231. Also see, G. Dédéyan, *Les Colophons de manuscrits Arméniens comme sources pour l'histoire des Croisades*, in J. France, W.G. Zajac, (eds.), *The Crusades and Their Sources: Essays Presented to Bernard Hamilton*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 1998, pp. 89–110.

¹⁰⁸ The Ilkhanids by then had such amicable relations with the Papacy that they sent envoys to the Council of Lyons. See P. Jackson, *The Mongols and the West, 1221–1410*, Pearson Education Ltd, Harlow, 2005, p. 166.

¹⁰⁹ B. Hamilton, *The Armenian Church and the Papacy* cit., pp. 80–85; I. Rapti, *Featuring the King*, 420.

Venetian fleet and congratulate its admiral¹¹⁰. On the part of the ecclesiastical institutions, the Armenian Church had always shown respect to the Roman Church and recognized the pope as the successor of St Peter. However, they also believed that different churches combined to make up the universal church, while the Latins believed the only church was the Roman Church and that a union, therefore, meant a complete acceptance of the ways of the Roman Church¹¹¹.

Comparing the Kingdom of Cyprus and the Kingdom of Cilician Armenia and their relations with the papacy during this period, although in practice the way the two kingdoms carried out the conditions of the unification was different, the underlying meaning and purpose of the act were the same. Analogies may also be drawn between two other aspects of the diplomatic relations of Armenians and the Kingdom of Cyprus. One is the relations of each of the kingdoms with the Teutonic Order. The Armenian approach to the Teutonic Order in the first half of the 13th century was almost the same as that of the Kingdom of Cyprus. It would not be misleading to state that despite the difficult relationship between the papacy and the Kingdom of Cilician Armenia, relations with the military orders, apart from the Templars, were particularly close, and for the Armenian kings, these relations also mattered for purposes of defence. Just like Aimery, Leo granted the military orders properties, castles, and alms in Cilicia, and concessions such as allowing Latin merchants to trade in the kingdom, which contributed to its economy. Wilbrand of Oldenburg, who visited the Latin East, including Cyprus and Cilicia in 1211, stated that King Leo was accompanied by the mounted Teutonic Knights during ceremonies at Sis¹¹². Leo also sought to gain the friendship of the Hospitallers with generous grants. During his reign, he granted them Seleucia, Norperts, and Camardias in the western part of his kingdom, hoping to protect his borders against the Seljuks¹¹³.

In addition to allying with the military orders, intermarriages between the rulers and the nobility of Cyprus and Cilician Armenia were deemed necessary to strengthen relations between the Crusader states. These intermarriages were sometimes heterodox, but the papacy had to acknowledge them for the sake of the future of the

¹¹⁰ N. Coureas, *The Armenians in Cyprus* cit., p. 82; G. Boustronios, *A Narrative of the Chronicle of Cyprus 1456-1489*, in N. Coureas, H. Pohlsander, [trans.], *Texts and Studies in the History of Cyprus*, Cyprus Research Centre, Nicosia, 2005, p. 219.

¹¹¹ B. Hamilton, *The Armenian Church and the Papacy* cit., p. 337.

¹¹² Wilbrand of Oldenburg, *Peregrinatio* cit., pp. 177-179.

¹¹³ K.M. Setton, R.L. Wolff, H. Hazard, (eds.), *The Later Crusades: 1189-1311* cit., p. 650. For a discussion of the numbers of the Teutonic Knights in the Eastern Mediterranean, see H. Houben, *The Teutonic Knights in Palestine, Armenia, and Cyprus* cit., p. 151.

Crusader kingdoms. Intermarriage began in the early years of the Cypriot and Armenian kingdoms as King Leo II married Sibylla, Aimery's daughter, in 1210, when he visited Cyprus, although at the time Leo was sixty and Sibylla was twelve¹¹⁴. Leo's marriage was considered scandalous but an even more dubious marriage was made between the sister of King Hugh of Cyprus and Leo's cousin, who eloped together in 1211¹¹⁵. The lack of suitable consorts was an important reason for the papacy ignoring canon law and granting marriage dispensations¹¹⁶. Beyond the royal houses, noble families, too, forged alliances via marriage, which continued throughout the latter half of the thirteenth century¹¹⁷ due to political interests directly or indirectly related to the Holy Land and the future of the Latin East. Dispensations were therefore seen as a key form of political support from the pope by the rulers and the nobility¹¹⁸. Being aware of the advantages of a joint political approach by the Crusader kingdoms, the papacy was in turn more tolerant in its approach to intermarriages.

Conclusions

To suggest that ecclesiastical institutions in the High Middle Ages were closely related to political decisions and could wield political power to protect religious interests, such as recovering the Holy Land, should not be controversial, though this is not to say that they made purely political decisions, or that political and spiritual decisions

¹¹⁴ N. Coureas, *Lusignan Cyprus and Lesser Armenia* cit., p. 34. RHC Arm, vol. 1, pp. 424-425; Aimery was succeeded by his son Hugh I in 1205, so when the marriage was held in 1210, Aimery had already died.

¹¹⁵ N. Coureas, *Lusignan Cyprus and Lesser Armenia* cit., p. 34.

¹¹⁶ L. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, vol. 3 cit., pp. 641-642. In a letter of Pope Gregory IX, he orders Archbishop Eutorge to revoke the ruling against Queen Alice of Cyprus and Bohemond of Tripoli, who were married against God. See Bullarium, vol. 1, pp. 287-8, n. d-1.

¹¹⁷ Guy of Ibelin's son Balian married the sister of King Leo III's wife and his sister married Roupen of Montfort who was an Armenian nobleman. Balian's daughter Margaret likewise married an Armenian nobleman named lord Oshin of Corycos, and, their daughter was to marry the future King Leo V of Armenia. Another Philip, from the Ibelin family and the uncle of the Cypriot King Henry II, was married to a daughter from an Armenian noble family. See N. Coureas, *Lusignan Cyprus and Lesser Armenia* cit., p. 37; Idem, *The Latin Church in Cyprus* cit. p. 46; for the Ibelins and the kings of Cyprus, see P. Edbury, *Franks* cit., pp. 87-92.

¹¹⁸ In 1295, King Henry II of Cyprus and his brother, King Smbat of Armenia and the Archdeacon of Nicosia, Henry of Gibelet requested nine dispensations, see N. Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus* cit., pp. 44-45; The Ibelin Lombard conflict took place between 1228-1232. It affected relations adversely and created a lack of suitable consorts. For connections during the Ibelin-Lombard conflict, see N. Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus* cit., pp. 31-43.

could not be made by other agents. This article has argued that the general political situation in the East left rulers no alternative but to form alliances, becoming closer to other local actors and taking sides. The best possible allies for the two polities under study were the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire. The element of opportunism in this choice is evident in the case of Leo, who also dealt with the Byzantines and, as soon as he identified a better option in the form of the growing power of the Mongols, became less concerned with the unification of the churches. As for Aimery, we cannot cite a change of sides, but when Aimery's internal and external gains are examined in detail, it is possible to assert that the establishment of the Latin Church and a process of drawing closer to the pope and the Holy Roman Emperor ensured Aimery's position. Additionally, those who lost lands to the Muslims in Syria and Palestine were granted lands and privileges in Cyprus, where it was safer. However, this protection was a demotivating factor in recovering the Holy Land. Those whose assistance was expected in recovering the Holy Land were now hesitant to resettle there, where protecting their interests would require significant levels of effort and resources. As a matter of fact, the Kingdom of Cyprus in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was relatively the safest region in the wider area. It is therefore fitting to state that Cyprus was not established as a Latin religious colony, but that its religious affiliation usually served to underpin the kingdom's security.

The wider hypothesis, of ecclesiastical actions with political motives, gains strength from the fact that while the rulers of Cyprus and Cilician Armenia benefited from political manoeuvres that involved spiritual action, the papacy, as the highest authority of the Latin Church, reluctantly tolerated acts against Catholic teaching (such as marriages prohibited by consanguinity), as well as political actions against the interests of the papacy, so as to preserve close relations between the Crusader kingdoms. It is thus possible to suggest that the activities of the papacy, although spiritual in nature, had worldly political elements. In a broader context, it is also possible to assert that the kingdoms of Cyprus and Cilician Armenia survived longer than other ephemeral Crusader polities, which may be considered a diplomatic achievement, while the success of the papacy was limited: promotion of these kingdoms could make little difference in recovering the Holy Land, and although the Latin Church of Cyprus survived until the end of Latin rule, unification of the Latin and Armenian Churches never reached the level that the papacy wished for and, indeed, eventually collapsed.

While the personal religiosity of Aimery and Leo II have not been the subject of this article, and should not be underestimated, we have

seen nonetheless that both rulers, as indeed also their successors, frequently put political before religious outcomes in their actions, even when those actions were religious in scope. The reaction of the Church and in particular the papacy – or often, the lack of reaction – shows us that this was expected and understood at the time. The goals of the Church could not be achieved without the survival in power of cooperative rulers, a reality which both rulers and popes accepted, and within which the rulers were well able to pursue their political goals with the Church's assistance.